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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis examines the executions policy undertaken by the pro-treatyite 
Provisional/Free State Government during the Irish Civil War (1922–23). Following the Irish 
War of Independence (1919–21) and subsequent Anglo-Irish Treaty Ireland‘s previously united 
nationalist movement fractured into opposing factions. The ensuing Civil War, fought between 
the Government and the anti-treatyite militants, known as the Irregulars, played an integral role 
in the development of the modern Irish State. Remarkably, this conflict has been marginalised in 
Irish revolutionary historiography. Similarly, the significance of the Government‘s official 
executions policy during the conflict has been further neglected and consigned to a footnote in 
existing works on the Civil War. Yet the execution of eighty-one fellow Irishmen and former 
comrades by the first independent Irish Government became one of the defining characteristics 
of the War. The proposition which underpins this study is that this executions policy had a 
significant impact on the dynamic of the Civil War, making it a far more ruthless and divisive 
affair. Moreover, it left an enduring legacy of bitterness in post-war Ireland, one which is still to 
be completely surmounted. In essence, this thesis presents an in-depth analysis of the effect of 
the executions policy on the character, course and outcome of the Irish Civil War. 
In evaluating the policy several questions need to be considered. For instance, what 
compelled the pro-treatyites to employ official executions during the Civil War? How did the 
Government implement the policy during the conflict? Conversely, how did the Irregulars 
respond to the executions? Finally did the policy, which was devised to hasten the end of the 
Civil War, achieve its primary objective? 
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An understanding of the tactics employed by Irregulars, in their attempt to thwart the 
Government and National Army, is crucial when ascertaining why the executions policy was 
adopted. The Irish Civil War, caused primarily by differences over the Anglo-Irish Treaty, began 
on 28 June 1922. The pro-treatyite political and military leadership included Arthur Griffith, 
Michael Collins, Richard Mulcahy, Kevin O‘Higgins and W. T. Cosgrave. Conversely, the anti-
treatyite political and military hierarchy consisted of Eamon de Valera, Cathal Brugha, Liam 
Lynch, Liam Deasy, and Rory O‘Connor. Following the collapse of the Irregulars‘ conventional 
resistance in both Dublin and Munster, by late July/early August, guerrilla warfare became their 
modus operandi. They subsequently dissolved into the countryside and broke up into smaller, 
more mobile, groups known as active service units or A.S.U.s and engaged in ambushes, sniping 
and armed raids. Moreover, the Irregulars focused on the country‘s infrastructure in an attempt to 
devastate commerce and cripple the Government financially. The Commander-in-Chief of the 
National Army, Michael Collins, had refused to adopt emergency measures to restore order. As 
will be demonstrated, his death, in a guerrilla ambush on 22 August, ushered in the Public Safety 
Resolution. This decree, which facilitated the Government‘s executions policy, will be examined 
in detail. Sanctioned on 28 September 1922, it was hoped that the resolution would halt the 
Irregulars‘ guerrilla campaign and end the Civil War. 
Following the ratification of the emergency resolution the Government, as will be 
established, altered the implementation of this decree as circumstances dictated. Initially it 
restricted the application of the executions policy to Dublin, executing a total of twelve men in 
ten weeks. The inaugural executions, which involved putting to death four low-ranked Irregulars 
on 17 November 1922, were surrounded by controversy. Critics maintained that this event was a 
test case to facilitate the execution of a more prominent anti-treatyite, Erskine Childers, one 
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week later. It was also claimed that both the Provisional Government and the British 
Government had a vendetta against Childers which ensured his capture, conviction and death 
regardless of crimes committed. These conspiratorial allegations, in addition to the initial 
executions themselves, will be studied and assessed.  
The Irregulars, in response to the executions policy, assassinated Seán Hales T.D. and 
seriously injured Deputy Pádraic Ó Maille on 7 December 1922. This event shocked the pro-
treatyites. As will be demonstrated, the Government subsequently decided to alter radically the 
implementation of the executions policy. This affair, like the death of Collins before it, proved a 
turning point for the pro-treatyites. Firstly, four untried Irregular prisoners were put to death, on 
8 December, in Mountjoy Jail in an event which was clearly outside the remit of the September 
resolution. In the long-term, however, the Government decentralised and accelerated its 
application of the emergency measures. Following the executions in early December the 
Government executed another seven men at once in Kildare on 19 December. These were the 
first to occur outside of the capital and it was the largest individual set of executions during the 
Civil War. Moreover, another sixty-nine men were executed by the end of the conflict. Sixty-
three of these occurred outside Dublin; four were civilians executed for armed robbery. Thirty-
four men were put to death in January alone. The Government also adopted an official hostage 
policy whereby several convicted prisoners, sentenced to death, received a stay of execution 
pending the improvement of order in their respective localities. This scheme proved successful 
and contributed to the pro-treatyites victory in May 1923. 
The official executions formed a central part of the Government‘s prosecution of the 
Civil War. Evidence suggests that this policy achieved its primary objective and expedited the 
end of the conflict. Moreover, it altered irrevocably the landscape of the Civil War turning what 
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was an already fractious affair into an extremely acrimonious conflict and it imbued an enduring 
legacy of hostility in post-war Ireland. 
No single academic work exists which focuses solely on the executions policy during the 
Civil War. This conflict has received limited scholarly attention compared to the wealth of 
academic work undertaken on both the 1916 Rising and the Irish War of Independence. The lack 
of dedicated research on the Civil War has ensured that the official executions within the conflict 
have been neglected. Any consideration afforded the policy to date has been restricted to broad 
generalisations based on incomplete evidentiary analysis. There is a tendency to view the 
executions in an incidental or cursory manner. Historians have chosen to focus almost 
exclusively on the causes, course and outcome of the conflict itself rather than provide an 
analytical examination of the most controversial policy employed by the pro-treatyites during the 
Irish Civil War.  
Nonetheless, secondary sources on the conflict, whilst not abundant, can be divided into 
several categories. There are a number of survey histories which offer a general analysis of Irish 
history over long periods of time. Consequently, they do not provide an in-depth examination of 
the Irish Civil War, nor do they discuss the executions that occurred during the conflict in detail. 
On the whole survey histories tend to represent the Civil War and the executions as either a 
necessary or unnecessary by-product of Ireland‘s state building process. Furthermore, they tend 
to only mention one or two actual executions. In Ireland since the Famine (1971) F. S. L. Lyons 
briefly states that the executions, particularly that of Childers, induced hatred and resulted in a 
vicious cycle of revenge. Lyons states that Hales‘ assassination was directly attributable to the 
death of Childers. The killing of the pro-treatyite T.D. resulted in the reprisal execution of four 
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Irregular prisoners in Mountjoy Jail in December 1922.
1
 R. F. Foster‘s Modern Ireland, 1600-
1972 (1988) implies that the executions, particularly the Mountjoy executions, were not 
repudiated by the public as this policy was undertaken not by Britain but by a native Irish 
Government. While this is true, the public accepted the executions policy for several reasons. For 
example, the Irregulars‘ guerrilla tactics ensured that public reaction was more muted than may 
otherwise have been the case. Even though the public acquiesced to the executions policy, he 
states that it left a deep scar on Irish society after the conflict.
2
 Similarly, Dermot Keogh argues, 
in his book Twentieth-century Ireland, nation and state (1994), that the Government‘s execution 
of fellow countrymen and former comrades meant that there were no victors in the Civil War.
3
  
There are a number of local histories which refer to the conduct of the Civil War in 
particular areas of Ireland. Such histories can be both useful and restrictive in equal measure. As 
they focus on specific localities they do not offer a detailed analysis of the conflict and, by 
extension, the executions that occurred nationally. However, they provide information pertaining 
to some of the men executed in their respective localities. Nollaig Ó Gadhra‘s Civil War in 
Connacht 1922-1923 (1999), for instance, details several of the executions that occurred in the 
province of Connaught during the conflict. He refers to the six men executed in Tuam, County 
Galway, on 11 April 1923 yet omits the execution of both Michael Murphy and Joseph 
O‘Rourke in the same barracks on 30 May 1923.4 Similarly, Tom Doyle, in his book The Civil 
War in Kerry (2008), refers to the seven executions that occurred in Kerry during the Civil War.
5
 
However, a number of of his arguments particularly those pertaining to the Government‘s 
                                                          
1
 F. S. L. Lyons, Ireland since the Famine (Suffolk, 1973), pp 466-467.  
2
 R. F. Foster, Modern Ireland, 1600-1972 (London, 1989), p. 513. 
3
 Dermot Keogh, Twentieth century Ireland, nation and state (Dublin, 1994), p. 17. 
4
 Nollaig Ó Gadhra, Civil War in Connacht 1922-1923 (Dublin, 1999), pp 82-85. 
5
 Tom Doyle, The Civil War in Kerry (Cork, 2008), pp 249-250 and pp 297-301. 
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official hostage scheme, launched in December 1922 to reduce guerrilla activity in Kerry, are 
unsubstantiated. 
Several biographies of prominent figures in the Civil War feature material relevant to the 
present study. These include Risteárd Mulcahy‘s Richard Mulcahy (1886-1971), a family 
memoir (1999) and My father, the General. Richard Mulcahy and the military history of the 
revolution (2009) and M. G. Valiulis‘ Portrait of a revolutionary, General Richard Mulcahy and 
the founding of the Irish Free State (1992). As Richard Mulcahy was the Commander-in-Chief 
of the National Army, Minister for Defence and head of the Military Council during the Civil 
War he was directly involved with implementation of the Government‘s executions policy. Even 
though Valiulis and Risteárd Mulcahy do not deal with individual executions in detail both 
authors do refer to the post-war process of army demobilisation, a course of action which 
produced several significant consequences.
6
 It resulted not only in the Army Mutiny in March 
1924 but, more importantly, it also led to the reinternment, in October 1924, of the men executed 
during the Irish Civil War.  
Both Terence de Vere White‘s Kevin O‟Higgins (1948) and John P. McCarthy‘s Kevin 
O'Higgins: Builder of the Irish State (2006) are worthy of mention. O‘Higgins, more than any 
other person, was held culpable for the executions policy by the anti-treatyites. As Minister for 
Home Affairs and Vice-President of the Executive Council he was an ardent advocate of the 
executions policy both prior to and after the conflict. His assassination in 1927 was directly 
attributable to his actions during the Civil War. Although McCarthy and de Vere White refer to 
                                                          
6
 Risteárd Mulcahy, Richard Mulcahy (1886-1971), a family memoir (Dublin, 1999), pp 192-193, see also Risteárd 
Mulcahy, My father, the General. Richard Mulcahy and the military history of the revolution (Dublin, 2009), pp 
179-182, see also M. G. Valiulis, Portrait of a revolutionary, General Richard Mulcahy and the founding of the 
Irish Free State (Dublin, 1992), p. 202. 
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the executions their brief analyses are restricted to O‘Higgins‘ possible involvement in one or 
two cases.
7
 
Finally, Meda Ryan‘s Liam Lynch - the real chief (1986) is pertinent to this study. Unlike 
some prominent actors in the Civil War, Lynch did not leave behind a large set of papers, other 
than the various pieces of correspondence and orders located in several archival repositories 
throughout the country. Hence, Ryan‘s biography, which draws on many of these private 
collections helps facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the Irregulars‘ Chief of Staff 
and, by extension, the anti-treatyite militant‘s response to the executions policy.  For instance, 
she mentions Lynch‘s dismay at the executions and their purported abhorrent treatment of 
Irregular prisoners, especially the Government‘s official hostage scheme.8 Furthermore, her 
highlighting Lynch‘s decision to order the assassination of members of the Government is 
helpful as this directive had a major impact on the landscape of the Irish Civil War.  
In addition to these secondary studies there are several works that deal specifically with 
the Irish Civil War. Eoin Neeson‘s The Civil War in Ireland (1966) and Calton Younger‘s 
Ireland‟s Civil War (1968) are examples of two useful but non-academic works on the conflict. 
Although the availability of primary material was a problematic issue during the 1960s, 
Younger‘s work is a good attempt at a non-partisan account of the Civil War. Neeson offers a 
somewhat subjective narration on the cause and course of the Civil War. Even though both 
Younger and Neeson do refer to the executions, their examinations on this matter are not 
extensive. Both briefly mention some individual cases but their analyses of the course and 
                                                          
7
 Terence de Vere White, Kevin O‟Higgins (London, 1948), pp 123-127, see also John P. McCarthy, Kevin 
O‟Higgins: Builder of the Irish State (Dublin, 2006), pp 92-94. 
8
 Meda Ryan, Liam Lynch – the real chief (Cork, 1986), p. 143.  
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outcome of the Civil War are limited.
9
 That said, both Younger‘s and Neeson‘s works did hold 
the field until Michael Hopkinson‘s seminal work Green against green, the Irish Civil War 
appeared in 1988. 
Hopkinson‘s book was the first detached analysis of the Irish Civil War. He manages to 
disassemble the intricate chain of events which caused the conflict and provides an analysis of 
what was a multifarious and disorderly event. The nucleus of Hopkinson‘s book lies in his 
chronological examination of the military conduct of the conflict. However, he does state that his 
account of the Civil War is far from definitive. While referring to the executions on a number of 
occasions he, like authors before and since, focuses briefly on the supposed link between the 
death of Childers and the first set of executions in Kilmainham Jail on 17 November 1922. He 
also addresses the legality of the Mountjoy executions.
10
 Nevertheless, this analysis of the 
executions policy, whilst useful, is not extensive. 
John M. Regan‘s book The Irish counter-revolution 1921-1936, treatyite politics and 
settlement in independent Ireland (1999) takes a somewhat alternative view of the Irish Civil 
War and the revolutionary period in Irish history. He argues that the conflict was indicative of 
the counter-revolutionary character of the pro-treatyite Government following the death of 
Michael Collins. According to Regan, O‘Higgins was the most doctrinaire counter-revolutionary 
as he relentlessly sought neo-imperialistic and conservative policies. A prime example of this 
was O‘Higgins‘ resolute support for executions. His examination of the executions policy, 
however, is not exhaustive. Regan instead chooses to reference the executions in an incidental 
                                                          
9
 Eoin Neeson, The Civil War in Ireland (Cork, 1966), pp 318-323, see also Calton Younger, Ireland‟s Civil War 
(London, 1968), pp 488-493. 
10
 Michael Hopkinson, Green against green, the Irish Civil War (Dublin, 1988), pp 189-192. 
 9 
 
fashion arguing that both Childers‘ and the Mountjoy executions were prime indicators of the 
Provisional/Free State Government‘s counter-revolutionary esprit de corps.11 
Alternatively, Tom Garvin‘s book 1922: The birth of Irish democracy (1996) champions 
the establishment of the Free State Government and their victory in the Civil War as a triumph 
for democracy and pro-treatyite pragmatism over the anti-treatyite authoritarianism. Garvin 
chronicles what he believes to be the undemocratic and unlawful conduct of the Irregulars during 
the conflict but there is little mention of the methods, in particular the executions policy, used by 
the pro-treatyites to win the Civil War. However, he contends that the decisions made by key 
players in the Government such as Cosgrave, Mulcahy and O‘Higgins, particularly the execution 
of four untried men in Mountjoy Jail, were central in establishing the rule of law and the primacy 
of democracy throughout the country.
12
 Similarly, Bill Kissane‘s book The politics of the Irish 
Civil War (2005) places the Civil War and the executions within a theoretical analysis of 
Ireland‘s decolonisation and democratisation process.13 Kissane‘s examination of the executions 
is quite sparse. This is understandable as Kissane‘s work focuses on the historiography of the 
Civil War and how competing analyses, initially developed by both pro- and anti- treaty 
advocates after the Civil War, continue to influence current attitudes towards the conflict. 
Eunan O‘Halpin analyses the development of Irish internal and external security policies 
since independence in his book Defending Ireland, the Irish State and its enemies since 1922 
(1999). Ireland‘s security strategy, according to O‘Halpin, can be attributed to the Irish Civil 
War. He argues that during the War the Government set a dangerous precedent by willingly 
enacting state terror, in the form of official executions under stern emergency legislation, to 
                                                          
11
 John M. Regan, The Irish counter-revolution 1921-1936, treatyite politics and settlement in independent Ireland 
(Dublin, 1999), pp 109-120. 
12
 Tom Garvin, 1922: The birth of Irish democracy (Dublin, 1996), p. 162. 
13
 Bill Kissane, The politics of the Irish Civil War (Oxford, 2005), p. 10.  
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preserve the nation.
14
 O‘Halpin refers to executions in the localities in his brief analysis of the 
Civil War. He suggests that these executions, on the whole, had a significant impact on Irregular 
morale and, by extension, restricted guerrilla activity in many areas. Furthermore, he argues that 
with the exception of Childers, Charlie Daly shot in March 1923 in County Donegal and those 
executed in Mountjoy Jail, most of those executed were low-ranking Irregular foot soldiers.
15
 
This is true. However, as O‘Halpin‘s work does not deal exclusively with the Civil War his 
overall examination of the Government‘s executions policy during the conflict is relatively 
limited.  
Anne Dolan‘s Commemorating the Irish Civil War: history and memory, 1923-2000 
(2003) charts the official neglect of the pro-treatyite dead since the end of the Civil War in May 
1923. Dolan‘s work contributes significantly to the historiography of Civil War politics as she 
argues that the history of this conflict has not only been assumed, distorted and most of all, 
ignored.
16
 Whilst those like Garvin tend to praise the process of democratisation Dolan is instead 
critical of the pro-treatyites for failing to commemorate the men who gave their lives for the 
success of this venture. She argues that the Irregulars honoured their dead much more 
enthusiastically since the expression of republican remembrance was well-established before the 
Civil War. However, as Dolan focuses primarily on pro-treatyite war dead this book does not 
refer to the executions during the Irish Civil War in great detail. She does mention briefly the 
reinterments of the executed men in October 1924. Yet Dolan inaccurately states that one man, 
Joseph Hughes, was one of the men put to death during the conflict.
17
 Hughes actually died on 1 
November 1924. He was an innocent bystander during one of the reinterments. He received a 
                                                          
14
 Eunan O‘Halpin, Defending Ireland, the Irish State and its enemies since 1922 (Oxford, 1999), p. 38.  
15
 Ibid, p. 30. 
16
 Anne Dolan, Commemorating the Irish Civil War: history and memory, 1923-2000 (Cambridge, 2003), p. 2. 
17
 Ibid, p. 134.  
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fatal wound following an explosion from a grenade and died following an armed clash between 
Free State and anti-treatyite supporters in St. Patrick‘s Cemetery, Dowdallshill, Dundalk, County 
Louth on 30
 
October. Nonetheless, this minor inaccuracy does not detract from the overall 
quality of Dolan‘s work. 
As this thesis devotes a chapter to the 1922 Public Safety Resolution, literature which 
examines emergency measures in Ireland were consulted. Colm Campbell‘s Emergency law in 
Ireland, 1918-1925 (1994) and Seosamh Ó Longaigh‘s Emergency law in independent Ireland 
1922-1948 (2006) are of particular interest. Campbell provides a complex analysis of emergency 
law procedures enacted in Ireland during 1918-25, focusing on legislation within three 
jurisdictions: Ireland during British rule; the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland. He is one of 
few authors to acknowledge that eighty-one and not seventy-seven official executions actually 
occurred during the Civil War. However, the information he provides for some of these men is 
inaccurate as he gives the wrong date and location for several of the executions.
18
 Ó Longaigh‘s 
work also undertakes an intricate analysis of legislation and its implications during the period 
1922-48. When dealing with the Civil War Ó Longaigh focuses on the provisions contained 
within the 1922 Public Safety Resolution. He examines the legal machinations surrounding the 
death of Childers and the Mountjoy executions. When examining other implications of Hales‘ 
assassination he, like Campbell, is one of only a few authors to acknowledge the existence of the 
mobile committee system which ultimately streamlined the Government‘s executions policy.19 
However, Ó Longaigh‘s book, like Campbell‘s, does not deal exclusively with the Irish Civil 
War nor does it focus on the executions policy during the conflict. Therefore, any analysis of the 
executions is limited in scope and of an incidental nature. 
                                                          
18
 Colm Campbell, Emergency law in Ireland 1918-1925 (New York, 1994), pp 361-371. 
19
 Seosamh Ó Longaigh, Emergency law in independent Ireland 1922-1948 (Dublin, 2006), pp 28-29. 
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There is a privately published non-academic book entitled Seventy-seven of mine said 
Ireland (2006) by Martin O‘Dwyer which attempts to examine the executions that occurred 
during the Civil War. However, this piece of work offers little analysis of the executions policy. 
Instead it refers mainly to the last letters of the Irregulars executed during the conflict. For 
instance, he details the final correspondence of the four men put to death in Kilmainham Jail, 
Dublin in November 1922.
20
 It appears that no archival material was consulted in the preparation 
of O‘Dwyer‘s work as no reference is made to any relevant repository. Furthermore, there is no 
contents page, index or bibliography attached to this book. 
Primary material for this thesis has been sourced from several different locations. Firstly, 
accounts written by contemporaries have been utilised. Works such as Walter Alison Phillips‘ 
The revolution in Ireland 1906-1923 (1923) and both of Dorothy Macardle‘s books Tragedies of 
Kerry 1922-1923 (1924) and The Irish Republic, a documented chronicle of the Anglo-Irish 
conflict and the partitioning of Ireland, with a detailed account of the period 1916-1923 (1937) 
were consulted. These publications, although subjective, are useful precisely for that reason. 
They provide a valuable insight into contemporary arguments concerning the Civil War. 
Furthermore, when compared to more modern literature, these works help the reader assess 
changes in opinions and arguments over time. 
Several Civil War participants have produced accounts which detail not only their 
individual experiences but also outline contemporary arguments concerning the conflict. These 
include Florence O‘Donoghue‘s No other law, the story of Liam Lynch and the Irish Republican 
Army, 1916-1923 (1954); Ernie O‘Malley‘s The singing flame (1978); C. S. Andrews‘ Dublin 
made me (1979) and Liam Deasy‘s Brother against brother (1982). Even though these accounts 
                                                          
20
 Martin O‘Dwyer, Seventy-seven of mine said Ireland (Cork, 2006), pp 18-26. 
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are subjective they provide an understanding of the opinions and subsequent justifications of the 
decisions taken by some figures most associated with the Civil War. Deasy‘s work is very useful. 
As the Irregulars‘ assistant Chief of Staff he was best placed to assess the impact that the 
executions policy was having on Irregular morale and how this affected their prosecution of the 
Civil War. Following his arrest in January 1923 he sought the cessation of hostilities, believing 
that the executions had placed the country in a very serious predicament and that it was futile to 
continue a war against such a policy. 
Extensive archival research was also undertaken. The archives department located in 
University College, Dublin holds several substantial private collections pertaining to some of the 
most important and influential characters during the Irish Civil War. Particularly relevant are 
private collections pertaining to Richard Mulcahy, Eamon de Valera, Frank Aiken, Ernie 
O‘Malley, Desmond FitzGerald, Kevin O‘Higgins, Moss Twomey, Seán MacEntee, Seán 
MacEoin, C. S. Andrews and Hugh Kennedy.  
Several private collections housed in the manuscript departments of both Trinity College, 
Dublin and the National Library of Ireland, Dublin were also used. With regard to the former 
repository the private papers of Childers, Robert Barton and Mary MacSwiney, amongst others, 
were utilised. This material was of immense use not only in the examination of Childers‘ 
execution but also the reinterment of the men executed during the Civil War. With regard to the 
latter archive the private papers of Florence O‘Donoghue, Piaras Béaslaí, Niall C. Harrington, 
Kathleen McKenna Napoli, and Michael Collins were examined. Some smaller collections 
housed in the N.L.I., notably items of correspondence pertaining to Liam Lynch and Kevin 
O‘Higgins, were also consulted. 
 14 
 
A number of contemporary newspapers were consulted in the National Library via its 
‗Newsplan‘ database. As the majority of historians tend to overlook the executions themselves 
local newspapers can provide a wealth of local information pertaining to individual executions. 
This is especially true in relation to the examination of the execution of four civilians convicted 
of armed robbery and unlawful possession of arms during the conflict. As these men were not 
Irregulars they have received even less academic attention than the already under-examined 
execution of the seventy-seven Irregulars during the Civil War.  
Documentation held at the National Archives, Dublin was consulted. This repository 
houses an extensive collection of files pertaining to Governmental departments which operated 
during the Civil War. Of particular interest were the Department of Taoiseach S files, 
Department of Finance FIN files, Department of Justice H files and the Provisional Government 
Cabinet minutes. Material held at the Military Archives situated in Cathal Brugha barracks, 
Dublin was also consulted. A significant number of captured Irregular documents and a large 
quantity of National Army operation reports were examined. These provided a more 
comprehensive description of several Irregulars and the events which led to their capture and 
subsequent execution. The Civil War Prisoners Collection was also examined as it records 
information on people interned by the State during the Civil War.  However, as the vast majority 
of military records pertaining to the executions were purposefully destroyed prior to the transfer 
of power from Cumann na nGaedheal to Fianna Fáil in 1932, the benefit of this repository was 
not as great as it may have been. 
Several Governmental papers pertaining to the Home Office and British Cabinet were 
inspected at the U.K. National Archives, located at Kew. This examination was necessary in 
order to identify and evaluate any involvement by the British authorities in the Provisional/Free 
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State‘s executions policy. It has been previously argued that the Secretary of the Home Office, 
Winston Churchill, influenced Childers‘ execution. Thus, any link between the British authorities 
and the death of Childers needs to be evaluated. Contemporary Irish parliamentary papers were 
also examined in detail. The Dáil debates provided a wealth of relevant material referring to the 
emergency resolution adopted by the Government in September 1922 and several of the 
executions that occurred during the Civil War. The debates can be viewed on the official Irish 
Oireachtas website, http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/index.html. 
This thesis is comprised of seven chapters. Chapter one is introductory in nature. It will 
begin by placing the executions during the Civil War in context. The Government‘s policy will 
be measured against previous executions undertaken by the British, after the Rising and during 
the Irish War of Independence, in order to ascertain why public opinion, on the executions, 
seemed so sedate in 1922-23 in comparison to the period 1916-21. Even though the 
Government‘s executions policy was initiated during the guerrilla phase of the Civil War, 
chapter one will also provide the necessary background to the conflict itself and a description of 
the preceding conventional stage of the War. This phase began on 28 June 1922 as the 
Government and National Army faced the Irregulars in open confrontation. It ended in late 
July/early August following the collapse of the anti-treatyite military resistance in both Dublin 
and Munster. The Irregulars subsequently adopted guerrilla warfare engaging in sniping, 
ambushes and armed raids. Furthermore, they focused on destroying the country‘s infrastructure 
in an attempt to ravage the transitional Irish State financially. As the death toll and economic 
cost of the conflict continued to rise, attitudes towards the Irregulars hardened and calls for the 
adoption of emergency measures increased.  
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Chapter two focuses on the 1922 Public Safety Resolution. This decree, which facilitated 
the executions policy, was enacted by the Provisional Government in response to the Irregulars‘ 
guerrilla campaign. In order to analyse the resolution, the conventions contained within it as well 
as the circumstances surrounding its introduction need to be examined. The death of Michael 
Collins on 22 August, in an Irregular ambush, unified support for the adoption of emergency 
measures which would, it was hoped, hasten the end of the Civil War. Ultimately, this period in 
the conflict was characterised by increased severity, resolve and determination on the part of the 
Government and its developing army as it attempted to reach a prompt conclusion to the war. 
Chapter three examines the inaugural executions carried out under the Public Safety 
Resolution. The successive execution of four low-ranked Irregulars in Kilmainham Jail on 17 
November and that of Erskine Childers on 24 November lead to the emergence of several 
conspiracy theories. Critics maintained that there was a dubious relationship between both of 
these events. It was claimed that the initial executions were a test case to assess the possibility of 
executing more prominent Irregulars. It was also argued that the pro-treatyites had a vendetta 
against Childers and that the British were involved in his death. These allegations will be 
evaluated. Once instigated this executions policy not only hardened the resolve on both sides of 
the Treaty divide, it also irrevocably changed the character of the Irish Civil War, making it a far 
more callous affair.  
Chapter four focuses on the Irregulars‘ reaction to the Government‘s executions policy 
and the immediate consequences of this response. Following the inaugural executions Liam 
Lynch issued an order advocating official reprisals. Subsequently, Deputy Seán Hales and 
Deputy Pádraic Ó Maille were attacked on 7 December outside Leinster House, Dublin resulting 
in Hales‘ death. This chapter centres on the premise that this single event acted as a catalyst that 
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significantly altered the landscape of the Civil War. The Government immediately altered its 
implementation of the executions policy and summarily executed four untried prisoners in 
Mountjoy Jail, Dublin on 8 December 1922. 
Chapter five analyses the long-term consequences of the events of 7 December. 
Subsequent to this, the Government decided to modify radically the way it implemented the 
executions policy. Hence, the hostage scheme launched on 13 December 1922 will be evaluated. 
This policy, which amounted to the suspending of death sentences, was initiated in Kerry and 
extended to other areas such as Cork and Donegal and was designed to halt Irregular activity in 
these areas. Furthermore, the Government decided to augment and streamline the executions 
policy. Of particular interest is the Government‘s decentralised and accelerated application of the 
September resolution. Initially the executions had been restricted to Dublin, resulting in the death 
of twelve men in ten weeks. However, following the assassination of Hales and the Mountjoy 
executions sixty-nine additional executions occurred by May 1923, sixty-three of which occurred 
outside Dublin. Moreover, thirty-four of these executions took place in January alone, making it 
the worst month for executions during the entire conflict.  
Chapter six will establish if the Government‘s executions policy achieved its primary 
objective, that is, hastening the end of the Civil War. Bearing this in mind the assertions made by 
Liam Deasy, after his arrest in January 1922, will be evaluated. Following his capture he called 
on several Irregular leaders to surrender given that executions had created a very serious 
situation in the country. In order to do this the remaining twenty-six executions that occurred 
during the Civil War need to be examined. Of particular interest is the execution of four 
civilians, on 13 March and 30 May 1923, for the unauthorised possession of arms following 
armed robberies, thus correcting the total number of men put to death during the conflict from 
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the previously accepted figure of seventy-seven to eighty-one. As these men were not associated 
with the Irregulars they receive little scholarly attention in existing works on the conflict. The 
Irish Civil War ended on 24 May 1923. It had been a bitter affair due in no small part to the 
Government‘s executions policy. However, the occurrence of several unofficial actions, by pro- 
and anti-treatyites alike, during the War instilled an acrimonious legacy in post-war Ireland. 
Hence, the atrocities which occurred in Kerry in March 1923 will also be analysed. These 
incidents represent the extremities of unofficial actions during the Civil War and, in terms of 
ruthlessness, rivalled any of the official executions. 
Chapter seven will examine the circumstances that prevailed in Ireland directly after the 
conclusion of the Irish Civil War, paying particular attention to the post-war process of 
demobilisation. This process not only caused the Army Mutiny in March 1924 but it eventually 
forced the recently established Cumann na nGaedheal Government to release the remains of the 
executed men for reinterment. This chapter will examine the process of internment itself but it 
will also detail the extraordinary scenes that occurred during the reinterments in Glasnevin 
Cemetery, Dublin and Dowdallshill Cemetery, Dundalk, County Louth. Both events resulted in 
substantial armed clashes between pro- and anti- treatyite forces in the course of which an 
innocent bystander, Joseph Hughes, was killed in Dundalk. Despite these encounters the remains 
of the men executed during the Irish Civil War were finally returned to their respective families 
and laid to rest in consecrated ground in various cemeteries throughout Ireland. 
It is not surprising that such a divisive conflict which ended without compromise or 
reconciliation has received relatively little scholarly attention to date. It is also understandable 
that such a contentious policy within this conflict has been largely overlooked by academics. 
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However, due to the passage of time and considerable political and social changes in Ireland 
since the Civil War new viewpoints can at last be offered. As Hopkinson stated in 1988: 
In many respects […] the 1980s is a better decade for writing about the Civil War 
than the 1960s, during which the two previous war histories [Younger‘s and 
Neeson‘s] were written. The last two decades have seen considerable changes in 
Irish politics and society, which have aided new historical approaches and 
perspectives. The old Civil War issues – of constitutional status and Anglo-Irish 
relations – no longer dominate Irish politics; passions resulting from the conflict 
have cooled somewhat with the death and retirement of many war veterans.
21
 
 
Great strides have been made towards resolving another of the old Civil War issues since the 
1980s, namely the northern question. Even though partition is still a reality, significant progress 
has been made in placing the ballot before the bullet in northern politics. As the centenary of the 
Civil War approaches 2010 is a more opportune time to finally examine the most controversial 
and divisive policy adopted by the pro-treatyites during the conflict: the eighty-one official 
executions. 
Note on lists and terms used 
As no complete list exists which relates to all of the executed men, one had to be 
compiled from several amalgamated indices. A number of comparable lists, which detail the 
names, locations and dates of the executions, exist; however, no two arrangements are identical. 
Some minor discrepancies are to be expected. For instance, John McNulty and Martin Moylan 
executed in Dundalk on 13 January 1923 and in Tuam on 11 April 1923, respectively, are 
sometimes referred to as Joseph Murphy and Michael Nolan. Inconsistencies of this nature are 
primarily caused by the use of aliases by Irregulars. Furthermore, Dublin was sometimes given 
as the location for the seven executions that occurred in the Curragh, County Kildare on 19 
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December 1922. Also old British names were sometimes given for the location of certain 
executions. Maryborough or Maryboro for example, which is present-day Portlaoise, was 
sometimes ascribed as the location of Thomas Gibson‘s execution on 26 February 1923. 
However, what is more concerning is that several of these lists mention different totals ranging 
from seventy-seven to eighty-one. 
Several lists exist which refer solely to the seventy-seven Irregulars executed during the 
Civil War. For example, a list located in the Twomey papers in the U.C.D. Archives Department 
entitled ‗Particulars of the 77 Free State Official Executions‘ was compiled by the Irregulars 
shortly after the conclusion of the conflict. Similarly Dorothy Macardle and Nollaig Ó Gadhra 
also published lists mentioning seventy-seven Irregulars in their books The Irish Republic in 
1937 and Civil War in Connacht 1922-1923, respectively. However, other lists such as those in 
both Colm Campbell‘s Emergency law in Ireland, 1918-1925 and in the de Valera papers in the 
Archives Department in U.C.D. state that a total of eighty-one men were put to death during the 
Civil War. This discrepancy relates to four civilians Luke Burke and Michael Greery put to death 
in Mullingar, County Westmeath on 13 March 1923 and Michael Murphy and Joseph O‘Rourke 
executed in Tuam, County Galway on 30 May 1923 for armed robbery. Campbell does 
acknowledge these four names; however, the details he provides are inaccurate. He claims that 
the two executions in Mullingar occurred on 14 March 1923 and provides no information 
whatsoever for the executions in Tuam. Furthermore, the list located in the de Valera papers not 
only provides the incorrect date for the executions in Tuam, but also assumes that these men 
were Irregulars. A further list located in the Childers papers in the Manuscripts Department of 
Trinity College, Dublin refers to eighty names. This roll does identify the execution of Keenan, 
an alias for Burke, and Greery in addition to Murphy and O‘Rourke on 13 March and 30 May 
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1923, respectively; however it does not mention Sylvester Heaney executed in Portobello 
barracks, Dublin on 8 January 1923. Finally, another list located in the Department of Taoiseach 
S Files in the National Archives, Dublin mentions seventy-nine names. Whilst referring to the 
execution of Murphy and O‘Rourke, although providing an incorrect date 11 April 1923, it omits 
the execution of Burke and Greery. Ultimately, the list used in this thesis refers to the eighty-one 
official executions that occurred during the Irish Civil War, Irregular and civilian alike. 
The terms used to distinguish both rival political/military factions are not used here in a 
prejudicial or pejorative manner. They were contemporary terms used during an extremely 
fractious civil war to distinguish political and military factions that had split several times. For 
instance, the ‗Provisional Government‘ refers to the pro-treatyite Sinn Féin T.D.s appointed to 
facilitate the transfer of power from the former British administration. However, membership 
and position within this assemblage changed following the death of its Chairman, Michael 
Collins. This body remained in existence until it was superseded by the Irish Free State on 6 
December 1922. Following this they are called the ‗Free State Government‘ or simply the 
‗Government‘. They are also referred to as the ‗Cumann na nGaedheal Government‘ from March 
1923 onwards. These generic terms are used to avoid confusion in a complex and confused 
situation where significant overlap occurred with the Second and subsequent Third Dáil which 
were also in existence during this period. Similarly the armed forces of the Provisional/Free State 
Government, which comprised of a number of pre-truce I.R.A. and several thousand promptly 
enrolled men, are referred to as the ‗National Army‘ or ‗National forces/troops‘ or just the 
‗Army‘. Conversely the anti-treatyite Sinn Féin politicians are referred to simply as ‗anti-
treatyite T.D.s‘ as these politicians were very slow in setting up of a rival political regime to 
counter the Provisional/Free State Government. Even when this occurred in October 1922 their 
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administration existed only on paper and had little real influence on events. Additionally, the 
anti-treatyite I.R.A. are referred to as the ‗Irregulars‘ as this was the contemporary term applied 
to them in 1922, admittedly by the pro-treatyites. They have also been called ‗anti-
treatyite/republican militants and combatants‘, however, this is only to avoid the repetition of the 
term ‗Irregulars‘. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The ‘greatest calamity that could befall a country’ 
 
 
 Historically speaking, executions have had a revolutionary effect in Ireland, particularly 
in the decade preceding the Irish Civil War. The execution of sixteen rebels by the British after 
the 1916 Rising and the putting to death of fourteen I.R.A. men during the Irish War of 
Independence aroused much anger, scorn and contempt for the British administration from Irish 
politicians and the public alike. On 11 May 1916 John Dillon, leader of the Irish Parliamentary 
Party (I.P.P.), contended in the House of Commons that the British Government‘s response to the 
Rising had washed ‗out our [I.P.P.] whole life work in a sea of blood.‘1 Mass demonstrations 
coincided with individual executions. Furthermore, numerous county councils, chambers of 
commerce and trades councils issued resolutions supporting the rebels in the days and weeks 
after the Rising.
2
 It was the public‘s revulsion at the executions, as F. S. L. Lyons states, which 
provided the impetus for the post-Rising resurgence in Irish nationalism.
3
 The executions carried 
out, primarily in Kilmainham Jail, between 3 and 12 May created several martyrs. They also 
transformed not only the Irish political landscape but also Irish history forever.  
Similarly, the executions during the War of Independence elicited immense criticism and 
public condemnation. For example, the execution of Kevin Barry on 1 November 1920 shocked 
the country. Barry, an eighteen year old student in University College, Dublin, was put to death 
for his part in the killing of three British soldiers which were collecting bread from Monk‘s 
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bakery in Church Street, in the north of Dublin city.
4
 With chronic insensitivity the British 
authorities executed Barry on the Catholic holiday, All Saints Day. As Donal O‘Donovan states 
‗quite apart from the outcry against hanging a man on a church holiday, the British forgot, or 
perhaps simply ignored, the effect of executing a young man on a day when every church in the 
country would be full to the doors several times over.‘5 This event created an outpouring of 
public sympathy and condemnation. For instance, nearly all baby boys baptised in Catholic 
churches in the days leading up to the execution were named Kevin.
6
 Furthermore, large crowds 
of kneeling people gathered and recited the rosary along the streets close to Mountjoy Jail on the 
morning of Barry‘s execution.7 Likewise, the execution of Patrick Moran on 14 March 1921, for 
his part in the assassination of British spies on Bloody Sunday 21 November 1920, educed much 
public admonition. On the morning of his death thousands knelt in prayer outside Mountjoy Jail 
and several masses were offered in nearby churches.
8
  
The executions during the Irish Civil War, on the other hand, did not elicit significant 
public denunciation. During the conflict the public, on the whole, acquiesced to the 
Government‘s executions policy. They majority of the country had voted for the Treaty. This, the 
Provisional/Free State Government argued, gave them a mandate to crush the Irregulars‘ 
rebellion by whatever means were necessary. It also meant that there were, automatically, fewer 
potential protestors against official executions. Furthermore, the guerrilla tactics employed by 
the Irregulars, such as the destruction of the country‘s infrastructure, requisitioning of supplies 
and money and the ambushing of National troops, continued to alienate the war-weary 
communities in which they operated. Moreover, the fact that the executions were carried out by a 
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native Irish Government and not the British resulted in less public criticism. Unlike previous 
conflicts the Government and Army ensured, possibly due to awareness of the catalytic effect of 
executions in Ireland, that the executions during the Civil War were a highly secretive affair. For 
the most part, relatives of those executed did not learn of their death until after the event had 
taken place. Previously, the public were aware days in advance of an impending execution. This 
provided ample time to demonstrate, line streets, sign petitions and appeal for clemency. 
However, as the Civil war progressed speed was of the essence. Therefore, in most cases, men 
were tried, convicted and executed quite quickly. This removed the opportunity for potential 
criticism and sympathy to emerge and gain momentum. The Catholic hierarchy also denounced 
the Irregulars‘ armed rebellion in October 1922 and threatened militants with excommunication. 
This would have had a significant impact on how people viewed the Irregulars and, by extension, 
the executions policy. That is not to say that the executions during the Civil War went without 
censure. An obvious source of criticism came from the anti-treatyites and Irregulars. 
Furthermore, as the only notable opposition in the Dáil, the Labour party consistently criticised 
the Government for supporting the executions policy. Yet some pro-treatyites, whilst being 
supporters of the Government, disapproved of this particular policy too. They believed that the 
Government needed to defeat the Irregulars but the employment of stern measures was 
unjustified and other, more acceptable, methods would suffice. Nonetheless, in order to ascertain 
why the Government adopted an official executions policy in the first place an examination of 
the origins of the Civil War and the initial conventional phase of the conflict must first occur. 
Without this many of the important themes, ideas and arguments which form the basis of future 
chapters could not be sufficiently addressed. 
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On 6 December 1921 at 2.10 am the ‗Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great 
Britain and Ireland‘ was signed at number 10 Downing Street, London. This document, also 
known as the Anglo-Irish Treaty, concluded the Irish War of Independence between Ireland and 
Britain and according to the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, it was the first treaty 
ever signed between the two democracies.
9
 This conflict lasted for over two years and it seemed 
that when a truce was called on 11
 
July 1921, the question of Irish independence would be finally 
settled. However, the optimism that had surrounded the truce and the subsequent Anglo-Irish 
Treaty quickly dissipated. Despite the fact that this agreement offered a significant amount of 
autonomy it did not deliver a fully independent Irish Republic. Hence, the Treaty was not 
entirely satisfactory to everyone and it immediately began to divide Ireland into both pro- and 
anti-treaty factions.
10
 It was backed by the pro-treatyites because it was seen as an end to war and 
the best possible deal that could have been achieved given the inequities between both 
delegations with regard to talent and experience.  
The British delegation was comprised of several experienced negotiators such as David 
Lloyd George, Lord Birkenhead, Winston Churchill, Austen Chamberlin and Gordon Hewart. 
These men were hardened negotiators accustomed to dealing with imperial matters affecting the 
colonies of the British Empire whereas on the Irish side there was Griffith, Collins, Robert 
Barton, Eamonn Duggan, George Gavan Duffy and Erskine Childers as a non-voting secretary. 
For all the qualities these men possessed they could not match the negotiating capacity of their 
British counterparts. Additionally, this deal was backed due to the degraded military state of the 
I.R.A. following the War of Independence. It led many to believe that a resumption of hostilities 
with the British would prove futile. Ultimately, those who supported the Treaty recognised its 
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practicality. Moreover, they believed that it was a significant step forward, one which would 
eventually lead to an Irish Republic. The anti-treatyites viewed the compromises accepted by the 
delegates as sinful acts of betrayal to everything that had been fought for up to this point. They 
objected not only to the disestablishment of the Irish Republic, originally proclaimed in 1916 and 
reaffirmed in 1919, and the partition of Ireland but also to the oath of allegiance to the British 
King. The Treaty, which was accepted by a majority and denounced by a sizable minority, 
became a major cause for renewed tension.  
Following the narrow ratification of the Treaty by the Dáil on 7 January 1922 by sixty-
four votes to fifty-seven, the once broadly unified political and military spheres of the nationalist 
revolutionary movement in Ireland ruptured into opposing sections.
 
This split was deeply 
personal as many of the leaders of both factions were close friends and former comrades during 
the War of Independence. The Anglo-Irish Treaty did not establish the Republic; instead it 
dictated that the new Irish State would have dominion status within the Empire and be called the 
Irish Free State or, in Irish, Saorstát Éireann. Furthermore, it confirmed the partition of Ireland as 
it offered the Government of Northern Ireland and its six counties an opt-out clause. This clause 
was duly enacted. However, the actual size of the northern territory was to be decided at a later 
date by a boundary commission. The agreement also ensured that an oath of allegiance firstly to 
the Irish constitution and then to the British monarch as head of the nations forming the British 
Empire would be taken by members of the new Irish Oireachtas.
11
 Finally, the Treaty also 
stipulated that three naval bases Berehaven, Queenstown (Cobh), and Lough Swilly would 
remain under the control of the British Navy.
12
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The pro-treatyites saw themselves as pragmatists whereas they accused the so-called 
purist anti-treatyites of possessing a ‗holier-than-thou‘ attitude towards the settlement with 
Britain, even though many were far from hard-line republicans.
13
 They charged the anti-treatyite 
politicians with being unrealistic and too idealistic in their aims. Collins, widely heralded as one 
of the main inspirations behind the War of Independence, due to his prominence in the I.R.A. 
and head of the I.R.B. but also as Minister for Finance and the leader of the Irish delegation in 
London was referred to by Griffith, during the Treaty debates, as ‗the man who won the war‘.14 
Collins believed that this settlement was merely a means to achieving the ultimate aspiration, a 
united Irish Republic. He, like so many others, was not entirely satisfied with the settlement. 
However, he famously argued that the Treaty ‗gives us freedom, not the ultimate freedom that all 
nations desire and develop to, but the freedom to achieve it.‘15 Nonetheless de Valera, an 
enormous figure in the nationalist arena as leader of Sinn Féin and president of both Dáil Éireann 
and the Irish Republic, resigned his presidency on 9 January in protest at the Treaty. Following 
his failed attempt at re-election, by a close vote of fifty-eight votes to sixty on 11 January, he 
departed from this assembly with the other anti-treatyite T.D.s declaring that the Dáil‘s 
endorsement of this agreement was illegitimate. 
De Valera claimed that all of those who had voted for the Treaty had broken their oath to 
the Irish Republic. For the former President it was the element of proximity that made him doubt 
that Ireland would ever be afforded the same freedom and status as other far reaching dominions 
like Canada.
16
 He advocated another settlement known as ‗Document no. 2‘ in which Ireland 
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would be externally associated with the British Empire. However, this article differed only 
slightly from the Treaty and received little support. Following this Griffith, founder of Sinn Féin 
and another prominent figure in Irish nationalism, was elected President of Dáil Éireann. As the 
largest party, which remained in the aforementioned assembly, the implementation of the newly 
sanctioned treaty was the prime responsibility of the pro-treaty Sinn Féin T.D.s. Collins, aided by 
Griffith, set about establishing a Provisional Government which would facilitate the transfer of 
power from the British administration to its Irish counterpart. Therefore, a confusing and 
complex situation of dual power now existed in Ireland whereby there were two relatively 
identical pro-treatyite cabinets in the form of the Second Dáil and the Provisional Government, 
Griffith being President of the former and Collins being Chairman of the latter. According to the 
Department of the Taoiseach: 
The Ministry of the Second Dáil was at the time already in existence, and from 
the 16th January, 1922, until the 9th September 1922, there was a dual system of 
Government.  
(a) The Second Dáil Cabinet responsible to Dáil Éireann  
(b) The Provisional Government, apparently responsible 
to no Parliament. 
The dual system terminated with the fusion of the two systems under the Third 
Dáil on 9th September, 1922.  
After that date, the newly constituted Provisional Government appointed by that 
Dáil continued in being as the sole Government, until superseded on 6th 
December, 1922, by the formation of the 1st Executive Council pursuant to the 
Constitution of Saorstát Éireann which became law on that date.
17
 
 
The anti-treatyite Sinn Féin T.D.s also regarded themselves as the legitimate government 
of the country. This situation was to become even more complicated following the split in the 
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I.R.A. over the Treaty. As a result, the anti-treatyite section of the I.R.A. also declared that it was 
the rightful government. In reality, the Provisional Government was the primary administrative 
body in the country as the Second Dáil, although remaining in existence until 9 September 1922, 
declined once the Treaty was ratified and de Valera and his supporters left the assembly. This 
convoluted situation remained until 6 December 1922 when the Irish Free State eventually came 
into being a year after the Treaty had been signed. Following his exit from the Dáil de Valera 
tried to rally support for his alternative settlement and for the anti-treatyite movement. The 
people of Ireland still had to vote on the Treaty and he believed that if he could get enough 
support for his ideals then the Treaty would fail. To achieve this objective he made several 
contentious speeches throughout Ireland in March and April of 1922 in which he prophesised 
civil war. In Killarney he stated that if the Treaty was accepted by the population then the I.R.A. 
‗will have to march over the dead bodies of their own brothers. They will have to wade through 
Irish blood.‘18 These controversial remarks, according to Michael Hopkinson, should be 
understood in the context of de Valera‘s diminishing influence in Irish affairs. As de Valera had 
left the Dáil, thus resigning as President of that assembly and the Republic, his authority over the 
anti-treatyites decreased dramatically.
19
 When the Civil War started the militarists were at the 
forefront of the anti-treatyite movement whereas the politicians, generally speaking, were 
demoted to the background. De Valera remained the leader of an ousted section of politicians, 
neither trusted nor useful to the pro-treatyites or anti-treaty I.R.A. alike. It was not until the final 
phase of the Irish Civil War, when the politicians came to the forefront once again to negotiate, 
that de Valera regained some of his influence. 
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The schism caused by the Treaty did not limit itself to the political sphere. The divisive 
nature of this Treaty continued to influence other sections of the nationalist movement in Ireland, 
most notably the I.R.A. Hopkinson argues that the ‗problem of preserving army unity would 
have been difficult enough in a static military situation, considering the divisions in the IRA over 
the Treaty.‘20 Like the politicians, military leaders too argued fiercely over the contents of this 
document. What galled the self-proclaimed purists, other than the disestablishment of the 
Republic, was that under this Treaty an oath of fidelity to the British monarch, in his capacity as 
head of the Commonwealth, had to be taken.
21
 As a result of this ever-increasing rift both 
previously united military factions faced each other in a perturbed peace. While the General 
Headquarters Staff or G.H.Q. of the I.R.A. such as Collins, Mulcahy, Eoin O‘Duffy and J. J. 
O‘Connell supported the Treaty, several influential leaders such as Lynch, Deasy, O‘Connor, 
Ernie O‘Malley, Liam Mellows and Tom Barry, in addition to a significant portion of the pre-
truce I.R.A., dismissed the agreement. It seems that only loyalty to Collins and Mulcahy, 
Minister for Defence and the Chief of Staff of the I.R.A., ensured that greater numbers did not 
challenge it. Unfortunately for the Provisional Government and newly established National 
Army only Michael Brennan‘s Command in Clare, Seán MacEoin‘s Command in Longford and 
elements of the Dublin No. 1 Brigade sided with the pro-treatyite Government. In addition to 
this, Listowel and Skibbereen were the only barracks in Munster which were occupied by men 
that supported the Treaty.
22
 Bill Kissane argues that from the outset of the Civil War the 
advantage lay with the anti-treatyite I.R.A. who dominated the provinces of Ulster, Connacht and 
Munster which in reality was three-quarters of the country. A mere seven out of sixteen I.R.A. 
divisions remained loyal to G.H.Q. and the Provisional Government. However, what was even 
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more worrying for the pro-treatyites was that both the First and Second Southern Divisions under 
Lynch and O‘Malley, respectively, sided with the anti-treatyites. They constituted a third of the 
total I.R.A.
23
 Eoin Neeson states that at the beginning of the conflict the anti-treatyite forces may 
have even outnumbered the National Army by four to one.
24
 Colm Campbell, on the other hand, 
places the numerical disparity between both forces around two to one.
25
 Obtaining exact numbers 
is problematic; however, it is accepted that the anti-treatyites did initially outnumber the National 
Army by a significant amount. This numerical advantage was not to remain the case indefinitely. 
The National Army held several recruitment drives in which they significantly bolstered their 
numbers, aided undoubtedly by the level of unemployment in Ireland at the time. 
 These drives proved rather successful for the National Army as it grew from an 
estimated numerical strength of 10,000 men at the outbreak of hostilities on 28 June 1922 to over 
55,000 men by the end of the conflict in May 1923.
26
  F. S. L. Lyons argues that with 150,000 
men unemployed recruitment for the National Army eventually increased to 1,000 men a day 
during the summer of 1922.
27
 A significant number of those that enlisted did so for monetary 
reasons rather than any great commitment to the Treaty. According to Hopkinson, men were 
enlisted in the armed forces ‗without training or medical tests and in many cases without a 
uniform.‘28 This is further evidenced by the Army‘s quartermaster, Seán MacMahon, as he stated 
it was literally a case of ‗accepting every man that came along and offered his service.‘29 
Properly uniformed and equipped it made its first public appearance when men from the Dublin 
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Guard, under the command of Paddy O‘Daly, paraded through Dublin past City Hall and took 
control of Beggars Bush barracks from the evacuating British forces.
30
 Unfortunately, due to the 
nature of their organisation, the number of anti-treatyite combatants is more difficult to discern. 
Hopkinson puts the number at 12,900; however, he also mentions that these numbers were not 
attested so they must be utilised with caution.
31
 
With the existence of two armies in the country trying to occupy the same territory the 
possibility of armed conflict increased dramatically throughout the early months of 1922. The 
split in the pre-truce I.R.A. was exacerbated when several incidents occurred between March and 
April which brought Ireland to the brink of civil war. Firstly, the speed of the British departure 
from Ireland, under the terms of the Treaty, ensured that local I.R.A. units took control of local 
barracks regardless of their attitudes towards the aforementioned settlement. Due to the 
haphazard occupation of barracks a serious episode known as the ‗Limerick Crisis‘ occurred. 
This incident, which began as a local affair, developed into an event which almost triggered all-
out military confrontation in Ireland. When a mid-Limerick Brigade, which had declared its 
loyalty to the Republic, moved to occupy several barracks situated around Limerick city the pro-
treatyites were placed in a serious predicament. Faced with the potential loss of this strategically 
important area Brennan‘s pro-treatyite First Western Division, based in Clare and supported by 
loyal troops from Dublin, was ordered to occupy the barracks in Limerick. In response to this 
anti-treaty forces led by some men from O‘Malley‘s Second Southern Division attempted to 
occupy the same military facilities.
32
 As a result, a stand-off situation emerged. O‘Malley‘s plans 
for a prompt take-over of the barracks in Limerick failed to materialise as both sides showed 
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great reluctance in firing the first shots on old comrades. The crisis in Limerick was a major test 
of the National Army‘s and the Provisional Government‘s will to enforce the Treaty and govern 
the country. Griffith urged that all barracks in the city should be taken and was, to some extent, 
supported by Collins. However, Collins had always tried to maintain army unity and avoid civil 
war. Mulcahy vetoed proposals for open confrontation on the grounds of military logic as he 
knew that the National Army was not ready for an all-out war at that time. Thus, a peaceful 
settlement to this dangerous situation was sought. One was finally reached when both sides 
agreed to occupy several barracks each. This episode that had emerged spontaneously 
represented a major climb-down by the Provisional Government. The Limerick incident 
indicated to both the Government and National Army that the anti-treatyite forces, in terms of 
military equipment and men, held the advantage in the early period of 1922 as they appeared to 
be better equipped and had a better infrastructure to cope with a military showdown.
33
  
Secondly, as the military situation in the country worsened, several intransigent members 
of the anti-treatyite military wing demanded that an army convention be held to determine the 
proper course of action over the Treaty. In response to these demands Mulcahy reaffirmed the 
necessity to keep army unity under the control of the Dáil. He recognised that if permission for 
this meeting was granted then the Government and nascent National Army would be greatly 
embarrassed by the almost certain declaration of the anti-treaty I.R.A.‘s independence from the 
Dáil. He subsequently informed the Cabinet that permission for any such convention should not 
be granted. He stated that: 
All ranks will understand the intensity with which, in the face of our present very 
grave National position, means have been sought to avoid any definite breach in 
the solidarity and the Organisation of the Army, and in the wonderful brotherhood 
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of the Army which has been its true solidarity and the real framework of its 
organisation. The calling of the sectional Convention against the orders of G.H.Q. 
Staff breaks definitely, to some extent this solidarity and this organisation, but it 
does not and must not break to any degree the brotherhood of those who in the 
past have worked and borne responsibility together.
34
 
 
Mulcahy finally stated that any officer that attended a convention would be dismissed from the 
I.R.A.
35
 Griffith banned holding any military convention on 16 March.  
In the meantime O‘Connor had declared that he was sole leader of the anti-treatyite 
military forces. In a press conference on 22 March, O‘Connor claimed that he represented eighty 
percent of the pre-truce I.R.A. When questioned on whether or not he intended to set up a 
military dictatorship he replied ‗you can take it that way if you like.‘36 Regardless of Griffith‘s 
ban the ‗Army Convention‘ took place at the Mansion House in Dublin on 26 March 1922. At 
this meeting many anti-treatyite militants repudiated the authority of the pro-treatyite Dáil over 
the I.R.A. In addition, they established their own military executive and subsequently declared it 
to be the real government of the country. According to Garvin, those militants like O‘Connor 
believed that the I.R.A. was solely responsible for establishing the Irish Republic and that it 
could not be disestablished by anyone. He states that ‗They [the anti-treaty I.R.A.] saw 
themselves as having created the Republic, and no-one had the right to give it away, 
democratically or otherwise.‘37   
The Convention did little to hide the fact that even the anti-treatyite faction of the I.R.A. 
was far from unified. It revealed Lynch‘s and his colleagues‘ unease at talks of military 
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dictatorship by O‘Connor. Conversely the ‗extremists‘, such as O‘Connor, disapproved of 
Lynch‘s ‗moderate‘ ideals. Deasy, future Deputy Chief of Staff of the Irregulars, stated that 
during the Convention problems occurred due to the group of radical anti-treatyites. Until the 
Government banned the Army Convention this group remained a minority amongst the anti-
treatyites which could be contained, according to Deasy. However, the ban gave them a platform 
to air their radical views. Deasy suggested that the elected I.R.A. Executive was deeply divided 
from the outset especially in its views towards Lynch and his First Southern Division. He stated 
that ‗[Lynch] was an acknowledged leader of proven worth and integrity, with the Republic as 
his guiding star, yet, it now became only too painfully obvious that he was not considered 
sufficiently extreme by some of his colleagues.‘38 The clash between the moderate and extreme 
factions of the anti-treatyites is accurately summed up by Hopkinson. He argues that beneath the 
surface this congregation revealed the anti-treatyites‘ disharmony and lack of a coherent purpose 
or plan of action. Minor arguments over who would chair the meeting occurred and several 
complaints were made by Cork men about their not being adequately represented on the new 
Executive. Oscar Traynor, the O. C. or Officer Commanding Dublin No. 1 Brigade, recalled that 
he threatened to resign over these complaints by Lynch. In addition to this many men criticised 
the lack of definite decisions made at the Convention. Nobody could pretend after this or any 
other convention, according to Hopkinson, that the I.R.A. pro- or anti- treaty was a single body.
39
 
This disharmony and lack of an effective and coherent strategy would ultimately result in the 
adoption of a reactive policy by the anti-treatyite forces and significantly hinder their prosecution 
of the Irish Civil War. However, were O‘Connor‘s assumptions correct, was Lynch too 
moderate?  
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For Lynch the possibility of civil war was unfortunate. According to Meda Ryan, Lynch 
had not been accurately interpreted by O‘Connor. He had fought bravely during the War of 
Independence and passionately wanted to avoid civil war. Like Collins, he hoped that the 
publication of the new Constitution, which was required under the terms of the Treaty, would 
unite the I.R.A. However, if civil war came then he would not shirk his duty to protect the 
Republic that he had fought for during the previous war with the British.
40
 Lynch divulged his 
personal views regarding the possibility of a civil war when writing to a friend: 
[I] assure you that there is no one more upset than I am that past comrades in arms 
should now be shooting one another down. There can be unity if all forces will 
uphold the established Republic now as in the past. It is too degrading and 
dishonourable for the Irish people to accept a Treaty which brings them within the 
British Empire even if it were only for a short period.
41
 
 
In addition to this letter he wrote to his brother, Tom, confiding that we ‗are absolutely 
convinced of wiping out this supposed Free State, but we don‘t mind giving it a slow death, 
especially when it means the avoidance of loss of life and general civil war. If we are forced to it 
we will concentrate all our forces to wipe it out.‘42 Lynch hoped that a solution could be reached 
to avoid conflict but if one could not be found he considered war a necessary evil if the Republic 
was to be saved. The fact that Lynch resumed his duties as Chief of Staff of the anti-treatyite 
militants following the fall of the Four Courts garrison was indicative of his dedication. This 
unwavering commitment, however, ensured that the Civil War continued longer than it otherwise 
would have. 
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The establishment of the new anti-treatyite military executive made the necessity to 
occupy evacuated barracks even more important. Many neutral militants had declared their views 
at the Convention and sided with the anti-treatyites. Confrontations over barracks in both Birr, 
County Offaly and Renmore, County Galway coincided with the holding of the Army 
Convention and a number of other struggles occurred in April in areas around the Midlands and 
the East. Even though the Provisional Government was extremely concerned over Dublin, and 
despite the fact the National troops were in a minority there, no barracks were ceded to the anti-
treatyite forces in the city. It was in Dublin, however, that the more hard-line and 
uncompromising of the anti-treatyite forces staged their most daring coup. On the night of 13 
April men from Dublin No. 1 Brigade occupied various buildings throughout Dublin‘s city 
centre. These included the Four Courts, the Masonic Hall, Fowler Hall, Kilmainham Jail, 
Moran‘s Hotel and the Belfast Office.43 The takeover of the Four Courts building by 
Commandant Patrick O‘Brien, as an anti-treatyite headquarters, was intended as a symbolic 
indication to the country of the Provisional Government‘s failed authority and their inability to 
govern. In addition, the anti-treatyite executive of O‘Connor, Mellows and O‘Malley in the Four 
Courts hoped that by openly challenging the Provisional Government they could provoke the 
British into re-intervening in Ireland, ultimately forcing both factions of the I.R.A. together in a 
renewed war against the British. This scenario was indeed a possibility. These events alarmed the 
British Government. The British administration subsequently informed Collins that unless he 
dealt with this rebellion then the Provisional Government would be in breach of the Treaty and 
they would halt their evacuation and be forced to intercede.  
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In an attempt to avoid a further deterioration of the situation in the country Collins 
organised an election pact with de Valera's anti-treatyite political followers to campaign jointly 
in the June election. This election, called the ‗Pact Election‘, would ensure, it was hoped, that a 
coalition government would be formed afterwards. According to this agreement both strands of 
Sinn Féin would contest the election as one party and not oppose each other. In an attempt to 
portray some semblance of democracy, other parties were not excluded from contesting the 
election but it was hoped, however, that other parties such as Labour would not put candidates 
forward. Thomas Johnson, leader of the Labour Party, alluded to this in a letter to his son: 
there was a pact between De Valera and Collins by which a free election was 
guaranteed but the two parties were not to oppose each other. There was a clause 
inserted however which said that all parties were free to act if they so chose, but it 
was evidently hoped by De Valera, and perhaps by Collins, that no one would 
enter the ring [...] However we [the Labour Party] concluded that we had stood 
down long enough, and we nominated eighteen men.
44
 
 
The pact would have undermined the nascent democracy in Ireland as it basically pre-
determined the make-up of the government before the election occurred and despite the wishes 
of the Irish population. Some, like Griffith, had grave concerns regarding this deal. However, he 
reluctantly agreed following Collins‘ assurances that this was the only way to avoid civil war. 
The Minister for Home Affairs, O‘Higgins, also had reservations over this election but he did see 
it as a way of avoiding an irreversible split. Prior to the election he spoke to his constituents and 
stated: 
I stand now for getting the best out of the Treaty, for making the fullest use of the 
power and opportunity it gives us to develop, the moral and material resources of 
the nation. I have not abandoned any political aspirations to which I have given 
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expression in the past but in the existing circumstances I advise the people to trust 
to evolution rather than revolution for their attainment.
45
 
 
The ‗Pact Election‘ was mainly seen as a vote not only on the Treaty itself but also the 
new Constitution which Collins played a leading role in constructing. Initially, Collins attempted 
to reach a compromise with the hard-core elements of the anti-treatyite I.R.A. leadership by 
constructing a republican-type constitution. This Constitution, according to Akenson, attempted 
to pacify the more ardent anti-treatyites by omitting not only the oath to the British monarch and 
the Treaty itself but also removing the role of the British Government in Irish domestic affairs 
altogether.
46
 Some prominent anti-treatyites such as Lynch were prepared to accept this 
compromise. In addition to this, Aiken, the O. C. Northern forces and eventual Irregular Chief of 
Staff, decided to remain loyal to the Dáil until the publication of the Constitution which was still 
being drafted. Aiken stated, on 19 June, that: 
Our objective is a Republic for an undivided Ireland and to shake off every social 
and economic evil from which it suffers in consequence of English rule, and to 
build up a Nation that an honest Irishman can be justly proud of. If we cannot 
honourably work the Constitution as the quickest way to that end, the Constitution 
must go. Until it is published we cannot see our way clearly, and till then we shall 
take our orders from G.H.Q. under the Dáil Ministry of Defence unless we are 
asked to do something which is dishonourable.
47
  
 
The British quickly vetoed this draft constitution as being contrary to the terms of the Treaty. 
Furthermore, they stated that if the terms of the Treaty were not implemented in full then Britain 
would re-intervene in Ireland. Collins reluctantly agreed and had the document quickly redrafted. 
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O‘Higgins, who aided the passage of the Constitution through the Dáil, later stated that it was a 
strict but fair interpretation of the Treaty. He conceded that: 
Many would have liked to do with the British what we read that Brian Boru did 
with the Danes, not far from here. But we did not do it. We were not able to do it. 
If we had been able to do it, the things that are in the Treaty and that are in the 
Constitution, that many here find irksome, would not be there [...] What we are 
asking the Dáil to face is simply that fact, because we failed absolutely to win out 
the 100 p.c. [per cent] of our programme and secure the inscriptions on our battle 
standards, we have had to swallow certain things which to many of us are 
objectionable.
48
 
 
This Constitution completely undermined the electoral pact between the pro- and anti-
treaty factions, who went into the Irish general election on 16 June 1922 as hostile parties, both 
calling themselves members of Sinn Féin. The Constitution was not published until the morning 
of the election so the vast majority of voters outside Dublin had little opportunity to view the 
document before voting.
49
 The pro-treatyites won the election with 239,193 votes to 133,864. A 
further 247,276 people voted for other parties, most of whom supported the Treaty.
50
 The 
election showed a majority of the Irish electorate were in favor of the compromise that the Treaty 
represented. Yet Hopkinson argues that the election results were not a comprehensive victory for 
the Provisional Government and the Treaty. He states that the: 
result did not represent a vote of confidence in the Provisional Government – still 
less an expression of resistance to Republican ideals. Instead it demonstrated a 
popular realization of the need of stable government, and the acceptance of 
realistic compromise with regard to Anglo-Irish relations. The electorate had at 
least been able to show that social and economic issues and, more particularly, the 
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desire for settled conditions were of greater import[ance] to them than the endless 
debate over constitutional symbols and authority.
51
 
  
The anti-treatyites refused to acknowledge the result of this election. According to Deasy, the 
results had little effect on the attitudes and morale of the anti-treatyite militants. He stated that 
this should not be wondered at as from ‗the first by-election in 1917 we were never unduly 
influenced by election results. Our mission was to continue the Fenian policy, to rouse the 
country and to strive for its freedom.‘52 
O‘Higgins recognised that the election results had irritated the anti-treatyite militants, 
even if they did not acknowledge the legitimacy of this election. He stated that the ‗general 
situation [in Ireland] is very serious at the moment, the results of the elections and the 
publication of the constitution have driven the proud fellows [the Irregulars] into a very ugly 
mood.‘53 The Constitution proved extremely disappointing for anti-treatyites such as Lynch. 
According to Ryan, the ‗Constitution which had been long-awaited [...] brought bitter 
disappointment to Republicans [...] The hopes and expectations of Liam Lynch were sadly 
shattered.‘54 Nonetheless, the June election played an important role in validating and 
legitimising the Treaty and the status of the Provisional Government. The pro-treatyite T.D.s 
now felt that they had their democratic mandate to enforce this settlement. Even though it did not 
prevent a civil war it greatly aided the establishment of the Free State Government during and 
after the conflict. The British Government now believed that the time had come for the 
Provisional Government and National Army to fully implement the terms of the Treaty and take 
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action against all those in armed defiance of the aforementioned settlement. For the British, 
whatever excuse existed for a delay in the Provisional Government‘s assertion of its authority 
was now gone.  
 Following the publication of the Constitution and the election on 16 June the anti-
treatyite military executive held another conference to discuss unity proposals. At this meeting, 
on 18 June, the tensions between Lynch and O‘Connor came to a climax. The resulting split was 
to weaken the anti-treatyite cause further several days before the outbreak of hostilities. At the 
conference Barry, the O. C. Second Southern Division, proposed a resumption of hostilities with 
the British unless they withdrew from Ireland in seventy-two hours. This initiative was supported 
by O‘Connor and Mellows. It was opposed, however, by Lynch, Deasy and Seán Moylan.55 
Barry‘s motion was ultimately defeated due to doubts over its practicality. O‘Connor then 
threatened to leave the convention if Lynch was given the floor. According to Seán McBride, 
eventual I.R.A. Chief of Staff and leader of Clann na Phoblachta, the policies of O‘Connor and 
Lynch were diametrically opposed to each other. For O‘Connor and the I.R.A. executive a 
renewed conflict with Britain was the most plausible course of action while those affiliated with 
Lynch proposed further unity proposals.
56
 Following a call by McBride, approximately half the 
delegates left this convention for the Four Courts. Joe McKelvey, the O. C. in Belfast, was 
elected Chief of Staff in Lynch‘s place.57 The motivations behind the locking of the Four Court 
gates to Lynch were, according to Deasy, most difficult to understand.
58
 Lynch‘s Adjutant, C. S. 
(Todd) Andrews, commented on this ‗extraordinary situation‘ after he went to the Four Courts to 
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meet O‘Malley. According to Andrews, this meant that ‗the Four Courts garrison had amputated 
their most powerful limb, effectively isolating themselves in the last bastion of the Republic.‘59 
Lynch continued to operate from his headquarters in Dublin and enjoyed the continued loyalty of 
the majority of anti-treatyite militants. Irrespective of this the combatants in the Four Courts 
remained defiant and refused to acknowledge that they had become considerably weaker due to 
their expulsion of Lynch and his forces. Like the 1916 Rising before, the men holed up in the 
aforementioned building were, according to O‘Malley, not just men they now represented a 
symbol of the Republic.
60
 
Coincidently, at this time another event occurred which would ultimately force Collins‘ 
hand. On 22 June 1922 two I.R.A. gunmen Reginald Dunne and Joseph O‘Sullivan assassinated 
Sir Henry Wilson in London. According to Hopkinson, Wilson had been trailed on a journey to 
unveil a war memorial at Liverpool Street station, London. Following this unveiling Wilson 
returned home where O‘Sullivan and Dunne shot him as he was walking between the taxi that he 
had just left and the door of his residence in Eaton Square. In addition to this, two policemen 
were shot whilst both men tried to escape; however, they were eventually arrested.
61
 The motive 
for Wilson‘s killing is not difficult to ascertain. Seán Moylan recalled that Collins had often 
stated that Wilson was a thorn in his side and had repeatedly made the procurement of arms in 
Britain much more difficult.
62
 It has become historically accepted (although it was not publically 
known at the time) that Collins had ordered this assassination some months previously. British 
suspicions regarding Collins‘ involvement were confirmed as documentation mentioning Collins 
had supposedly been found on the arrested men. Joe Sweeney, the pro-treatyite military leader in 
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County Donegal, recalled that Collins had informed him of his decision to order the shooting of 
Wilson. In addition, Sweeney stated that upon hearing the news that the order had been carried 
out, Collins seemed very pleased.
63
 However, Peter Hart claims that the opposite is true: 
Collins did not have much control over the IRA any more and would have needed 
an awfully good reason to arrange such a provocative murder at such a critical 
time. No such reason has ever been presented. And, since he showed no other 
signs of madness or bloodlust to give us an irrational explanation, we can acquit 
him of the charge.
64
 
 
The British Government was eager for action to be taken against the Four Courts garrison 
and as a result they readily placed the blame for this event solely on the shoulders of the 
aforementioned anti-treatyite militants. Lloyd George wrote to Collins on 22 June and reiterated 
that unless the Provisional Government moved on O‘Connor and his men in the Four Courts then 
they would be forced to do so. He stated that: 
I am desired by his Majesty‘s Government to inform you that documents have 
been found upon the murderers of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson which clearly 
connect the assassins with the Irish Republican Army […] Other information has 
reached his Majesty‘s Government showing that active preparations are on foot 
among the Irregular elements of the I.R.A. to resume attacks upon the lives and 
property of British subjects both in England and in Ulster. The ambiguous 
position of the Irish Republican Army can no longer be ignored by the British 
Government. Still less can Mr. Rory O‘Connor be permitted to remain with his 
followers and his arsenal in open rebellion in the heart of Dublin in possession of 
the courts of Justice […] His Majesty‘s Government cannot consent to a 
continuance of this state of things, and they feel entitled to ask you formally to 
bring it to an end forthwith […] I am to inform you that they regard the continued 
toleration of this rebellious defiance of the principles of the Treaty as 
incompatible with its execution. They feel that now you are supported by the 
declared will of the Irish People in favour of the Treaty, they have a right to 
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expect that the necessary action will be taken by your Government without 
delay.
65
   
 
The British offered military aid to the Provisional Government to facilitate the expulsion 
of the anti-treatyite forces from the Four Courts building and in other places throughout Dublin. 
Lloyd George stated that ‗His Majesty‘s Government are prepared to place at your disposal the 
necessary pieces of artillery which may be required, or otherwise to assist you as may be 
arranged.‘66 Ultimately, the British Army had supplied the National Army with over 27,400 
rifles, 6,606 revolvers, and 246 Lewis guns by the end of September 1922.
67
 As a result of the 
assassination of Wilson British impatience towards the Provisional Government‘s procrastination 
dramatically increased. Lloyd George subsequently ordered General Macready, the G.O.C. of the 
British forces in Ireland, to attack the Four Courts on 24 June with troops that had not yet 
evacuated the country. Macready wisely chose to ignore this request as he knew that it would 
ultimately destroy the Treaty. Nonetheless, British pressure on Collins remained. These demands 
placed him in a serious predicament. He could not be seen to be acting under British orders or as 
a result of British intimidation. Regan argues that ‗the growing threat of British reintervention 
and the cohesive effect this would have on the disparate elements of the IRA was of primary 
concern to the [pro]treatyite Government.‘68 In addition, a significant amount of Collins‘ 
hesitation to take action against the anti-treatyites in the Four Courts was due to the secret policy 
which he and O‘Connor were implementing in Northern Ireland.  
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In the first six months of 1922 Collins had been actively engaged in providing northern 
Catholics with weapons in order to counter the loyalist threat in the six counties. Collins had 
made a secret deal with O‘Connor in which some of the guns that the British gave to the National 
Army were swapped with similar weaponry in the possession of the anti-treatyites and 
transported north.
69
 This was done because Collins had to ensure that the military hardware that 
the British provided the National Army was not discovered in the North as if it were to be found, 
it would not take the British Government long to discern his involvement. This policy ran 
contrary to the terms of the Treaty, hence the secrecy. In order for the plan to run efficiently 
Collins held off on taking action against the anti-treatyite inhabitants of the Four Courts for as 
long as possible. However, British pressure had increased considerably due to Wilson‘s 
assassination. Collins knew that if he did not act then the British would. Even though Collins 
wanted to avoid civil war his hand was finally forced. Leo Henderson was appointed Director of 
the Belfast Boycott, an operation which the anti-treatyite I.R.A. renewed on the North, and he 
proceeded to levy fines on Dublin traders that stocked goods from Belfast. According to Piaras 
Béaslaí, I.R.A. and subsequently the National Army‘s Director of Publicity, Henderson and a 
body of men raided Ferguson‘s motor garage in Lower Baggot Street in Dublin on 26 June and 
seized motor cars valued at £9,000. Following this National troops under the command of Frank 
Thornton were dispatched to apprehend these anti-treatyites. Henderson was subsequently 
arrested and sent to Mountjoy Jail.
70
 In response to this the anti-treatyite militants housed in the 
Four Courts building kidnapped General J. J. ‗Ginger‘ O‘Connell, assistant Chief of Staff of the 
National Army, and led him to the aforementioned garrison to be incarcerated.
71
 Collins and the 
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Provisional Government now had to act. Collins issued an ultimatum in which he called for those 
inside the Four Courts to evacuate. Following silence from the inhabitants he ordered the 
bombardment of the Four Courts at 4.30 a.m. on the morning of 28 June 1922. The Irish Civil 
War which had stumbled into existence now roared into being. 
The Four Courts garrison, under the command of Commandant Patrick O‘Brien, devised 
defence plans in conjunction with O‘Malley and Traynor. However, these plans which only 
included some automatic weapons, rifles and a Rolls Royce armoured car, the ‗Mutineer‘,  
proved to be insufficient. The National Army‘s attacking force in the city consisted of roughly 
4,000 soldiers. O‘Daly‘s Dublin Guards and General Tom Ennis‘ Second Eastern Division 
formed the backbone of this force, however, a significant quantity of them were raw recruits.
72
 
Under the guidance of then Brigadier Emmet Dalton, a close friend of Collins and an 
experienced veteran of both the First World War and War of Independence, the bombardment of 
the Four Courts began with shells fired from two eighteen pounder field guns provided by the 
British.
73
 The inexperience of some of the officers and men attacking the garrison could be seen 
as, according to Costello, many of the shrapnel shells fired at the Four Courts missed the 
building and others barely scratched the surface of the stone structure.
74
 This is also evidenced 
by the fact that Dalton himself had to take control and operate the field guns in order to ensure 
that the shells hit their intended targets. Those pro-treatyites, such as O‘Higgins, believed that 
this Civil War was regretful but necessary to ensure that the democratic wishes of the Irish 
people, entrusted to the Provisional Government, be carried out. He stated: 
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Civil war is almost the greatest calamity that could befall a country. Only the 
vindication of a very precious right, the protection of a very vital principle, could 
justify it. The right of the majority of a country‘s citizens to decide its destiny, to 
dictate its policy, to regulate its development in accordance with hard military, 
political, and economic facts, will be generally to be worth even the bitter price of 
civil strife. Whether the Parliament of a nation shall be the sovereign voice within 
the nation, or whether that voice shall be drowned and silenced by the matter of 
arms in the hands of men who give no obedience to the people through their 
representatives that is an issue so grave that no government could evade it [.]
75
  
 
O‘Higgins declared that civil war could only be vindicated by enforcing constitutional 
government and implementing majority rule. No man, according to O‘Higgins, had the right to 
betray the people of Ireland.
76
 As stated in official notes circulated by the Provisional 
Government, the conflict was one which was not of their making. They believed, because they 
had won the elections, that the Treaty was democratically accepted and that no one had the right 
to challenge the will of the Irish people, militarily or otherwise. The Government stated that on 
‗them lay the responsibility of restoring and maintaining order in the country. They did not and 
do not shirk this duty, and they are determined that before they step, the common Irish people 
shall be the masters in their own house‘.77 
The lack of military foresight, displayed by the anti-treatyite militants holed up in the 
Four Courts building, was apparent at the start of the Civil War. The fact that twelve of the 
sixteen members of the new executive were in the building at the time it was shelled showed a 
significant lack of judgment. Furthermore, the Four Courts garrison cornered in a small area of 
Dublin could not coordinate with other operations elsewhere. Kissane argues that confining 
themselves into a few buildings, as was the case in 1916, was not the most opportune way to win 
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a quick victory in a civil war.
78
 Ronan Fanning also argues the anti-treatyites‘ military strategy in 
the Four Courts was fatally misconceived. He states that the Irregulars had the military 
advantage in the early months of 1922. However, he contends that to avoid firing the first shots 
of the Civil War in order to tar the Provisional Government and National Army with the brush of 
aggression and guilt may have been politically prudent but it made no military sense. Fanning 
believes that the obsession with the symbolism of the Rising, in occupying major buildings in the 
vain hope that Collins would not do what the British had done, was ludicrous. He states that ‗the 
military successes of the revolutionary war had been achieved through the guerrilla strategy of 
1919-21 and that the 1916 rising had been a military fiasco was forgotten.‘79 F. M. Blake argues 
that the Irregulars‘ executive preferred to make a symbolic gesture of resistance rather than take 
the offensive. She also maintains that due to their defeat and capture a significant portion of the 
anti-treatyite forces elite, such as O‘Connor, Mellows and McKelvey, spent the rest of the Civil 
War in prison.
80
 These men would ultimately be executed by the Army as a reprisal for the 
assassination of Seán Hales T.D. in December 1922. Unfortunately, for the anti-treatyite forces, 
the absence of a clear proactive strategy became a common trend throughout the Civil War. The 
militants lacked any clear plan and as a result they quickly adopted a defensive strategy during 
the conflict. According to Townshend, the outcome of the Civil War was a foregone conclusion, 
militarily speaking, because the anti-treatyites rapidly lapsed into a reactive policy.
81
 P. S. 
O‘Hegarty also stated that: 
The course of the war speedily demonstrated the falsity of the Irregulars‘ position 
and calculations. They were on the defensive from the outset in Dublin and 
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throughout most of the country, and they were in a great minority generally so far 
as popular support was concerned.
82
 
 
O‘Hegarty was secretary to both Dáil and Provisional Government Cabinets and ultimately 
became chairman of the Office of Public Works.
83
 The Civil War which had now begun finally 
brought both previously united sides of the Treaty divide into armed confrontation. 
The opening of hostilities against the Four Courts Garrison pushed some relatively 
neutral members of the I.R.A. towards the anti-treatyite cause. Aiken initially decided to remain 
neutral until the publication of the long awaited ‗republican‘ constitution. However, as Collins 
failed to deliver such a document Aiken‘s anti-treatyite sympathies increased. In a statement 
released following the attack on the Four Courts Aiken stated that: 
Fellow Citizens of the Irish Republic [...] The fateful hour has come. At the 
dictation of our hereditary enemy [Britain] our rightful cause is being 
treacherously assailed by recreant Irishmen. The crash of arms and the boom of 
artillery reverberate in this supreme test of the Nation‘s destiny [...] Gallant 
soldiers of the Irish Republic stand vigorously firm in its defence and worthily 
uphold their noblest [traditions]. We especially appeal to our former comrades of 
the Irish Republic to return to that allegiance and thus guard the Nation‘s honour 
from the infamous stigma that her sons aided her foes in retaining a hateful 
domination over her.
84
 
 
The Four Courts garrison fell within two days of heavy shelling and a storming by National 
forces but not before a significant portion of the building was completely demolished. The 
shelling of the building was described effectively by Commandant Simon Donnelly: 
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A final retirement to the last inhabitable portion of the building was ordered, the 
basement under the library. In the meantime negotiations had been going on 
between our leaders and the enemy through the medium of the priests. A short 
time afterwards Liam Mellows Joe McKelvey Ernie O‘Malley with tears in their 
eyes addressed the men stating that to save the lives of such men they had decided 
to surrender. They informed the men that surrender was no dishonour while they 
were compelled to surrender their guns they would never surrender their 
principles.
85
 
 
 
O‘Connor provides another account of the attack on the Four Courts by the National 
Army. He argued that neither Collins nor the National Army asked him or his men to evacuate 
the Four Courts before 28 June. He also stated that both Collins and Mulcahy were content to 
leave the men inside the building as while they inhabited the Four Courts their joint Northern 
policy could run effectively. O‘Connor resolutely stated, when writing from his prison cell in 
Mountjoy Jail prior to his execution, that:  
The lies and hypocrisy of the Free State Leaders are astounding, especially to 
those of us who took part in the army negotiations for unity and know the whole 
inner history of these negotiations [...] We were never requested to evacuate the 
Four Courts, on the contrary, at one meeting of the Coalition Army Council, at 
which Mulcahy, O‘Duffy, Mellows, Lynch and myself were present, we were 
only asked to evacuate the Belfast Office, Kildare Street Club, the Masonic Hall 
and Lever Bros. At that stage we actually discussed co-ordinated Military Action 
against N.E. Ulster, and had agreed to an officer who would command both 
Republican and Free State troops in that area. We were also to send from the 
South some hundreds of our Rifles to use in that area, the reason given was, that it 
would never do if rifles – which had been handed to the ―Government‖ for use 
against the Republic and which of course could be identified – were found in use 
against Craig. An exchange of Rifles was [effected]. It should be remembered that 
at this time the ―Government‖ was publicly declaring that it was the ―Mutineer‖ 
section of the army which was fighting the Ulster people [...] At this meeting I 
have referred to, someone suggested the evacuation of the Four Courts, and 
Mulcahy laughingly said that as long as we held that place, the war in the N.E. 
Ulster would be attributed to us. We, of course, had no objection. From this you 
see the real reason why we were not asked to evacuate the Four Courts. (We 
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subsequently got 25 minutes to do so) [...] You see also the double-faced policy of 
these men towards the people of ―Southern Ireland‖ and their allies, the British.86  
 
The surrender of anti-treatyite garrisons proved to be the rule rather than the exception in 
Dublin. In an attempt to create a diversion for the Four Courts militants, several units of the 
Dublin Brigade, organised by Traynor and the Brigade staff from Barry‘s Hotel, occupied and 
held strategic points around the city centre. The most formidable of these attempts was the 
occupation of the Hamman Hotel and several other neighbouring buildings on O‘Connell Street 
by a force under the command of Garry O‘Houlihan of the Second Battalion. After several days 
of fighting in Parnell Square, Talbot Street and the western side of O‘Connell Street had fallen. 
In addition to this, the east side of O‘Connell Street, which included the Hamman Hotel, was 
ablaze.
87
 On 5 July O‘Houlihan ordered an evacuation from the entire block of buildings. This 
order was not adhered to by a small group of men which included Cathal Brugha, former 
Minister for Defence and ardent anti-treatyite. That evening Brugha ordered the remaining men 
out of the building and he remained inside with Dr. Brennan and nurse Kearns. Those who 
surrendered stayed in the laneway and witnessed Brugha dash from the doorway of the building 
with two revolvers blazing. He was seriously wounded and subsequently died from his injuries.
88
 
Brugha‘s death on 5 July was symbolic of the anti-treatyites‘ prosecution of the conflict in 
Dublin. As the Four Courts fell so too did the rest of the anti-treatyite strongholds and by 5 July 
the Capital was now in the hands of the National Army and the Provisional Government. The 
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Civil War in Dublin resulted in an estimated sixty-five killed and over three hundred wounded 
while the property damage amounted to between three and four million pounds.
89
  
The anti-treatyite evacuation of Dublin was haphazard and unplanned. As mentioned 
previously, the surrender of the Four Courts Garrison ensured that a significant amount of the 
anti-treatyite leadership had been imprisoned. In addition, Barry was arrested as he entered the 
Four Courts, prior to its bombardment by the National Army, dressed as a woman.
90
 However, 
he escaped in August. Also, as many anti-treatyites recognised the inevitability of defeat, several 
leaders including de Valera escaped across the River Liffey to Mount Street and O‘Malley and 
Seán Lemass escaped from Jameson‘s Distillery due to the ineptitude of their guards. Finally and 
most importantly, O‘Duffy, acting on Mulcahy‘s orders, allowed Lynch, Deasy and Seán 
Cullhane to leave Dublin, following their arrest, as he believed that they were travelling south to 
ensure that both they and their respective commands would not participate in the conflict.
91
 Both 
Deasy and Lynch later denied that they gave any indication of this. Either way Mulcahy must 
have regretted this decision. Lynch and Deasy, who became Chief of Staff and assistant Chief of 
Staff respectively, would form the backbone of anti-treatyite military resistance during the Civil 
War.  
Following these events Aiken, who initially remained neutral, was arrested by the 
National Army in Dundalk on 16 July. However, after his escape from prison he threw in his lot 
with the anti-treatyite forces. Although this was beneficial to the anti-treatyites their aspirations 
received another blow, on 27 July, when Traynor was arrested. On the same day, Béaslaí, in an 
attempt to control republican propaganda, issued his general instructions for Press censorship: 
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The Army must always be referred to as the ―Irish Army‖, ―National Army‖, 
―National Forces‖, ―National Troops‖, or simply ―The Troops‖ [...] The Irregulars 
must not be referred to as ―Executive Forces‖ nor described as ―Forces‖ or 
―Troops‖. They are to be called ―Bands‖ or ―Bodies‖ or ―Armed men‖ [...] The 
term ―Provisional Government‖ should not be used. The correct term is ―Irish 
Government‖ or simply ―The Government‖.92 
 
It was these instructions which ultimately led to the anti-treatyite I.R.A. being labelled as the 
‗Irregulars‘. 
Following the defeat of the Irregulars in Dublin Lynch and Deasy claimed that they had 
set up a defensive line throughout the province of Munster which incorporated Limerick, 
Tipperary and Waterford. They referred to this area as the ‗Munster Republic‘. Harry Boland, 
another prominent anti-treatyite figure in the revolutionary movement as a leading member of 
the I.R.B. and close friend to Collins, stated that this province was entirely against the Treaty: 
Munster is solid for the Republic as is most of the west. I do not know what may 
happen in Munster if the Free State troops invade that area. Of one thing I am 
certain, we cannot be defeated, even if Collins and his British guns succeed in 
garrisoning every town in Ireland. The Government of the Free State shall not 
function, as they and their army and officials shall be treated exactly as the Black 
and Tans were treated by the I.R.A.
93
 
 
Boland was fatally wounded outside the Grand Hotel in Skerries on 30 July 1922 and died in St. 
Vincent‘s hospital from his wounds. However, his assertions that the anti-treatyite forces in 
Munster could not be easily defeated proved inaccurate, in the short-term at least, as in reality 
this so-called republic existed only on paper. Before the conflict in Dublin had come to an end it 
became clear to the leaders of both the National and Irregular troops that Limerick would be vital 
in any future conflict. According to Hopkinson, if the Irregulars had gained full control of 
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Limerick then both Brennan‘s Command in Clare and Galway and MacEoin‘s in Athlone, two 
vital pro-treatyite command areas outside Dublin, would have been completely isolated. In 
addition, he argues that if the Irregulars controlled Limerick then it could be used as a 
springboard for a further move on Dublin.
94
 Accordingly, the hierarchy of the National Army 
ordered a national offensive to breach this so-called defensive line and capture the Munster 
Republic. They believed that it was only a matter of time before the Irregulars‘ resistance would 
disintegrate in the face of their ever-improving National force. In their efforts to capture the 
Munster Republic they not only dispatched columns overland to take Limerick and Waterford, 
they also initiated seaborne landings at various locations throughout the coastline of the South-
East and West. Firstly, Brennan reneged on a previous truce between both forces occupying 
Limerick city. He attacked the anti-treatyite militants garrisoned there on 11 July 1922. 
Additionally, O‘Duffy reinforced Brennan with a force of 1,500 men, four armoured cars and a 
field gun.
95
 By 19 July the National Army had driven the Irregulars from their positions in 
Limerick and it was now in Government hands. 
Meanwhile, as the Civil War gathered pace, the Provisional Government announced the 
setting up of an Army Council on 13 July which consisted of Collins as Commander-in-Chief, 
Mulcahy as Chief of Staff and O‘Duffy as Assistant Chief of Staff.96 Mulcahy also remained as 
Minister for Defence but as Collins was now in military uniform Cosgrave became acting 
chairman of the Provisional Government. This move was intended to inspire confidence in the 
National Army. Nonetheless Waterford City, despite some obstacles, was taken relatively easily 
by National troops via a small scale amphibious landing on 23 July 1922. In addition to this, 
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National troops disembarked from the SS Lady Wicklow and landed at Fenit pier, County Kerry, 
on 2 August under the command of O‘Daly and members of the Dublin Guard. With the use of a 
large quantity of military hardware the National Army quickly occupied Tralee, Castleisland and 
Killarney without opposition. According to Niall C. Harrington, a junior officer in the Army at 
the time of the Civil War and future Deputy Director of Irish Intelligence, the ‗armament we 
carried was formidable for that period of our military beginning.‘97 During this operation he 
claimed that the National troops had at their disposal: 
one 18-pounder filed piece, an armoured car named ‗Ex-Mutineer‘ which had 
been captured at the Four Courts (where it had been ‗Mutineer‘); Lewis guns, 
rifles, ammunition in great quantities, grenades and grenade caps; tools of the 
trade for the task ahead.
98
 
 
The Army now switched its focus to Cork. With the aid of diversionary landings at Union Hall 
the Avornia, under Dalton‘s command, put ashore several hundred men and a large quantity of 
military equipment at Passage West, County Cork on 8 August. This seaborne operation, 
according to Deasy, seriously affected the Irregulars‘ prosecution of the conventional phase of 
the conflict.
99
 Finally, they National Army also took control of Mayo and its surrounding areas 
due to an amphibious operation there. With Limerick and Waterford now occupied, by National 
troops, the Irregulars‘ aspirations at defending their so-called ‗Munster Republic‘ through 
conventional warfare, like Dublin before it, were no more. 
Although the level of Irregular resistance varied from area to area, nowhere were they 
able to defeat comprehensively the National troops. Collins confidently wrote to Cosgrave on 5 
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August and stated that despite the activity of localised columns in the West no ‗definite military 
problem‘ faced them outside the First Southern Division area.100 With the fall of the ‗Munster 
Republic‘, in addition to the collapse of Irregular opposition in Dublin, it became increasingly 
apparent to the Irregulars‘ hierarchy that they could not sustain a conventional war given the 
growing inequities between both forces. Deasy realised that the Irregulars‘ confidence and 
optimism was crushed following the coastal landings in late July and early August 1922. He 
stated that:  
Any possibility of our forces mounting a full scale defence of Munster was by 
now discounted. The Free State forces were well organized and fully equipped 
with arms, artillery, armoured cars and transport. They had taken us by surprise 
when they began landing troops at strategic points on the coast […] This was 
really, for all of us, the bitter end of the first phase of the Civil War. The solid 
south, in which we had so much confidence, was completely broken.
101
  
 
More importantly, even before the fall of the ‗Munster Republic‘, Lynch recognised the 
Irregulars‘ inability to conduct an effective conventional war against the National Army. 
Consequently, he issued an order on 25 July in which he stated that ‗Our Military policy must be 
Guerrilla tactics as in late war with common enemy, but owing to increased arms and efficiency 
of officers and men, it can be waged more intensely.‘102 As the Irish Civil War progressed from 
July to August a general trend emerged whereby the Irregulars, following a confrontation with 
National forces, fled rapidly and burned the barracks which they had held as they retreated. They 
also began to focus on the country‘s railway network in an attempt to devastate the Provisional 
Government financially.
103
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The emergence of guerrilla warfare became an ever-increasing concern for the 
Government and National forces. Cosgrave, determined to portray the Civil War as an Irregular 
war against the Irish people, claimed that the tactics adopted by the Irregulars would result in 
significant hardships for the civilian population. He stated that: 
As it becomes increasingly clear that the Irregulars cannot hope to offer 
successful military resistance to the National Army, their operations are assuming 
more distinctly the character of a war upon the economic life of the Irish people. 
Bridges are being broken and roads obstructed all over the country. In many 
places the railways have been cut and traffic interrupted. Within the last few days 
sections of the canals have been drained off. These acts do not prevent the 
progress of the National Troops; they do not even seriously impede the transport 
of military supplies. They are effective only against the civilian population. They 
prevent the proper distribution of flour and other imported foodstuffs, causing 
generally great hardships and in some cases actual starvation.
104
 
 
As the Civil War entered the month of August, the optimism that Collins demonstrated 
diminished as it soon became apparent that the National Army only had superficial control over 
large areas of Munster. The Irregulars, beaten conventionally, retreated into the mountains and 
adopted guerrilla warfare as their modus operandi for the remainder of the War. This meant that 
Boland‘s declarations that Munster would not be effortlessly defeated ultimately proved correct. 
In the short term, the Irregulars proved to be no match for the National Army. However, as the 
Civil War progressed and degenerated into a guerrilla conflict Munster, particularly Kerry, 
became a thorn in the side of the Provisional Government and National Army, one which 
ensured that the conflict would last for a further nine months. 
 The character of the Irish Civil War had shifted once again and now became a war based 
on ambushing, sniping and raids. Because the Irregulars were defeated conventionally they 
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adopted guerrilla tactics as they attempted to hinder the establishment of the Irish Free State. 
This internal conflict began with the National Army‘s bombardment of the Four Courts building 
in Dublin. However, due to the ineptitude and lack of forward military planning the Irregulars‘ 
prosecution of the conflict was severely hampered from the outset. Owing to the radical element 
of the anti-treatyite militants they had jettisoned one of their most able commanders and his 
substantial division of troops. Furthermore, because of their lack of a clear proactive strategy the 
Irregulars haphazardly prosecuted the conventional phase of the Civil War until they were driven 
from the majority of places which they claimed to occupy. Determined not to be defeated, Lynch 
and his remaining militants evaporated from the towns and cities and attacked army 
communication and supply routes, attacking the country‘s infrastructure and constantly 
ambushing Government forces. Yet for other prominent Irregulars, such as Aiken, the adoption 
of guerrilla warfare against former comrades was an unfortunate way to achieve the Republic. 
He stated:  
In July 1922 we find ourselves through the trickery of our common enemy in two 
camps using all our talents and energy in fighting, abusing, and even maligning 
each other. We are the same men, the difference is, as an old priest said, that war 
with the foreigner brings to the fore all that is best and noblest in a nation, civil 
war all that is mean and base.
105
   
 
It was now early August 1922 and the conventional phase of the Irish Civil War was 
over. It has been established in the foregoing chapter that divisions within the anti-treatyite 
I.R.A.‘s leadership, coupled with their defensive strategy, ensured that the Irregulars‘ 
prosecution of the Civil War was hampered from the beginning. The fall of both Dublin and the 
‗Munster Republic‘ further guaranteed that a conventional conflict was no longer an option for 
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the Irregulars. Thus guerrilla warfare, by way of ambushes, sniping and raids became a reality. 
The decision by Lynch to adopt tactics such as these would irrevocably alter the dynamic of the 
conflict leaving it more callous and bitter affair. The Provisional Government and National 
Army, initially buoyant with their succession of victories, became increasingly concerned at the 
rising level of violence in the country. Moreover, they became progressively frustrated at their 
inability to defeat the Irregulars‘ guerrilla campaign. Consequently, further divisions emerged in 
the Dáil. Disharmony centred on the issue of adopting stern emergency measures which were 
necessary, it was argued, to hasten the end of the Civil War. Ultimately, the adoption of guerrilla 
tactics by the Irregulars meant that the likelihood of future retaliatory measures by the 
Government and Army increased significantly. For now, however, the general unity enjoyed by 
the nationalist independence movement prior to the Anglo-Irish Treaty was shattered. What 
remained was a country split by a civil war that had deteriorated into a malevolent guerrilla 
conflict.
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CHAPTER 2 
Emergency Powers: The 1922 Public Safety Resolution 
 
 
Following the conventional defeat of the anti-treatyite militants by August 1922 and the 
adoption of guerrilla warfare by the Irregulars the Irish Civil War entered a new chapter. Due to 
the Irregulars‘ abandonment of large-scale engagements and the restructuring of their fighting 
formations into A.S.U.s the Government and its embryonic armed forces were plagued with a 
continual threat of ambush, sniping, and raids. Moreover, the constant sabotaging of the 
country‘s railway network threatened to leave the newly established state in economic ruin. As 
W. A. Phillips stated in 1923 ‗Towns might be taken […] but the victors found themselves 
masters only of the ground on which they stood, while the vanquished melted away into the bogs 
and mountains, to harass the flanks and rear of their conquerors.‘1 Yet it was not until Michael 
Collins was killed in an Irregular ambush, on 22 August, that an official executions policy 
became a distinct possibility. This chapter focuses on the supposition that this incident acted as a 
catalyst for the Government, a government shocked to its core by the death of its leader. Collins 
and Mulcahy had opposed the adoption of stern emergency measures to tackle the Irregulars. 
However, Collins‘ death unified support for the adoption of increasingly resolute policies. 
Bearing this in mind the Public Safety Resolution, passed on 28 September 1922, will be 
examined. Adopted in response to Collins‘ death this decree facilitated the Government‘s 
executions policy during the Civil War. In order to evaluate a resolution of this nature the 
circumstances surrounding its introduction need to be assessed. The ratification of the emergency 
resolution irrevocably altered the landscape of the conflict. Ultimately, this period of the War 
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was characterised by an increased severity, resolve and determination on the part of the 
Government and the developing National Army to tackle the Irregulars‘ guerrilla campaign and 
conclude the conflict. 
Since the beginning of the Civil War numerous cabinet ministers, such as W. T. 
Cosgrave, Kevin O‘Higgins and Patrick J. Hogan, believed that insufficient measures had been 
employed against the Irregulars. Hence, an atmosphere of growing impatience emerged within 
the Provisional Government. The opening sessions of the Third Dáil, which began on 5
 
September, coincided with increasing evidence of rising casualties, such as the death of the 
Commander-in-Chief General Michael Collins, and the spiralling economic cost of the conflict. 
The Irish Civil War would eventually result in an estimated four thousand military dead and 
wounded. The economic cost, which would nearly bankrupt this fledgling state, eventually 
reached an estimated £30 million in material damage with a further £17 million required to 
finance the War.
2
 The hardening of resolve on the part of certain elements of the Provisional 
Government culminated in the formation of the controversial Public Safety Resolution. 
Introduced to the Dáil, on 27
 
September 1922, by the Minister for Defence and new Commander-
in-Chief General Richard Mulcahy, this proposition would permanently change the face of this 
increasingly bitter conflict.  
Debates both for and against the implementation of more comprehensive measures to 
tackle the rising level of lawlessness in Ireland were ever-present. The onset of the guerrilla 
campaign exacerbated the situation. Like the War of Independence before, ambushes on 
Government troops became commonplace. Moreover, the Irregular forces sought to create the 
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conditions whereby the establishment of order and the Provisional Government‘s authority 
throughout Ireland would become unfeasible. This intent was acknowledged by Liam Lynch, in a 
memorandum which he issued on 4 December 1922: 
Activities on our side have been hitherto restricted to larger operations of guerrilla 
[…] Harassing tactics must be continually adopted to weaken enemy morale. 
Sniping and ambushing enemy parties, attacking posts, destroying enemy 
communications and supplies – these must be pushed and destroyed.3 
 
For Lynch the most opportune way to defeat the pro-treatyite forces was to attack the 
infrastructure of the country upon which the Army and Government relied. This opinion was 
outlined in a letter to de Valera on 11 January 1923:  
The following are our reasons for obstructing train communications:- 
 
1 to delay enemy reinforcements and supplies. 
2 by forcing enemy to use roads for transport, and so create more 
opportunities for attack on his forces by our A.S.Us. 
3 to force enemy to employ large numbers of his forces guarding railways 
and road convoys. 
4 to prevent the travelling of his I/C‘s and spies. 
5 to considerably delay his dispatches. 
6 to hold up general administration of the enemy.
4
  
 
Therefore, the Irregulars focused on the country‘s railway network with an orgy of destruction 
which was designed to bring the Provisional Government to its knees.
5
 Concern over attacks on 
the railway network and army supplies to the troops was emphasised in a letter from Collins on 
31
 
July 1922 to his then Chief of Staff, Mulcahy. In an attempt to alleviate the problem Mulcahy 
suggested that military stores be placed on civilian trains, which would be guarded in order to 
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provide a suitable deterrent against attack.
6
 Advocates of the adoption of increasingly stern 
measures were primarily civilian members of the Government. Conversely, those conciliatory 
elements within the Government which were opposed to the adoption of increasingly rigid 
measures were represented by Collins and Mulcahy. Collins, even though accustomed to 
conflict, had hoped for reconciliation. This was denoted by his reluctance to take firm action 
against the Irregulars that occupied the Four Courts.
7
 Furthermore, he had on numerous 
occasions encouraged peace initiatives in an attempt to restore military and political unity, as 
evidenced by the attempted Collins-de Valera electoral ‗Pact‘ in May 1922. 
Collins, as Minister for Finance and Chairman of the Provisional Government, was an 
excellent administrator and organiser. However, he also had an in-depth knowledge of the 
military side of the independence struggle due to his prominent roles in the I.R.A., I.R.B. and 
National Army. Both he and Mulcahy were previously comrades and close friends with many of 
those who had taken up arms against the Provisional Government and the National Army. 
Consequently, the loyalty and camaraderie felt by both men to their previous comrades may have 
influenced their attitudes towards the adoption of emergency measures.
8
 Even though both men 
held political portfolios they were perhaps more acutely aware of the ramifications of 
implementing increasingly stern policies against the Irregulars. Whereas certain civilian 
members of the Government, void of a certain amount of sentimental attachment to the pre-truce 
I.R.A., were primarily political beings and were more adamant to implement resolute policies. 
Even though O‘Higgins did have a brief military career, it was by his own admission ‗very short 
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though very brilliant‘.9 O‘Higgins had been a member of the Volunteers, the predecessor of the 
I.R.A., and attempted to participate in the 1916 Rising. However, roadblocks prevented his 
admittance to Dublin on the day of the rebellion.
10
 Following the Rising he became the Captain 
of the Stradbally Company in the Carlow Brigade in 1917 but the title did not denote any active 
service.
11
 When Collins temporarily left the running of the Provisional Government to Cosgrave 
in July to head the Army Council, O‘Higgins was dispatched to the Adjutant-General‘s office to 
assist Gearóid O‘Sullivan. O‘Higgins, with little military experience, made an unlikely 
Commandant-General. Following Collins‘ death he was released from his military duties to 
pursue a much-preferred political career. He was appointed as Minister of Home Affairs on 26 
August and Vice-President of the Executive Council on 30 August 1922 as part of the cabinet 
reshuffle following the death of both Griffith and Collins.
12
 Collins was of the opinion that every 
effort should be made to avoid the implementation of drastic measures until it was an absolute 
necessity. Publicly he was determined to defend and consolidate the country‘s freedom as 
ratified by the people following the vote on the Treaty. He stated we ‗have now a native 
government, constitutionally elected, and it is the duty of every Irish man and woman to obey it. 
Anyone who fails to obey it is an enemy of the people and must expect to be treated as such.‘13 
Privately, however, he believed that the Irregulars should be given an opportunity to capitulate, 
keep their dignity and beliefs intact, while adhering to the democratic principles as represented in 
the people‘s acceptance of the Treaty. He wanted to avoid any unnecessary destruction and loss 
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of life. Moreover, he did not want to mitigate the Irregulars weaknesses by resolute action 
beyond what was required.
14
  
Nonetheless, Cabinet divisions grew. Numerous examples of correspondence between 
Collins, Mulcahy and Cosgrave are indicative of the developing situation. When writing to 
Mulcahy, on 26 July, Collins acknowledged that the Government were contemplating the 
employment of increasingly stern methods to restore order in areas where violence still 
continued. Collins stipulated that the Government would support ‗the Military Authorities in 
whatever steps they may consider necessary to restore order in districts where military operations 
have ceased, but in which outbreaks of violence still continue.‘15 In response to this early 
enthusiasm, indicated by the Government, Collins recommended that the Army should simply 
undertake general searches for arms and carefully look for local co-operation. According to 
Collins, if anything should be found the appropriate action to take would be to simply disarm in 
most cases, in other cases internment and in exceptional situations, trial. These proposals did not 
equate to unwavering support for the adoption of emergency measures. Mulcahy, in his response 
to the aforementioned letter, concurred with Collins. He stressed that all persons found in 
possession of un-reported arms after a given date would be ‗(a) Guilty of an offence and liable to 
a small penalty, and (b) That in districts where there is armed disturbance they shall be further 
liable to be charged with complicity in that disturbance.‘16 This correspondence indicates that 
Mulcahy did not advocate the adoption of stern measures. Mulcahy, as Regan argues, ‗was more 
temperate than that of some of his civilian colleagues in the Government.‘17  
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Cosgrave, as acting Chairman of the Provisional Government, voiced his support for the 
potential adoption of emergency measures in a letter to Collins on 27 July 1922. He stated that a 
proclamation should be issued warning all those Irregulars ‗that the troops have orders to shoot 
persons found sniping, ambushing or in possession of bombs, or interfering with Railway 
communications in areas which military operations have ceased.‘18 Again, in response to the 
above letter and while in support of certain strategies, Collins documented his overall 
disapproval of the adoption of an unyielding approach towards the Irregulars. He stated that ‗I 
may say that I am in favour of drastic action being taken, but I am against the shooting of 
unarmed men in any circumstances when it is known to the Troops that the men are unarmed.‘19 
Mulcahy‘s opposition to the adoption of stern action disappeared after the death of Collins on 22 
August 1922 in an Irregular ambush at Béal na mBláth, County Cork.
20
 This event was to shock 
both Government and Army. It crudely reminded both institutions of the grave threat that the 
Irregulars‘ guerrilla campaign posed to the country. It was reported in the London newspaper, the 
Daily Sketch, that as Collins lay fatally wounded, following the ambush, he re-emphasised his 
distaste for the implementation of unyielding methods against the Irregulars. He told his close 
friend Emmet Dalton, who had accompanied him on the tour of the West, ‗Forgive them. No 
reprisals. Bury me in Glasnevin with the boys.‘21  
As Collins and Mulcahy represented the main force opposing the implementation of stern 
measures his demise left an enormous void which would prove difficult, if not impossible, to fill. 
This in itself presented many obstacles which would have enormous repercussions not only for 
the Government and the Army but for the entire landscape of the Irish Civil War. Collins‘ death 
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left important positions vacant and in urgent need of occupation to maintain stability. Collins 
was an able Government administrator and successful military commander. Mulcahy quickly 
adopted the role of Commander-in-Chief, while retaining his ministerial status as Minister for 
Defence, a move that caused some contention in the Dáil. Coupled with this, Cosgrave became 
Chairman of the Provisional Government, having already been elected President of the Dáil 
following the death, by brain haemorrhage, of Arthur Griffith, on 10 August 1922. His 
appointment was welcomed by the vast majority of the assembly as he was regarded as the best 
candidate for the post. As Curran states, Cosgrave had a wealth of administrative experience, 
which none of his colleagues could match and his participation in the Easter Rising in 1916 left 
him with unimpeachable nationalist credentials.
22
 Consequently, numerous ministers now 
occupied the military and political positions that one man, Collins, had previously held.  
The death of Collins and Griffith, combined with the current military situation of 
ambushes and attacks on railways, had a resounding effect on the reformed leadership of the 
Provisional Government and Army. According to a British intelligence report on 26 August: 
The tragic death of MICHAEL COLLINS, following so closely on that of 
ARTHUR GRIFFITH, will probably have one of two effects; it will either cause 
the Army and the Nation to lose its temper and take really drastic action against 
the rebels or it will dishearten them to a dangerous degree. For the moment the 
indications are that the second alternative is supervening.
23
   
 
The Government was indeed despondent after Collins‘ death. However, this quickly turned to 
renewed determination. Those who inherited Collins‘ legacy also inherited his policies. The 
Government issued a national message of condolence to the Irish people following his death. 
They stated that the Government were going to interpret his wishes and continue along the path 
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that Collins had set out for them. According to this message, he ‗has been slain to our unutterable 
grief and loss, but he cannot die. He will live in the rule of the people which he gave his great 
best to assert and confirm, and which his colleagues undertake a solemn charge to maintain.‘24 
However, his colleagues‘ interpretation of his policies proved to be somewhat different than that 
of the late Commander-in-Chief. Neeson argues that Collins‘ policies were ‗followed […] more 
rigidly and ruthlessly than he might have done.‘25 Hopkinson argues that Collins‘ untimely 
departure, particularly the way in which he died, led to a greater degree of commitment and 
ruthlessness on the Provisional Government side, which culminated in the adoption of 
increasingly resolute measures.
26
  
Before emergency measures could be pursued the legislative abilities of the Provisional 
Government needed to be assessed. They were, despite claims by the anti-treatyites, the de facto 
government of the country. The Treaty, under which this Government had been established, was 
ratified by the Dáil and the country in January and June 1922, respectively. Furthermore, as the 
Third Dáil had begun on 9 September 1922, following the June election, the complicated nature 
of dual governance became less complex. The original dual system terminated on this date and 
saw the union of the Second Dáil and the initial Provisional Government under the Third Dáil. 
Following this a new Provisional Government was appointed responsible, technically speaking, 
to the Dáil and continued as the sole Government of the country until it was superseded by the 
establishment of the Irish Free State Government on 6 December 1922.
27
 O‘Higgins alluded to 
this on 28 September 1922. According to O‘Higgins, we ‗are at the moment a Provisional 
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Government, and this Parliament is at the moment a Parliament to which the Provisional 
Government is responsible. It is not proposed by any act of ours to acquiesce in any departure 
from that position.‘28 Hugh Kennedy, the law officer of the Provisional Government, was 
consulted to clarify the Government‘s legislative status. He subsequently became the Attorney 
General and first Chief Justice of the Irish Free State from 1922-1924 and 1924-1936, 
respectively.
29
 Kennedy stated that, under the terms of the Treaty, the Provisional Government 
faced certain restrictions when passing laws.
30
 These laws could only be concerned with 
functions actually transferred to the Provisional Government. Furthermore, they could only 
legislate for the twenty-six counties and pass laws relating to matters of administration during the 
period 6 December 1921 and would end upon the ratification of the new Irish Constitution or 6 
December 1922, whichever was sooner.
31
 The Government was also restricted in making laws 
concerning the imposition of taxation.
32
 The most important issue related to royal assent. Under 
the terms of the Treaty royal assent was a pre-requisite before any law could be ratified in 
southern Ireland. Following the signing of the aforementioned settlement between Ireland and 
Britain a Governor-General would be the King‘s representative in Ireland and would fulfil this 
role. However, Kennedy argued that: 
I am of the opinion that the office and functions of the Lord Lieutenant as such 
have ceased in the 26 counties since the passing of the Irish Free State Agreement 
Act. The appointment of a Governor General has not yet arrived [...] the 
Provisional Government is in my opinion in the position of both [of] these 
functions [...] It may well be argued by the British that the King‘s personal assent 
is requisite [...] This question may give rise to much difficulty which may be 
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avoided by confining the legislative work of the Parliament to resolutions on the 
subjects within the powers of the Parliament.
33
 
 
As a result, Kennedy advocated the adoption of resolutions instead of fully-fledged Acts of 
Parliament. Whether or not the Provisional Government possessed the absolute authority to 
introduce emergency measures, whilst noteworthy, is ultimately overshadowed by the fact that it 
ratified and implemented an emergency resolution regardless of issues concerning its legality. 
The Government introduced a retrospective Act of Indemnity in August 1923 designed to rectify 
any legal irregularities during the conflict which will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 
seven. 
With this information in his possession Mulcahy made a final attempt to find a 
rapprochement with de Valera.
34
 This meeting was ultimately unproductive. Mulcahy was 
criticised by his colleagues when they discovered that he had secretly met with de Valera. 
Following a statement, on 15 September, by Mulcahy detailing the powers required by the Army 
to restore order to the country, the Law Officer was instructed to draft the necessary bill.
35
 On 27 
September Mulcahy, under the auspices of the Provisional Government, introduced the Public 
Safety Resolution which ignited the Dáil into a heated debate. On the one hand, there were 
numerous members of the Government that advocated the adoption of more austere measures to 
tackle the Irregulars. These included, amongst others, Cosgrave, O‘Higgins, and Hogan. 
Additionally, Mulcahy altered his outlook following Collins‘ death. This was counter-balanced 
by the Labour party and a small quantity of independent T.D.s. Opponents of the resolution did 
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not believe that implementing the decree would result in the restoration of order throughout 
Ireland or a quick end to the Civil War. Following the passing of the Treaty and the departure of 
the anti-treatyite political faction, led by the ex-President Eamon de Valera, the Labour party 
became the primary opposition in the Dáil. Yet, as the Provisional Government maintained a 
numerical majority of one hundred and twenty-eight seats to seventeen the opposition of the 
Labour party had little real effect or influence. Therefore, a sizeable section of the Provisional 
Government, now filled with a new resolve, pushed for the implementation of the controversial 
resolution.  
The emergency powers, it was hoped, would effectively tackle the continuing situation of 
disorder and armed resistance that existed in numerous parts of the country and hasten the end of 
the Civil War. Resembling martial law, it endowed upon the National Army the responsibility of 
setting up military courts and/or military committees. These courts/committees had authority 
over both civilians and militants, and were charged with the task of restoring order and enforcing 
the Provisional Government‘s authority throughout the country. The resolution stated that the 
Government had: 
entrusted to the Army the duty of securing the public safety and restoring order 
throughout the country and has placed on the Army the responsibility for the 
establishment of the authority of the Government in all parts of the country in 
which that authority is challenged by force.
36
 
 
Incorporated within the decree was the power to inflict a sizeable range of punishments which 
included execution, imprisonment, internment, deportation and fine for sundry offences that 
interfered with or delayed the effective establishment of order and Governmental authority 
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throughout the country. The offences that could be investigated by the courts/committees 
included: 
The enquiry by such Military Courts or Committees into the cases of persons 
charged with any of the offences following, that is to say:— Taking part in or 
aiding or abetting any attack upon or using force against the National Forces. 
Looting arson destruction seizure unlawful possession or removal of or damage to 
any public or private property. Having possession without proper authority of any 
bomb or article in the nature of a bomb or any dynamite gelignite or other 
explosive substance or any revolver rifle gun or other firearm or lethal weapon or 
any ammunition for such firearm.
37
  
 
Following the introduction of these proposed measures, the Dáil erupted into an intense and 
animated debate in which both advocates and opponents of an executions policy disputed the 
potential merits and drawbacks of the proposition.  
Cosgrave, as President of the assembly, opened the discussion with a speech which 
characterised and represented the resolute attitude of the Government. He believed that the 
Government‘s primary responsibility was to the developing Irish democracy over the personal 
loyalties to former friends and colleagues. He argued that there was a necessity to extinguish, as 
quickly as possible, the current armed guerrilla resistance in the country, in order to save the 
social and economic livelihood of the country and to halt the increasing amount of military and 
civilian casualties: 
In this resolution the Government asks for certain powers for the army, which the 
responsible Army authorities consider are necessary for the protection of their 
soldiers. If murderous attacks take place, those who persist in those murderous 
attacks must learn that they have got to pay the penalty for them […] They must 
be taught that this Government is not going to suffer their soldiers to be maimed 
and ruined, crippled and killed.
38
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Cosgrave acknowledged that it was hoped the resistance could be crushed by other means, a 
view once held by Collins and Mulcahy, but given the current military situation the adoption of 
such a hard-line course of action was, in his view, an absolute necessity. This is interesting 
considering that Cosgrave once decried the British for adopting an executions policy after the 
Rising in 1916 and during the War of Independence. Nonetheless, he accepted the severity of the 
proposal but could see no other way to defeat the Irregulars. He argued that: 
although I have always objected to a death penalty, there is no other way I know 
of in which ordered conditions can be restored in this country, or any security 
obtained for our troops, or to give our troops any confidence in us as a 
Government. We must accept the responsibility.
39
 
 
Desmond FitzGerald, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, seconded the resolution and stated 
that the adoption of an official executions policy was completely unavoidable. He believed that it 
was crucial to facilitate the troops in carrying out their duties as expeditiously as possible. 
FitzGerald reminded the Dáil that a disastrous situation existed throughout the country where 
ruin was being spread and that ‗on an occasion like the present there is no opportunity, and there 
is no justification, for any quibbling about legality or […] humanitarian catch-cries.‘40 
FitzGerald‘s comments are important. They are indicative of the sense of urgency and necessity 
that had infused the Government. He believed that every means necessary, irrespective of 
legality, should be employed to defeat the Irregulars and restore settled conditions. Coupled with 
this FitzGerald, like others such as Seán Milroy, argued that this policy was absolutely necessary 
to combat the economic impact that the Irregulars‘ guerrilla campaign was having on the country 
through their destruction of the country‘s infrastructure. He believed that the time had come for 
comprehensive action as the Irregulars had been given ‗every possible encouragement by the fact 
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that we have allowed them to inflict as much damage as they can.‘41 Milroy agreed with 
FitzGerald and argued that the Irregulars‘ continuous assaults on the economic livelihood of the 
country were completely unacceptable. He stated that Ireland was confronted by people who 
were defying the constituted authority of the Nation and were endeavouring to overthrow that 
authority by engaging ‗in an attempt to pass sentence of capital punishment on the economic life 
of the nation.‘42  
Mulcahy, showing a volte face in relation to policy, requested that the assembly endorse 
the executions policy in order to save the livelihood of the country. He wanted to indicate to the 
Irregulars that their armed resistance would no longer be dealt with mildly. He stated in the Dáil: 
We are asking for these powers that certain steps may be taken against people 
who commit murder and burn down property, people who are aiming at the life of 
the country […] It is a necessity that these people in the country who are 
committing murder, who are committing arson, looting, and destroying the life of 
this country, should know that they shall forfeit their lives if they continue to do 
that work, and the Government must set up machinery for taking that forfeiture.
43
 
 
Mulcahy‘s choice of rhetoric is interesting. No longer was he a member of a rebel organisation 
fighting for Irish independence, he was now Minister for Defence in the Government and 
Commander-in-Chief of the National Army. Mulcahy was proposing a policy that he once 
condemned the British for adopting. However, now charged with enforcing the Treaty and 
defeating a group of armed militants, his language became increasingly formal, contending that 
an executions policy was now an absolute must. Mulcahy suggested that the Irregulars‘ constant 
attacks on the country‘s railway network could prove disastrous to Ireland as the economic 
structure necessary for trade was being destroyed, arguing that: 
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All over the south of the country we have railway communications running from 
here to Waterford, from here to Mallow, and in a day or two to Limerick. But the 
country lying lateral between these points is practically without transport. There 
are no railways running there, because those forces that have thrown themselves 
loose on the country have smashed up the railway. Practically the whole South of 
Ireland is without means of transport and communication necessary to [do] 
business.
44
 
 
He claimed that the death penalty would be employed purely as a defensive measure to protect 
the property and lives of the people and was essential to facilitate the restoration of normal 
conditions to the country.
45
 Mulcahy‘s assertions would be scrutinized further following several 
incidents, such as the reprisal executions of four men in Mountjoy Jail, carried out under this 
decree. Nonetheless, at this juncture the Minister for Local Government, Ernest Blythe, 
applauded the Army for its composure during the Civil War and argued that it was to the 
Government‘s credit that they did not hastily conceive this policy: 
If there is anything that has been noticeable about the attitude of the Army since 
the beginning of the year it has been the desire of the Army, not only the High 
Command of the Army, but of the local officers and of the men to spare life as 
much as possible. It was that desire to spare life and to avoid the shedding of 
blood that caused the delay in operations as long as it was. It may be that their 
delay will bring and has brought additional bloodshed, but nobody will regret that 
delay because the whole purpose of it was to do everything to avoid settling this 
matter by killing.
46
 
 
Blythe stated that the high command of the Army, personified by Collins and Mulcahy, were not 
originally in favor of extreme measures. He argued that they endeavored to avoid the crushing of 
the armed resistance by executions. Darrell Figgis, an Independent T.D., supported the 
Government in their adoption of stern tactics. Acknowledging the severity of the proposition he 
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indicated that it was absolutely essential due to the tactics adopted by the Irregulars. He 
recognised that there existed a situation in Ireland so severe and unusual that unless it was 
tackled ‗by some Draconian method, the health of this country might be permanently destroyed, 
the sanity of this country might be permanently destroyed, and the welfare of this country 
undoubtedly will be permanently destroyed.‘47 Figgis acknowledged that the armed guerrilla 
resistance that existed within the country must be dealt with vigorously, however, he argued that 
the Army should not be given carte blanche to deal with the Irregulars.
48
  
The Labour party leader, Thomas Johnson, began the disputation of this resolution. 
Johnson, although against the adoption of an executions policy, argued that his disapproval in no 
way implied support for the Irregulars. He protested that his opposition was an attempt to save 
the good name of the Army and the Nation from the risks and dangers that would follow the 
adoption of such a policy.
49
 Johnson condemned the lack of transparency, on the part of the 
Government concerning their proposition of these measures, believing that there was a necessity 
to carry out a detailed examination and disclosure of the military situation throughout the country 
before such powers could be assigned to the Army.
50
  He claimed that the adoption of this kind 
of policy was a clear sign of weakness on the part of the Government and the Army, stating: 
Anybody, I am quite certain, reading the resolution would say it was a sign, not of 
strength, but of weakness—an S.O.S. signal that the Army was not capable of 
dealing with the situation in the country, and that it would need to have powers 
over all men—civilians as well as soldiers— during peace or war in any part of 
the country.
51
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He also questioned the Government over the potential emergence of a military dictatorship 
following the adoption of the proposal: 
They have been granted power, and we are asked to confirm that grant of power 
to the Army, to set up Military Courts to try any cases that that Army wishes, to 
punish by death any civilian who breaks a general order or regulation made by 
that Army in the future. Military dictatorship indeed!
52
 
 
Johnson argued that this increased risk of dictatorship was unacceptable as the Government were 
not only requesting the adoption of the death penalty but also the ability to deport and intern 
offenders for indefinite periods.
53
 However, the ultimate reason for the Labour party‘s opposition 
related to the discipline, or lack of it, in the National Army. Johnson focused on the type of the 
troops that would be entrusted to implement the policy stating that they did not possess the 
necessary experience to carry out such a task: 
You have not got within your Army to-day that perfect discipline and control 
which would prevent a fearful disaster coming upon the good name of this 
country [...] You are not only authorising the Army to punish by death any 
offender against the Regulation or Order issued by that Army, but you are 
authorising that Army to deport or transport overseas any citizen of this country 
for any indefinite period. Is that a power that we are willing to hand over to the 
Minister for Defence or to his subordinates, most of whom have not one-tenth of 
the appreciation of the responsibilities of their position that he has.
54
 
 
            Another Labour T.D., Cathal O‘Shannon, concurred with Johnson. He acknowledged that 
the Army possessed numerous qualities; however, he stated that it was essentially the sum of its 
parts. He argued that the composition of the Army was practically identical to that of the anti-
treatyite guerrillas. Hence, he believed that they did not possess the discipline or legal knowledge 
to enforce such a policy. According to O‘Shannon, troops in the Army: 
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have not the training, the ability or the experience in decisions, involving big 
questions of law, constitutionalism and everything else. They are not fit to be the 
judges in courts that have power of life and death over tens of thousands and 
hundreds of thousands of people in this country.
55
 
 
O‘Shannon and Johnson‘s arguments are valid to a certain degree. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, a sizeable proportion of the experienced pre-truce I.R.A. chose to take the anti-treaty 
side during the Civil War. The National Army, therefore, contained a lot of inexperienced men 
recruited since the signing of the Treaty. The National Army did, however, contain some skilled 
pre-truce I.R.A. Furthermore, a small percentage of these seasoned fighters had also served in the 
British Army. For example, Emmet Dalton, a close associate of Collins had risen to the rank of 
Major in the British Army and had been awarded the Military Cross for gallantry during the First 
World War. Following his return to Ireland Dalton became a prominent member of the I.R.A. in 
Dublin during the War of Independence and subsequently became the G.O.C. Southern 
Command as a Major-General in the National Army during the Civil War.
56
 Nonetheless, Seán 
Milroy stressed that any country‘s embryonic defence forces would face similar problems. 
Therefore, he claimed that the country‘s developing Army was not responsible for its own chief 
defects.
57
 Blythe suggested that this lack of familiarity would benefit the situation. He argued 
that it would void these troops of a certain amount of ill-feeling and contempt towards the 
Irregulars, as he stated:  
The fact that the Army consists so largely of recruits, of new men, of men of not 
very long experience hardly affects the matter when that is the spirit. Perhaps the 
only result of that will be that they will not have the hardness, the rigidity, the 
callousness that you will find in professional officers of long standing, and 
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soldiers who had a long and hardening experience. And the suggestion that this 
thing will cause dark deeds to be done is also a ludicrous suggestion.
58
 
 
            The inexperience and indiscipline of the National Army was one of the main reasons for 
the introduction of the proposal. Mulcahy was all too aware of the growing number of excesses 
carried out by National troops in various locations throughout the country. Following the death 
of Collins and the descent into guerrilla warfare National troops faced the continual threat of 
ambushes, sniping and raids by the Irregulars with no legal means to vent their frustrations. As a 
result, a certain number of unofficial executions occurred, especially in areas where the 
Irregulars‘ resistance was strongest, particularly in places like Dublin and Kerry. According to C. 
S. Andrews, the number of unauthorised killings ‗by the Free State murder gangs, of which there 
were several, principally in Dublin, amounted to 153.‘59 Eunan O‘Halpin substantiates Andrews‘ 
claims. He suggests that as many as 150 Irregulars were killed, outside the law, during the Civil 
War.
60
 The majority of these unofficial incidents were carried out, according to both O‘Halpin 
and Andrews, by National soldiers and by plain-clothes C.I.D, Criminal Investigation 
Department, men located in Dublin.
61
 The British faced a similar situation during the War of 
Independence. The British Government enforced martial law in several places in Ireland on 10 
December 1920.
62
 They also adopted an official reprisal scheme, in early 1921, to stem the 
unofficial killings carried out by British troops in response to the I.R.A.‘s guerrilla tactics. As 
Major-General Radcliffe told Sir Henry Wilson in September 1920: ‗I think the only solution to 
this problem is to institute s system of ―official‖ reprisals […] If there is a definite scheme of 
reprisals in force, and made known beforehand, it should be easy to get the troops to restrain 
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their unofficial efforts[.]‘63 The first of these reprisals occurred in Midleton, County Cork, on 29 
December 1920 when British troops destroyed six houses in response to an earlier I.R.A. ambush 
that day.
64
 For the first five months of 1921 attacks on property of alleged republican 
sympathisers and activists became commonplace.
65
 However, as was the case with the British 
during the War of Independence, this effort was not very successful as unofficial actions also 
continued during the Civil War. The atrocities that occurred in Kerry in March 1923, which will 
be discussed in more detail in chapter six, were perfect examples. Nevertheless, several pieces of 
correspondence between Major-General Dalton and G.H.Q. in Dublin indicated the difficult 
situation that the National forces found themselves in different parts of the country. Dalton 
indicated that since he had arrived in Cork his forces had sustained constant losses. He stated 
that: 
Since I arrived here I have had casualties to the extent of six killed and twelve 
wounded, most inflicted [in] Cork City. I must bring in Martial Law, or remain 
impotent. I will shoot without trial men found in possession of arms. Can I 
publish a notice to this effect. I must get more men for Columns if possible, send 
two hundred immediately also officers.
66
 
 
For Dalton the difficult conditions that he and his forces faced in Cork required that further, 
more resolute, action be taken if the Irregulars were to be defeated. He requested permission to 
execute Irregulars discovered with arms. In reply to this request, at 9.20 p.m. on the same day 
O‘Duffy ordered Dalton to ‗Act vigorously especially with those who did not fight against the 
English, but don‘t issue notice. Action is much stronger without them.‘67 In addition to this, 
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O‘Duffy replied at 11.56 p.m. on 3 September and ordered Dalton to ‗Set up Military Courts and 
try men on charge of MURDER or ATTEMPTED MURDER, and execute in both cases.‘68 
O‘Duffy‘s comments are noteworthy. In this instance, he was quick to advocate the execution of 
fellow countrymen; however, in similar fashion to Mulcahy, Cosgrave and FitzGerald, he had 
once deplored the establishment of British military courts and subsequent executions of I.R.A. 
men during the War of Independence. It is unclear if any men were executed following 
O‘Duffy‘s order. Nonetheless, the theme of this correspondence is more important than its 
consequences. It can be ascertained from this correspondence that certain members of the pro-
treatyite military hierarchy became increasingly frustrated at the prevailing conditions 
throughout the country.  
Another example of this frustration occurred in Macroom, County Cork. Commandant 
Conlon, the O.C. in Macroom, reported the illegal shooting of an Irregular prisoner to Dalton on 
18 September. According to Conlon: 
The shooting of this prisoner here in the operations has caused considerable 
contempt amongst the Garrison here. They have paraded before me and have 
given me to understand that they will not go out on to the hills anymore. 
Therefore you will want to tell these officers from Dublin that they will want to 
stop that kind of work or they will corrupt the Army. But at the same time that 
does not clear me here, and the situation here is at present very critical, I may tell 
you among the men. If I was taken prisoner I would want to be treated as one. 
Therefore, we must do the same I oppose that policy in the strongest way.
69
 
 
Dalton then forwarded this message to Mulcahy in Dublin and stated that this incident was the 
work of ‗the Squad‘. The Squad were an infamous group of assassins originally put together by 
Collins in Dublin for the purpose of countering British intelligence efforts during the War of 
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Independence.
70
 Following the decrease of military activity in Dublin, after the fall of the Four 
Courts, many of Collins‘ elite group landed in Munster during the naval landings in August 
1922. Their controversial leader, Paddy O‘Daly, would feature in several contentious incidents 
both during and after the Civil War. At this moment in time Dalton approved of the shooting of 
the prisoner but the men under his command where of the opposite temperament to Conlon‘s 
troops. According to Dalton: 
Now I personally approve of the action but the men I have in my command are of 
such a temperament that they can look at several of their companions being blown 
to atoms [...] without feeling annoyed [...] but when an enemy is found with a rifle 
and amm[unition] they will mutiny if he be shot.
71
 
 
In response to this communication Mulcahy neither agreed nor disagreed with the illegal 
execution. Mulcahy‘s prime concern was the reputation of the Army. He did not want a situation 
to develop where the Army would be embarrassed. He informed Dalton that he could return any 
officer that he thought needed to be returned.
72
 Mulcahy was placed in a serious predicament 
with situations like this. Mulcahy, according to Regan, faced a difficult task of controlling an 
army which had only the loosest command structures. He argues that discipline and loyalty in 
certain commands might not endure if Mulcahy imposed severe reprimands especially 
interference by Mulcahy in Collins‘ former Squad where he already had an antagonistic 
relationship. Mulcahy, like Dalton, resigned himself to the realities of the Army he inherited 
from Collins and ignored its excesses.
73
 Younger argues that it was difficult to maintain 
discipline in the Army when seemingly innocent civilians shot National troops and having 
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achieved their objective either disappeared into the crowd or surrendered as prisoners of war.
74
 
According to Younger: 
O‘Higgins was critical of lapses by the National Army, and some of these lapses 
were inexcusable. Mulcahy, as high-principled as O‘Higgins, deplored them too, 
but better understood the provocation and supported his officers. In the Dáil, 
Mulcahy frankly admitted some of the accusations against men of the National 
Army. He asked the Government on behalf of the Army, for special powers.
75
 
 
The adoption of the emergency resolution was, for Mulcahy, a necessity to halt these 
excesses. He argued that the proposal would give the commanders better control and influence 
over their men as they would now see that legal measures were being taken against the Irregulars 
who had ambushed and killed some of their comrades. Mulcahy stated in the Dáil that: 
the putting of these powers into the hands of such a General Officer will give him 
greater authority over his men, and when he stands before a group of them who 
have three of their comrades dead by the hands of Irregulars he will not stand with 
his finger in his mouth and say, ―Well, you will have to be more careful when you 
are going to Mass next Sunday.‖ [...] In asking for legislation like this and for 
powers like this, we ask it in order to prevent men from taking upon themselves 
authority to execute people in an unauthorised way, and the dangers that without 
this legislation such executions will take place is great. They have happened in 
one or two instances and they would happen in thousands of instances if the men 
of the Army had not the control over themselves which the vast majority of the 
Army has.
76
  
 
Mulcahy alluded to a case that occurred between Swinford and Ballina, County Mayo when five 
captured Irregulars laughed at the sight of a dead National soldier in a sitting position on the 
roadside. According to Mulcahy, these Irregulars showed ‗an almost fiendish delight at the fact 
that one of our men was killed.‘77 Furthermore, he stated that it was with great difficulty that the 
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Commanding Officer prevented the death of these five Irregular prisoners. Ultimately, Mulcahy 
advocated the adoption of an executions policy in order to:  
save our men from being in the position of being driven to that, and never 
departing from the attitude of chivalry and gallantry they have always shown […] 
our men will have some chance, even among the very difficult and dangerous 
circumstances under which they work, of being chivalrous soldiers, who will 
continue to show, to those who are fighting in such an ugly fashion against them, 
and against the country, the chivalry and kindness and the manly disposition they 
have shown to them invariably, in the past few months.
78
 
 
Issues of inexperience and indiscipline were not the only concerns to be voiced by the 
Opposition. 
            The Labour party accused the Government of being too eager in their pursuit for the 
ratification of emergency powers. They were charged with side-stepping numerous issues of 
legality and were willing to place in the hands of untrained troops the power of life and death 
over potentially every citizen in the country. The disregard for morality, from the point of view 
of the Opposition, could only be described as a ‗blood-lust‘. O‘Higgins immediately countered 
this claim and reiterated that these emergency powers were essential given the gravity of the 
current military situation:  
I would ask Deputies here to believe that this particular motion does not spring 
from any blood-lust of the Cosgraves, the Mulcahys, or the O'Higginses, but 
springs from the realisation on the part of the whole Government of the urgency 
and gravity of the situation in which we find ourselves [.]
79
 
 
O‘Higgins stressed that the Government did not think human life cheap. He maintained that the 
Irregulars were bleeding the country to death in their quest to cause anarchy and chaos. He stated 
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that ‗if there is to be a check to that we must take measures much stronger than any that have 
been taken up to the present.‘80 Following these animated debates a vote was taken on 28 
September 1922. As the Labour party could not defeat the proposition, given the unquestionable 
numerical majority that the Government held, the motion was passed by forty-seven votes to 
fifteen, following minor amendments to its terminology.
81
 
            In an attempt to placate those opposed to the Public Safety Resolution the Government 
contemplated offering amnesty to the Irregulars. Mulcahy, still disappointed at having to adopt 
comprehensive measures, discussed this potential offer on 22 September 1922 in a letter to 
George A. Lyons: 
With regard to those people whose tendency is voluntary to surrender, the actual 
state of affairs is that we are not looking for anybody except those actually 
engaged in carrying out attacks either upon our forces or on property, or known to 
be organising such […] I would suggest that preferably that the young fellows 
themselves go to some priest known to be definitely on the Government side, or at 
any rate on the side of order and common sense, and surrender their arms to him. 
As far as those people that you meet are concerned you might be able to suggest 
such a priest to them; some one that would give them a good hard but sympathetic 
talking to. Failing this which would seem to be an ideal arrangement they could 
hand their weapons over to you and you could have them transmitted to us.
82
 
 
The Government was advised by one of their law officers, Kevin O‘Shiel, to offer amnesty 
before the resolution came in to being as it would serve many purposes. Firstly, it would 
encourage the public to accept the executions policy and, secondly, the propaganda benefits to be 
gained should the majority of Irregular abstain from this offer of clemency would be significant. 
According to O‘Shiel: 
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The Dáil is engaged in the business of passing very necessary, but very drastic 
legislation [...] I believe such an Amnesty would have a very good effect on 
public opinion, and would certainly lessen captious criticism of the New Bill [...] 
Without an Amnesty the effect of the Decree might be to drive back into the ranks 
of the Irregulars large numbers of the luke-warm and timid who are only too 
anxious to seize every possible opportunity of escaping from their unpleasant 
commitments.
83
 
 
The Provisional Government having passed the Public Safety Resolution decided to 
incorporate an amnesty offer. It stated that: 
a full amnesty and pardon should be offered to all those in arms against the State 
who, on or before October 15
th
, voluntarily deliver up all arms, ammunition etc in 
their possession and all public or private property unlawfully held or occupied by 
them, and cease to take part in armed opposition to the Government.
84
 
 
It was decided by the Government that it would receive full publicity and it would be printed in 
all newspapers pertaining both to Dublin and the surrounding provinces. Coupled with this, it 
was decided that members of the clergy would receive copies of this proposal in order to 
maximise its publicity. A proclamation, signed by Cosgrave and Mulcahy, was issued on 10 
October stating that from 15
 
October the Army Council would exercise all the powers 
established within the emergency resolution.
85
 Despite receiving maximum exposure very few 
Irregulars availed of this official pardon.  
In comparison to previous legislation, such as the 1920 Restoration of Order in Ireland 
Act or ROIA, the Public Safety Resolution, whilst containing many similarities, differs due to its 
rigorous implementation by the Provisional Government. The Restoration of Order in Ireland 
Act, passed by the British during the War of Independence on 9 August 1920, provided the legal 
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basis for the employment of numerous emergency powers throughout Ireland. This legislation 
sanctioned, amongst other measures, the extension of the jurisdiction of courts-martial to cover 
offences against the ordinary civil law.
86
 The Act, resembling martial law, facilitated the 
application of the capital penalty against civilians tried under military judicial procedures.
87
 
According to both Joost Augusteijn and Hopkinson, the legislation proved counter-productive as 
it had a self-perpetuating characteristic. Enacted by the British administration to curb the growth 
of violence that had spread throughout Ireland, it actually produced quite different results. The 
ROIA resulted in numerous I.R.A. arrests but it also forced other militants underground. It 
contributed to the onset of guerrilla warfare and the emergence of mobile squads of men, known 
as ‗Flying Columns‘, who disrupted communications and carried out numerous ambushes, 
assassinations and raids which proved successful against the British. The legislation, devised to 
restore order throughout Ireland, actually served as a catalyst for the I.R.A. as it ultimately 
increased the level of disorder that existed throughout Ireland. 
              The Public Safety Resolution is comparable to the ROIA. Endorsed during periods of 
war, both allowed for the execution, imprisonment, internment, deportation and fine of both 
civilians and militants. With regards to the former, any person suspected of acting or having 
acted or being about to act in a manner prejudicial to the restoration or maintenance of order in 
Ireland was liable for prosecution.
88
 Similarly, with regards to the latter, punishment could be 
inflicted on ‗persons found guilty of acts calculated to interfere with or delay the effective 
establishment of the authority of the Government.‘89 Another similarity in both declarations is 
the definition and description of offences. The Public Safety Resolution‘s description of 
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offences, mentioned earlier in this chapter, is quite comprehensive whereas the British 
Government chose to define a crime generically. The ROIA defines a crime as ‗any treason, 
treason–felony, misdemeanour, or other offence punishable by imprisonment or any greater 
punishment.‘90 This insubstantial description of offences mentioned in the ROIA, in comparison 
to the September resolution, does not imply inferiority. In defining a crime quite ambiguously 
the British administration ensured that the scope of this legislation was wide-ranging. The 
ambiguity meant that any person, militant or otherwise, faced prosecution for a vast array of 
offences. Even though it failed in its primary aspiration the ROIA was devised to tackle the 
activities of an armed guerrilla resistance who implemented numerous methods of attack. On the 
other hand, the meticulous approach of the Public Safety Resolution also ensured that the 
numerous guerrilla activities performed by the Irregulars faced prosecution. The definition of an 
offence, whether specific or non-specific, ensured that both sets of emergency powers would be 
widely applicable. 
The implementation of these respective powers is where the similarity ends. As a result 
of the execution of fifteen rebels in Ireland following the Easter Rising in 1916 extreme 
nationalism gained considerable momentum in Ireland.
91
 It must be noted that another man, 
Roger Casement, was hanged in Pentonville Prison, London for his attempts to smuggle arms to 
the Irish rebels, bringing the total to sixteen.
92
 This enormous sway in opinion, amongst other 
contributing factors, helped fuel the Irish War of Independence. Consequently, the cautious 
British Government only executed fourteen I.R.A. men during the War of Independence.
93
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Therefore, knowledge of the catalytic effect that executions can have on a populous may have 
caused the British to incorporate a level of restraint when implementing emergency powers. 
They ultimately executed a total of thirty men in five years. The Provisional/Free State 
Government proved more vigorous and ruthless in the application of the Public Safety 
Resolution executing eighty-one men, a number nearly three times that of the British, in a little 
over six months. This figure might seem extreme in comparison, but it needs to be placed in 
context. Comparatively speaking, the executions during the Irish Civil War were, as Keogh 
states, small scale considering that at the end of the Hungarian Civil War more than 5,000 people 
were killed in the White terror, not to mention the 12,500 Finns that died in White prison camps 
in the summer and autumn of 1918.
94
 However, as Lee argues, the numbers executed may not 
have a direct relationship with the psychological scars that a civil war can impart on a country. 
According to Lee, it does not seem that the atmosphere of Finnish politics was more polluted 
than its Irish counterpart in the aftermath of their respective civil wars. For instance, in Finland 
former adversaries were prepared to severe together in government after 1937.
95
 Political 
conciliation in Ireland between Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, on the other hand, is still to occur. 
This comparison does not undermine the importance of the eighty-one executions. On the 
contrary, it is indicative of the level of animosity that the Civil War, and by extension the 
Government‘s executions policy, imbued on post-war Ireland. Nonetheless, in 1922 the 
Provisional/Free State Government were aware of the possible revolutionary impact that 
executions could have on the public. However, they believed that they had a mandate to act 
vigorously against the Irregulars and that a situation existed in the country where not only was an 
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executions policy completely justified but the public would support or at least acquiesce to such 
a policy. 
Following ratification of the Public Safety Resolution the Army Council, of which 
Mulcahy was the senior member, decided to augment the terms of the emergency resolution in 
October 1922. This order stated that: 
From and after the date hereof any person shall:- 
a. Murder any person, or aid or abet the murder of any person, or attempt in 
any way to murder any person; 
b. Conspire to murder any person; 
c. Command, procure, incite, counsel, solicit, encourage, persuade or 
endeavour to persuade any person to murder any person, 
Shall upon trial and conviction thereof by Military Court be liable to suffer death 
or any less punishment.
96
  
 
The order also stated that those who commanded and encouraged others to commit an offence 
would face prosecution. Also, those who communicated, gave intelligence, furnished supplies 
and assisted those committing offences would face the death penalty. Furthermore, the Army 
Council stated that those who assisted, or attempted to assist any person in civil or military 
custody to escape shall, following conviction, face penal servitude or any less punishment for 
their actions.
97
 
The adoption of the 1922 Public Safety Resolution denoted that the Government were 
willing to execute fellow Irishmen and former comrades in their effort to restore order, establish 
the Government‘s authority and the will of the people throughout Ireland. This decree stipulated 
that any person, militant or otherwise, caught in the unauthorised possession of a weapon would 
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face the possibility of execution. It has been established that the death of Collins provided the 
impetus for the adoption of the executions policy. Prior to his death those who proposed such a 
policy faced considerable opposition from Collins and Mulcahy. They wanted to avoid any 
measures that would hinder reconciliation after the conflict. Given both men‘s stature and 
influence, particularly Collins‘, this resistance was enough to ensure that emergency measures 
would not be contemplated. However, following Collins‘ death this final barrier was removed. 
This incident shocked the Government and the country. It left those previously opposed, 
Mulcahy for example, in no doubt that an executions policy was now a necessity if the Irregulars 
were to be defeated. As Harrington suggests ‗the Provisional Government believed that it had no 
alternative but to enforce [emergency measures] firmly if the country were to be pulled back 
from the abyss of anarchy, chaos and destruction.‘98 Evidence suggests that the Government 
needed to be creative when preparing the resolution. The Government‘s chief legal officer, Hugh 
Kennedy, stipulated that the Government would face several significant obstacles should it 
choose to pursue a policy of this nature. He believed that the Provisional Government faced 
restrictions, under the terms of the Treaty, relating to the passage of certain types of legislation. 
Furthermore, all legislation needed royal assent. To overcome such issues he advocated the 
passing of resolutions rather than Acts. As the King‘s representative in Ireland, the Governor-
General, had not been established, Kennedy argued that the Provisional Government possessed 
the powers associated with that office. Ultimately, there is no evidence which suggests that the 
British disapproved of these measures or the way in which they were ratified. Given that the 
British administration was supporting the Government and Army financially and politically it 
can be assumed that they offered no opposition to the adoption of the executions policy. 
Nonetheless, the Government implemented the resolution regardless of issues of legality. The 
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inaugural episode occurred on 17 November 1922 when four young men were tried and found 
guilty of the individual possession without proper authority of revolvers and executed in 
Kilmainham Jail, Dublin.
99
 These executions, the first of eighty-one, not only hardened opinions 
on both sides of the Treaty divide but also irreversibly changed the character of the Irish Civil 
War, leaving it an increasingly bitter and acrimonious affair. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A ‘Damned Englishman’  
The execution of Erskine Childers 
 
 
Following ratification of the Public Safety Resolution in September 1922 and the failure 
of the amnesty offer, which expired on 15 October, the Government sought to implement the 
emergency measures. This chapter focuses on its initial implementation of the executions policy. 
The inaugural executions, which were marred by controversy, will be examined. The execution 
of four low-ranked Irregulars on 17 November in Kilmainham Jail, Dublin for the unauthorised 
possession of revolvers followed closely by the execution of the prominent Irregular, Erskine 
Childers, in Beggars Bush barracks, Dublin on 24 November 1922 invited condemnation. 
Several conspiracy theories, which became associated with these events, will be evaluated. 
Opponents of the policy focused on a potential link between the executions in Kilmainham Jail 
and that of Childers. They believed that the executions on 17 November were a test case to see if 
this policy could be extended to include members of the Irregulars‘ elite, particularly Childers. 
Moreover, the manner of Childers‘ arrest was also scrutinized. Given that he was captured 
bearing a weapon in his familial home it was argued that this did not imply guilt and, therefore, 
did not justify the death penalty. Critics also sought to expose the supposed link between the 
British Government and the execution of Childers. It was argued that the Home Office, under 
Secretary Winston Churchill, influenced the decision to execute this man. Ultimately, opponents 
of the executions policy proclaimed that the pro-treatyites, particularly Griffith and O‘Higgins, 
 96 
 
had a vendetta against Childers and were obsessed with catching, trying and executing this man 
regardless of offences committed. 
Even though the Public Safety Resolution had been ratified for several weeks the new 
Commander-in-Chief and Minister for Defence, Richard Mulcahy, exercised caution with 
regards to implementation of the decree. Mulcahy‘s procrastination, coupled with the 
Government‘s offer of amnesty, resulted in a delay between the establishment of the emergency 
powers and their inception. The postponement was symptomatic of the friction which was ever-
present between certain members of the pro-treatyite political and military leadership. Following 
the death of Michael Collins, the civilian-military relationship between the Government and 
Army had altered. As a result, the personalities who inherited Collins‘ legacy were now at the 
forefront of the Government and the Army. However, they possessed different views with 
regards to the operation and relationship between both bodies. Their association, although never 
perfect, would not operate as smoothly as it had done under Collins. His military successor, 
Mulcahy, although a proven military leader, did not possess the same charisma and status as his 
predecessor. As a result, certain members of the Provisional Government, primarily Kevin 
O‘Higgins and W. T. Cosgrave pushed for more Cabinet control over the armed forces. This is a 
point which is illustrated by Younger: 
Impatient of the Army‘s inability to settle the issue [the Civil War] he 
[O‘Higgins] sought more control by the Cabinet. Army leaders, [Mulcahy] on the 
other hand, thought he was meddling in their affairs already and that he should 
give more attention to his own Department.
1
  
 
This differed significantly from the relationship which Collins had with the Government. 
He was given a free hand with regards to the Army‘s liaison with the Cabinet. Mulcahy, 
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however, was not completely innocent in this matter. During the turbulent time of the Civil War 
Mulcahy was so focused on military affairs and often neglected his responsibility to inform the 
Government regarding certain military issues. Mulcahy was of the opinion that the Army was 
accountable to the Dáil but believed that there should be as little political interference as possible 
in the Army. His outlook further exacerbated the problem and increased hostility between both 
elements of the Provisional Government. As M. G. Valiulis explains: 
There is no question but that he [Mulcahy] believed the army was subordinate to 
the government […] However, he interpreted that principle very broadly. He 
believed that after it had decided general policy, the government should leave the 
actual working out of strategies and tactics to headquarters. Mulcahy resented 
[…] political interference in what were properly military matters.2  
 
The delay, which frustrated O‘Higgins and Cosgrave, was referred to when the President 
requested Mulcahy‘s attendance at a Cabinet meeting on 7 November. Cosgrave informed 
Mulcahy that considerable criticism had been expressed in preceding meetings due to the delay 
in setting up the military courts. He told Mulcahy that the lack of forthcoming information, 
pertaining to any trials and the distribution and execution of any sentences, invited 
condemnation. According to Cosgrave, ‗To-day there will be a further hub-bub and they want 
your attendance at the beginning of the meeting and your business will be first on the agenda.‘3  
Friction did subside, temporarily, as both the political and military leadership decided 
that the time was now appropriate to finally implement the executions policy. The first case 
before a military court, under the Public Safety Resolution, occurred on 3 November 1922. The 
number increased to twelve in less than two weeks; however, only one sentence had been handed 
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down and confirmed by military authorities. According to Mulcahy, these cases were all 
concerned with those accused of having possession without proper authority of a revolver and 
only led to the imposition of minor penalties. In an attempt to answer his critics in the Dáil 
Mulcahy stated that, ‗in one case the accused was convicted, and sentenced to undergo 
imprisonment for 12 calendar months with hard labour. This is the only case in which sentence 
has been confirmed and come into effect.‘4 The outcome of this case was to pale in comparison 
to the subsequent sentences as the severity of penalties escalated rapidly when four young men 
were executed in Dublin in November 1922. This not only initiated what was to become an 
extensive executions policy, totalling eighty-one, but also marked a turning point in the conflict. 
The implementation of the Public Safety Resolution ensured that the Civil War would become a 
far more fractious affair. It not only represented, according to Costello, the Government‘s 
harshest attempt to protect itself and the country but also indicated to the Irregulars that the 
Government and subsequently the Army were willing to meet their armed resistance with a 
bloody response.
5
 
 The inaugural set of executions occurred on the morning of 17 November 1922. Four 
young men were put to death in Kilmainham Jail in Dublin. James Fisher, Richard Twohig, Peter 
Cassidy and John Gaffney, all aged between eighteen and twenty-one, had been arrested in 
Dublin between 23 and 27 October. They were subsequently tried and found guilty of the 
individual possession without proper authority of a revolver and sentenced to death. Following 
this, the sentences were confirmed and duly carried out at seven o‘clock that morning.6 The 
choice of venue for the first executions during the Civil War is remarkable given Kilmainham 
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Jail‘s historic importance in the nationalist psyche. Several of the rebels executed after the 
Rising were put to death, by the British, in Kilmainham Jail; therefore, why the Government 
chose this particular site during the present conflict is somewhat perplexing. However, it appears 
that it was intended to indicate to militants and civilians alike that the Government took the 
Irregulars‘ armed resistance extremely seriously. That they would put to death fellow Irishmen 
in a place with such obvious emotive connections was designed to suggest, to the country, that 
the Government and Army possessed moral and mental fortitude. Nonetheless, the event caused 
outrage in the Dáil. The Opposition questioned the Government‘s motivations for executing four 
Irregular nonentities. Thomas Johnson argued that: 
The possession of a revolver does not justify the execution of a man, lawfully or 
unlawfully, and no one, I believe, despite the decision of the Dáil, and no one in 
this Dáil, in his heart of hearts, believes that the possession of a revolver warrants 
the execution of the man or the woman who possessed it.
7
  
 
 
Mulcahy argued, in response to these accusations, that anything which would shock the country 
into a realisation of the gravity of the situation which existed, where it became a necessity to 
take human life, was in fact justified. He defended the execution of these men when he divulged 
that they were apprehended in direct military action against the Government and the National 
Army. He stated that they were found in the streets of Dublin at night, in possession of loaded 
revolvers, waiting to take the lives of other men.
8
 Undeterred by criticism, Mulcahy indicated 
that the implementation of the executions policy would certainly continue. He argued that the 
executions were an absolute necessity in order to astound the country and issue a statement to 
the Irregulars that ‗anybody who goes around with a loaded revolver in his pocket on the street 
seeking to take the lives of other men must be made face the fact that by doing so he forfeits his 
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own life.‘9 Mulcahy‘s comments did not satisfy the critics and considerable reservations 
regarding the Government‘s motivations endured.  
Kevin O‘Higgins did little to suppress the already charged atmosphere in the Dáil. In an 
attempt to answer the Government‘s critics, he claimed that they did not act impetuously or 
vindictively when deciding to execute these men. He argued that the initial case was chosen to 
deter all those in armed rebellion within the country and stated that the implementation of the 
emergency measures for any other reason would in fact prove counter-productive. According to 
O‘Higgins, the Government chose these four men as it was necessary to take an average case 
first as they had no particular facts about them which distinguished them from the thousands of 
Irregulars throughout the country that were destroying the Nation.
10
 It must be noted here that 
the Provisional Government had handed over responsibility for enforcing the Public Safety 
Resolution to the Army. However, it appears that the Cabinet still played a crucial role in 
deciding who was actually executed after they were tried and convicted by a military court. It is 
unclear if the Cabinet approached the Army Council with a particular prisoner in mind or if the 
Army Council proposed a specific person and then the Cabinet decided the prisoner‘s fate. It was 
probably a joint decision given that there was an overlap in personnel between both parties, 
Mulcahy being Minister of Defence, Commander-in-Chief and head of the Army Council. The 
decision to execute should have remained solely with the Army since the September resolution 
clearly stated that the Government had entrusted to the Army the duty and responsibility of 
restoring order throughout the country.
11
 In practice, however, evidence suggests that this did not 
occur. Nonetheless, those opposed to the Government‘s new policy believed that the initial set of 
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executions were in fact a precursor to more divisive and contentious cases, where more infamous 
Irregulars would be put to death. 
Despite the controversy which surrounded these initial executions, they did in fact serve 
a number of purposes. Firstly, they consummated the Government‘s Public Safety Resolution 
and they indicated to the country that they were prepared and willing to institutionalise the 
execution of fellow Irishmen in armed rebellion throughout the country. Secondly, as General 
MacMahon testified at the Army Inquiry in May 1924, the initial executions were practically a 
test case. He stated that they were a critical test of the temper within the Army.
12
 It was a 
possibility at the time that soldiers may have refused, even mutinied, when confronted with 
official executions, especially in Kilmainham Jail given its recent history of executions. Now the 
National Army were charged with implementation of the executively sanctioned executions. 
Therefore, as Regan suggests, the shooting of the first four prisoners by the best and the most 
reliable unit in Dublin enabled the Government and General Staff to test the reaction of the 
Army.
13
 The ordeal provided a favourable outcome for the Government as the National troops 
carried out their orders successfully. Nevertheless, it is to be expected that the first set of 
executions would be used as a test case to assess the prospect of extending the scope of the 
policy. Consequently, the probability that the Civil War would witness further executions 
increased. This became evident when Ernest Blythe, another advocate of the adoption of stern 
measures, spoke in the Dáil. Having already suggested that if a man is taken in the street with a 
revolver with the intention of committing murder then that man must get ‗the murderer‘s doom‘, 
he indicated that these initial executions were merely a prelude. He mentioned that ‗I am afraid 
[that stern measures] have to be taken again, because at this stage I do not think that the 
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execution of four would suffice.‘14 Coupled with this, O‘Higgins again unaffected by the 
occasion argued that ‗we, in grave consultation and in grave council, have decided that if it is 
necessary to take the lives of many individuals then the lives of many individuals will be 
taken.‘15 As a result, it was a certainty that, as James Fisher stated in his final letter to his 
parents, more Irregulars would ‗die […] a soldier of the Irish Republic [,] die for Ireland.‘16  
 Once the country had witnessed, albeit under questionable circumstances, the inception 
of the emergency powers resolution, the implementation of this procedure gathered momentum. 
Within a week of the initial executions another more divisive and controversial case presented 
itself. As an author Erskine Childers published several works, including The riddle of the sands, 
a record of secret service in 1903, War and the Arme Blanche in 1910 and The framework of 
home rule in 1911. In these works he criticised the British Government and its military forces for 
a variety of reasons which included their unpreparedness for the First World War, their use of 
obsolete cavalry tactics and he proposed an economically advantageous argument for the 
implementation of Home Rule in Ireland, respectively. Even though he had served in the British 
Navy he was a man who had sound nationalist credentials due to his participation in the Howth 
gun-running incident in July 1914 in which he landed a significant amount of arms and 
ammunition for the Volunteers from his yacht, the Asgard. In addition to this, he had proven 
himself during the War of Independence as a prominent member of Sinn Féin and T.D. for 
Wicklow. He was a Staff-Captain in the I.R.A. and an expert wartime propagandist. During the 
conflict with the British he was editor of the republican newspaper Irish Bulletin and the Dáil‘s 
Director of Publicity. He had sided with the anti-treatyite faction during the current conflict. 
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Childers, in an effort to resume his role as Director of Publicity for the Irregulars, was arrested 
with another individual, David Robinson, while en-route to Dublin from the South of Ireland. 
Robinson was a former British cavalry officer, tank commander and a holder of the Croix de 
Guerre.
17
 Childers was apprehended following a 5 a.m. raid on Robert Barton‘s residence, 
Annamoe House, County Wicklow on 10 November 1922. During the raid, on his cousin‘s 
house, Childers was caught in an attempt to evade arrest. When confronted by National troops he 
attempted to draw a small automatic pistol from his pocket. Following a significant struggle, 
however, he was disarmed by Lieutenant Gerard with the help of Officer J. Short.
18
  
After his arrest Childers was kept in a large shed in Beggars Bush barracks, where he 
exercised several times a day by walking ‗one measured mile inside the shed. Between his walks 
he would sleep for a few hours, and spent the rest of his time writing.‘19 As Childers was a high 
profile prisoner the shed was closely guarded to prevent his escape or rescue by outsiders or by 
members of the National forces.
20
 He was tried by military court at Portobello barracks, Dublin, 
on 17 November 1922 and charged with the unauthorised possession of the automatic pistol, 
found guilty and sentenced to death. Following the confirmation of the sentence it was duly 
carried out in Beggar‘s Bush barracks, Dublin, at 7 a.m. on 24 November 1922.21 There were 
fifteen men in the firing party. However, only five had loaded rifles. Paddy O‘Connor, the 
officer in charge, arranged prior to the execution that the five loaded weapons were given to 
First World War veterans, due to their superior marksmanship.
22
 In the moments leading up to 
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the execution Childers shook the hands of the men in the firing party and was then made to stand 
at the end of the shed where a section of the roof had been removed thus leaving him in the 
light.
23
 The firing party remained in the dark where they could not be clearly seen by Childers. 
According to Risteárd Mulcahy, Childers did not require the coup de grace as his death was 
instantaneous.
24
  
Other, more irregular, accounts of Childers‘ execution also exist. According to one recent 
account: 
After they removed the bandage from his [Childers‘] eyes etc and placed his 
corpse in the coffin some five minutes after death or perhaps a little longer, Lt. 
Murtagh, brother of Peadar Murtagh and brother-in-law of Major General Paddy 
Daly rushed from the bottom of the shed and, to their credit be it recorded, 
horrified everyone present by firing his ―Peter‖ (name given to the .45 Webley 
revolver) into the face of the dead man.
25
 
 
 
According to Marie Louise McCrory, the statement was probably given by a soldier present at 
the event and, if it is true, it is indicative of the hatred which characterised the Civil War. 
However, as the identity of the original author cannot be ascertained the credibility of this source 
cannot be attested. Nonetheless, if familial ties are any indication of ruthlessness the 
aforementioned Paddy O‘Daly was not without controversy. O‘Daly played a leading role in the 
killing of eight Irregular prisoners and the serious wounding of another, Stephen Fuller, with a 
landmine at Ballyseedy Cross, County Kerry on 7 March 1923. There may be some element of 
truth to the aforementioned account. According to Frank Holland, who was present at the actual 
event, Childers did require a coup de grace. Holland stated that: 
When he was being lifted into the coffin his body didn‘t sag. I can‘t account for it 
[...] Our M.O. [Medical Officer] would not certify him as dead. It happened so 
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suddenly that there was not a tremble in his body. The officer in charge, who 
would shoot him if there was still life in him, wouldn‘t do it and M. M. did. P. 
O‘C [Paddy O‘Connor] or I had no revolver at the time but M. M. had and he shot 
him through the heart. His was the quickest death that was possible for a man to 
get.
26
 
 
This was a high-profile event in comparison to the first set of executions. It witnessed the 
putting to death of Childers for the unauthorised possession of a revolver, which was supposedly 
given to him as a present by Collins. The incident became one of the most divisive events during 
the Irish Civil War. According to members of Kildare County Council, it would ‗only cause 
further bad feeling when we are all looking forward to peace.‘27 Nonetheless, it raised many 
important issues which require individual examination. Following the death of Childers, 
numerous conspiracy theories quickly emerged as those opposed to his execution questioned the 
validity of the courts set up under the Public Safety Resolution and the motivations which lay 
behind the execution of the prominent anti-treatyite.  
 Firstly, subsequent to his arrest, Childers refused to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the 
military court following orders issued by Liam Lynch.
28
 An impressive legal team, which 
included Patrick Lynch, Michael Comyn, Conor Maguire, and Seán Ó hUadhaigh, decided to 
represent Childers. They decided to appeal his arrest in the civilian courts by revealing, what 
they believed to be, numerous flaws not only in the case constructed by the Army but also the 
legality of the military court system. They submitted a writ of habeas corpus to O‘Connor M.R., 
Master of the Rolls, on his behalf. His counsel explicitly stated that it was not Childers‘ wish to 
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submit this plea unless it would be of use to other men tried by military courts. In his affidavit, 
on 18 November, 1922 Ó hUadhaigh stated that: 
I say that the Plaintiff [Childers] personally charged me not to institute and such 
proceedings as this action unless they were brought in such a way as to be 
available for the other prisoners who have been dealt with by the alleged Courts. 
My instructions to act on behalf of the Plaintiff in this action were expressly 
conditional on my undertaking to him that I would bring them in such a manner as 
to ensure for the benefit of others in the like case.
29
 
 
Furthermore, he pleaded with O‘Connor to intervene as he feared for his client‘s life given that 
four men had already been tried by military court and executed under the Public Safety 
Resolution. According to Ó hUadhaigh: 
I have grave apprehensions for believing that if this Court does not intervene in 
this case, the Plaintiff‘s life [Childers] and the lives of the other persons who have 
been dealt with by such Courts in so far as they still survive may be forfeited by 
decisions of these Tribunals which I charge and believe were illegally constituted 
and were acting contrary to Law.
30
 
 
Childers‘ counsel submitted an additional affidavit outlining several objections in relation to his 
case.
31
 They claimed that under the resolutions of the International Red Cross Conference 1921, 
which had been accorded international recognition, civil war political prisoners were to be 
treated as prisoners of war, thus entitled to belligerent rights.
32
 Additionally, his advisors 
maintained that it had been universally accepted in every civilised community that prisoners of 
war should not be tried by any tribunal selected from the opposing military forces. They argued 
that such purported trials require an Act of Indemnity to correct the illegality of the proceedings 
and until such an act was passed such so-called trials were contrary to law. Finally, they stated 
that Childers was not a civilian and was not within the definition of the class of persons 
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contemplated by the general regulations of the September resolution under which the tribunal 
purported to act. He was a Staff-Captain in the Irish Republican Army. Therefore, they stated 
that the said regulations were null and void.
33
  
The writ of habeas corpus relied heavily on O‘Connor‘s own decision in the case of 
Egan versus Macready. However, in his judgement O‘Connor distinguished Egan‘s case from 
Childers‘ on the grounds that the former case was based primarily on the ROIA and that piece of 
legislation applied to the British Army and, thus, was not adaptable to the Irish Constitution as it 
is provisionally established.
34
 Before O‘Connor refused the application he stated that: 
Now the Government is for the time being in a state of transition, we have what is 
called a Provisional Government pending the completion of the Constitution of 
the Irish Free State – but although the Government is only provisional it has been 
formally and legally set up, and its authority cannot be questioned. It derives its 
validity from the Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland and the Act of 
Parliament confirming it. […] The Provisional Government is now de-jure as well 
as de-facto – the ruling authority bound to administer, to preserve the peace and to 
repress by force, if necessary, all persons who seek by violence to overthrow it 
[...] He [Childers] disputes the authority of the Tribunal and comes to this Civil 
Court for protection, but its answer must be that its jurisdiction is ousted by the 
State of War which he himself has helped to produce. However doubtful the law 
may have been in the past it is now clearly established that once a state of war 
[arises] the Civil Courts have no jurisdiction over the acts of the military 
authorities, during the continuance of hostilities.
35
 
 
O‘Connor refused the application on the grounds that once a state of war had arisen the civil 
courts had no jurisdiction over the acts of the military authority during that state of war.
36
 His 
defense counsel decided to appeal the verdict, however, Childers was promptly executed while 
the application was still being processed. Nonetheless, the issues raised by Childers‘ legal team 
were not to be the only questions which emerged following his trial and conviction. The manner 
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and location of Childers‘ arrest was also questioned. Those opposed to the execution argued that 
the location and circumstances of his capture did not justify the death penalty.  
 Childers was, according to one official draft of evidence supplied by the Army personnel 
involved in his arrest, apprehended in the unlawful possession of a pistol.
37
 There are also other 
official drafts of evidence, which despite containing many similarities with the aforementioned 
summary, such as the time, location and date of arrest, also contain some minute, yet important, 
discrepancies. In their sworn affidavits, Captain P. Byrne stated that ‗he [Childers] was passing 
me I laid my hand on his arm, he then made an attempt to draw an automatic revolver, which 
was taken from him by Lieutenant J. M. Gerard in my presence. He was placed under arrest.‘38 
In addition to this, Captain C. J. Coughlan verified Byrne‘s description of events as he stated:  
When about half way up the stairs I saw Captain Byrne and Lieutenant Gerard 
struggling with a man [Childers] on the landing. I saw an automatic revolver in 
the man‘s hand, it was pointing towards Lieutenant Gerard. I then ran up, and 
grasped him round the waist. Lieutenant Gerard then disarmed him, and he was 
placed under arrest.
39
 
 
Finally, Lieutenant Gerrard provided the most important description of events as he stated:  
When I entered the room he [Childers] brushed past me and got out on the 
landing, and there he was stopped by Captain Byrne. I had caught him by the 
sleeve, and I held on and we both struggled with him. I took a Spanish automatic 
revolver from his right hand. I saw Captain Coughlan examining the automatic 
and saw him taking a loaded magazine out from the butt, and ejecting one from 
the breach. He was placed under arrest.
40
 
 
This account details an attempt by Childers to evade arrest. Moreover, it maintains that he was 
willing to use his weapon if the opportunity presented itself. This constituted a threat to the lives 
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of the soldiers and therefore justified the death penalty. As a result they indicated that, similar to 
the first executions, Childers was arrested in direct armed conflict against National troops. In 
order to obtain a more comprehensive picture other accounts, such as Childers‘ own 
recollections, need to be analysed. According to Childers‘ final letters to his wife Molly, which 
were smuggled out of jail, he stated that: 
In case proceedings at my trial are never known, I want to say that I asked all the 
witnesses questions to show that a shooting fight – in the passage outside my door 
when taken – would have endangered two women there, and that is why I did not 
use my pistol, and only tried to force my way through. They admitted it was a 
fact.
41
 
 
Childers‘ account offers a somewhat different interpretation of his arrest. Although in 
possession of a firearm, he claimed that he did not intend firing on those who came to apprehend 
him as he did not wish to injure those resident in the house in which he was lodged. This point of 
passive resistance can be further substantiated as it can be argued that Childers was arrested in 
what was essentially his familial home. This issue was highlighted in the Dáil on 28 November 
1922. George Gavan Duffy not only questioned the Government over Childers‘ guilty verdict but 
also chastised the Government for convicting this man, and those previous to him, without 
proving their intent to use their weapons. According to Gavan Duffy: 
Now, what happened? The military authorities apparently ascertained that Erskine 
Childers was living at the home of his childhood in Wicklow; they surrounded the 
house in the early morning; they found him there and arrested him, as I 
understand, getting out of bed with a revolver. They charged him for that he had a 
revolver without their authority; they sentenced him for that; and they executed 
him for that; for having a pistol in that private dwelling-house without the 
authority of the Provisional Government. That and that alone is his capital 
offence.
42
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This is also argued by Regan. He states that Childers was not captured in an armed raid on a 
military installation or against National troops, but taken from his own residence, a house in 
which he lived since he was a teenager.
43
 
Gavan Duffy continued to question the Government over their inability to prove 
Childers‘ actual intentions with his pistol. In an effort to express his point more effectively 
Gavan Duffy referred to the previous executions in Dublin on 17 November. He argued the four 
men were charged with the mere possession of revolvers and were executed because of their 
intent to kill National troops. However, Gavan Duffy stated that these four men were never 
charged with intent. He claimed that there is a substantial gap between the evidence required to 
convict a man for possession and the evidence required to convict a man of intent. If a man has a 
gun and no permit the court, he claimed, is obliged to convict him no matter what the 
extenuating circumstances were. He argued that if a man‘s intentions cannot be proven then he 
cannot be convicted.
44
 He suggested that Childers‘ case was: 
even worse. He is not found at night in a city, armed. He is found in a private 
dwellinghouse, and because he has that revolver—that pistol—in his home, in 
what, for the time being, really is his home, the house of relatives, he is put to 
death for that. I refuse to believe that this Dáil pliant as it is to the wishes of the 
Government in many respects would ever have consented to the passing of the 
resolution as it was passed, had it realised that such a thing as this would be done 
by virtue of its action.
45
 
 
In response, Cosgrave immediately rebuked Gavan Duffy and labelled him ‗weak-kneed‘ and 
‗afraid of his own shadow.‘46 However, these arguments do contain a certain amount of 
substance. In another letter to his wife, Childers stated that his mother Anna was the daughter of 
                                                          
43
 Regan, The Irish counter-revolution, p. 109. 
44
 Dáil Debates, Dáil in committee – army, volume 1, col. 2361 (28 November 1922). 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Ibid, cols 2362-2363. 
 111 
 
Thomas J. Barton, of Glendalough House, Annamoe, County Wicklow. According to Childers, 
that residence ‗became my own home and domicile from 1883 onwards, until I married in 1904, 
for both my parents having died when I was young, from the age of 13 I was brought up at 
Glendalough House by my uncle and aunt, Charles and Agnes Barton, along with their 
children.‘47 Coupled with this Robert Barton, Childers‘ cousin and owner of the house in which 
he was arrested, supported Childers‘ claim. Barton stated that ‗I do not remember the time when 
the Childers family did not reside at Glen [Glendalough] nor have I had recollections of my early 
childhood immediately subsequent to their arrival there.‘48 Nonetheless, the controversy does not 
conclude with the manner and place of Childers‘ arrest, as there were several other factors which 
may have affected this case. 
Despite Childers‘ previous revolutionary record and the fact that he had been secretary to 
the Treaty delegation in London he became one of its fiercest opponents, which according to 
Hopkinson, bordered on obsessive.
49
 The substantial division in opinion resulted in a great deal 
of animosity towards Childers from the pro-treatyite elite. According to Pakenham, Griffith 
disapproved of Childers‘ inclusion in the Treaty delegation and only relented at de Valera‘s 
request. The trust which de Valera placed in Childers was returned in abundance. According to a 
source close to Childers, he displayed a great deal of respect and loyalty towards de Valera. 
‗During these past months I had a long talk with Erskine Childers about Mr. De Valera. I found 
that he held for the latter the most unbounded respect and affection [...] Mr. Childers described 
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the perfect loyalty with which he and his colleagues supported and aided ―the Chief.‖‘50 Even 
though the author of this note is unknown it can be substantiated by de Valera‘s appointment of 
Childers as secretary to the Treaty delegation. As the unity once enjoyed by the Republican 
movement during the War of Independence began to falter over the Treaty, Childers‘ association 
with de Valera ensured that he was distrusted by the pro-treatyite hierarchy. It was this distrust 
that was to transform into a serious antagonism which rivalled that of Collins and Brugha. 
According to Pakenham, ‗this tragic complex, whether we place the responsibility for it on 
human nature or on the circumstances that brought Childers to Ireland [his British descent], takes 
rank among the causes of the friction that was to cut the [Treaty] Delegation in two.‘51  
Hostility towards Childers escalated and was clearly evident during the Treaty debates. 
Following questions by Childers, Griffith, a staunch supporter of the settlement displayed a great 
deal of antipathy towards the former when he slammed the table and remarked: ‗I will not reply 
to any damned Englishman in this Assembly.‘52 Consequently, as Regan suggests, the distrust 
held by Griffith was inherited by O‘Higgins.53 This was highlighted in the Dáil by Gavan Duffy. 
He argued that this sense of enmity towards Childers, displayed by certain members of the 
Government, resulted in the accused receiving an unfair trial. According to Gavan Duffy: 
It was their [the Government‘s] paramount duty to take quite exceptional 
precautions to see that in no way should they be influenced against him, that they 
should not be influenced against him in the smallest degree, except by what was 
definitely proved in evidence against him before the Court.
54
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The issue of bias did contain some validity, according to Comyn. In a letter to de Valera, Comyn 
indicated that the military court established to try Childers ‗consisted of a junior Barrister and 
two young officers. I had a notion that they were selected for unpleasant work.‘55 He argued that 
this court was in fact completely prejudiced against his client. He stated that ‗honestly, I believe, 
[that] Childers is getting Black man‘s law, that is, the law applied to negroes and hindoos under 
the English Privy Council.‘56 According to Gavan Duffy, a large segment of the country 
despised Childers. He argued that as a result of pro-treatyite propaganda, which supposedly 
engrossed the country, Childers was viewed by the political, military and civilian populations as 
a ruthless monster, an agent of the British Government and therefore deserving of the death 
penalty.
57
 There is some truth to this. Childers was held responsible by the Government and the 
Army for orchestrating several Irregular attacks throughout the country. For example, it was 
alleged in the Dáil that he had commanded an expedition of Irregulars, on 29 August, which had 
set out to destroy the transatlantic cables in Valentia, County Kerry, by damaging one cable and 
attempting to sever the other.
58
 These accusations also appeared in the press. In addition to the 
attempt to cut the cables in Kerry, he was also implicated in the destruction of several railway 
bridges and signal boxes throughout the country.
59
 As a result, critics viewed his execution as an 
outrageous conspiracy. During Childers‘ trial the Irregulars‘ G.H.Q. issued a statement which 
argued that the verdict of the trial was assured beforehand because ‗your [the Government‘s] vile 
propaganda, have loaded the dice against him.‘60 It was claimed that he was executed due to the 
anti-Childers sentiment that had engulfed the country and as a result of an anti-British or at least 
                                                          
55
 Letter from Comyn to de Valera, 18 November 1922 (U.C.D. Archives, de Valera papers, P150/1659). 
56
 Letter from Comyn to de Valera, 22 November 1922 (U.C.D. Archives, de Valera papers, P150/1659). 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 Dáil Debates, Statement by the President, volume 1, no. 2, col. 76 (11 September 1922). 
59
 The Times (7 Sept. 1922). 
60
 Statement by I.R.A. G.H.Q., 15 November 1922 (U.C.D. Archives, FitzGerald papers, P80/304). 
 114 
 
a vindictive action undertaken by the Government. In accordance with this theory a great deal of 
emphasis has been placed on numerous speeches made by O‘Higgins in the Dáil. 
 O‘Higgins firmly believed that Childers was one of those ultimately responsible for the 
Irish Civil War. O‘Higgins claimed that this ‗able Englishman‘ was responsible for misleading 
others through his propaganda and was intent on destroying the fabric of the country. During the 
debates over the Public Safety Resolution O‘Higgins rose to his feet in the Dáil and argued: 
I do know that the threads and ties which bind society, ties which bind the ordered 
fabric of this State, are strained to snapping point, and I do know that the able 
Englishman who is leading those who are opposed to this Government has his eye 
quite definitely on one objective, and that that is the complete breakdown of the 
economic and social fabric […] His [Childers‘] programme is a negative 
programme, a purely destructive programme […] He has no constructive 
programme, and so he keeps steadily, callously and ghoulishly on his career of 
striking at the heart of this nation, striking deadly, or what he hopes are deadly, 
blows at the economic life of this nation […] I am now referring to the 
Englishman, Erskine Childers. [We must] take what we consider are the most 
effective steps to check this headlong race to ruin.
61
 
 
 
This statement, which exaggerated Childers‘ actual involvement in the Civil War, added to the 
suspicion in the Dáil that the Government and the Army were anxious to capture, try and execute 
Childers. However, the reference to Childers as an Englishman was not the only one made by 
O‘Higgins. When defending the first set of executions, on 17 November, he declared that: 
If you took as your first case some man who was outstandingly active or 
outstandingly wicked in his activities the unfortunate dupes through the country 
might say, ―Oh, he was killed because he was a leader,‖ or ―He was killed 
because he was an Englishman,‖ or ―He was killed because he combined with 
others to commit rape.‖ It was better in my opinion, wiser in my opinion, more 
calculated to achieve the object, to achieve the deterrent object, to take simply the 
plain or ordinary case of the men who go out with arms to kill their fellow-
countrymen.
62
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O‘Higgins later suggested that this was an innocent remark used to prove a point but it only 
added to the uncertainties held by those who claimed that Childers‘ fate was already sealed 
before he had even been arrested.  
In a letter to Chester Allen Arthur Junior, grandson of the twenty-first American 
President Chester Arthur, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Desmond FitzGerald, indicates 
that the Government did not act vindictively when deciding to try Childers. In a previous 
telegram, on 12 November, Arthur attempted to chastise FitzGerald and the Government for 
capturing Childers. He stated ‗If Childers is executed [reprisals] will follow. Reprisal[s] until all 
prisoners are killed and Ireland loses respect of world one more martyr will add weight to cause 
of republic […] God forgive you for you know not what you have done.‘63 In his reply 
FitzGerald, Childers‘ former collaborator on republican propaganda, argued that they had to 
undertake these acts despite the fact that they were, previously, closely associated with Childers. 
According to FitzGerald: 
It is, in a way, almost laughable to hear people talk as though we shoot these men, 
who were our most intimate comrades merely because we like shooting them […] 
It is our misfortune that the situation demands that we should strike at those 
whom we least desire to strike […] but you might remember that we are far more 
intimately associated with these men than you were […] the difference between 
you and us is that you are an individual, able to consider your feelings […] we are 
[…] responsible representatives. Each of us feels as you do, but we are not in your 
happy position.
64
 
 
Arthur‘s comments are important as they indicate that despite the fact that the public, for the 
most part, acquiesced to the executions policy the Government did receive some criticism, in this 
case from a foreign notable. However, as FitzGerald contended, the Government had no choice 
but to execute former comrades and friends in order to end the Civil War. FitzGerald did 
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concede in further correspondence to Arthur, on 29 January 1923, that the possession of a 
weapon was a technicality. Nevertheless, he firmly believed that Childers was, despite their 
previous relationship, ‗an immediate danger to the life of this country, and his execution 
certainly saved the lives of others.‘65 
Critics also attempted to highlight the British Government‘s involvement in this case. 
The British administration, although in the process of vacating the country, were accused of 
influencing the outcome of Childers‘ case. In a statement made during Childers‘ trial de Valera 
suggested that they were mere puppets of the British Government. He stated that: 
the order has come from London that Capt. Erskine Childers, of the Republican 
Army, tried to-day behind closed doors by a Court that has no legal standing […] 
If this order is carried out, not all the blood that will flow as a consequence will 
expiate our national guilt. If Erskine Childers be shot by Irishmen at England‘s 
bidding we shall be called a nation of slaves.
66
 
 
 
The British Cabinet had previously indicated interest in the apprehension of Childers. The Home 
Office, under Secretary Winston Churchill, indicated on numerous occasions that they would 
like to have tried Childers for treason assuming they had the legal ability to do so. Numerous 
internal memoranda were circulated throughout Churchill‘s department which inquired into the 
possibility of trying Childers, if he was located on British soil. According to one of these 
memorandums: ‗Assuming that evidence is available to prove an act of high treason or treason 
felony by Erskine Childers […] the question arises whether such persons could legally, if found 
in England, be arrested and tried for such crimes.‘67 This was not the only time Churchill 
disclosed his personal feelings of contempt for Childers. Following Childers‘ arrest Churchill, 
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speaking in Dundee on 11 November, scornfully referred to him as a ‗murderous renegade.‘ He 
stated: 
I have seen with satisfaction that the mischief-making, murderous renegade, 
Erskine Childers, has been captured. No man has done more to harm or shown 
more genuine malice, or endeavoured to bring a greater curse upon the common 
people of Ireland than this strange being, actuated by a deadly and malignant 
hatred for the land of his birth.
68
  
 
Churchill‘s comments did not go unnoticed. In the Dáil Mr. Gaffney, a member of the 
Labour party, not only questioned the link between the initial executions and that of Childers but 
also argued that Britain‘s involvement was undeniable. Gaffney argued that due to ‗the very fact 
that in England you had Winston Churchill, and men of his calibre crying down this renegade 
Englishman […] should have set us thinking that there was a screw loose somewhere.‘69 
However, these were only opinions expressed by the then Home Office Secretary and it has to be 
acknowledged that whether Winston Churchill, and by extension the British Cabinet, had any 
influence is indeed questionable and in reality insignificant as the Provisional Government and 
the National Army already had grounds to execute Childers. To date one important viewpoint 
has been omitted, Childers‘. 
 Following his arrest, Childers made a detailed statement in which he highlighted several 
factors which he believed affected his case. He commented on the numerous speeches made by 
both O‘Higgins and Churchill and he questioned the legality of the tribunal set up to try him. 
Furthermore, he examined the subject of his so-called dichotomous nationality as he felt that this 
was a key factor which contributed to his conviction. He stated ‗in view of the mass of prejudice 
which has gathered about me owing to false statements and calumnies, and innuendoes which 
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have been made about me in the press and elsewhere for a year past.‘70 Childers claimed that 
propaganda was used and prejudices cultivated to ensure his conviction. He was referring to 
Griffith‘s, O‘Higgins‘ and Churchill‘s comments which either cast him as a ‗damned 
Englishman‘, an ‗able Englishman‘ or a ‗murderous renegade‘, respectively. Childers argued 
that: 
I have constantly been called an Englishman who, having betrayed his own 
country, came to Ireland to betray and destroy Ireland, a double traitor [...] 
According to the rules laid down by your own Government – I am by birth, 
domicile and deliberate choice of citizenship an Irishman. My father was English, 
born in England, my mother was Irish, born in Ireland, Anna, the daughter of 
Thomas J. Barton, of Glendalough House, Annamoe, Co. Wicklow [...] With the 
formal establishment of the Republic in 1919, it became necessary for people like 
myself, of mixed birth, to choose our citizenship once and for all. I chose that of 
the Irish Republic.
71
 
 
The term ‗Englishman‘ was, according to Childers, grossly and unfairly applied to him. 
He ultimately believed that he was an Irishman legally and morally and the application of this 
term only served to affect his chance of receiving a fair and unbiased trial. It is worth noting here 
that Childers was just as ―Irish‖ as other high profile nationalist figures such as de Valera, 
Pádraic Pearse and Griffith, all of which have ancestral ties to foreign countries including 
America, Britain and Wales, respectively. Childers argued that: 
When his [O‘Higgins‘] speech was made on November 17th, my case, so far as I 
know, was still sub judice […] this sentence had to be confirmed and, in the case 
of a sentence of death, further confirmed by two members of the Army Council, 
and it seems probable that the speech may have influenced the minds of those 
whose duty it was […] to review the sentence [...] I submit that it was a grave 
matter that this speech of Mr. O‘Higgins was made when it was made. I 
understand that technically, at any rate, Military Courts are wholly under the 
Army, and that then Civil authority has no control over them – or rather has 
delegated its control to the Army – but Mr. O‘Higgins spoke as though he himself 
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were, as a member of the Government, responsible, not merely for authorising the 
Army to execute, but for the policy of actually carrying out particular executions 
[…] The impression left on the mind was that so far from the Army having sole 
and autocratic discretion, the policy of carrying out the executions was a Cabinet 
matter, in which Mr. O‘Higgins himself had a voice as well as General 
Mulcahy.
72
   
 
Childers also claimed that Churchill‘s speech at Dundee, in which the Home Secretary referred 
to him as a mischievous and murderous renegade, indirectly contributed to his conviction. He 
maintained that: 
He [Churchill] has had personal charge of carrying out the Treaty for his 
Government and has been in constant and intimate association for that purpose 
with the Provisional Government and especially, among others, with Mr. 
O‘Higgins. That such veiled appeal for my execution, with the abdominal 
slanders attached to it, would influence the mind of any Irish Minister.
73
 
 
Another important point, according to Childers, was that he was never convicted of being 
‗outstandingly active or wicked‘ as claimed by O‘Higgins and Mulcahy. He declared that 
nothing was produced by witnesses beyond his identity, details of his capture and possession of 
an automatic pistol. No reference was made, according to Childers, to his activities since the 
beginning of the conflict. He argued that being charged with the possession of a gun alone was 
ridiculous.
74
 Childers was adamant that he was not attempting to do ‗this in the desire to shirk 
any penalty. If it is to be so, I will gladly and happily suffer the lot of the four lads executed on 
the 17
th
 on the same charge as mine.‘75 He felt, however, that it was imperative that he put across 
his views about what he felt was a slanderous attack on both his character and the republican 
cause before his conviction and subsequent execution. Childers accepted responsibility for his 
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propaganda but was appalled at how, as he believed, the Provisional Government over 
exaggerated his actual role in the Civil War. ‗I take the fullest responsibility for any influence I 
may have had on my fellow countrymen. [However] That influence has been grossly and 
ridiculously exaggerated by our enemies in order to discredit our cause through me, but such as it 
has been I am proud of it.‘76 It was his opinion that there needed to be a counter-balance to all of 
the pro-treatyite propaganda which had been used against him to defame his character and to 
deprecate the cause which he supported while it was still possible to do so. This is important as it 
now facilitates a more comprehensive analysis of the factors which he felt contributed to his 
conviction and pending execution. 
Childers‘ death was a considerable blow to Irregular morale. According to de Valera, 
when writing to Liam Mellows in prison, the loss of Childers was enormous. He indicated that 
‗Childers died like the good brave man he was […] his loss is irreparable – not half so much 
because of his ability as because of the nobility of his character.‘77 However, unbeknownst to de 
Valera and Mellows the Irregulars‘ G.H.Q. was also formulating a response to the executions 
policy. They released a statement which argued ‗If Erskine Childers dies in their hands, he will 
have died in the cause of Tone and Padraig Pearse, and his judges and his executioners will have 
acted in the cause of [...] Maxwell, and they should know that they cannot do these things with 
impunity.‘78 The Irregulars attempted to portray the Government and Army as British dupes 
throughout the Civil War. The executions policy provided them with ample opportunities to do 
so. In this instance, they were quick to link Childers‘ execution to that of previous 
revolutionaries in an attempt to taint the pro-treatyites with the same anti-British sentiment that 
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emerged after the executions of Pearse and Tone. Nonetheless, Childers hoped that his execution 
would mean an end to the Government‘s executions policy. He stated that ‗Oh! will this nation 
soon understand and pay reverence to what actuates our comrades in the cause? I feel it will. If 
only I can die knowing that my death would somehow – I know not how – save the lives of 
others and arrest this policy of executions.‘79 However Childers, whose execution brought the 
total to five thus far, was proved wrong. The decision to execute him simultaneously issued a 
message to the Irregulars that no one, leader or otherwise, would be immune to prosecution 
under the Public Safety Resolution. Unfortunately for the aforementioned prisoner, Mellows, the 
Irregulars‘ response to the Government‘s executions policy ensured that he, along with three 
other prisoners, would also face the firing squad on 8 December 1922. 
There was never really any doubt that the military court would find Childers guilty as 
technically he was under the conventions of the Public Safety Resolution. However, there were 
several issues which could have influenced this particular case. Evidence suggests the occurrence 
of a less speculative and more logical chain of events. It has been argued that there was a direct 
link between the executions of four men on 17 November and Childers‘ execution on 24 
November. Critics claimed that the former event was a test case to assess the possibility of 
extending the scope of the executions policy to include members of the Irregulars‘ hierarchy. 
Furthermore, it was suggested that the executions on 17 November were devised to desensitise 
the country in preparation for a more controversial execution, that of Childers. While it has been 
established that the initial executions were a test case this does not imply conspiracy. The first 
cases under any new policy are used to assess to practicality of that policy. Even though Childers 
was, technically speaking, a leader the vast majority of those executed, as will be established in 
subsequent chapters, were ordinary soldiers and not members of the Irregulars‘ hierarchy. It is 
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evident that there was a relationship between both sets of executions. However, the connection 
was not a dubious or malevolent one. Moreover, having five executions in such a short space of 
time actually fuelled rather than quietened condemnation. 
O‘Higgins‘ referral to Childers in the Dáil on two separate occasions was also 
highlighted by opponents of the Government and the executions policy. Firstly, O‘Higgins 
alluded to Childers as an ‗able Englishman‘ engaged in ‗a purely destructive programme‘ on the 
same day that the Public Safety Resolution was tabled, 27 September. Critics argue that this 
meant that these emergency powers were specifically devised for Childers. O‘Higgins claimed 
that this was an innocuous remark. This may well have been the case. How could O‘Higgins and 
the other pro-treatyites for that matter create or endorse a policy for a man that was still at large? 
None of those involved in the construction or proposition of the September resolution could have 
known that Childers would be arrested whilst in possession of a weapon nearly two months later. 
Furthermore, if the policy was meant solely for Childers then why did the executions continue 
after he was put to death? It is highly unlikely that the pro-treatyites would have devised such a 
controversial policy and executed eighty additional men just to facilitate the execution of one 
particular man. Secondly, critics also highlighted O‘Higgins‘ comments on 17 November. When 
justifying the first set of executions, he stated that it was necessary to execute ordinary Irregulars 
first as this would send a clear message to other average Irregular soldiers that if they were 
caught with a weapon then they would face execution. O‘Higgins claimed that if they took as the 
first case an Irregular leader and/or an Englishman then the message would have been lost as 
normal Irregulars would have assumed that the executions policy only applied to the anti-
treatyite elite. O‘Higgins would have been well aware of Childers‘ arrest on 10 November and, 
as evidence suggests, referred to him to prove a point and justify the executions which occurred 
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that same day. All that O‘Higgins‘ comments indicate is that he, in addition to several other 
prominent pro-treatyites, loathed Childers. It suggests that following his capture, trial and 
conviction by military court the Cabinet, in conjunction with the Army Council, confirmed his 
sentence. This, however, does not imply existing intent or prove the Government was involved in 
a conspiracy. It must be noted that Childers and his associates proclaimed that his so-called 
intent to discharge his weapon, when being arrested, was presumed by the pro-treatyites. They 
further claimed that assumption did not equate to intent. However, they were just as quick to 
misrepresent O‘Higgins‘ intentions and assume that he had malevolent objectives in mind when 
he referred to Childers in the Dáil. 
The manner and location of Childers‘ arrest was also referred to as proof of a conspiracy. 
It was claimed that as he was arrested in his own home and did not use his weapon against the 
National troops then his conviction and subsequent execution was unjustified. Regardless of how 
this might be perceived by the general public, the Government were not unduly concerned. They 
believed that Childers was a menace to society, a man that led numerous Irregulars astray with 
his propaganda and as he was captured with an unauthorised weapon he was subject to 
execution. The issues surrounding Childers‘ arrest are interesting and noteworthy; however, they 
are largely irrelevant. Whether he was captured in his home or in open confrontation did not 
matter. He was still a prominent Irregular, one that had taken up a guerrilla struggle against the 
Provisional Government. Childers was apprehended with a weapon regardless of whether or not 
he intended to use it. He claimed that he did not fire his weapon as his relations were in the 
house at the time of his arrest. Does this mean that he would have been content to engage the 
arresting troops in a shoot-out if his relatives were not in the house? The fact remains that he was 
a self-proclaimed anti-treatyite. He was a prominent member of an organisation that had declared 
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its opposition to the Treaty and was engaged in military resistance against the Government. 
Conversely, would an armed O‘Higgins have survived if a group of Irregulars raided his house 
and attempted to capture him? The Irregulars had indicated on several occasions that they were 
well capable of killing prominent pro-treatyites. For example, Collins was killed on 22 August. 
Controversy aside, Childers was captured with a weapon and under the terms of the Public 
Safety Resolution he was guilty. 
Critics also alluded to the possibility of British involvement. This point is indefensible. It 
is evident that Churchill wanted to try Childers for treason and presumably execute him 
thereafter. Churchill certainly despised this ‗murderous renegade‘, as he called him, but again 
this does not imply direct or indirect involvement in Childers‘ execution. The Provisional 
Government did not need British permission or support to convict and put Childers to death. The 
Irregulars also attempted to create a link between Childers execution and other nationalist 
martyrs, such as Pearse and Tone, in an effort to portray the Government and Army as British 
puppets. The Government was not overly worried by these attempts or how this particular case 
would be perceived by the public. They believed that in this instance people would view 
Childers‘ execution in the same way they did, regrettable but necessary. Despite condemnation 
from expected sources such as the Irregulars, anti-treatyite sympathisers and the Labour party, 
the Government were accurate in their assumption. 
Finally, in several letters to Chester Allen Arthur Junior, FitzGerald admitted Childers‘ 
conviction for the unauthorised possession of a weapon was not the sole reason for his execution, 
however, it was enough to convict him. Again this does not imply conspiracy. It must be 
emphasised here that FitzGerald suggested that despite the fact that several prominent pro-
treatyites loathed Childers they did not have a vendetta against him. He states that they acted out 
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of necessity. Childers was an influential character and was regarded as a clear and present danger 
to society. Thus, it was politically and militarily expedient to execute Childers. He stated that the 
Government did not execute Childers out of vindictiveness. After all Childers was, some months 
previous, close friends and comrades with the very same men that now faced him. According to 
the Government, they did not want to execute Childers but as responsible servants of the Irish 
people they had to act in the best interests of the country. 
This is not to say that Childers‘ death was beyond reproach. The fact remains that he was 
put to death while his appeal, albeit a civil one, was still being processed. Furthermore, the pro-
treatyites over-estimated Childers‘ actual influence and importance during the Civil War. It can 
also be argued that the execution of this man, and many others, for the mere possession of a 
weapon, given that the consecutive nature of the War of Independence and the Civil War had put 
weaponry in the hands of many people, is disputable. It must be emphasised that this was a time 
of civil war and hindsight was not an option in 1922. 
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CHAPTER 4 
‘Terror Meets Terror’  
Assassination and Executions 
 
 
Following the executions in early November the Irish Civil War continued unabated. 
Determined to continue their prosecution of the conflict, the Government carried out three more 
executions in Beggars Bush barracks, Dublin on 30 November. These events caused Liam Lynch 
to reconsider the Irregulars‘ policy concerning official reprisals. Prior to this he had opposed this 
course of action. However, his attitude changed following the execution of the eight Irregulars. 
Lynch issued an order, on 30 November, which stated that all those that voted for the Public 
Safety Resolution would be shot on sight. This directive resulted in the assassination of Seán 
Hales T.D. and the serious wounding of Deputy Pádraic Ó Maille outside Leinster House, 
Dublin, on 7 December. This incident will be examined in detail as the notion that this single 
event significantly altered the landscape of the Irish Civil War forms the basis of this chapter. 
The immediate consequences of this event, the extrajudicial execution of four untried prisoners 
in Mountjoy Jail on 8 December 1922, will also be analysed. This proved to be one of the most 
contentious incidents during the Civil War, one which even surpassed the attack on the previous 
day. The execution of four untried men signified the Government‘s intentions to radically alter 
their implementation of the executions policy in response to the Irregulars‘ policy of 
assassination, in reality, breaching the law in order to maintain it. 
The execution of five Irregulars by 24 November 1922 caused Lynch great concern. He 
was determined to counter the impact that the executions policy was having on his troops. Lynch 
informed Eamon de Valera, on 25 November, that ‗at [the] last Executive meeting a unanimous 
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decision was come to that if [the] enemy carried out their Murder Bill by executing any members 
of I.R.A. […] that all [the] members of P.G. [Provisional Government] Parliament who voted for 
Bill would be shot at sight.‘1 In addition to this, Lynch stated that all Labour T.D.s would be 
notified that if they continued to participate in the Dáil that similar action would be taken against 
them.
2
 De Valera, although uncertain about the effectiveness of a reprisals policy, concurred with 
Lynch. He argued that ‗the efficacy of reprisals is open to doubt, but as I see no other way to stop 
these others and protect our men, I cannot disapprove.‘3 Lynch subsequently issued a letter to the 
Ceann-Comhairle of the Dáil, on 28 November, threatening drastic action against those who had 
voted for the emergency powers resolution. Regardless of the Irregulars‘ threat the pro-treatyite 
political and military authorities put to death three more prisoners in Beggar‘s Bush barracks, 
Dublin. Prisoners Joseph Spooner, Patrick Farrelly and John Murphy were executed on 30 
November for the unauthorised possession of revolvers and bombs.
4
 These men had been 
arrested in Dublin near Oriel House, the headquarters of the C.I.D., whilst attempting to destroy 
the building.  
Oriel House and its employees had an unsavoury reputation. It was established as a part 
of the Government‘s first response to post-truce policing problems in Dublin. It had an armed 
plain clothes force which was charged with detective, security and both military and political 
intelligence functions.
5
 Irregular prisoners who were detained there were interrogated by men 
who, according to Ernie O‘Malley, ‗were untrained in detective work, but they were handy with 
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their guns and they were tough.‘6 One prisoner, Joseph Clarke, detailed his treatment by C.I.D. 
officers in an account which he gave on 13 November 1922. Following his arrest officers Frank 
Bolster and Dolan:   
twisted my arms and kicked me on the legs and body, tore my moustache off with 
a scissors, razor and some other torture instruments. Dolan did most of the torture, 
assisted by Bolster. They also twisted my ears with a pliers. They also threatened 
to use a hot iron if I did not give them information. Dolan made a blow at me with 
a large black bottle. I dodged the blow; Bolster said I should be shot [...] I was 
told I would be taken to the torture room again in an hour‘s time if I did not give 
[them] the information [they] wanted.
7
 
 
Mulcahy tried to rationalise the putting to death of these three men as he had done for the 
first set of executions. He stated that these men were representative of the rank and file of the 
Irregulars throughout the country. He claimed that they were probably uneducated men without 
any political convictions and never meant to get involved in a situation as serious as they did.
8
 
Mulcahy also suggested that we ‗provided for these men all the spiritual assistance that we could 
to help them in their passage to eternity.‘9 Another detainee, a student named Seamus Mallin 
who attended University College, Dublin, had been convicted of the unauthorised possession of a 
revolver and sentenced to death along with the above prisoners. Fortunately for Mallin, his death 
sentence was commuted to imprisonment. This partial-clemency occurred upon the advice of the 
legal advisor to the National Army elite, a former Dáil court judge, Cahir Davitt. Davitt, who had 
been appointed Judge Advocate General on 15 August 1922, intervened and recommended that 
Mallin‘s sentence be reduced due to the prisoner‘s young age.10 Furthermore, Mallin‘s familial 
                                                          
6
 Ernie O‘Malley, The singing flame (Dublin, 1992), p. 145. 
7
 An account by Joseph Clarke of the treatment of prisoners by the C.I.D., 13 November 1922 (U.C.D. Archives, 
Twomey papers, P69/250). 
8
 Dáil Debates, Dáil in committee – estimates – motion for adjournment, volume 1, col. 2542 (30 November 1922). 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Seosamh Ó Longaigh, Emergency law in independent Ireland, 1922-1948 (Dublin, 2006), pp 22-24. 
 129 
 
connections may have played a part in this act of leniency. His father Michael Mallin, an Irish 
Citizen Army officer, had been executed on 8 May 1916 for his participation in the Easter Rising 
in which he commanded a group of Volunteers in Stephen‘s Green, Dublin.11 This indicates that 
even though the Government were willing to execute former comrades and fellow countrymen, 
even in Kilmainham Jail, thus running the risk of being labelled hypocritical British pawns they 
did, in certain circumstances, express caution. In this instance, the Government recognised that 
they had to be careful about how this might be perceived by the public. Even though the public 
generally accepted the executions policy during the Civil War the Government did, at times, 
have to tread carefully when deciding who was to be put to death. Executing the young son of a 
1916 hero might lead to a shift in public perception of the Government and its executions policy. 
Nevertheless, in comparable manner to the previous executions, official notification had not been 
forwarded to the relatives of the condemned Irregulars. Due to the secrecy which surrounded 
these events they were unaware that these men had even been tried. An announcement in the 
newspapers was the first notification they received.
12
 
As Lynch‘s warning had gone unheeded he issued a general order to the O.C.s of all 
Irregular Battalions on 30 November 1922. This command stated that ‗all members of 
Provisional ―Parliament‖ who were present and voted for Murder Bill will be shot at sight.‘13 It 
included the names of those who had voted in favour of the emergency resolution and also listed 
numerous other categories of Government supporters which would now be targeted and harassed 
by the Irregulars. For example, the residences of active Government supporters, all Army 
officers and all ex-British officers who joined the National forces since 6 December 1921 would 
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be subject to attack.
14
 Lynch had sanctioned official reprisals in order to equip his forces with 
their own form of emergency powers as he sought to counter the psychological effects of the 
Government‘s executions policy. The issuing of the warning to the Government was an absolute 
necessity due to, in Lynch‘s opinion, the appalling undertakings of the National Army. He stated 
that the: 
Provisional Government of Southern Ireland has embarked on a ruthless 
campaign of extermination and it is quite evident that they intend carrying this 
through to the last ditch. All their efforts are now concentrated on making a 
success of the terrorist tactics which failed the English in 1920-21. The F.S. [Free 
State] leaders have developed a most callous and blood-thirsty outlook and are 
prepared to go any length to destroy the REPUBLIC [...] His [Mulcahy‘s] salaried 
supporters have been allowed to go unmolested while our prisoners have been 
murdered and tortured in the most devilish fashion.
15
 
 
Interestingly, Lynch condemned the Government for their ‗bloodthirsty‘ imitation of British 
‗terrorist tactics‘, however; he was now countenancing similar methods. Moreover, he, like 
Mulcahy, Cosgrave and FitzGerald, denounced comparable tactics employed by the British 
during the War of Independence. According to Lynch, the Irregulars had acted admirably when 
dealing with prisoners which had been taken during the Civil War. Ryan suggests that Lynch had 
refused on numerous occasions to endorse reprisal action against prisoners of the National 
Army. She states that: 
Requests had often been put to Lynch to allow Free State soldiers armed or 
unarmed to be shot as reprisals for the executions which the Free State 
Government were continuing to pursue, but Lynch refused to countenance this. 
Lynch thought that shooting prisoners was immoral; he wondered how as 
Christians the Free Staters justified such to their own consciences.
16
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After the ratification of the Free State Constitution Bill and the Consequential Provisions 
Bill by the King on 5 December, the Irish Free State came into existence.
17
 The Provisional 
Government which was established to facilitate the transfer of power from the British to the Irish 
administration had run its course and was superseded by the Irish Free State Government. This 
historical event witnessed the appointment of Timothy Healy as Governor-General by the King. 
It also saw the re-election of W. T. Cosgrave as President and Kevin O‘Higgins as Vice-
President of the Dáil. This occasion was ultimately overshadowed by what followed. On 7 
December, the day after the Irish Free State came into existence, two pro-treatyite deputies were 
attacked in Dublin whilst on their way to a meeting of the Dáil. This event, undertaken by a 
raiding party consisting of members of the Dublin No.1 Brigade, resulted in the assassination of 
Deputy Seán Hales and the serious injury of Deputy Pádraic Ó Maille, Leas-Cheann Comhairle 
of the Dáil, outside Leinster House following their luncheon in the Ormond Hotel. Both men had 
attended a conference which was held by prominent pro-treatyites as they attempted to establish 
a new political party, Cumann na nGaedheal. Following this attack, however, the pro-treatyites 
decided to postpone the public unveiling of their new party until April 1923.
18
 Unfortunately for 
Hales, as evidenced by the weekly operational report from Lynch to the Adjutant-General, he 
was shot unintentionally. In accordance with the report ‗Padraig O‘Maille, Deputy Speaker, F.S. 
[Free State] Parliament [was] wounded. Sean Hales, F.S. T.D. and officer of F.S. Army [was] 
shot dead – unintentionally – while in company of P. O‘Maille. It was intended only to wound 
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Hales, but he was mistaken for O‘Maille.‘19 The report further indicated that during the 
operation:  
O‘Maille was pointed out as our men were under cover in a laneway and during 
the few seconds while O‘Maille turned back to speak to a friend he exchanged 
places with Hales and owing to their general appearance being somewhat similar 
the mistake was made […] You will realise however that it was not intended to 
shoot Hales at the time […] The intention was only to wound him.20 
 
 
Another account of this event was reported in the Irish Independent on 17 February 
2002. The report entitled The truth behind the murder of Seán Hales detailed an encounter in 
1985 between Ulick O‘Connor, an Irish writer, and a man called Seán Caffrey during the run of 
O‘Connor‘s play „Execution‟ in the Peacock theatre, Dublin. The play was based on the 
Mountjoy executions. Caffrey was, according to O‘Connor, the Irregular Intelligence officer 
who took the official report from the man that had just shot Hales an hour or two previously.
21
 
According to Caffrey, the man that pulled the trigger was called Owen Donnelly from 
Glasnevin, County Dublin. He stated that Donnelly was ‗a rather girlish-looking, fair-haired 
fellow who had been a very good scholar in O'Connell Schools.‘22 He also claimed that he had 
attended this school with Donnelly and that he came from a good family as his ‗brother was a 
chemist in Cork and his father was a civil servant in the Custom House.‘23 Furthermore, Caffrey 
stated that Donnelly was delighted after shooting Hales. He claimed that Donnelly even ‗gave a 
little chuckle, as if reminiscing over something which he particularly enjoyed.‘24 If true, this 
account suggests that Donnelly may have been aware that he had just killed his intended target 
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Hales and not Ó Maille. Alternatively, Donnelly may not have cared which of the two deputies 
he shot once he killed one of them. If this is the case it is indicative of the animosity felt by some 
members of the Irregular forces towards the pro-treatyites and the executions policy. 
What is not in doubt is that Hales was killed, whether purposefully or by mistake, at the 
hands of an Irregular assassin. What is interesting is the fact that Hales had not actually voted for 
the Public Safety Resolution. Even though he was an active supporter of the Government he was 
absent from the Dáil when T.D.s had voted for emergency powers. Additionally, he was not 
actually mentioned on the list that Lynch included with the general order which he had issued on 
30 November.
25
 This further substantiates the claim that he was not the intended target. Hales 
was a popular soldier as he had played an important part in the War of Independence. 
Unfortunately his family, like so many others, embodied the tragedy which is inherent in any 
civil war. His brother, Tom, had sided with the Irregulars and was, at the time of the 
assassination, a prisoner of the Government. This single incident, in which the Irregulars 
potentially threatened the lives of all Free State T.D.s and the existence of the newly-fledged 
Irish State, shocked the country. According to Stephen Collins, numerous Dáil Deputies fled 
Dublin in fear of their lives following this event. Cosgrave was aware that if the Dáil wilted in 
the face of this terror then Irish democracy and the Irish Free State would founder at its 
inception. He ordered the secret service to follow the fleeing Deputies and ensure that they 
returned to Dublin. Following this he met each T.D. individually and appealed to them to remain 
undeterred and honour their patriotic duty.
26
 The assassination of Hales and the wounding of Ó 
Maille had an enormous impact on the landscape of the Irish Civil War. It was to have 
immediate and long-standing effects both of which eclipsed even the death of Michael Collins. 
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Firstly, it ensured a brutal and ruthless response from the newly-established Irish Free State 
Government and the National Army which rivalled the preceding assassination. Secondly, in the 
long term, this event set in motion what would prove to be a dramatic escalation in both the 
implementation and the geographical scope of the pro-treatyite‘s emergency resolution. It 
ensured that the Free State Government and the Army would become even more determined to 
crush the Irregulars‘ armed resistance. Essentially, it meant that whatever restraint was shown 
previously by both the Government and the Army was now removed and the wholesale 
implementation of the emergency powers would now occur. As Piaras Béaslaí indicated on 16 
December 1922: 
Brigadier Sean Hales, T.D., one of the bravest and most loyal soldiers of the 
Army of Ireland died on Thursday week, foully slain by the bullets of assassins 
[...] Stern measures are necessary if Ireland is to be saved, but we will carry on the 
work inspired by only one passion – the desire to save Ireland.27 
 
Following Cosgrave‘s address to the Dáil, on 7 December, Mulcahy issued a brief but 
emotional speech which stated ‗There was neither Press present, nor were the Deputies asked if 
they would like to see their relatives, nor were they asked would they like to see a clergyman, 
nor were they asked had they any private business of their own that they would like to 
transact.‘28 Mulcahy‘s speech was indicative of his contempt for the measures employed by the 
Irregulars in comparison to the Government‘s executions policy which, theoretically speaking, 
offered due process. The Government‘s response to this event was to be swift and fierce. Firstly, 
Mulcahy immediately issued an unwavering proclamation to the country which was published in 
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the newspapers on 8 December. The declaration, which outlined the existence of a ‗conspiracy‘ 
to assassinate the members of the nation‘s parliament, stated that to preserve the: 
Lives of the People‘s Representatives, to Safeguard the life of the Nation itself, 
the Sternest Measures are necessary, and will be adopted. It is therefore 
announced and proclaimed [that] every person arrested in possession of any one 
or more of the articles or substances specified in the second paragraph [...] shall 
be liable to be brought forthwith before a Committee of Officers of the National 
Army and charged with such possession. Such Committee will investigate the 
charge, and report, in writing to the Confirming Authority [...] Upon consideration 
of the report of such Committee as aforesaid the Confirming Authority will, if 
satisfied [...] order such person to suffer death or such other punishment as they 
shall think fit. Such order will be carried out summarily.
29
 
 
 
Mulcahy‘s declaration is interesting. As a prominent member of the I.R.A. during the War of 
Independence he countenanced the use of guerrilla tactics, such as assassinations; however, now 
that he was attempting to establish a state his attitude towards these tactics had changed.   
The decree proved to be a clear indication of intent. The Government finally enforced the 
military committee system originally devised in the Public Safety Resolution. It outlined the 
setting up of mobile groups of officers which were to streamline the application of the 
aforementioned declaration. Campbell states that by spring 1923 captured Irregular prisoners 
were ‗having their cases disposed of not by military court but by summary Army committees as 
a matter of course.‘30 These committees composed of lower ranking officers, one of which could 
not be ranked lower than captain, would dispose of charges concerning the unauthorised 
possession of arms, ammunition and explosives.
31
 Even though military courts were favoured up 
until now these committees would permit a more summary application of the emergency powers 
on an increasingly decentralised basis. The previously sanctioned military courts would continue 
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to operate, however, only in incidents where there was doubt placed on cases.
32
 Persons arrested 
in possession of arms would, as quickly as possible, be brought before a local committee of 
officers which would then analyse the arrest and subsequently report, in writing, if there had 
been a case of unauthorised possession. For those accused there seemed to be no provision for 
the accused to consult with a solicitor or barrister. However, the accused would have the 
opportunity to defend himself and could have an officer for that purpose, when in front of the 
aforementioned committee.
33
 Upon receipt of a committee‘s report the officers would devise a 
punishment, which included that of death, and this sentence was to be carried out summarily in 
accordance with Mulcahy‘s proclamation. Davitt was concerned over the adoption of the 
committee system. He believed that they had no judicial function and were nothing more than 
drumhead courts martial. Davitt argued that as they merely investigated and reported, and as 
investigations were not legal trials, that the committees did not require any rules of procedure.
34
 
In order to keep the system of committees within the terms of the September resolution each 
committee would include an officer chosen by Mulcahy and certified by the Law Officer to be a 
person of legal knowledge – a command legal officer – who would ensure that committees were 
conducted appropriately and that reports were suitably presented.
35
 He stated in his memoirs that 
as they were not judicial in nature, neither he nor his Office should participate in them. Davitt 
also added that the legal officers supervising these committees should do so as troops obeying 
orders.
36
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This was not the only response by the Government and Army to the attack on 7 
December. In addition to the swift establishment of military committees the newly formed Free 
State Government decided to sanction an event which would purposefully rival Hales‘ 
assassination. Following a late emergency Cabinet meeting on 7 December, which saw 
numerous heated and emotional debates, a decision was taken to execute summarily four 
Irregular prisoners as a response to the events of that day. It is believed by some historians, such 
as Hopkinson and Keogh, that Mulcahy and Eoin MacNeill proposed and seconded this radical 
motion at this meeting. O‘Higgins, despite being an ardent supporter of stern measures, was the 
last to accept the decision. He was eventually persuaded as, according to the remaining members 
present at the Cabinet meeting, there was no other way to halt the Irregulars‘ policy of 
assassination.
37
 However, the Irregulars believed, according to Andrews, that Mulcahy had 
neither the intelligence nor the nerve to initiate the Mountjoy executions.
38
 Questions concerning 
the occurrence of the Cabinet meeting persist as no official minutes for the conference remain. 
When writing to C. S. Andrews, John O‘Beirne claimed that it was common practice for the 
Government to omit certain information from official minutes. He stated that the Government 
decided, on 22 July, that Ministers should only be supplied with extracts of cabinet minutes 
which affected their own departments. He claimed that ‗this was to prevent their Cabinet 
decisions being captured in toto [total], but it also means that unpleasant or very secret 
information/decisions might not have been made known to all Ministers.‘39 O‘Beirne remarked 
that the secret meeting which occurred on the night of 8 December may not have actually taken 
place as: 
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There does not appear to have been a Cabinet meeting on 7
th
 December [...] I 
haven‘t been able to find any other reference in the Cabinet Minutes of this period 
[7 December] to the execution policy. It appears to me that Mulcahy at this time 
was really running the whole show and that the Free State Army was acting 
without reference to its civilian masters. Certainly the passage I‘ve quoted above 
would make it seem that the Cabinet was retrospectively agreeing, especially 
since previous minutes do not contain reference to an execution policy in any 
form.
40
 
 
This explanation is implausible. O‘Higgins referred to the ‗coldest of cold discussions‘ in 
the Dáil, on 8 December, when T.D.s furiously debated over the Mountjoy executions.
41
 This 
indicates that a meeting of some sort, official or unofficial, did in fact occur. In a letter to Kevin 
O‘Higgins‘ daughter, Una O‘Higgins O‘Malley, Uinseann MacEoin claimed that ‗Mulcahy 
proposed it [the execution of four Irregular prisoners], and Eoin MacNeill seconded it. He was 
extremely bitter. The person who held out the most on the thing was Kevin O‘Higgins.‘42 A 
meeting did occur as the execution of four men did not occur miraculously. The decision resulted 
in an event which Deasy described as ‗such an act of savagery that it seemed all principles of war 
were abandoned.‘43 In the early hours of 8 December four Irregular prisoners, Joseph McKelvey, 
Rory O‘Connor, Liam Mellows and Richard Barrett were executed in Mountjoy Jail as a reprisal 
for the assassination of Deputy Seán Hales. The condemned men were the former I.R.A. 
Executive‘s Chief of Staff, Director of Engineering, Quartermaster-General and Deputy 
Quartermaster-General, respectively. They were in the custody of the Government since the fall 
of the Four Courts on 30 June 1922.
44
 These men were not tried or convicted. They merely 
received notification, signed by Mulcahy, following the late Cabinet meeting on 7 December 
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which informed them of their impending execution. The notice highlighted the emotion which 
the assassination of Hales evoked: 
You   are hereby notified that, being a person taken in arms 
against the Government, you will be executed at 8 a.m. on Friday 8
th
 December as 
a reprisal for the assassination of Brigadier Sean Hales T.D., in Dublin, on the 7
th
 
December, on his way to a meeting of Dáil Éireann and as a solemn warning to 
those associated [with] you who are engaged in a conspiracy of assassination 
against the representatives of the Irish People.
45
  
 
This event was a perfect example of how members of the pro-treatyite political and military 
hierarchy coalesced to decide who was to be put to death. Evidence suggests that these particular 
men were put forward for consideration, probably by Mulcahy, and that some sort of a vote was 
taken with O‘Higgins being the last to consent. It must be emphasised that extraordinary 
circumstances influenced the case. A pro-treatyite T.D. had just been killed. Ultimately, speed 
was of the essence if the Government were to respond to Hales‘ assassination. 
The carrying out of the executions tended to be shrouded in secrecy and as a result 
obtaining an accurate description of the actual executions themselves has proven difficult. 
However, with regard to the Mountjoy executions an account emerged in 1997 which provided 
an insight into the events on 8 December. The account came from a Parish Priest of the Holy 
Redeemer Church, Canon John Pigott. Pigott was one of the first three chaplains appointed to 
the National Army. When writing of this incident in the 1960s at the request of the late Father 
Liam Martin, on behalf of Archbishop John Charles McQuaid, he chronicled the events of the 
night prior to the execution of these men. According to Pigott, he was summoned to Mountjoy 
Jail around 1.30 a.m. and upon his arrival he was directed straight to O‘Connor‘s cell where he 
met with a pale but resolute man. O‘Connor insisted that no time should be wasted with 
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conversation and that both men should get down to the actual preparation. Pigott mentions that ‗I 
can say that no one could have made a more Christian preparation for death than did Rory 
O‘Connor.‘46 After spending some time with the aforementioned anti-treatyite Canon Pigott 
gave the prisoner Holy Communion upon which the prisoner remarked ‗Do you know, Father, 
isn‘t it strange – this is the Anniversary of my First Holy Communion.‘47 Following this he 
attended to Mellows. According to the Canon, he was ‗obviously agitated and talkative, and I 
believe, elated that he was to die for Ireland.‘48 Upon hearing from Mellows that he would not 
take the sacraments Pigott promised him that he would return to see him before the execution. 
He then returned to see O‘Connor. A mass said by another priest, Canon McMahon, for the four 
condemned men occurred in the Chapel. When it came to the receiving of Holy Communion 
Mellows was the only one to refuse. Phil Cosgrave, Governor of Mountjoy Jail and brother of 
W. T. Cosgrave, stood to attention beside the altar and attempted to prolong the mass as long as 
possible so that Mellows might receive communion. His assistance failed. When the mass 
concluded the prisoners were promptly led out of the Chapel in single file and blindfolded. 
Pigott recalled that it was at this time that Mellows decided to make his peace with God. 
According to Pigott Mellows was ‗a deeply religious man, and his fervent prayers at the end had 
gained him a very special Grace from God.‘49 He received the Viaticum after a brief delay as 
Canon McMahon got locked in to the Sacristy by accident by Paudeen O‘Keefe, the Deputy 
Governor of the Jail. Having made his peace with God, Mellows pressed upon Pigott to give to 
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his mother a small crucifix that he had in his possession. This item was important to Mellows as 
he stated it ‗was out in 1916 too.‘50  
Pigott remembered the event itself in great detail. According to the Canon, all the 
concerned parties were present in the prison yard and the four condemned men were ‗all brave 
and calm […] [and] lined up before the Firing Squad.‘51 Pigott gave the last absolution and with 
that Liam [Mellows] said ‗Slan Libh Lads.‘52 The volley rang out. According to Joseph 
Campbell, a republican author and an Irregular prisoner in Mountjoy Jail at the time of the 
executions, the shots which killed the condemned men were ‗so loud at first that I thought it 
must be an explosion somewhere. But it had not the depth of sound of [a] bomb or mine – just 
rifle-shots in unison. About 12 revolver shots were heard following.‘53 For a prisoner during the 
Civil War life was, according to Campbell, very difficult. He contends that on several occasions 
the inmates, in Mountjoy Jail, were treated like ‗primitive animals.‘54 The fear of being shot by 
sentries or being executed caused him constant anxiety. For example, 19 November 1922 was, 
according to Campbell, a ‗lovely mild misty morning. Bells ringing for mass. [However, a] 
feeling of sick horror all the same grips me because of these executions.‘55 Even though this is 
only one account of a prisoners‘ experience during the conflict it is indicative of the 
psychological impact that the Government‘s executions policy had on those incarcerated at the 
time. 
As was common practice at the executions two National troops stood by to provide the 
coup de grâce in case any of the prisoners had not been killed outright. According to Pigott, 
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McKelvey, who was still conscious, needed attention. He called ‗give me another […] and 
another […] and then there was silence […] a great silence.‘56 With this the reprisal execution of 
the four men in Mountjoy Jail was concluded. Coogan also describes harrowing scenes at these 
executions as he states that most of the firing squad aimed at O‘Connor ultimately setting his 
clothes on fire. This assertion, if true, might be linked to the level of animosity felt towards 
O‘Connor for his role in splitting the I.R.A. however; this reference to O‘Connor‘s clothes being 
set alight seems dubious. Coogan further states that O‘Connor required several additional shots 
from the officers standing by before he eventually died. Due to the concentration of fire on 
O‘Connor one of the other men, Barrett, also required further attention.57 
Ernie O‘Malley, who was also incarcerated by the Government when these executions 
occurred, stated that the ‗news was a great shock to me. I felt as if I had again been wounded, the 
same swift disappearance of my innards, an icy chill where they had been, and a trembling in my 
legs.‘58 Poblacht na hÉireann, the anti-treatyite newspaper, claimed that ‗Four more names 
added to the roll of Ireland‘s martyred dead, four more [...] Irishmen murdered in your [Free 
State and National Army‘s] name. [...] Done hastily and secretly to death in a British dungeon, 
shot down by British guns and bullets, that the Empire might prevail.‘59 While the British did 
loan military equipment to the National Army, this is another example of the attempts by the 
Irregulars to portray the pro-treatyites as British lackeys in order to undermine the credibility of 
the Government and, by extension, their executions policy. Conversely, the New York Times 
stated that the reprisal executions, ruthless as they were, implied a degree of moral courage 
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which was rarely encountered.
60
 This particular set of executions, which quickly became known 
as the ‗Mountjoy executions‘, were carried out as a deliberate attempt to halt the Irregulars 
policy of assassination. As Ciara Meehan suggests, the Government became synonymous with 
the state and the Treaty, and an attack on one was seen as an attack against all. Thus, according 
to Meehan, ‗any perceived threats to the stability and security of the state – from either the 
extremists or even Free State elements – were responded to decisively.‘61 This event proved to 
be the most controversial execution during the Civil War and was, in essence, an action carried 
out by a Government shocked to its core, willing to breach the law in order to preserve it. 
Numerous questions arose over the moral justifications and legality of this particular 
action chosen by the Government. According to Tom Garvin:  
The executions of Barrett, McKelvey, Mellows and O‘Connor were certainly 
illegal, whatever the Realpolitik reasoning of the Government; they were executed 
without trial, for no particular crime other than being on the wrong political side; 
as jailbirds, they were notionally held guilty for crimes they could not possibly 
have committed.
62
  
 
 
Thomas Johnson was quick to highlight this point in the Dáil. He indicated that these four 
prisoners, except with the ‗connivance‘ of the Government, could not have had anything to do 
with Hales‘ assassination. He argued that these men could not have been involved in any 
conspiracy to murder members of the representative assembly as they had been in the charge of 
the Government for five months.
63
 He stated that as a result of these executions, the Government 
had, after two days since the establishment of the Free State, destroyed the fabric of law in 
mindsets of the public. He claimed that ‗you [the Government] have killed the new State at its 
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birth.‘64 Johnson‘s argument slightly over-estimated the public response to these executions and 
the executions policy in general. Mulcahy, in an attempt to keep informed of public opinion, 
received a special report from an intelligence officer following the event. ‗There is not much 
actual condemnation, but people would have much preferred the other more orthodox method. 
The reprisal tends to make the fight one between two parties instead of being an attempt to 
restore order by the Govt. of the country.‘65 Generally speaking, the public had become 
relatively immune to the Government‘s employment of stern measures. There were several 
reasons for this. Firstly, the majority of the country, in varying degrees, supported the Treaty as 
indicated by the ratification of this settlement in the June election. Due to this support the 
Irregulars‘ rebellion was seen by many as undemocratic. The Irish population also believed that 
the emergency powers employed by the Government were a necessary evil in order to restore 
settled conditions to the country. Secondly, as the public had become war-weary following, in 
quick succession, the First World War, the Rising, the War of Independence and the Civil War 
their attitudes towards executions became more temperate in comparison to the public‘s reaction 
to the executions in 1916. The attitude of the Church‘s hierarchy, towards the Irregulars, may 
have also impacted on public perceptions and, by extension, their opinion of the Government‘s 
executions policy. Finally, the widespread employment of guerrilla tactics by the Irregulars, 
particularly the destruction of the country‘s railway network, ambushes and raids, led to a 
desensitisation of the civic population towards the executions by the Free State Government. 
Ultimately, milk had to be brought to the creamery, cattle had to be driven to fairs, children had 
to travel to schools and mass had to be attended on Sunday. As Michael Harrington states, the 
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Irregulars ‗lack of awareness that destruction of infrastructure seriously discommoded rural 
communities in carrying out their daily activities affected their support in those communities.‘66  
The employment of exceptional measures against political crimes, in O‘Halpin‘s view, 
did not do the incumbent Government any harm provided that the response was seen as 
proportionate to the immediate threat posed by militant republicans. This was evidenced by the 
absence of significant public protests at the time from non-republican sources.
67
 The public 
support, which the pre-truce I.R.A. enjoyed during the War of Independence, had evaporated by 
the commencement of the Irish Civil War. This is further evidenced by a letter which was sent to 
Mulcahy on 9 December 1922 from E. P. Culverwell, a Professor of Law in Trinity College, 
Dublin. Culverwell suggested that if further executions were required then the Government 
should inform the public of the services, such as a chaplain or the chance to write last letters, 
received by the condemned men prior to their execution. This would, for Culverwell, directly 
contrast with the assassination of Hales and increase public support for the Government. He 
stated that: 
As the Government knows better than anyone else what the necessities of the 
situation are, I feel that direct comment on their action is to be deprecated, but I 
also feel that the action is so unusual that every means might be taken to present it 
to the public in the most favourable way, i.e., with all those circumstances which 
show that every consideration of which the circumstances permit has been shown 
to the men who have been executed.
68
 
 
The Government did benefit from public support, however, not everyone approved of the 
executions policy. Another important piece of information can be obtained from the 
aforementioned description of events by Pigott. He stated that the then Archbishop of Dublin, 
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Dr. Edward Byrne, spent many hours with Cosgrave on the eve of the executions in which he 
tried to persuade the latter to cancel the executions. In a letter to Cosgrave, on 10 December 
1922, the Archbishop stated that the ‗policy of reprisals seems to me to be not only unwise but 
entirely unjustifiable from a moral point of view. That one man should be punished for another‘s 
crime seems to me to be absolutely unjust.‘69 This admission not only suggests that a meeting of 
the members of the Executive Council did in fact occur but it also indicates that this high-
ranking member of the Catholic clergy was critical of the Government‘s executions policy. The 
fact that the Archbishop of Dublin condemned the act and the fact that Pigott administered the 
sacraments to the condemned men is very important. On 10 October 1922 the Catholic hierarchy 
issued a pastoral letter which amounted to a public condemnation of the Irregulars‘ rebellion. 
This statement openly declared that the Church would excommunicate any Irregulars who 
continued their armed rebellion against the Free State Government and National Army. In 
addition to this, the statement ordered the Church‘s members to refrain from administering the 
sacraments to captured Irregulars.
70
 It is safe to say that the undertakings of both Archbishop 
Byrne and Canon Pigott were contrary to that declaration. Furthermore, other members of the 
Catholic Church privately criticised the Bishops‘ denunciation of the Irregulars. This point is 
evidenced in a letter which was discovered on prisoner Edward McCluskey and sent to Mr. 
Cremins, in the Department of External Affairs, by Captain Hugh Smith on 18 January 1923. 
The letter was originally written by Edward‘s brother, Packie, on 23 December 1922. He was a 
divinity student at Maynooth, County Kildare. Packie claimed that the Bishops‘ threat of 
excommunication was nothing to cause concern. According to this letter: 
By way of advice there is no need to ask you to do nothing which your conscience 
tells you is wrong and as long as you do that you need not fear the statement of 
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the Bishops. You can act without sin if you can say for sure that the above 
statement does not apply to you. I just say that much to solve any doubt about the 
matter. It is well to say that what would be a serious mortal sin for one to kill a 
soldier, might not be for another at all [...] Anyhow, be careful, as the Free State 
attitude is very severe towards those they capture.
71
  
 
This suggests that the Catholic hierarchy denounced the Irregulars and their guerrilla campaign 
in public. Privately, however, some of the Church‘s representatives were divided with regards to 
the Government‘s executions policy and the hierarchy‘s threat of excommunication. 
Following Johnson‘s accusations Gavan Duffy, a man who condemned the previous 
execution of Childers, claimed that the Government was not fit to run the country. This protest 
was supported by Cathal O‘Shannon. Mulcahy maintained that these men were executed not as a 
result of the assassination of Hales but as a firm deterrent to ensure that the country was not 
destroyed or thrown into chaos. He claimed that they were executed as ‗there are forces working 
round us to-day, more vicious, more insidious, and more striking than Britain ever employed 
against representative government in Ireland.‘72 In effect, Mulcahy contended that the Irregulars 
were more ruthless than the British ever were and that the Government had no choice but to 
employ drastic measures in order to counter their ‗vicious‘ tactics. Interestingly, the Irregulars 
held a similar opinion of the pro-treatyites given that the Government would ultimately execute 
eighty-one men during the Civil War, far outnumbering the executions carried out by the British 
in the previous decade. According to Mulcahy, the Irregulars were now willing to enact brutal 
methods in an attempt to thwart the Government‘s and the Army‘s effort to restore order to the 
country. This is an issue which had some validity. Even though Lynch had not sanctioned 
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official reprisals before 30 November the threat of killing Government officials was not a new 
occurrence.  
On 4 August 1922 Cosgrave issued a memorandum to numerous ministers which 
highlighted a previous conspiracy against members of the Government. He stated: 
The Government is aware of plots to murder the members of the Government who 
are carrying out the people‘s mandate to restore order to the country. They are 
further aware that certain Officers in the Army [...] give public notice of the 
existence of this conspiracy so that the people may be able to co-operate in 
tracking it down and may be prepared for any eventuality which may occur. They 
also take the opportunity of making it clear that, in accordance with the 
precedents of all civilised countries threatened with such outbreak of crime, the 
prominent members of the organisation will, together with all those personally 
taking part in them, be held responsible and brought to account.
73
 
 
Several Irregular officers also advocated the use of reprisals in their individual Command areas. 
For example, an officer from the Third Western Division stated that:  
We [are] getting on well down this part of the Country. [We] will continue 
indefinitely. So far we have 8 dead, 6 of those were foully murdered when 
prisoners were taken including the Divisional Adjt. and Brigdr. Devins. Very Sad, 
although we are not out for vengeance, still we will make those in high places 
among the Free Staters realise that such things cannot be done with impunity […] 
Excuse [the] scribble as I am writing under physical difficulties having some 
bones broken.
74
 
 
 
This report, if accurate, depicts several murders supposedly carried out by members of the 
National Army. Unofficial actions of this nature did occur during the Civil War and was one of 
the reasons behind the introduction of the Public Safety Resolution in September 1922. 
However, this account suggests that even after the ratification of the emergency powers 
unofficial actions still occurred. Nevertheless, officers from Cork No. 4 Brigade issued a threat 
to Denis Galvin, Commandant-General of the National forces in Kanturk, on 4 December 1922. 
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They stated that following a Brigade meeting, on 2 December, a resolution was passed which 
advocated: 
That in the event of any of Cork No. 4 Brigade, Irish Republican Army, being 
executed; and you countenance the carrying out of such orders by members of His 
Majesty‘s Imperial Forces (of which you are one) that you would meet the same 
fate. PEACE OR NO PEACE, even though it may incur the loss of lives. 
FURTHER [...] That in the event of a man or men of Cork No. 4 Brigade, Irish 
Republican Army, being executed, that an area of 12 miles be declared and that 
10 Free Staters be executed in that area for every one of our men executed.
75
 
 
The fact that several Irregular officers had advocated the employment of reprisal action indicated 
that Lynch‘s order, on 30 November, was generally accepted amongst the ranks of the Irregulars. 
It also indicated that they intended to continue the assassinations policy.  
Whatever reasons Mulcahy gave for the Government‘s actions the fact remains that these 
four men were clearly executed as a reprisal. The condemned men acknowledged as much in 
their last letters to their loved ones. Firstly O‘Connor, in a final letter to his mother at 3.30 a.m. 
on the morning of his execution, stated: 
I have just been notified that I am to be executed at 8 this morning for being 
―taken in arms‖ and as a reprisal for the shooting of Hales. I send you all my love, 
my best love. I ask father to forgive me as I have [opposed] his wishes in my 
action. I am going to confess soon. Do you know this is the anniversary of my 
first Communion [?] God bless and care [for] you.
76
  
 
Secondly, Mellows in a letter to his mother which was reported in a Republican broadsheet Chun 
an Lae, stated that: 
The time is short and much that I would like to say must go unsaid. But you will 
understand; in such moments heart speaks to heart. At 3.30 this morning we (Dick 
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Barrett, Rory O‘Connor, Joe McKelvey and I) were informed that we were to be 
―executed as a reprisal.‖ [...] I go to join Tone and Emmet, the Fenians, Tom 
Clarke, Connolly, Pearse, Kevin Barry and Childers. My last thoughts will be on 
God and Ireland and you.
77
  
 
Mellows reference to previous nationalist martyrs is noteworthy; however, the circumstances 
which surround his execution are very different. These martyrs died in rebellion against British 
rule in Ireland, however, Mellows was put to death on the orders of former comrades as a 
reprisal for a crime that he had no part in. Finally, McKelvey when writing to his mother in the 
same newspaper indicated that: 
How can I tell you the news, I have to let you know. I don‘t care at all for my own 
sake, but I grieve for the pain it will cause you, my loving mother. A document 
has just been read to me informing me that, as a reprisal for the shooting of Sean 
Hales, I am to be executed at 8 a.m. this morning. [...] I only hope I face the firing 
squad with [...] equanimity. Liam Mellows, Rory O‘Connor and Dick Barrett are I 
think to go along with myself.
78
  
 
This was a point which O‘Shannon was quick to argue. He not only accused Mulcahy 
and the Government of lying, but also accused them of using this falsehood in an attempt to 
cover up the murder of these four men:  
Is the drafter of this official proclamation a liar, or is he telling the truth when he 
says that it has been done as a reprisal for the assassination of Deputy Sean Hales 
yesterday? […] You did not give these men a trial at all […] You murdered these 
men—nothing short of murder were the executions of these men this morning.79 
 
 
O‘Shannon questioned the ability of the Government to steer Ireland through the Civil War, 
following their incomprehensible decision to execute these four Irregulars. He stated that the 
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Government was absolutely incompetent and unfit to govern the country.
80
 In response to 
O‘Shannon‘s accusations Seán Milroy stated that if it were not for the Army, an army which he 
had such a poor estimate of, he would not be in a position to denounce the Government.
81
 
O‘Higgins, who was the last to consent to these executions at the critical Cabinet 
meeting, remained relatively quiet during initial stages of these debates. The reason for this was 
that one of the condemned men, O‘Connor, had been the best man at O‘Higgins‘ wedding. This 
issue is not dissimilar to the argument which FitzGerald alluded to when he had written to 
Chester Arthur. FitzGerald argued that it was quite difficult for the Government to endorse the 
executions of former comrades and friends. When O‘Higgins eventually rose to his feet in the 
Dáil he argued that the Government acted without sentiment as they had been through times 
calculated to expel any feeling. He stated that they did not disclaim responsibility for the 
execution of these men but claimed that the Government wanted to finish the Civil War as 
quickly as possible. The decision to execute these men was taken, according to O‘Higgins, the 
previous night following an extremely difficult meeting. He stated: 
The thing that was decided on last evening was decided on after the coldest of 
cold discussions. We may be lacking in judgment, we may be lacking in wisdom 
[…] but I do say that from the day the Provisional Government was set up, and 
from the time we functioned below there in the City Hall, there was not an act 
done that was inspired by any other motive than the securing of the welfare and 
the safety and the freedom of the Irish people.
82
 
 
 
O‘Higgins, in a poignant speech, one which saw him overcome with grief as he had to take a 
seat, challenged his and the Government‘s critics as he contended that: 
There was never an act done through personal vengeance, and never an act done 
through hot blood. We have no higher aim than to place the people of Ireland in 
the saddle in Ireland, and let them do their will, but we will not acquiesce in gun-
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bullying, and we will take very stern and drastic measures to stop it. Personal 
spite, great heavens! Vindictiveness! One of these men was a friend of mine.
83
 
 
 
The Minister for Agriculture, Patrick Hogan, defended the decision taken by the pro-
treatyite political and military leadership. He chastised Gavan Duffy for his accusations that the 
Army did not have the consent of the Dáil to carry out the executions. Hogan argued that the 
decision to execute was left at the discretion of the Cabinet and the Army Council stating that 
‗we will continue to leave it to their discretion‘.84 Cosgrave, like O‘Higgins, had remained 
relatively quiet. He finally contributed towards the latter stages of these debates. Cosgrave 
promptly summed up the Government‘s and the Army‘s position relating to the execution of 
these four men in Mountjoy Jail:  
It is really a psychological question. It is where terror meets terror […] Only the 
night before last I rang the Commander-in-Chief and asked: ―Have you any trials 
on? If you have I think it is a time for showing clemency.‖ He said: ―Yes; I 
thoroughly agree with that,‖ and the next day one of the most inoffensive 
members of this Dáil, [was assassinated] a man who had done great service during 
the war, and who entered the war with a hurley stick —a hurley stick was his first 
weapon— was struck down and an attempt was made to strike down the Deputy 
Speaker. I know full well there is a diabolical conspiracy on foot […] There is 
only one way to meet it, and that is to crush it and show them that terror will be 
struck into them.
85
 
 
 
The execution of the four Irregulars in Mountjoy Jail on 8 December 1922 introduced the 
phenomenon of official extrajudicial executions to the Civil War. According to Edy Kaufman 
and Patricia Weiss Fagen there is no practice more blatant and degrading than the use of 
extrajudicial executions in any conflict. They state that: 
The distinction between EJE and summary execution is blurred. For example, 
because summary executions are carried out on official orders of some kind they 
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are therefore not strictly speaking extrajudicial. On the other hand, an officially 
ordered execution may be considered extrajudicial when the accused is left 
without legal protections, and the authorities pass death sentences as standard 
means to rid themselves of undesirable elements of society.
86
 
 
 
Whether the Mountjoy executions were extrajudicial or not needs to be examined. The answer to 
this issue, according to the above authors, is not easily ascertained. The primary reason for this 
difficulty is that in any conflict the boundaries between legal and illegal executions, between 
extrajudicial executions and murder can become blurred. They argue that: 
In a wide variety of cases it becomes impossible to differentiate between illegal 
executions in which the due process of law is severely curtailed or distorted 
(although there may be some kind of judicial procedure involving special decrees) 
and extra-judicial executions involving no process of law whatsoever. An illegal 
execution should be seen as an extrajudicial execution when the act is carried out 
behind a flimsy facade of debased legality, or under the pretext of instructions to 
lesser officials from above in the hierarchy.
87
 
 
 
Kaufman and Weiss Fagen argue that the introduction of guerrilla warfare into a conflict can 
distort these aforementioned boundaries and cause further difficulties in deciding whether or not 
particular sets of executions are in fact illegal or extrajudicial. Moreover, they claim that the 
introduction of activities like political assassinations and ambushes can increase the potential for 
the ruling authorities to adopt extrajudicial measures as a means to strengthen and retain their 
power. They state: 
Generally one finds EJE used extensively in countries where urban or rural 
guerrilla movements have operated. By threatening the legality of the regime, and 
accepting the use of EJE for the advance of the revolutionary cause, the guerrillas 
have in many ways increased the options of the regime in acting against the due 
process of law.
88
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Evidence suggests that the events which occurred on 8 December 1922 were 
extrajudicial. Even though they were certainly outside the remit of the September resolution they 
may not have been, according to the above definitions, strictly illegal as they were approved by 
Mulcahy and the Executive Council. This was an issue alluded to, on 20 December 1922, when 
the Tralee Rural Districts Council wrote to the Minister for Fisheries, Fionán Ó‘Loingsigh. The 
council passed a resolution which was proposed by Mr. Maurice Keane and seconded by Mr. J. 
D. Long. It stated: 
That we, the Tralee Rural Districts Council view with horror the executions of the 
Prisoners [Mt. Joy executions] who were in charge of, and under the protection of 
the Government, as well as the execution of the eight prisoners [first eight 
executions] who were brought to trial [...] We feel that if the matter were put to 
the people to-morrow that [...] [the] public would not approve of the action of the 
Government [...] In our opinion it exceeds the worst tyranny of the British 
Government, and that, we call on the Kerry T.D.‘s who support the Government 
to resign, as we hold them equally guilty with the Cabinet, and we adjourn the 
remaining correspondence, as a mark of respect to the memory of the deceased.
89
  
 
Like the correspondence FitzGerald received, from Chester Allen Arthur Junior, this resolution is 
indicative of the type of criticism the Government received following some executions. As this 
particular set of executions was more controversial than others, the level of public condemnation 
could be expected to rise accordingly. Furthermore, the rhetoric, such as the comparisons with 
British ‗tyranny‘ used in such resolutions, is also expected to be more intense and emotive. 
However, despite receiving disparaging comments such as this, public criticism for the 
executions during the Civil War never reached the same level as it had done in previous 
conflicts. This is possibly due, in this particular case, to the tactics employed by the Irregulars, 
that is, the assassination of Hales and the serious wounding of O‘Maille. The resolution is also 
interesting for another reason. It suggests that contemporary parties recognised that the first eight 
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executions, that is the executions in Kilmainham Jail and Beggars Bush barracks, were distinct 
and separate from those that occurred in Mountjoy Jail. According to these councilors, this was 
due to the fact that the condemned men were not even tried or convicted but were executed, 
despite being incarcerated for several months. They believed that the Government acted outside 
of the principles of the September resolution, which ensured a trial, when they decided to 
execute these four men. In response to this letter Ó‘Loingsigh argued that: 
I note the Resolution makes no reference to the burning alive of Emmet McGarry 
and attempt to burn alive his Mother, Brother and Sister, nor the foul murder of 
Sean Hales, T.D. without giving him time for a prayer. It would take a great many 
engineered resolutions to convince me that the people of Kerry, or one percent of 
them, are on the side of murder and baby-roasting and I am quite prepared to face 
my Constituents at the next Election to prove that I am not misrepresenting them 
[...] In the meantime I shall continue to give the Government all the support that I 
can in its efforts to suppress anarchy and restore ordered and decent conditions to 
our country.
90
 
 
According to Hopkinson, the Mountjoy executions were certainly abnormal. He argued 
that since the Public Safety Resolution was devised and enacted to try cases for execution and as 
none of the condemned men were tried under this decree then realistically no other conclusion 
could be deduced: 
There could be no pretence that these executions were carried out under the 
Public Safety Act. All four men had been captured during the Four Courts Attack 
and had been in Mountjoy since that time [...] No argument could detract from the 
fact, however, that these were killings of untried and unconvicted men.
91
 
 
In comparison to previous cases such as Childers‘, while he was afforded a trial and a means to 
defend himself, he was executed while his appeal was still being processed. Childers‘ execution 
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was certainly irregular but may not have been extrajudicial or illegal despite the claims of his 
defense counsel. 
Despite the aforementioned issues concerning the Mountjoy executions what were the 
precise criteria for the selection of these four men? According to The General Regulations as to 
Trial of Civilian by Military Courts, the responsibility for deciding who was to be tried was 
placed on the local G.O.C. in the command area where the offence was alleged to have taken 
place.
92
 In reality, however, prisoners were tried on the orders of the Military or Executive 
Council. With no particular offence committed, other than being a prisoner of the Free State 
Government, it is evident that other criteria were utilised in the choosing of these four Irregulars. 
Given that the process of executing Irregular prisoners was shrouded in secrecy and the trials and 
investigations under the new committee system were performed in camera, obtaining precise 
criteria for inclusion is difficult. It is possible, however improbable, that all of these men could 
have been randomly selected. Furthermore, it has been incorrectly argued that these men were in 
fact chosen to represent the four provinces of Ireland. Supposedly O‘Connor was chosen to 
represent Leinster, Barrett for Munster, McKelvey for Ulster and Mellows was chosen to 
represent Connacht. This is unlikely as none of the men were from Connacht. According to 
Desmond Greaves, Mellows‘ biographer, he was ‗so unmistakably a Leinster man that nobody 
would seriously consider him in this connection, unless he was paying a belated penalty for his 
part in 1916.‘93 Then again O‘Connor and Mellows were ardent opponents of the Treaty, which 
might explain their inclusion. McKelvey on the other hand, despite briefly being I.R.A. Chief of 
Staff in the Four Courts, was less well known. The fact that he had been a principal member of 
the Irregulars might explain his addition. Barrett was a west Cork officer but he was not well 
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known outside his own area. Regan argues that revenge for Collins‘ assassination may have 
played a part in his inclusion.
94
 Whereas Hopkinson argues, the fact that all these men were 
members of the I.R.B. could have influenced their addition. He states that O‘Connor and 
Mellows were particular bêtes noires of the pro-treaty Army leadership. He claims that relations 
between O‘Connor and Mulcahy had been particularly acidic over the previous Army unity 
discussions prior to the outbreak of the Civil War.
95
 Another factor has been mentioned which 
may indicate why it would have been prudent to eliminate these particular men, personal 
knowledge of the secret Northern policy.
96
 As stated previously O‘Connor and Mellows, 
amongst others, had detailed knowledge of this policy.
97
 It could be argued that the condemned 
men were all included for numerous different reasons as several of these motives are plausible. 
Nevertheless, the reason for their inclusion is relatively insignificant as what is ultimately 
important is the obvious injustice in executing untried and unconvicted prisoners who could not 
have availed of the Government‘s offer of amnesty in October, due to their incarceration. 
Following this event the Irregulars attempted to indicate that they were unaffected by the 
Mountjoy executions. They argued that their troops had consecrated their lives for their cause. In 
addition to this they claimed that their forces sought no ease or comfort in the conflict and for 
‗those who seek such, and who by word or deed sanction such things (reprisals) know that for 
them there shall be no ease or peace until this monster, begotten of England, is utterly and finally 
destroyed.‘98 In a further attempt to indicate solidarity Lynch issued a General Order on 20 
December which indicated his continuing support for further reprisal action against the pro-
treatyites. He argued that from ‗this date [on] when our prisoners are executed, a similar number 
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of [pro-treatyite] hostages in [the] brigade area of which prisoner is from must suffer the same 
fate. Divisional O/C‘s will confirm such sentence.‘99 
The Civil War continued with no end in sight and the Irregulars continued to harass the 
country. This ensured that the Government‘s prosecution of the Civil War and, by extension, the 
executions policy was to continue. This was indicated in a private letter from O‘Higgins to his 
brother Tom: 
The burden has been pretty tough, as you say, but it is growing lighter and in any 
case it had to be shouldered or the country was down to a deeper depth than it 
ever reached, which is some depth. I know a lot of quite decent people are 
thinking badly of us now. It is unfortunate that the only way to remedy that 
situation would be to abdicate and let the British back, in which event a new and 
more numerous crop of equally decent people would be thinking and speaking 
harshly of us. On the whole our duty seems clear – we must push along and do 
our job [...] and take what‘s coming to us afterwards.100 
 
The sentiment expressed in this letter shows a side of O‘Higgins rarely seen during the Civil 
War. He was usually very defiant and unrepentant. However, in this instance, O‘Higgins‘ referral 
to ‗a lot of quite decent people are thinking badly of us now‘ suggests that he believed some of 
the Irregulars were good people, acting out of principal and led astray by men like Childers. On 
the other hand, if O‘Higgins meant the general public and was referring to those people, such as 
the Tralee Rural Districts Council, who criticised the Government‘s executions policy, he 
believed that the Government‘s duty was to continue on regardless of such disapproval. 
Nonetheless, Mulcahy had established the mobile committee scheme to streamline the executions 
policy. This would play an important role in the future conduct of the Civil War. 
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Despite the fact that this period had witnessed the extremities of violence, with regards to 
reprisals and assassinations, neither the Free State Government nor the Irregulars were to resort 
to such official ruthless tactics again. Both acts of ‗terror‘ had occurred in a short space of time 
and as the Civil War entered its sixth month the Free State Government and National Army now 
faced the Irregulars‘ armed rebellion with new vigour and determination. 
Following the eight executions in November Lynch decided that the best course of action, 
in response to the Government‘s executions policy, was official reprisals. The decision led to the 
assassination of Hales and the serious wounding of Ó Maille. It has been established that this 
single incident set in motion a chain of events which would irrevocably alter the course and 
character of the Irish Civil War. Mulcahy, in response to the attack, issued a proclamation which 
announced the establishment of more efficient mobile committees to augment the military court 
system. This scheme was designed to streamline the executions. In the long-term it significantly 
altered the implementation of the Government‘s executions policy. It not only decentralised the 
executions, spreading them around the country, but it also led to an acceleration of this 
procedure.  
In the short-term Hales‘ assassination resulted in the execution of four men in Mountjoy 
Jail. Evidence indicates that the execution of O‘Connor, McKelvey, Mellows and Barrett were 
clearly outside the terms of the September resolution. They were put to death, in a ruthless act, as 
an extrajudicial reprisal for the events on 7 December. These four men were incarcerated long 
before the ratification of the September resolution. Therefore, to apply the emergency resolution 
retrospectively was illegal on any count but, according to the Government, it was an absolute 
necessity, ironically, to preserve the law and defeat the Irregulars. 
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It has been argued that these particular four men were chosen for a multitude of reasons. 
Supposedly O‘Connor was chosen to represent Leinster, Barrett for Munster, McKelvey for 
Ulster and Mellows was chosen to represent Connacht. This is inaccurate as none of the men 
were from Connacht. Mellows, despite representing Galway in the first and second Dáil, was 
actually from Leinster. O‘Connor and Mellows were fervent opponents of the Treaty, which 
might explain their inclusion. McKelvey, on the other hand, despite being the anti-treatyite 
I.R.A. Chief of Staff for a short period, was not as well-known as some of the other men. 
Similarly, Barrett, a west Cork Irregular, was not a prominent figure outside his own area. Regan 
claims that retribution for Collins‘ death may have determined his inclusion. He also claims that 
O‘Connor‘s and Mellows‘ personal knowledge of the secret Northern policy may have helped 
influenced their inclusion. Whereas Hopkinson argues that both O‘Connor‘s and Mellows‘ I.R.B. 
membership could have been a factor. They may simply have been in the wrong place at the 
wrong time. Nonetheless, the reason for their inclusion is relatively insignificant as what is 
ultimately important is the injustice in executing four untried prisoners which were imprisoned 
months before Hales‘ assassination occurred.  
Evidence suggests that Hales was not the intended target in the preceding attack. He was 
absent when the vote was taken in the Dáil to ratify the Public Safety Resolution. Furthermore, 
he was not mentioned on the list which accompanied Lynch‘s general order on 30 November. 
According to the weekly operations report concerning this incident Lynch stated that Hales was 
shot unintentionally. But why execute anyone in response to this act? 
It has been established that the Government were not going to stand for the gradual 
decimation of the Dáil. Given the fact that the entire elected representative body faced 
assassination, a situation that the Opposition seemed to forget, the Government did not have an 
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abundance of alternatives to choose from. Additionally, there is no evidence to indicate that the 
Irregulars would have halted the reprisals if the Free State Government did not answer the 
assassination of Hales with a brutal response. As the Cabinet felt that the very core of 
representative government and Irish democracy was being threatened they were determined, 
according to Valiulis, to ‗respond in such a way so as to make the price of a repeat occurrence 
much too high to pay.‘101  
It must be emphasised that the act of executing four untried incarcerated Irregulars did 
achieve its primary objective. As Andrews stated, these executions ‗were [a] very effective 
method of preventing the killing of TDs and Senators.‘102 However, the Government had 
breached its own emergency resolution in order to preserve the law. They had met terror with 
terror, a method they once decried the British for. Nonetheless, as no other T.D.s were 
assassinated during the Civil War it could be argued, for the Government at least, that the end 
justified the means. That said, a child was burned to death when the house of Seán McGarry T.D. 
was attacked on 10 December. Furthermore, Cosgrave‘s house was destroyed when a body of 
Irregulars burned it to the ground on 14 January 1923. The Mountjoy executions also contributed 
to the assassination of Kevin O‘Higgins‘ father. He was shot dead in his house in Stradbally, 
County Laois, on 11 February 1923. They also led to the death of O‘Higgins himself in 1927.103 
In response to his father‘s murder he stated that there would be no recrimination of any kind. 
O‘Higgins reassured a leading republican in Co. Laois, Lar Brady, that both his family and home 
would be safe and secure as they ‗need be in no anxiety about a reply in kind.‘104 Ultimately, the 
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Mountjoy executions were indicative of the Government‘s willingness to modify its emergency 
measures as the situation demanded. This flexibility became a defining characteristic of the 
Government‘s executions policy in the subsequent months. 
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CHAPTER 5 
‘executions in every County’  
The decentralisation of public safety 
 
 
Under the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, the establishment of the Irish Free State 
occurred on 6 December 1922. However, this historic occasion was overshadowed by the 
assassination of Seán Hales T.D. and the serious wounding of Deputy Pádraic Ó Maille the 
following day. This incident ensured a swift and ruthless response from the pro-treatyites. 
Richard Mulcahy announced that summary action would now be employed against the 
Irregulars. This resulted in four extrajudicial reprisal executions in Mountjoy Jail on 8 
December. Hales‘ assassination also produced several lasting consequences which irrevocably 
altered the dynamic of the Civil War. It caused the Government to radically modify the way in 
which it implemented the executions policy. For instance, the official hostage scheme, initiated 
in Kerry on 13 December 1922 and extended to other areas such as Cork and Donegal, will be 
evaluated. The executions had been restricted to Dublin, at first, resulting in the death of twelve 
men over a ten week period. However, this changed following Hales‘ assassination. The 
Government decided to decentralise and accelerate the executions. This development will be 
examined in detail. Facilitated by the introduction of the mobile military committee system sixty-
nine additional executions occurred by May 1923, sixty-three of which occurred outside Dublin. 
Moreover, thirty-four of these executions occurred in January alone, making it the worst month 
for executions during the conflict. As the Civil War entered its eight month the Government 
decided that all efforts would be made to defeat the Irregulars. 
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The guerrilla phase of the Civil War was fought most furiously in Kerry. Even though the 
National Army possessed strong posts in the towns the Kerry countryside was a different matter. 
The centre, south and east of the county were dominated by Irregular units, particularly in the 
mountainous regions.
1
 Communications of all kinds were constantly being destroyed and were 
out of action for long periods of time. Furthermore, the ambushing of National troops and 
convoys was a regular occurrence. Irregular activity in Kerry should not be over-estimated as 
throughout the conflict the anti-treatyite militants adopted a defensive strategy nationally and 
they constantly failed to take advantage of those areas in which they had a degree of control.
2
 An 
event occurred in Kerry in early December regarding four Irregular prisoners captured with arms 
and ammunition. Prisoners Mathew Moroney, Thomas Devane, Cornelius Casey, and Dermot 
O‘Connor were apprehended about a mile from Farmers Bridge in the direction of Currane on 1 
November 1922. These Irregulars were tried separately at Ballymullen barracks in Tralee, on 23 
November 1922, and each charged with the possession without proper authority of a rifle and 
having possession without proper authority of a bandolier containing a number of rounds of 
ammunition for those rifles.
3
 They were each found guilty and sentenced to death. Immediately 
after this General Murphy, the G.O.C. Kerry Command, recommended to Mulcahy that these 
four prisoners should be executed as they were caught in an armed attack on National soldiers. 
Murphy was obliged to seek confirmation of these sentences from Mulcahy under the 
General Regulations issued on 21 November 1922. They stipulated that every ‗sentence of a 
Military Court and every finding other than a finding of Not Guilty shall be subject to 
confirmation by the Confirming Authority [...] The Confirming Authority shall be any two 
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members of the Army Council.‘4 The Army Council, of which Mulcahy was the senior member, 
had the power to revise the sentence, confirm or refuse confirmation in whole or in part of the 
original or revised finding or sentence, and order a new trial of the accused by military court. It 
could also mitigate the punishment awarded by the sentence or remit, or reduce, or commute the 
same for any less punishment, and suspend the execution of the sentence.
5
 The confirming 
authority did not have the power to increase any sentence awarded by a military court. Where the 
sentence of a military court was sent back by the confirming authority for revision, the court did 
not have power to increase the original sentence.
6
  
When reporting to Mulcahy, Murphy acknowledged that the Government‘s executions 
policy was having a salutary effect on Irregular morale in Kerry. Yet he believed that if too many 
were killed then it would have a negative effect there. Murphy suggested that only those 
Irregulars caught like these four men, ‗red-handed‘ in an ambush on National troops, then they 
should be put to death.
7
 He concluded by informing Mulcahy that the ‗Irregulars organisation 
here is well nigh broken up. Several of the best men have ceased to act [...] The capture of 
Kenmare will dispose of this last rallying ground [...] Then you can mark off Kerry as finished.‘8 
Mulcahy seemed satisfied with Murphy‘s report. He congratulated him ‗on the very excellent 
work that you appear to have done [in Kerry] during the last few weeks.‘9 Mulcahy received 
additional reports from the Kerry Command which confirmed that Irregular resistance was all 
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but finished. One such report stated that the ‗situation in Kerry is now well in hand [...] [the] 
ceaseless harrying that has been carried [out] on [the Irregulars] has borne fruit.‘10 
With the information regarding the four Irregular prisoners in his possession Mulcahy 
immediately sought the advice of Cahir Davitt. Mulcahy accepted Murphy‘s assertions and was 
of the opinion, given the good state of affairs in Kerry, that these four men could be utilised in a 
more opportune way. Given the climate of animosity engendered by Hales‘ assassination 
Mulcahy advocated that Irregular prisoners be sentenced to death but have their sentences 
postponed pending an improvement of conditions in a particular area. Mulcahy suggested that 
these four men be used as official hostages designed to finally quell the remaining Irregular 
activity in Kerry. Davitt saw no legal grounds for a pardon. He argued that the fate of these four 
men was a question of policy. When comparing this case to the Mountjoy executions Davitt 
stated that: 
There are only two considerations which justify this course; firstly that 
circumstances of the nation at present justify almost anything that would serve to 
end the present [Irregular] campaign of murder and arson [...] secondly that the 
execution of persons tried and convicted in pursuance of a resolution of the Dáil 
as a reprisal, is preferable to the execution of persons untried and unconvicted.
11
 
 
The sentiment contained within Davitt‘s argument, when referring to the Mountjoy executions, 
was similar to the Government‘s at the time, a sense of the ends justifying the means, breaching 
the law to preserve it. However in this instance, the Judge Advocate General indicated his unease 
with Mulcahy‘s hostage policy stating there ‗is no justification whatever for the course which 
cannot be called humane. In no criminal or court-martial code can a death sentence be suspended 
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and normally the course indicated is foreign to all ideas of fair play and humanity.‘12 The latter 
comment raised the question as to whether or not the proposed course was outside the remit of 
the September resolution. What Davitt meant was that there was no legal power in existence to 
suspend the execution of men pending the conduct of others. However, Davitt finally argued that 
the policy was not inconsistent with the Public Safety Resolution passed in late September 1922 
and therefore he supported Mulcahy‘s plans.13  
Disagreement emerged between the members of the Army Council in relation to the fate 
of the four convicted Irregular prisoners. Some believed that one month awaiting execution was 
adequate punishment whilst others believed that the executions should be carried out without 
delay. Mulcahy‘s decision prevailed. In a Government statement, on 13 December, it was stated 
that the ‗Minister of Defence reported that in view of the improved situation in the Kerry area, he 
proposed to adopt a certain procedure in regard to the cases of four men who had been captured 
in arms, and tried before a military court. His proposal was approved.‘14 Murphy received his 
final instructions on this particular situation: 
Confirmation of the Finding and Sentence will be [...] sent [to] you in the case of 
Moroney, Devane, Casey and O‘Connor, together with an instruction that the 
execution of the sentence has been suspended for the present with a view to 
seeing whether clemency may not ultimately be exercised in each of these four 
cases [...] The Army Council look on it that they cannot in fairness to the people 
of the country, and the Government, extend clemency to cases of this kind in 
Kerry unless the favourable report contained in your recent two letters to me of 
the 7
th
 December is maintained almost absolutely unbroken for the next two or 
three weeks, and that [leading Irregulars in Kerry] Brosnan and McAllister, and 
those others you speak of, throw up their activities absolutely [...] What we have 
in mind is that should, within the next two or three weeks, a serious ambush take 
place, or a ‗spy‘ case occur, or should the work on the railways in Kerry be 
interfered with, or should there be any other serious evidence that the Irregulars 
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are going to continue their activity in Kerry, it will not be possible to extend 
clemency in these four cases [...] The decision in the matter will rest entirely with 
the Army Council, but you will fully understand that we realise your 
responsibility so much that we are guided very much by your appreciation of the 
general situation and the significance of events [...] You will be getting a formal 
statement for issue to the Press locally.
15
 
 
Mulcahy forwarded the information which he wanted Murphy to dispatch to the press. In this 
statement he argued that under paragraph 23 (e) of the General Regulations, in compliance with 
the Public Safety Resolution, the confirming authorities have suspended execution of the 
sentence in each of these cases.
16
 In order to ensure that this scheme achieved the highest 
possible publicity Mulcahy ordered Murphy to distribute posters throughout the county which 
stated that these men had been tried, convicted and sentenced to death but these sentences were 
suspended on several conditions.
17
 The Irish Times reported that:  
the confirming authority, influenced by the favourable reports of the General 
Officer Commanding Kerry Command […] has suspended the execution of the 
sentences in each of these cases on certain conditions – if, after Thursday, 21 
December (1) ambushes or attacks on national troops, (2) interference with 
railways or roads, and (3) interference with private property are committed, the 
stay on the execution of the sentences will be removed, and the sentences of death 
on each of the above named men will be forthwith carried out.
18
 
 
This action indicated the new resolve possessed by the Free State Government. They had, 
in reality, placed these men on death-row in an attempt to mitigate Irregular resistance in Kerry. 
Murphy‘s claims of pro-treatyite victory in Kerry were, according to Hopkinson, inaccurate and 
naive. He states that the ‗south and east of the county, the area covered by Kerry No. 2 Brigade, 
were uncleared of [Irregular] columns until the very end of the war. Ambushes, raids and the 
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blocking of communications remained frequent occurrences.‘19 A true depiction of the conditions 
in Kerry can be ascertained in several pieces of correspondence received by Piaras Béaslaí. 
Eileen O‘Sullivan, from Kenmare, County Kerry, stated that ‗I was quite ready to go to see you 
for a day or two on the last boat that was in Kenmare when the town fell to the Irregulars [...] I 
hope this reign of terror will soon be over [...] [I] hope you will keep quite well & escape the 
furies of the times.‘20 In addition to this, Domnall Ó Donneachdha from, Rathmore, County 
Kerry, wrote ‗I cannot look on any longer and see the unfortunate people of East Kerry 
persecuted by the Irregulars [...] No matter what you hear to the contrary the Irregulars have it all 
their own way and the people see no hope of release from them.‘21 Kerry was far from clear and 
‗finished‘ as Murphy claimed. This was further evidenced, on 29 December 1922, when National 
troops were fired upon by Kerry Irregulars when they were returning on foot to Castlegregory 
barracks. In the attack two National soldiers, Private John Talty of Lisadeen, County Clare and 
Private Henry McLoughlin of Buncrana, County Donegal were shot and killed with another two 
soldiers wounded. Moreover, the anti-treatyite militants set fire and burned a portion of the 
aforementioned station.
22
 As a result of this incident it seemed that the stay of execution placed 
on the four Irregular prisoners in Kerry would be removed. Cosgrave alluded to this issue on 2 
January when he responded to a question issued by a journalist affiliated with the Cork 
Examiner. When Cosgrave was asked whether or not the Kerry Irregulars would be put to death 
he responded ‗I very much regret it, but I am afraid they will be.‘23 Remarkably, this did not 
happen and it is unclear why they were not executed. The death sentences of the four prisoners 
were ultimately commuted to ten years penal servitude. They were also transferred from Tralee 
                                                          
19
 Hopkinson, Green against green, p. 240. 
20
 A letter from O‘Sullivan to Béaslaí, 2 December 1922 (N.L.I. Archives, Béaslaí papers, Ms. 33, 965 (12)). 
21
 A letter from Ó Donneachdha to Béaslaí, 20 February 1923 (N.L.I. Archives, Béaslaí papers, Ms. 33, 918 (3)). 
22
 Cork Examiner (1 Jan. 1923). 
23
 Ibid (2 Jan. 1923). 
 170 
 
Jail, Kerry, to Mountjoy prison, Dublin, to serve their terms of imprisonment.
24
 What were the 
motivations behind the official hostage scheme in Kerry?  
According to Doyle, the stay of execution could possibly have been an authentic attempt 
by the Government to offer an olive branch to the Irregulars in Kerry.
25
 T. Ryle Dwyer argues 
that these men were in fact held as hostages only to ensure the good behaviour of Irregulars over 
the Christmas period.
26
 The hostage scheme was, for Ryan, an appalling tactic employed by the 
Free State to win the Civil War. She states that ‗it seemed that the Free State forces were out to 
win the struggle no matter how ruthless the methods.‘27 In reality, the reasoning behind this 
tactic may involve certain aspects from all of the above arguments. The General Regulations 
stipulate that the final say on whether or not a person was put to death lay in the hands of the 
Army Council. Even though Murphy wanted these four men to be executed Mulcahy believed 
that the suspension of the sentence would prove more beneficial to the pro-treatyites prosecution 
of the Civil War in Kerry. Mulcahy believed that the situation in Kerry was favourable so he 
decided that these four men would serve a better purpose as hostages. Even though this strategy 
initially failed in Kerry, as it remained a problem spot for the Army for the remainder of the 
conflict, the policy itself seemed sound when implemented elsewhere. According to Florence 
O‘Donoghue, the Government‘s new scheme had a significant impact on Irregulars‘ morale. 
O‘Donoghue, a prominent Cork republican having fought in the War of Independence, stated 
that the hostage policy ‗devoid as it was of the humanitarian consideration accorded even to 
criminals, imposed an additional strain on the convicted men in prisons and a more terrible 
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responsibility on their comrades who were fighting outside.‘28 The decision to use these 
prisoners as hostages contributed to O‘Donoghue‘s decision to establish the neutral I.R.A. 
association (N.I.R.A.) in December 1922. This was an organisation for those I.R.A. men that 
decided to remain neutral during the Civil War. 
Kerry was not the only location where this type of policy was implemented. Liam 
Moylan, a Cork Irregular, had been captured with arms in November 1922. Rather than being 
executed the authorities decided to use him as another hostage. Following his arrest, conviction 
and pending execution Moylan‘s brother Con Moylan, O.C. transport in the Newmarket Irregular 
Battalion in Co. Cork, surrendered to the pro-treatyite authorities and was released in order to 
appeal to local Irregulars outside to surrender in order to save his brother‘s life.29 The threat of 
Liam‘s execution placed his brother in serious predicament. According to Michael Harrington, 
Liam Moylan‘s ‗life was at stake and he [Con Moylan] buckled under the strain. His surrender 
and subsequent request placed his fellow republicans in the [Newmarket] column in a terrible 
dilemma.‘30 Additionally, other Cork Irregulars in Mallow were placed in a similar situation. 
When the pro-treatyite authorities threatened to execute three Irregular prisoners named Bolster, 
Cunningham and Morgan the Mallow Urban Council forwarded a petition from the people of 
Mallow to the Government in an attempt to obtain a reprieve.
31
 The request forced local 
Irregulars to restrain themselves and their activities in their battalion area.
32
 In the end neither 
Liam Moylan nor any of the Mallow prisoners were executed. This was possibly due to the fact 
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that Cork remained relatively quiet during the Civil War. As Hopkinson states ‗Cork Republican 
IRA men very reluctantly entered the war and showed little commitment during it.‘33 
The Mountjoy executions and the implementation of an official hostage scheme indicated 
that the newly-established Irish Free State Government had decided that any means necessary 
would now be employed in order to defeat the Irregulars. There was a growing belief amongst 
the pro-treatyites that the Irish Civil War had dragged on for long enough. They now believed 
that the restraint which they displayed in withholding the widespread implementation of their 
executions policy was no longer viable. A memorandum from Irregular G.H.Q. to all Brigades, 
on 8 December 1922, acknowledged as much as it stated that the Government intended to 
decentralise the executions policy: 
You may take it that in the near future, the enemy now realising that the 
executions in Dublin have not had the desired effect, will carry out local 
executions as a last resort. In view of this I must ask you to concentrate in 
securing information re individuals who are actively supporting the enemy 
―Government‖ with a view to having the said individuals taken as hostages [...] 
and supporters or relatives of members of the enemy Govt. or Senate would be 
very useful, if members of the ―Government‖ are not available, Army officers of 
high rank would, of course, be equally good hostages. Take this up with O/C. 
Command at once.
34
 
 
The reply also advocated that family members, if any could be obtained, of those in command of 
the National Army would be perfect hostages. It stated that ‗Mulcahy, a brother of the C-in-C., is 
I am informed stationed somewhere in the 3
rd
 Southern Divisional area. We presume he has a 
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Commission. Can you locate him? He would be a useful hostage if we could lay [our] hands on 
him.‘35  
The Free State Government and Army now acted quickly to increase the pressure further 
on the Irregulars. Their actions were indicative of a significant shift in focus and a sign of an 
impending pro-treatyite policy. The Government, dissatisfied with progress made by the 
executions policy thus far, decided to expand the scope of the executions both numerically and 
geographically. The effects of this could be seen less than two weeks after the Mountjoy 
executions. Seven more men were executed in one single event in County Kildare. Despite 
constituting nearly nine per cent of the entire official executions during the Civil War, this event 
became the single largest set of executions during the conflict.
36
 Even though Kildare was 
relatively subdued, in comparison to Cork and Dublin, during the War of Independence it 
became relatively more active and important, according to Hart, during the Civil War.
37
 Seven 
Irregulars were executed, on 19 December 1922, in the Glasshouse section of the Curragh 
barracks, County Kildare. This building was a survivor from the British occupation and was 
named, according to Ernie O‘Malley, due to the design of its roof and it was where the military 
authorities confined their own delinquents.
38
 Stephen White, Joseph Johnston, Patrick Mangan, 
Patrick Nolan, Brian Moore, James O‘Connor and Patrick Bagnel, all aged between eighteen and 
thirty-four, were executed following a raid on 13 December on a farmhouse near Mooresbridge, 
which is situated approximately one and a half miles from the Curragh.
39
 According to a 
statement issued by Mulcahy on the day of the execution, these men were charged before a 
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military committee, the first of its kind, with being in possession without proper authority of ten 
rifles, two hundred rounds of ammunition, four bomb detonators, and one exploder. He 
subsequently stated that these men were found guilty under the September resolution and 
sentenced to death. The sentences were duly carried out on Tuesday 19
 
December at 8.30 a.m.
40
 
He also divulged that the condemned men, in the weeks prior to their arrest, were responsible for 
numerous attacks on National forces and train services in the area. These particular Irregulars 
belonged to a larger outfit responsible for the ambush of National troops at the Curragh siding on 
25 November 1922.
41
 The column was responsible for a major attack on the Great Southern and 
Western railway line on Monday morning, 11 December. Two engines had been taken, during 
this incident, from Kildare train station and sent down the line into an obstruction near 
Cherryville. Finally, Mulcahy labelled these men as thieves as he claimed that they were 
responsible for the looting and robbing of local shops.
42
 
The destruction of railway lines, identified as one of reasons for the introduction of the 
Public Safety Resolution, was a well-practised guerrilla tactic employed by the Irregulars 
nationally and locally in Kildare. Given Kildare‘s close proximity to Dublin its connecting 
railway lines were a primary target for the Irregulars in their attempt to destroy the Free State 
Government and Army. According to an operation report from the H.Q. of the First Eastern 
Division to the Command Adjutant North and Eastern Command, on 24 October 1922, Irregulars 
in Kildare were well versed in the destruction of the local infrastructure. The report stated that a 
‗Telephone communication [was] smashed at Cellbridge. [The] Bridge over the Morrel [was] 
blown up. An attempt [was] made to blow up the Curragh Rail Bridge on the same night but 
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[the] exploder failed to act.‘43 A further example of Irregular guerrilla activity in Kildare could 
be seen in notes on military matters which were provided for the Free State Cabinet on 12 
December. From these notes it can be discerned that Kildare Irregulars had within ‗the past few 
days [...] engaged on what seems to be a definite policy as affecting the destruction of railways at 
Kildare. 3 engines were destroyed, and on the Midland system a train was set alight at Liffey 
Junction and sent into Dublin.‘44  
Controversy surrounded this particular set of executions. Officially another man, Thomas 
Behan, who had been discovered with these seven men, was fatally wounded whilst trying to 
escape through a window in the Glasshouse where the remaining men were executed.
45
 
However, a local historian, James Durney, maintains that Behan was in fact killed at 
Mooresbridge. Following the location of the Irregulars Behan obtained a broken arm when a 
National troop struck him with a rifle. When it came to the loading of these men on to a truck 
Behan was unable to mount the vehicle. As a result he received a swift blow from a rifle butt to 
his head and fell fatally wounded.
46
 There appears to be a certain amount of validity to this 
argument. A note captured on the Irregulars‘ Adjutant General, Tom Derrig, stated that Thomas 
‗Behan [was] shot after [his] arrest [...] The relatives got [the] body of Thos. Behan. [It was] 
Brought from [the] Curragh Camp to Rathangan Chapel. [He was] Interred [the] following day in 
Rathangan Cemetery.‘47 Derrig was arrested, on 4 April 1923, on Raglan Road, Dublin. This 
note indicates that Behan was indeed killed on-site rather than executed. If he was shot like the 
other seven men then he would have been buried with them in the Curragh as this was common 
practice following official military executions. But whether or not he was killed at Mooresbridge 
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or in the Glasshouse is unclear. Durney also states that these executions caused a lot of bitterness 
in Kildare. Local reprisals for the executions, such as the burning of country houses, were a 
common occurrence during the Civil War. In a purported retaliation for this particular set of 
executions the Earl of Mayo‘s residence was burned to the ground on 29 January 1923. That 
night around thirty armed Irregulars from Naas, Kill and Kilteel arrived at the Earl of Mayo‘s 
home in Palmerstown, Naas, County Kildare. This particular residence was once home to one of 
the most important families of the British administration in Ireland during the nineteenth century, 
the Bourkes. They were the Earls of Mayo and Barons of Naas. The sixth Earl, Richard 
Southwell Bourke, was elected M.P. for Kildare in 1847. He was subsequently appointed Chief 
Secretary for Ireland on three separate occasions. He was also appointed Viceroy and Governor-
General of India where he was assassinated in 1872.
48
 The Irregulars that arrived that particular 
night viewed the house as a symbol of the Free State‘s compliance with British imperialistic 
aspirations. They made the servants place all the furniture in piles in the middle of each room, 
cover them with petrol and set them alight. The windows were then broken to assist the process. 
The house was completely destroyed but it was subsequently rebuilt at the expense of the Free 
State Government.
49
 
The burning of country houses, while forming one aspect of the Irregulars‘ retaliatory 
response to local executions, is a much more complex subject which needs further examination. 
The issue of agrarian violence was nothing new in Ireland. For generations land ownership was 
intrinsically linked to nationality and social standing in Ireland. Following the eruption of the 
‗Land War‘ in the 1880s and the founding of the Irish Land League in 1879, with its aim of 
ending landlordism and enabling tenant farmers to own the land they worked on, the British 
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Government implemented several pieces of legislation, such as the Wyndham Land Act in 1903, 
in an attempt to finally remove this emotive issue from Irish politics. Land agitation, which was 
most prevalent in the west of Ireland, consisted of driving cattle, knocking boundary fences, 
posting threatening letters and the slaughter of livestock. On occasion, however, agrarian 
violence resulted in the murder of landlords and the burning of country residences. During the 
early part of the War of Independence, the Royal Irish Constabulary (R.I.C.) managed to keep 
agrarian crime in check. However, Terence Dooley suggests that, when the I.R.A. focused their 
attacks on rural R.I.C. barracks, thus forcing a significant number of them to close in 1920, 
agrarian disorder increased dramatically, reaching its pinnacle in the spring of that year.
50
 For 
instance, the total number of agrarian crimes reported for the period from 1 January to May 1919 
was 156. For the same period in 1920, the number had increased significantly to 712.
51
 Some 
rural I.R.A. leaders, such as Michael Brennan in County Clare, understood how to cultivate the 
general hunger for land in the countryside to entice young men into the revolutionary movement 
during the War of Independence. He stated that ‗I hadn‘t the slightest interest in the land 
agitation, but I had every interest in using it as a means to an end […] to get these fellows into 
the Volunteers.‘52 However, during the Civil War the British forces had pulled out of Ireland, the 
R.I.C. was disbanded and no official police force was ready to take their place.
53
 Furthermore, 
the Treaty had not promised any economic gains for the landless men or the holders of 
economically unviable land. Tom Garvin suggests that some I.R.A. leaders and their followers 
sided with the Irregulars for fear of losing what they had been promised by Sinn Féin and the 
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I.R.A. during the War of Independence.
54
 Nonetheless, the Irregulars manipulated agrarian 
discontent. In County Cork, for example, the I.R.A. forcibly seized at least eleven farms which 
belonged to alleged loyalist spies and subsequently executed them during the War of 
Independence. The land was let by the Irregulars to local farmers, during the Civil War, to ensure 
loyalty and support.
55
 
The Provisional/Free State Government watched nervously as the latest episode of 
agrarian disorder, feeding off anti-treatyite support, swept through the west and several other 
parts of the country. They feared that if this powder-keg of agrarian violence was allowed to 
remain unchecked, it would do irreparable damage to the country and the authority of the 
Government. The Minister for Agriculture, Patrick Hogan, had warned his colleagues since the 
beginning of the Civil War that increasing levels of agrarian disorder contributed significantly to 
the amount of violence in Ireland. Hogan knew that land and political issues were intertwined. 
He contended that for the majority of people living in rural Ireland, access to land continued to 
be a more attractive commodity than independence. He maintained that as the Treaty made no 
provisions for the completion of land purchase or redistribution of large untenanted estates the 
Government needed to rectify this issue in order to undermine the Irregulars‘ support, 
particularly in the west. He stated in a memorandum that the ‗―land for the people‖ is almost as 
respectable an objective as the ―republic‖ and would make a much wider appeal.‘56 Mulcahy, 
acting on Hogan‘s suggestion, introduced the Special Infantry Corps, designed specifically to 
tackle agrarian disorder, in February 1923. Furthermore, the ratification of the Enforcement of 
Law (Occasional Powers) Act and the District Justices (Temporary Provisions) Act in March 
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1923 was indicative of how serious the Government viewed the threat that agrarian violence 
posed to the country. Hogan‘s efforts to remedy the situation ultimately led to the ratification of 
the Land Act on 9 August 1923. The formal introduction of the legislation to the Dáil in May 
1923 coincided with the end of the Civil War. Dooley argues that the anticipation of this land bill 
contributed to the decline in support for the Irregulars‘ and their agrarian campaign.57 
Agrarian violence certainly contributed to the level of disorder in several parts of the 
country during the Civil War. Moreover, the Irregulars undoubtedly engaged in and attempted to 
control this for their own advantage. Yet, it is unclear whether incidents like the burning of 
Palmerstown House in Kildare was actually a reprisal for the execution of seven men in 
December 1922 or whether it was an example of the apolitical agrarian violence that occurred 
during the conflict and the perpetrators simply claimed to be Irregulars. In many cases these 
attacks were undertaken by active Irregulars, as retaliation for local executions, against what they 
regarded as symbols of the British imperialism in Ireland. However, as was the case during the 
War of Independence, not all incidents were politically motivated. Many offenders merely 
proclaimed Irregular affiliation to bolster their credentials and lend legitimacy to their actions. 
Dooley contends that a significant number of the 300 county houses burned during the period 
1920-23 can be put down to local agitators who simply wanted to expel local landlords and 
redistribute the untenanted and demesne lands.
58
 The corollary of this also needs to be examined. 
It is unclear how many of those executed during the conflict participated in agrarian agitation as 
most men were convicted of either or both the unlawful possession of firearms and attacking 
National troops. But that is not to say that some executed men were not involved. For example 
two civilians, Michael Murphy and Joseph O‘Rourke, were put to death on 30 May 1923 for 
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armed robbery in an event that was ultimately related to land trouble. These men were not 
associated with the Irregulars and claimed no political allegiances. This suggests that there were 
some instances where agrarian violence played a role in the conviction and execution of men 
during the Civil War. Nonetheless, the Kildare executions became the largest single set during 
the conflict. Given the importance of these executions, it is striking that several authors, such as 
Ó Gadhra and Campbell, incorrectly state that they occurred in Dublin. The mistake is even more 
remarkable considering that there is a memorial cross located in the centre of Kildare Town 
which is dedicated to the men executed in the Curragh Camp during the Civil War.
59
 This is 
indicative of the lack of research undertaken on this area. Before 1922 ended two further 
localised executions occurred. Prisoners John Phelan and John Murphy were executed in 
Kilkenny Jail, on 29 December, for the unlawful possession of ammunition in a raid on 
Sheastown House.
60
 
January 1923 began with a rarity in relation to the Government‘s executions policy when 
five captured Irregulars were put to death in Dublin on 8 January. One of the reasons this case 
proved unusual was that those who had been executed so far had generally been killed for the 
unlawful possession of arms and ammunition, the Mountjoy executions being different as it was 
a reprisal. However, according to an official Army communiqué, Corporals Leo Dowling and 
Sylvester Heaney, and Privates Laurence Sheehy, Anthony O‘Reilly and Terence Brady were 
court-martialled in Kilmainham Jail on 11 December 1922. They were charged with treachery 
given that they, at Leixlip, County Kildare, assisted and consorted with certain armed persons 
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and used force against National troops on 1 December 1922.
61
 In addition to this, the ‗Court 
found each of the accused guilty of both charges. They were sentenced to death. The sentences 
were duly confirmed in each case and the executions were carried out this morning at 8 
o‘clock.‘62 According to an Irregular propagandist handbill, issued soon after this event occurred, 
these men‘s: 
eyes were opened [after the Treaty]. You saw that the treachery and falsehood, 
you had been betrayed; and like honourable men you returned to your old 
allegiance; to fight for the only cause worthy of your manhood – the 
Independence of your country. For this they executed you. For this you died.
63
 
 
Events since early December had caused certain Ministers, primarily Cosgrave, 
O‘Higgins and Hogan, to lose patience and become increasingly sceptical of the Army‘s ability 
to conclude the Civil War. They began to call for the alteration and increased implementation of 
the executions policy in a final attempt to finish the conflict. Even though it was 10 January 1923 
the Public Safety Resolution which had been in operation for four months had, to the 
dissatisfaction of the these ministers, not achieved definite results. Demands for further localised 
executions and the increased implementation of the policy intensified. This was highlighted in 
mid-January 1923 when a conference between the Executive and Military Councils occurred ‗to 
discuss the present situation, and to decide upon the most effective means of dealing with the 
lawlessness prevailing throughout the country, with a view to bringing it to a speedy end.‘64 In 
order to prepare for the crucial meeting each minister was asked to organise a comprehensive 
account of the affects that the Civil War had on their particular ministry and to devise a number 
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of suggested solutions. Both Hogan and O‘Higgins produced extremely pessimistic memoranda. 
Hogan, whilst warning of an impending land war, indicated his frustration and argued 
extensively for the increased implementation of the September resolution. Hogan demanded that 
a clear-cut stern policy which would provide the Army, of which he was extremely critical, a free 
hand to halt the disastrous situation which existed in the country. Hogan claimed that if Ireland 
witnessed another two months like those that had just passed then it and the Irish Free State 
would crumble. He stated that:  
The people are thirsty for peace, and thirsty for strong ruthless and efficient 
measures, because they believe such measures will bring peace. There will not be 
the slightest re-action against any measure we take provided they are strong and 
efficient, and the people will give us plenty of time to do our work if they feel we 
mean business.
65
 
 
Hogan believed that the public would support increasingly stern measures if they perceived these 
actions to be justified. The lack of overt public condemnation after the Mountjoy executions 
suggests that his assertions would be correct. Hogan argued that the Government and the Army 
must realise that the Civil War was a conflict that the Government and Army had no choice or 
alternative except to win. He stated that the country and the Army, for that matter, were confused 
and that the only way to obtain their objectives was to annihilate the Irregulars: 
The Irregulars in these areas must be beaten and terrorised by the utmost military 
activity. Otherwise the cure is worse than the disease [...] I know the executions 
are only a second best, and that they cannot be continued indefinitely; in fact, they 
can only be continued for a fairly limited time, but within that time they ought to 
be going with machine-like regularity.
66
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Hogan knew that even though the public, for the most part, supported the Government and the 
executions policy, this support would not remain indefinitely if the Government and the Army 
did not end the Civil War. The executions were accepted as a necessary evil to defeat the 
Irregulars, but if victory was not achieved quickly then support for the executions and the 
Government, for that matter, would dwindle. As a result, he proposed the adoption of 
increasingly severe measures. Hogan claimed that the machinery which allowed the Army to 
execute Irregulars had broken down due to ‗the unwillingness of indecision of the local 
commands, and legal difficulties.‘67 
O‘Higgins, in similar fashion to Hogan, argued that the previous executions were not 
having the desired effect as the centralised executions which occurred in Dublin did not 
influence those Irregulars who were located throughout the country. To rectify this problem he 
advocated more localised executions. According to O‘Higgins: 
I am of the opinion that there should be executions in every County. The 
psychological effect of an execution in Dublin is very slight in Wexford, Galway, 
or Waterford. The Irregulars in these Counties, as a rule, do not know the men 
who are shot in Dublin, and the effect on their minds is very little more than if 
they were reading an execution in a novel, or a history instead of a newspaper. I 
believe that local executions would tend considerably to shorten the struggle.
68
 
 
In this instance, O‘Higgins, in order to prove his point, is being slightly impertinent. It is very 
doubtful that the Irregulars would look upon the execution of their comrades, wherever they 
occurred, as if they were being carried out in a novel. What O‘Higgins wanted was to 
decentralise the executions policy, thus having them in every county, so that local Irregulars 
would feel the impact of the Government policy. He argued that if the pro-treatyites wanted to 
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win before the summer then there needed to be an immediate improvement and intensification of 
propaganda. O‘Higgins said that this would be pointless and ineffective unless it was 
synchronised with other approaches such as the tackling of illegal land occupation and non-
payment of debts and rates. In summation, he remarked ‗we must kill the active Irregular, tackle 
the passive Irregular, [and] make friends with the rest.‘69  
O‘Higgins and Hogan believed that the Irregulars threatened Ireland militarily, politically 
and economically but they also posed a social danger to the country. According to Kissane, key 
figures ‗within the civilian leadership were clearly convinced that behind the irregular campaign 
lay the menace of social revolution and this fear informed their more extreme proposals.‘70 
Furthermore, O‘Higgins possessed an almost overwhelming eagerness to see that his ideas and 
conceptions were translated into action.
71
 Following the conference, he wrote to Mulcahy in a 
more optimistic mood. He stated ‗I was greatly gratified at the result of last night‘s discussion, 
and feel confident that when the decisions arrived at are translated into action, the results will be 
good.‘72 Both O‘Higgins and Hogan wanted to ensure that the Army did not ease up on the 
Irregulars and they were determined to pursue a ferocious policy of unconditional defeat rather 
than settle for a conditional surrender.
73
 After the conference a further eight republican militants 
were put to death in less than a week. This indicated that the ideals discussed at the January 
conference were adopted and the determination to crush the Irregulars was stronger than ever. 
Thomas McKeown, John McNulty and Thomas Murray were executed in Dundalk on 13 January 
for the unlawful possession of revolvers and ammunition. The Daily Bulletin, a republican 
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newspaper, stated that the speed at which these prisoners were apprehended, tried and executed 
was remarkable. It stated that McNulty and Murray ‗had been arrested only on the previous 
Tuesday, less than four days before their execution. Their ―trial‖ consisted of a flying visit to the 
town by [the] Colonial General Hogan, for the purpose of passing the death sentence.‘74 Francis 
Burke, Patrick Russell, Patrick MacNamara and Martin O‘Shea were also executed in Roscrea, 
Co. Tipperary on 15 January for the unlawful possession of varying amounts of arms and 
ammunition.
75
 James Lillis was put to death in Carlow on the same day for the unlawful 
possession of a rifle and the taking part in an attack on national forces on 24 October.
76
 
According to the I.R.A. Roll of Honour, Lillis had originally joined the Free State Army in 
January 1922 but soon found that he had broken his faith with the Irish Republic and he returned 
to his old allegiance in May of that year. It stated that ill-treatment at the hands of the pro-
treatyites caused him to change his mind. It mentioned that ‗he was beaten in the face with butts 
of revolvers and rifles and was then placed in a cell, and given no medical treatment of any 
kind.‘77 Lillis was actually tried in Dublin and then returned to Carlow to be executed. The Roll 
of Honour finally stated that he ‗died as he lived true to faith and country.‘78  
The Free State Government and Army, unwilling to negate their renewed momentum, set 
about enacting supplementary emergency measures. On 17 January 1923 the Army Council 
issued a General Order, which became known as the ‗Stand-Clear‘ order. The proclamation 
extended the remit of the Public Safety Resolution ensuring that it would now cover additional 
types of criminality. Under the order any person who shall: 
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Murder any person, or aid or abet the murder of any person, or attempt in any way 
to murder any person […] Conspire to murder any person […] Command, 
procure, incite, counsel, solicit, encourage, persuade or endeavour to persuade any 
person to murder any person […] shall upon trial and conviction thereof by 
Military Court or Committee be liable to suffer death or any less punishment.
79
 
 
The directive greatly expanded the jurisdiction of the military courts and committees. It was 
designed to ensure that Irregular followers and sympathisers, i.e. civilians, would now stand an 
even greater chance of prosecution. According to Campbell, the expansion in power of the 
September resolution was enacted to ‗bring IRA back-up personnel and supporters within the net 
of those triable.‘80 It must be noted here that civilians were included in the September resolution, 
however, none had been executed to date. The resolution used the term ‗persons‘ to ensure that 
the emergency powers were all-inclusive.
81
  
Thomas Johnson seriously doubted the necessity for such an extension as he claimed that 
the military necessity, touted as one of the reasons for the adoption of emergency measures in 
September, no longer existed.
82
 Mulcahy argued that this directive was absolutely necessary in 
order to indicate to both militants and civilians that if they engaged in criminality, or co-operated 
and assisted the Irregulars‘ armed rebellion in any way then they too would face immediate and 
merciless prosecution. He stipulated that:  
This new Order of the Army Council is intended to be a Stand-Clear Order, and to 
make people definitely stand clear of the National destruction that is going on at 
the present time, if they do not want to be chargeable with it, and if they do not 
mean to be punished for it.
83
 
 
                                                          
79
 Dáil Debates, Army Council General Order, volume 2, col. 876 (17 January 1923). 
80
 Colm Campbell, Emergency law in Ireland 1918-1925 (New York, 1994), p. 167. 
81
 See Appendix 2. 
82
 Dáil Debates, Army Council General Order, volume 2, col. 883 (17 January 1923). 
83
 Ibid, col. 888. 
 187 
 
Hogan argued that in obtaining the additional authority the Army had both the Dáil‘s and the 
country‘s support. He denounced Johnson‘s attempt to hide behind legal technicalities and 
political niceties. Hogan stated that the extension was a necessity to halt the Irregulars‘ national 
destruction in the quickest possible time by doing ‗what every other Government in similar 
circumstances has always done.‘84 O‘Higgins firmly believed that the Irregulars were severing 
the country‘s arteries and killing the Nation. He stated that the Government would do whatever 
was necessary to annihilate the Irregulars. He claimed that: 
because the veins and arteries of the country are being cut, and because we bid 
fair to be classed with the nigger and the Mexican, as a people unable to govern 
themselves, we who have a democratic mandate, for the moment, to control the 
destinies of this country, will go very, very far indeed against the people who are 
menacing the life of this country.
85
 
 
O‘Higgins also accepted that the Government had previously failed to fully implement the 
emergency powers and that this only served to encourage the Irregulars and make them believe 
that a compromise was possible. He stated that this assumption would be no more: 
And if anyone who was opposed to us, or those now opposed to us, interpreted the 
moderation with which we used the power in the past as any symptom of 
indecision, as any indication of doubt about these issues, then unconsciously we 
have been cruel, cruel to the country, cruel even to those who are in arms against 
us, if we help to prolong the struggle by any lingering hope in the minds of our 
opponents that there could be compromise on those issues.
86
 
 
Finally, Cosgrave joined the debate over the ‗Stand-Clear‘ order. He dictated that the 
Government and the Army would not and must not economise on the death penalty. He declared 
that it was completely legitimate and an absolute necessity if Ireland is to be saved, as he argued: 
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stern measures must be taken—in which we cannot economise on the death 
penalty There is no use talking about drastic measures. Drastic measures are 
spoken about on the other side when they mean to take men's lives, but they will 
not say that. The death penalty is a thing we cannot economise on when there is 
such destruction, such disorder, and such hopeless lack of morality through the 
country from one end of it to the other.
87
 
 
Following the introduction of the ‗Stand-Clear‘ order the Army issued another directive. 
Signed by the Adjutant General, Gearóid Ó Sulleavain, new procedures for the execution of a 
death sentence were introduced on 18 January 1923. These regulations superseded those issued 
in November. These procedures stipulated that the person or persons mentioned in the certificate 
of confirmation would be at once removed to the place of execution and be placed in a separate 
cell or cells. Furthermore, before 12 p.m. on the day before the execution, a copy of the 
certificate of confirmation, duly signed by the confirming authorities, which outlined the 
charges, finding, and sentence of the court, would be read over to the prisoner or prisoners 
concerned.
88
 The prisoner or prisoners would be informed separately that the sentence would be 
executed at 8 a.m. the following day. They could then have the service of an Army chaplain or 
any clergyman he desired. This would be subject to the services of such clergyman being 
reasonably available and there being no individual objection to such clergyman by the G.O.C. of 
the area where the execution was to occur. With the exception of the clergyman no one would be 
allowed to visit the convicted prisoner. The utmost care was to be taken to ensure that the 
prisoner or prisoners were not subjected to any annoyance and that the prisoner or prisoners 
were to be treated with the utmost humanity, compatible with the fulfilment of the above 
instructions. The prisoner or prisoners, under death sentence, would be afforded facilities to 
write any private or business letters. Such letters would be censored in the ordinary way by the 
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Command Intelligence Officer, and copies may be made. The originals together with any 
personal effects of the deceased would be forwarded to persons for whom they were intended. 
Following the execution of the prisoner arrangements would be made to assemble a military 
court of enquiry into the death of the prisoner or prisoners. The executed prisoner would then 
receive an expeditious burial within the confines of the barracks, when the court of enquiry had 
completed its deliberations. The certificate of confirmation would be produced at the court of 
enquiry, and both copies attached to the proceedings would be forwarded to the Army 
headquarters. However, notice would not be sent to the next-of-kin prior to the execution but 
immediately after the carrying out of the death sentence. Such notification would be signed by 
the Command Adjutant.
89
  
Mulcahy subsequently issued a memorandum in which he clarified the criteria for the 
distribution of cases between the military courts and the committees. In future, cases would be 
separated into two categories.
90
 The first class of cases referred to persons who were guilty 
beyond doubt. These cases dealt with people that were blatantly caught and as a result were to be 
tried by the committees at Battalion level. The second class, however, were to be brought to 
Command headquarters and dealt with by a military court.
91
 This scenario had many similarities 
to the previous British system of drumhead courts. The decision to refer cases to committees of 
officers primarily involved cases of persons caught red-handed. This placed the accused at 
maximum risk of receiving the death sentence as, like their British predecessors, the minimum 
safeguards were to apply.
92
 One main effect of introducing the committee system in to the Irish 
Civil War at Battalion level was that the resulting executions were much more widely distributed 
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geographically than would probably have been the case had disposal of cases been limited to 
trial by a military court which were organised at Command level. Ó Longaigh states that: 
approximately 140 persons came before the military courts and 9 were executed, 
with 85% of suspects being convicted. Of the 1,039 who came before the 
committees, 64 were put to death, with about 46% of suspects being found guilty. 
In total, 77 were officially executed.
93
 
 
These figures are not only simplistic but they are also inaccurate. Ó Longaigh claims that 
executed Irregulars had their cases dispatched either by a military court or a military committee. 
Whilst this was the general idea, there were some important exceptions to this trend. Ó Longaigh 
omits some crucial information and as a result his figures are incomplete. The executions during 
the Civil War were not as orderly as Ó Longaigh portrays them. He does not account for the four 
civilians executed for armed robbery during the Civil War, bringing the total number of official 
executions during the conflict to eighty-one. Due to the complete lack of information pertaining 
to these men it must be assumed that they were tried by a military committee as cases were 
almost exclusively dispatched by committees after 8 December 1922. Moreover, he does not 
allow for the five Irregulars which, being former National soldiers, were court-martialed and 
executed for treachery. As a result these men were not tried by a military court or a military 
committee.
94
  
With this new momentum the executions in January were set to continue unabated. 
Eleven Irregulars were executed on 20 January 1923, two in Limerick Cornelius McMahon and 
Patrick Hennessy, four in Tralee James Daly, John Clifford, Michael Brosnan and James Hanlon 
and five in Athlone, County Westmeath Thomas Hughes, Michael Walsh, Herbert Collins, 
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Stephen Joyce and Martin Burke.
95
 According to the official report, these eleven men had been 
found guilty ‗of being in possession of arms and ammunition without proper authority, and the 
two men executed at Limerick were further found guilty of being implicated in the destruction of 
the railway [in] Co. Clare.‘96 The executions which occurred in Athlone once again highlighted 
another controversial pro-treatyite policy. As stipulated in the aforementioned procedures it was 
common practice not to inform the next of kin until after the execution had taken place and 
withhold the body of any executed prisoners indefinitely. This was highlighted in the Dáil, on 30 
January 1923, when Seán Ó Laidhin questioned Mulcahy:  
if it is a fact that in connection with the five executions which took place in 
Athlone on Saturday, January 20th, the parents of the prisoners were not notified 
until after the executions had taken place; and, if so, what was the reason for this; 
also, why the remains of John [Thomas] Hughes, one of the executed men, were 
not given to his mother, at her request.
97
 
 
It must be noted here that Ó Laidhin refers to John Hughes. Evidence suggests that the executed 
Irregulars‘ name was Thomas Hughes. Small differences are not uncommon amongst the names 
of the eighty-one men executed during the Civil War. Nonetheless, in response to the enquiry 
Mulcahy replied that it was neither the practice nor the intention of the Army to communicate 
with relatives of men who had been arrested. In the case of an execution, he stated that, formal 
notification would be sent immediately after the execution had taken place. He also declared that 
it was also not the intention to hand over the remains of any executed men to friends or family of 
the deceased.
98
 Not satisfied with the Minister for Defence‘s reply the Labour T.D. claimed that 
Thomas Hughes‘ mother lived in very close proximity to Athlone and that she only received 
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word that her son had been killed, informally, when she was travelling around the town. 
According to Ó Laidhin: 
His [Thomas Hughes‘] parents live one and a half miles from Athlone. His mother 
was in town at the market, and was going home when she was overtaken by some 
person in authority, who told her about the execution […] As this was the first 
time in the history of Ireland that an execution took place in Athlone, and this 
man's people live within a mile of the town, surely it was the duty of the 
Government to notify them before executing him.
99
 
 
 
Ó Laidhin was completely shocked at the perceived insensitivity and inhumane nature of the 
Government and the Army. The issue over the remains of the executed men would cause further 
controversy and scandal for the Government after the Civil War. This will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter seven. According to Ó Gadhra, a sixth person had been tried and convicted 
along with the other five prisoners in Athlone. Tom Maguire, an anti-treatyite Sinn Féin T.D., 
was also sentenced to death. However, his sentence was never carried out possibly due to his 
status as a sitting Deputy, despite the fact that he along with de Valera and the other anti-treatyite 
T.D.s had walked out of the Dáil in protest at the Treaty.
100
 This may have been an attempt, by 
the pro-treatyites, not to unduly antagonise public opinion. Nevertheless, for Martin Burke, as he 
stated in his final letter to his brother Jim, both he and his comrades were proud to die for the 
Republic:  
Just a few lines before I pass away from this world forever. I suppose my time has 
come [...] Poor Tom Hughes is by my side, a soldier to the last. Stephen Joyce, 
Mick Walshe and Collins are going before God in the morning. I think with God‘s 
help I‘m prepared to die [...] Poor old Dad, this will give him a blow, but it‘s a 
chance for a happy death. So goodbye until we meet again in that happy land 
beyond the skies.
101
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Another example of the rapid speed in which Irregular prisoners were arrested, tried and 
convicted occurred when four men were executed in Kerry. According to Paddy O‘Daly, the new 
G.O.C. Kerry Command following General Murphy‘s transferral to Cork, prisoners James Daly, 
John Clifford, Michael Brosnan and James Hanlon were notorious republicans. Therefore, he 
pushed for their immediate execution. O‘Daly declared that ‗I am trying three exceptionally bad 
cases, caught with arms, by [a] council of officers. Will you [Mulcahy] sanction [the] death 
sentence. Verify by wireless. [The] Feeling here [is] very strong for immediate action.‘102 Not 
content with Mulcahy‘s procrastination O‘Daly contacted him again the following morning and 
enquired as to the whereabouts of the confirmation for these four cases. He stated that if ‗you 
sanction [the] sentence on Daly, Clifford Bros. and Hanlon send me word in time to carry it out 
[at] 8 o‘clock to-morrow morning (Saturday).‘103 Whilst O‘Daly waited for the sentences to be 
confirmed he replied to a resolution, passed by the Tralee Urban Council, which demanded that 
the sentences of death imposed upon the four men be commuted to imprisonment. His reply is 
interesting and is indicative of the level of animosity that he felt towards the tactics employed by 
the Irregulars. O‘Daly stated that: 
I can assure you that it would be the happiest moment in my life if I were in a 
position to convey to you definitely that the executions were at an end. I would 
willingly give the remaining years of my life to see this unfortunate fight 
terminated […] But, in justice to my dead comrades […] Executions will stop 
when train-wrecking, murder and highway robbery cease […] When the people of 
Ireland at a free election vote in favour of a truce with the murderers of Seán 
Hales, Emmet McGarry, and the train wreckers, I will then have finished serving 
the people of Ireland.
104
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Nonetheless, Mulcahy promptly replied and confirmed the findings by merely singing his name 
on the back of a brown envelope.
105
 The four Irregular militants were put to death that same day, 
20 January 1923. These executions indicate that level of armed resistance in the county was 
increasing rather than decreasing as Murphy predicted.  
The executions in Kerry also indicate another consequence of the Government‘s 
decentralisation process. Previously, all the executions were confined to Dublin and the Cabinet, 
in conjunction with the Army Council, decided who was to be put to death. However, the vast 
majority of cases were now dealt with locally by the Officers Commanding the area where the 
offence was committed. Even though the Army Council, that is Mulcahy and his colleagues, had 
to confirm the conviction and authorise the execution, evidence suggests that the Cabinet‘s 
influence in the decision making process was significantly decreased. 
A further seven men were put to death by the end of January as the Free State 
Government and National Army continued with the swift rate of executions. Three men, James 
Melia, Thomas Lennon and Joseph Ferguson, were executed in Dundalk on 22 January for the 
unauthorised possession of arms and ammunition. Melia and Lennon were under twenty years of 
age and had brothers in a Free State prison at the time of their executions. Both men had stolen a 
vehicle belonging to Senator O‘Rourke and were captured following a raid on the Iniskeen 
station on 2 January. Ferguson, on the other hand, was a well-known local footballer.
106
 
According to Joseph Gavin and Stephen O‘Donnell, news of the executions shocked the town of 
Dundalk, due to the young age of the executed men.
107
 They were all members of the Fourth 
Northern Division‘s Dundalk Brigade. Melia, according to an Irregular report, was executed for 
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carrying arms when in reality he did not have any on him at the time of his arrest. He had signed 
papers to obtain his freedom following a previous arrest; however, following his release he once 
again continued to fight the National Army. It further stated that Melia was an excellent soldier 
and was willing to do anything for the cause.
108
 Another captured Irregular Intelligence report 
claimed that the aforementioned republican combatants were actually caught with arms in their 
possession. It stated that ‗James Melia and Thomas Lennon had one revolver and some 
ammunition in their possession when arrested. The [Free] Staters say they got some grenades 
[and] a rifle and ammunition in or about the place where Ferguson was staying.‘109 According to 
the Connacht Tribune, demonstrations were held on 26 January outside the gates of the prison in 
Dundalk where these men had been executed. Local women recited the rosary and refused to 
disperse, however, they fled after revolver and machine gun fire was directed over their heads as 
a warning.
110
 Some demonstrations, of this nature, occurred in towns after local executions 
during the Civil War. However, for reasons stated already, the extent of these protests never 
matched those that occurred in 1916 or during the War of Independence. 
Two men, Michael FitzGerald of Main Street, Youghal, County Cork and Patrick 
O‘Reilly of Coast-Guard station, Youghal, Co. Cork, were put to death in Waterford on 25 
January. According to the official report, both men were found guilty of the unauthorised 
possession of arms and ammunition having been captured at Ballinaclash, Clashmore, County 
Waterford on 4 December 1922.
111
 Another man, Patrick Cuddihy, was also tried with these 
men. However, he only received five years penal servitude.
112
 The Youghal No. 2 Council, 
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County Waterford adopted a resolution denouncing these executions, offered its deepest 
sympathy to the relatives of the executed men and adjourned its meeting in protest.
113
 Three 
more executions occurred in Birr, County Offaly. Colum Kelly, Patrick Cunningham and 
William Conroy were put to death on 26 January. These men, according to the official report, 
were found guilty of the possession without proper authority of arms in Tullamore, County 
Offaly on 21 November 1922. These men were also found guilty of ‗feloniously and 
burglariously with intent the houses of several residents in Tullamore, and stealing therefrom a 
silver watch, several sums of money, with other goods [.]‘114 Father Pat Gaynor, one of two 
priests who served as chaplains to the three men the other being Father Dinan, was impressed by 
their calm and composed nature prior to their execution. In his description of the executions 
Gaynor states that fifteen minutes before the actual event a Free State officer enquired if the men 
had any last requests. Two of them asked for some lemonade and the other for a bottle of 
stout.
115
 He also claimed that the condemned men were blindfolded and were executed sitting 
down on chairs. According to Gaynor: 
the tallest boy – without any air of bravado – asked to be left face the firing-squad 
standing: there was not even a tremor in his voice and his comrades were equally 
calm and brave. On being told that he must sit in the chair, he obeyed without a 
word.
116
 
 
Finally, he states that after the shots rang out two of the men seemed to be unconscious, if not 
dead, however, the third man ‗fell sideways and the chair toppled over and he lay, moaning and 
twitching, on the ground […] three young officers advanced and placed revolvers against the 
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boys‘ temples and fired one shot each[.]117 Two men, Patrick Geraghty and Joseph Byrne, were 
shot dead in Portlaoise, County Laois, on 27 January 1923.
118
 The official report concerning this 
set of executions states that Geraghty was tried on 5 January for the unauthorised possession of 
an automatic pistol at Croghan, County Offaly on 10 November 1922. Byrne was also tried on 
the same day with the possession without proper authority of a Webley revolver. The findings in 
both cases were confirmed and they were duly executed.
119
 Cinemas in Cork closed their doors 
in protest at the recent sets of executions throughout the country; however, the Free State 
authorities compelled them to re-open.
120
  
The claim that prisoners Cunningham, Conroy and Kelly, executed in Offaly, had been 
involved in burglary is interesting and appears to have some validity to it. According to a 
captured Irregular document, from the Adjutant General to the Adjutant Third Southern Division, 
it was stated that these men were ‗reported to have been charged with burglary. I have already 
asked you to send me a report on this matter, we must be in a position to refute such charges. I 
require a statement from you [on] this case at once.‘121 Philip McConway contends that none of 
these three men were actually associated with the Irregulars but were simply young men 
foolishly engaged in robbery. He claims that Seán McGuinness, the O.C. First Battalion, 
Tullamore, Offaly No. 1 Brigade, told these men to go home when they attempted to enlist in the 
Irregulars because of their young age.
122
 Yet, McConway states that the Irregulars, determined to 
maximise the propaganda capital from these executions, eagerly claimed them as Irregular 
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soldiers. However, he provides no evidence to substantiate this assertion.
123
 The fact remains that 
the official Army report and the captured Irregular document, pertaining to these three men, 
threat them as Irregulars. Nonetheless, since the beginning of the Civil War, and particularly 
since the death of Hales, the Government and the Army were attempting to portray the Irregulars 
as little more than undemocratic and ruthless criminals determined on destroying the social and 
economic fabric of the country. The hostage policy, as O‘Donoghue suggested earlier, is perhaps 
further evidence of the Government‘s efforts. As the above official report, pertaining to the 
Offaly executions, clearly demonstrates and the official report issued after the seven executions 
in Kildare in December, the Government were quick to label some Irregulars as common thieves. 
The fact that the Irregulars had to constantly requisition much needed funds, materials and 
supplies from the public made the Government‘s task much easier. Therefore, having already 
made the unauthorised possession of any weapon illegal and punishable by death, their attempts 
to further criminalise the Irregulars for commandeering materials served several purposes. For 
instance, it helped justify the Government‘s rationale for fighting the Civil War, democratic 
principles and morale values. Moreover, it legitimised the methods that the Government were 
employing, particularly the executions policy, during the conflict. If they painted a picture 
whereby Irregulars were looting and stealing at will then the Government and Army received a 
certain amount of vindication in their efforts to defeat these so-called criminals. That is not to 
say that some members of the Irregulars, and the National Army for that matter, were not 
involved in burglary and looting as they certainly were but the Government made sure to 
highlight the Irregulars‘ involvement in such practices. What is also interesting here is that 
during the War of Independence the appropriation of supplies was an accepted practice, 
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frequently employed by some of the same men in the Government and Army that were now 
referring to the Irregulars as delinquents.  
This issue did not go unnoticed by the Irregulars Chief of Staff. Lynch knew that thievery 
would antagonise the public and decrease what little support they received from them. As a result 
he proclaimed ‗it is hereby solemnly notified that robbery will be sternly suppressed and that 
persons falsely representing themselves to be soldiers of the Irish Republican Army will be dealt 
with summarily.‘124 Nonetheless, this would not be the last time stealing would play a part in the 
determining of a man‘s fate.  
Following the executions in Dundalk, on 22 January, a communiqué was sent from 
Captain O‘Connor, in the Quartermaster‘s office, Dundalk military barracks, to Colonel 
O‘Higgins, Quartermaster in the Dublin Command, Collins barracks, on 1 February 1923. It 
outlined the effect that the execution of former comrades and fellow Irishmen was having on the 
unfortunate National soldiers that had to carry out the terrible order. According to this message:  
I [O‘Connor] enclose herewith Accounts for Whiskey which was purchased on 
the order of General Hogan, and supplied to the Firing squads who carried out the 
execution here. I have certified these Accounts correct, and would be glad if you 
would arrange to have them paid.
125
 
 
The provision of alcohol for the troops, who had to perform such awful tasks, is perhaps an 
indication that the Army authorities recognised the intensely unpleasant nature of these duties. 
Nonetheless, the rapid pace of the executions was satirically attacked in Irregular pamphlet 
entitled „Five Centuries To Go‟: 
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The pace is too slow, Dick! [Richard Mulcahy] You are killing only about One 
Hundred Republicans a Quarter. At this rate it will take you Five Hundred Years 
to kill them all off. This is not good enough. If you don‘t hurry up we will have to 
get someone who will do the job quicker. Get on with the work Dick! 
126
 
 
The executions dealt a huge blow to Irregular spirits. According to Campbell, the 
executions to date had a demoralising effect on the anti-treatyite militants.
127
 While remaining 
armed resistance, particularly in Kerry, hindered the pro-treatyites from exercising complete 
control throughout Ireland it was clear by January that the anti-treatyite rebellion was collapsing. 
The capture of Liam Deasy, on 18 January 1923, did little to aid their cause. This event was to 
have significant implications, which will be discussed in the next chapter, for the final stages of 
the Irish Civil War. Deasy represented the most important example of the Cork I.R.A.‘s reluctant 
participation in the conflict. He was very pessimistic about the Irregulars‘ chances of actually 
winning the Civil War and had been preparing for peace for some time. He was apprehended on 
the Galtee mountains whilst en-route to see Lynch to discuss the possibility of peace 
negotiations.
128
  
It has been established that the Government‘s official hostage scheme was adopted as 
another method to reduce the level of Irregular resistance in specific areas. Even though this plan 
initially failed in Kerry it did, however, prove relatively successful in other areas. It affected the 
morale of local Irregulars forcing significant amounts of them to appeal for peace, especially as 
the Civil War dragged on. Evidence also indicates that that the Government decentralised and 
accelerated for several reasons. Ó Gadhra argues that the decentralisation of the Public Safety 
Resolution was authorised and enacted to ensure that every county, Command and Battalion was 
                                                          
126
 Irregular pamphlet, 1923 (U.C.D. Archives, FitzGerald papers, P80/834). 
127
 Campbell, Emergency law in Ireland, p. 168. 
128
 Hopkinson, Green against green, p. 230. 
 201 
 
involved in the execution of Irregular prisoners not only to spread future accountability but also 
to strike fear in to local republican circles. According to Ó Gadhra: 
The toll of horror was spreading throughout the provinces, into almost every 
county and divisional area where the Free State army had triumphed. Every 
section of the army was being involved in blood and in bloody reprisals, not only 
in order to ‗share the responsibility‘ but also to strike terror into each local area.129  
 
Similarly, Blake argues that as the executions were usually carried out at the discretion of the 
local commanders, even though the final say lay with the Army Council, the authorities wished 
that personal responsibility should be as widely spread amongst as many senior officers as 
possible.
130
 While these arguments of mass-culpability may be plausible, they are nonetheless 
just opinions. Evidence suggests that one of the primary reasons for undertaking localised 
executions at Battalion level rather than Command level was to ensure that the executions would 
become much more dispersed geographically. This was to ensure that the effects of executions 
would penetrate a number of the localities where Irregulars operated. Moreover, it has been 
established that the adoption of this policy is undeniably linked to the attack on 7 December. 
This incident hardened the pro-treatyite‘s resolve and led to the adoption of a far more ruthless 
approach than may have otherwise been the case if it did not occur. In addition to this the Civil 
War had, in the eyes of the pro-treatyites, staggered on for long enough and it was time to finish 
it. Bolstered by renewed determination, engendered by Hales‘ killing, they enacted the ‗Stand-
Clear‘ order and enforced the committee system to streamline the implementation of the Public 
Safety Resolution. The pro-treatyites believed that they had a democratic mandate to operate as 
they did and that if they did not make these tough and controversial decisions to halt the 
Irregulars‘ destruction of the country then the Irish Free State would collapse. 
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CHAPTER 6 
‘The serious situation which the Executions have created’ 
 
 
  The capture of the Irregulars‘ assistant Chief of Staff, Liam Deasy, on 18 January proved 
a significant blow to their hopes of victory in the Irish Civil War. Following his arrest Deasy 
circulated a letter, to several prominent anti-treatyites, appealing for peace. He recognised the 
affect that the executions policy was having on Irregular morale and, by extension, their 
prosecution of the conflict. This chapter will evaluate the validity of Deasy‘s assertions relating 
to the ‗serious situation which the Executions have created‘1 and establish whether or not the 
policy actually achieved its primary objective, the hastening of the end of the Civil War. Bearing 
this in mind, the remaining twenty-six executions during the conflict will be examined. Of 
particular interest is the execution of four civilians, on 13 March and 30 May 1923, for the 
unauthorised possession of arms following armed robberies. These men were not associated with 
the Irregulars; thus the attention that they receive to date is almost non-existent. Yet these 
executions were facilitated by the Public Safety Resolution and should be included in this body 
of research. The Irish Civil War was an acrimonious affair, partly due to the Government‘s 
official executions policy. However, the occurrence of several unofficial actions carried out by 
both sides of the Treaty divide contributed to the bitterness which endured long after the final 
shots were fired in anger. The atrocities which occurred in Kerry in March 1923 will also be 
analysed. They represent the extremities of unofficial actions during the Civil War and in terms 
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of ruthlessness rivalled any official executions. Nonetheless, it was now February 1923 and the 
Civil War continued as did the executions policy. 
By mid-January the Irregulars‘ guerrilla prosecution of the Civil War was disintegrating 
rapidly in the face of the National Army which was financially, numerically and logistically 
stronger than the anti-treatyite militants. Irregular defeats, captures and deaths were also on the 
increase and, due to the decentralisation of the Public Safety Resolution, the anti-treatyite 
combatants throughout the country faced the ever-increasing possibility of execution should they 
be discovered with arms. According to Hopkinson, the first four months of 1923 saw a definite 
collapse of the Irregulars‘ military effort. He argues that any large-scale military activity was 
impossible, only small A.S.U.s remained and arms and financial resources were extremely 
limited. He states that ‗the conflict had become patchy and localised and scarcely merited the 
term ‗war‘. Captures and deaths did much to demoralise the cause [...] The only type of activity 
possible in much of the country was house-burning and the wrecking of communications.‘2 
Furthermore, the introduction of the Special Infantry Corps in February 1923, designed to tackle 
agrarian disorder in the countryside, particularly where Irregulars were involved, served to 
increase the pressures on the Irregulars further. According to Regan, even though a guerrilla 
victory was still technically possible, although highly unlikely, the National Army were in an 
abundantly better position considering they were bankrolled and armed by the British. He argued 
that for the Irregulars it became a war of ‗indefinite attrition fought against insurmountable 
odds.‘3  
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The apprehension of Deasy proved to be another turning point in the Civil War. Having 
fought during the War of Independence in Cork, he was a proven military leader. Even though 
the War of Independence was fought fiercely in Cork the present conflict was a different matter 
altogether. Deasy argued that in the ‗south of Ireland where I had an intimate and personal 
knowledge of the great majority of those who were taking an active part in the anti-Treaty side 
there was no enthusiasm for this war.‘4 It must be noted here that Deasy‘s arguments are 
subjective. Thus the position he took, with regards to surrender, in addition to his efforts to 
justify that position, need to be taken into account when examining the arguments he 
subsequently put forward in his book Brother against brother. Nonetheless, Deasy did represent, 
according to Hopkinson, ‗the most important example of the Cork IRA‘s reluctant participation 
in the conflict.‘5 Deasy had for some time acknowledged the futility in the conflict‘s 
continuance. He ultimately believed that the Irregulars were right to protest militarily at the so-
called abandonment of the Republic by the pro-treatyite elite. The real tragedy for Deasy was 
that this armed protest did not end on 30 June 1922 with the fall of the Four Courts building in 
Dublin. His pessimistic beliefs were reinforced following a disheartening tour of the Third 
Southern Divisional area in early January 1923.
6
 He finally concluded that peace negotiations 
were the only viable option.
7
 However, he was captured on 18 January as he lay asleep in 
O‘Brien‘s safe-house at Ballincurry, Cahir, County Tipperary on the Galtee Mountains.8 The 
prominent anti-treatyite awoke to find the house in which he was staying surrounded by National 
troops. Before he could attempt an escape he discovered:  
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an officer standing at the foot of the bed with a revolver. I was trapped, well and 
truly, with no option but to accept the position as it was. The officer was joined by 
others and they waited while I dressed. Then they searched the room and found a 
loaded revolver under the pillow and some extra rounds of .45 ammunition in my 
trousers pocket [...] The loaded revolver was sufficient evidence for a charge.
9
 
 
At Deasy‘s trial he was charged with having in his possession, without proper authority, a 
long parabellum revolver and twenty-one rounds of ammunition.
10
 Deasy remained silent when 
the prosecuting officer asked for the maximum penalty. He was found guilty and sentenced to 
death.
11
 The findings were transferred immediately for confirmation by the special wireless 
telephone system which was used by military units to maintain communication with G.H.Q. in 
Dublin. Following a brief delay the sentence was confirmed and relayed to the G.O.C. Waterford 
Command Major General T. Prout.
12
 The order stated that ‗I enclose you [the] certificate of 
confirmation in the case of William Deasy. You will have sentence executed tomorrow Saturday 
morning 27
th. January, at 8 [o‘clock].‘13 However, Mulcahy received a message from Prout at 10 
p.m. on 26 January. It stated that Deasy requested a stay in execution in order to aid an ending of 
the present hostilities. He was then removed from Clonmel to Dublin, on 29 January, where he 
signed a statement declaring that he would help persuade other Irregulars to surrender. The 
declaration was published in the press the following morning. It stated ‗I accept and will aid in 
[the] immediate surrender of all arms and men as required by General Mulcahy.‘14 Furthermore, 
he was instructed to forward a copy to several members of the anti-treatyite hierarchy such as 
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Lynch, de Valera, Aiken and Frank Barrett in an attempt to persuade them to cease their 
participation in the armed rebellion.
15
 In one such letter to de Valera he stated that: 
  
Previous to my arrest, I had decided to advocate a termination of the present 
hostilities. My principal reason was based on the grounds that the National 
position was decreasing in strength, rather than increasing; as a result, not so 
much as the actual fighting, but primarily because of the particular side phases 
that had arisen, and were being concentrated on, vis., the executions and what has 
followed as a result. That the latter phase would develop and become more 
intense, I had not the slightest doubt, and to avoid our country and people being 
reduced to such a state, I am prepared to advocate a cessation on lines that would 
mean a temporary setting aside of the attainment of our ideals.
16
 
 
In the circular appeal, Deasy indicated to the remaining prominent anti-treatyites that he had 
already intended to propose peace, however, his capture prevented him from carrying out his 
intentions. He then put forward several reasons why the continuance of the Civil War was 
irresponsible and futile. Deasy declared that:  
In considering the whole position, there are a few matters I will put before you all, 
and asked that they be carefully weighed before making your decision:-  
(a) The increasing strength of the F.S. Army as evidenced by the present 
response to the recruiting appeal. 
(b) The decrease in strength [...] of the I.R.A. consequent on the recent 
numerous arrests. 
(c) The entirely defensive position of our units in many areas, and the general 
decreasing in fighting. 
(d) The ―War Weariness‖ so apparent in many areas. 
(e) The increasing support of the F.S. Government, consequent on our failure 
to combat the false propaganda. 
(f) The serious situation which the Executions have created; Reprisals, 
Counter-reprisals etc.
17
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It was the final part of this appeal which caused the Irregulars, according to Deasy, the 
most concern. He believed that the country was being ruined by the official executions as he 
stated ‗This calls for more serious consideration than the others.‘18 He knew that if the Irregulars 
continued their armed resistance then the Government would increase their implementation of 
their executions policy even further. This would antagonise the Irregulars and result in more 
reprisals. The resultant vicious cycle would engulf the entire country where families fought 
families until the losses on both sides were so great that British soldiers would intervene and be 
welcomed with more enthusiasm than was displayed at their departure. He finally pleaded that 
‗whatever the sacrifice, we must prevent such happenings, if the position of Ireland supreme is 
maintained.‘19 
The declaration of peace made by Deasy impacted differently on both sides of the Treaty 
divide. In the Dáil Mr. D. J. Gorey, a member of the Farmers party, commended Deasy when he 
stated that the announcement in that morning‘s papers was the most important that had been 
made since the Dáil assembled. He claimed that it was very important to see a man of such 
considerable standing in the Irregular ranks as Liam Deasy realising facts and coming to the 
conclusion that no greater disservice could be done to anti-treatyite aspirations than a 
continuance of the Civil War.
20
 Mulcahy had a somewhat more pragmatic view of this event. He 
argued that: 
He [Deasy] was satisfied, temporarily, at any rate, to live the lie that you could rid 
the country of what he calls the common foe, or any outside person interfering 
with the affairs of this country, and that you could build up this country by the use 
of the bomb and the torch and the petrol can. He was prepared to live that lie in 
the hope that in the turn of events they would be able to get away from the 
situation which they got themselves into, but like the responsible man that he is, 
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he was not prepared to endorse that lie with his death, and to die leaving on the 
people who had been led by him into the actions that they were led the impression 
that he believed so much in the fact that you could do these things, that he was 
satisfied to lay down his life for them.
21
 
 
Deasy‘s appeal, however, did not have an immediate effect on the Irregulars‘ hierarchy. It 
did weaken the morale of the ordinary Irregular militants but it did little to alter the opinions, in 
the short-term, of the majority of the leadership as they categorically rejected his proposals.
22
 
According to Costello ‗while Deasy‘s statement no doubt served to weaken the Republican 
effort, the statement had little impact on the IRA‘s leadership, in or out of prison.‘23 Some like 
Lynch and O‘Malley, who consistently refused to acknowledge the Irregulars‘ diminished 
military position, believed that Deasy‘s petition was a scornful insult to the Republic. Others, 
although aware of the Irregulars‘ crumbling military stance, believed that it was not their duty to 
decide whether the conflict continued or not. Upon receipt of Deasy‘s petition Lynch stated that 
the ‗war will go on until the independence of our country is recognised by our enemies, foreign 
and domestic. There can be no compromise on this fundamental condition. Victory is within our 
grasp if we stand unitedly and firmly.‘24  
O‘Malley was appalled at Deasy‘s plea for peace. According to O‘Malley, it represented 
‗rank indiscipline‘ which he loathed.25 Upon receipt of a daily newspaper in his prison sick bed, 
O‘Malley asked the prison chaplain to take a statement from him and have it published in the 
press. He stated that: 
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I would like to point out to our men how gallantly boys of eighteen have walked 
out to their firing squads. Life was precious to them, but they did not falter. I wish 
that their example might again be brought to the memory of all our officers. The 
men without rank have shown the way to die; it is our duty to follow their good 
lead.
26
 
 
According to O‘Malley, this caused the chaplain to take two nervous steps backwards from his 
bed as he advocated that Irregulars, who had been sentenced to death, should take their fate 
proudly for the Republic. He condemned Deasy‘s so-called cowardice. He believed that Deasy 
should have led by example instead of seeking to avoid execution. O‘Malley had been arrested in 
a spectacular scene following a daring raid on his elegant retreat on Ailesbury Road, Dublin by 
National troops. In the early hours of 4 November 1922 National soldiers surrounded Mrs 
Humphreys‘ house in the prosperous Herbert Park area. He was concealed in a secret room, 
however, the troops knew exactly where to locate him. O‘Malley, determined to evade the pro-
treatyites, decided to shoot his way out. During the fierce engagement which ensued one pro-
treatyite troop was killed and Mrs O‘Rahilly was accidently wounded by O‘Malley. He was 
badly wounded himself and spent the next few months in a prison hospital battling for his life.
27
 
The Government were anxious to execute O‘Malley. Ironically, he proved to be too ill for 
execution. In this instance a sense of caution, due to O‘Malley‘s condition, may have entered the 
mindsets of the pro-treatyites. They were, perhaps, unwilling to execute a severely injured man 
given the possible comparisons with James Connolly. Badly wounded, he was executed in a 
chair by the British after the 1916 Rising. 
Robert Barton agreed with O‘Malley‘s sentiment. He wrote to de Valera stating that 
while an honourable surrender would be more acceptable than a dishonourable compromise, 
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prisoner's lives should not even enter the minds of the Irregular leaders when deciding policy. He 
argued: 
Better an honourable surrender unconditionally than a dishonourable compromise. 
The fate of prisoners should never be considered, whether many or few, leaders or 
rank & file. If we can win today tomorrow or two years hence, carry on and let 
them execute every prisoner they hold. Each volley hammers home another nail in 
their coffin.
28
 
 
Barton assumed that the Government‘s executions policy would lead to its downfall. He hoped 
that the putting to death of Irishmen would result in mass public demonstrations and an upsurge 
in nationalist sentiment, in similar fashion to the aftermath of the Rising; however, this did not 
happen. Nonetheless, Frank Barrett, the O.C. First Western Division, gave a somewhat 
alternative response to Deasy‘s petition. While he concurred with Deasy‘s argument he stated 
that he would continue his defence of the Republic if that was the wish of the Irregulars‘ H.Q. 
According to Barrett: 
The six headings which the D.C.S. [Deputy Chief of Staff] submits for our 
consideration are unfortunately too truly representative of the real position [...] 
We are prepared to carry on to the end if it is the decision of G.H.Q. and our 
Government. I know I am viewing the situation from its worst aspect but it is 
always well that we know our weak points especially when playing the game of 
war.
29
 
 
Lynch‘s Adjutant, Todd Andrews, acknowledged that the morale of the ordinary rank and file 
militants had received a ‗bad blow‘ due to Deasy‘s appeal.30 Andrews admitted that his ‗own 
morale was in neutral gear but even so I had no intention of opting out or of advocating such a 
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course of action to others. While I believed the war was irrevocably lost, I felt the decision to call 
it off was no responsibility of mine.‘31 
Even though Deasy‘s appeal received a mixed reception it was not the only one of its 
kind. Following his petition other Irregular leaders petitioned for their freedom in an attempt to 
obtain a peaceful settlement to the Civil War. To the displeasure of the Irregular hierarchy 
Maurice Sweeney was paroled in order to conduct peace negotiations with several Irregular 
officers in the West of Ireland. According to a captured Irregular document:   
Maurice Sweeny has been out on parole for a week conducting ―peace 
negotiations‖ and meeting our Officers and men for this purpose. Also he got 
further extension of parole yesterday (17
th
) for this purpose and proceeded to 
Connemara today. You are to inform him that his actions in this direction are 
absolutely contrary to G.H.Q. Orders and that he must desist from conducting his 
business any further. Also, if he persists, that, much as we regard him personally, 
we cannot tolerate it and we will have to take whatever action we find 
necessary.
32
 
 
Additionally Tom Barry, who initially denounced Deasy‘s appeal, became increasingly 
disillusioned with the Civil War and eventually signed his name to peace moves published in the 
Cork Examiner on 8 March 1923. Significant numbers of Irregulars incarcerated in prisons, such 
as Limerick and Waterford, also agreed with Deasy. For example, 600 men in Limerick prison, 
through eleven nominated representatives, made an appeal to the G.O.C. Limerick Command to 
contact the National Army‘s headquarters and request that four prisoners be paroled in order to 
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appeal for peace to prominent Limerick Irregulars.
33
 Another plea was made to General Prout, on 
10 February 1923, on behalf of ninety-eight detainees in Clonmel, County Tipperary.
34
 
Deasy‘s appeal is significant as it is essentially an acknowledgement, by a senior anti-
treatyite, of the impact that the executions policy had on the Irregulars‘ prosecution of the Civil 
War. Until now they portrayed a resolute attitude in the face of the executions. Now, Deasy 
openly admitted that the executions carried out by the National Army had a significant effect on 
the anti-treatyite militants and that they seriously hampered the Irregulars‘ prosecution of the 
conflict. It caused other prominent anti-treatyites to divulge their own opinions, negative or 
positive, regarding the Government‘s executions policy. It can be argued that when faced with 
execution Deasy would have signed anything placed in front of him to avoid execution. This 
argument contains further substance given that Deasy had been quite defiant in the past when he 
denounced the executions policy. Following the first set of executions Deasy ordered the O.C.s 
of all Irregular battalions that all ‗ranks will be notified immediately to stand firm and resolute 
against the latest and last device of the enemy to crush the Republic – The murder campaign by 
execution.‘35 Ryan suggests that Deasy was forced to sign his appeal due to pressure from 
Mulcahy and his impending execution.
36
 This was not the case, according to Deasy. He stated 
that he was not coerced into appealing for peace. He agreed to the deal because the calamity that 
was the Irish Civil War had continued for long enough and that it was futile to continue against 
an ever-improving opponent. Deasy was not going to admit cowardice in any case yet as 
assistant Chief of Staff he was all too aware of the increasing Free State military strength, the 
increasing rate of captures, arrests and executions and the denigration of popular support for the 
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Irregulars. He stated that ‗I can honestly say that I have never regretted the decision. I made it 
without fear or favour and in the best interests of the country as I saw it.‘37 But the question 
needs to be asked, why did the pro-treatyites not just execute this prominent anti-treatyite as they 
did so many others and in doing so issue another stern message to the Irregulars?  
According to Garvin, there was a simple explanation as to why the Government did not 
execute Deasy. Garvin argues that Denis (Dinny) Lacey, of the South Tipperary Irregulars, had 
arrested five farmers who were brothers of the National Army‘s commanders in the area. Garvin 
suggests that if Deasy was put to death then these five men would be executed as a reprisal for 
the killing of the assistant Chief of Staff.
38
 Whether Mulcahy and the Free State Government 
would have acquiesced to Irregular threats, such as this, in the midst of the busiest month of 
executions during the Civil War is questionable. Evidence suggests that they were willing to 
execute Deasy as they captured, tried and sentenced him. Moreover, an execution date was set. It 
must be emphasised that Deasy approached the pro-treatyite authorities for a reprieve. Thus, they 
decided to use him in the most opportune way. Like the Government‘s hostage scheme before, it 
was a win-win situation for the Free State Government and National Army. If Deasy achieved a 
termination in hostilities then this would suit the Government. Alternatively, if Deasy failed to 
agree to a deal he would be executed as he was already convicted and his death sentence was 
confirmed. Even though his petition for peace failed to bring about an immediate cessation of 
hostilities it did damage the morale of the rank and file Irregulars. Hence, it did contribute to the 
Government‘s victory in May 1923. 
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In an attempt to facilitate Deasy‘s proposal the Government decided to incorporate 
another offer of amnesty to assist those who wished to adhere to his appeal. According to 
Mulcahy: 
the Government decided to make the matter public for the benefit of all 
concerned, and to issue the offer of Amnesty which has this morning been issued, 
so that no excuse should be left to anybody for the continuation of the present 
destruction, and so that no leader or group of leaders could act as a kink in the 
hose that would prevent the rank and file getting the benefit of knowing what the 
position was, from the point of view of men like Deasy and others, and getting a 
chance of accepting the conditions which the Government have put upon their 
being allowed to return to their homes.
39
 
 
It is difficult to say if many Irregulars accepted the amnesty offered by the Government. 
However, as the Civil War continued it can be assumed that the numbers that accepted the offer 
were not sufficient enough to warrant a cessation to hostilities in January 1923. 
Deasy‘s appeal and the Government‘s amnesty offer ensured that there was a lull in 
executions during the month of February. However, they were not stopped completely. Despite 
the appeal one execution occurred as the pro-treatyite leadership did not intend to halt the 
executions indefinitely. Mulcahy decided, on 12 February, that ‗bad cases‘ should be prepared 
for execution.
40
 Moreover, the Army Council had decided on 18 February that ‗it must be 
anticipated that no clemency will be shown in any case.‘41 Thomas Gibson, a former National 
soldier, was executed in Portlaoise, County Laois on 26 February having already been court-
martialled in Roscrea, County Tipperary on 18 January 1923. He was charged with:  
treacherously assisting the enemy, in as much as on 19
th
. November, 1922, being 
then on active service, he left PORT LAOIGHSE BARRACKS, and took with 
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him five rifles, and one grenade cup. He was absent until 10
th
 January, 1923, 
when he was arrested with two prominent Irregulars, all three being at the time in 
possession of arms. VOLUNTEER GIBSON was found guilty of the charge and 
was sentenced by the Court to suffer death by being shot. The sentence was duly 
confirmed and was carried out at Portlasighise on 26
th
 February, 1923.
42
 
 
Gibson had deserted from Portlaoise barracks the National Army, on 19 November 1922, and 
had taken with him five rifles and a grenade. He was captured, on 10 January 1923, while asleep 
in a safe house.
43
 According to Father Thomas Barbage, the local chaplain, this execution should 
not have occurred as Gibson was ‗unbalanced in mind, and that his mother had been a patient in 
Maryboro [Portlaoise] Lunatic Asylum.‘44 Whether this assertion is true or not, Gibson had 
committed treachery and, as a result, was shown no mercy. 
Following this, members of the neutral I.R.A., formed by Florence O‘Donoghue in 
December 1922, requested a meeting with Cosgrave. They hoped that they could bring about a 
truce and, in doing so, end the Government‘s executions policy. In this meeting, on 27 February, 
members of the neutral I.R.A.‘s Executive, Donal Hannigan and M. J. Burke, attempted to 
ascertain Cosgrave‘s attitude towards the possibility of a ceasefire.45 It proved a futile effort as 
Cosgrave had already refuted the possibility of a truce or negotiations whilst the Irregulars 
continued with their guerrilla activities. He stated, on 16 February, that the Government would 
not compromise with the Irregulars: 
The Government is determined to put down this revolt against democracy 
regardless of the cost. Let no man be deceived. If anyone continue[s] in this 
unnatural war upon his own people after the expiration of the stated period of 
Amnesty [offered after Deasy‘s appeal], he must be prepared to pay the price in 
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full, for there will be no going back on this. Further. Let it be clearly understood 
that there will be no meetings for negotiations on the part of the Government with 
De Valera, Liam Lynch, or any of their collaborators in destruction, male or 
female.
46
 
 
Hannigan argued that unless the Civil War was concluded promptly then it would become 
increasingly embittered and the Government and National forces would ultimately lose public 
support.
47
 Cosgrave, aware of Gibson‘s execution, countered that argument and stated that the 
‗executions have had a remarkable effect. It is a sad thing to say, but it is nevertheless the case. 
The unfortunate thing about them is you have to execute the unfortunate dupes, and the 
responsible people were not got.‘48 Cosgrave further stated that if the anti-treatyites did not cease 
their armed rebellion then:  
we must exterminate them. If they [the Irregulars] have any idea of a modification 
of our terms [an unconditional surrender] they are sadly mistaken. They cannot 
burn the whole country and we will get them eventually. I am not going to 
hesitate if the country is to live and if we have to exterminate ten thousand 
Republicans, the three millions of our people is bigger than this ten thousand.
49
  
 
Cosgrave‘s assertion was certainly an exaggeration; however, his sentiment cannot be ignored. 
According to Hopkinson, the Government would not compromise on constitutional and political 
issues whilst they were in a far superior military position than the Irregulars Thus, for Cosgrave 
and the Government, compromise was not an option. Therefore, due to the Irregulars‘ inability to 
accept the prevailing military position in the country, the Civil War continued. He states that the 
‗war continued because there appeared no means of bringing it to an end, either by negotiations 
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or by complete military victory.‘50 O‘Donoghue subsequently wound up the neutral I.R.A. in 
March 1923 stating that its purpose was incapable of fulfilment.
51
 March 1923, like December 
1922, became one of the most notorious months during the Irish Civil War. Not only did eleven 
official executions take place in the space of four weeks but a number of unofficial incidents 
occurred resulting in the death of several Irregular prisoners. In terms of controversy these events 
rivalled the Mountjoy executions. 
Kerry became the thorn in the side of the National Army and Government as the military 
stalemate in this county persisted into March 1923. The comments which General Murphy made 
in December 1922 regarding his success in Kerry proved to be highly inaccurate. Even though 
anything which resembled a large-scale Irregular engagement did not occur ambushes, raids and 
the destruction of communications remained a frequent occurrence. The large sweeps which had 
been devised by the Army to catch the remaining elusive Irregular columns proved unsuccessful. 
The unpopularity of the National troops in Kerry did little to dampen Irregular resistance in the 
county. These troops who were non-natives of Kerry were primarily composed of members of 
the Dublin Guard and were frequently implicated in allegations of violence against prisoners and 
the local community. According to Hopkinson, complaints and rumours about violence on 
Irregular prisoners and general troop indiscipline were commonplace.
52
 Inspection reports 
highlighted that the command area, now under the control of Paddy O‘Daly, left a lot to be 
desired. This in itself was not a major problem, as a certain amount of indiscipline is to be 
expected from an army that was promptly put together during a time of civil war. However, 
when troop indiscipline is antagonised by the enemy‘s use of guerrilla tactics it can lead to 
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further unpleasant episodes. One such incident occurred at Knocknagoshel, on 6 March 1923, 
when an Irregular mine killed five National troops, including three officers, and seriously 
wounded another. The mine was placed at the scene in an attempt to kill Lieutenant O‘Connor. It 
was claimed that he was responsible for the torture of Irregular prisoners.
53
 According to a 
captured Irregular document:  
A trigger mine was laid in Knocknagoshel for a member of the F.S. Army Lt. 
O‘Connor who had made a hobby out of torturing Republican prisoners in 
Castleisland. On Tuesday a party of F.S. troops including Lt. O‘Connor 
proceeded to the place and two Copls. Lt. O‘Connor and the two privates were 
killed.
54
 
 
In response to this guerrilla attack on National forces O‘Daly issued a proclamation on 
the 6 March which stated that any obstacles such as stone barricades, dug-outs or dumps 
discovered by officers in Kerry were not to be interfered with by National troops. O‘Daly stated 
that the officer in charge should immediately proceed to the nearest detention barracks and bring 
with him a sufficient number of Irregular prisoners to remove the barricades.
55
 He was so 
infuriated at the attack which occurred at Knocknagoshel that he threatened serious disciplinary 
action against any officers that attempted to remove any Irregular barricade themselves. O‘Daly 
claimed that since ‗the Four Courts fight, mines have been used indiscriminately by the 
Irregulars. The taking out of prisoners is not to be regarded as a reprisal but as the only 
alternative left [to] us to prevent the wholesale slaughter of our men.‘56 This order ensured, 
however, that the incident which occurred on 6 March at Knocknagoshel would be a mere 
prequel to an even more controversial event. On 7 March at 3 a.m. nine Irregular prisoners, 
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chosen by Colonel David Neligan, were taken from Ballymullen barracks in Tralee and ordered 
to clear a mine at Ballyseedy Cross about three miles from the aforementioned garrison. These 
particular men were chosen as none of them were closely related to any members of the clergy. 
The reason being was that the clergy, who publically supported the Free State, would not be 
unduly antagonised. These selection criteria raise an interesting point. Did they also help 
determine who was to be officially executed? All of the official executions during the Civil War 
were carried out for reasons specific to the individual cases. These reasons ranged from the 
unlawful possession of weaponry and attacks on National troops to reprisals and from treachery 
to armed robbery. Furthermore, it is probable that, of the eighty-one men put to death during the 
conflict, some were related to members of the clergy. Thus, it is unlikely that these criteria 
formed part of the wider process of selection for official executions. Nevertheless, Neligan chose 
John Daly, Michael O‘Connell and Patrick Buckley from Castleisland; Stephen Fuller, George 
O‘Shea and Tim Twomey from Kilflynn; Patrick Harnett from Finuge; James Walsh from 
Churchill; and John O‘Connor from Waterford.57 According to the official report made by the 
court of enquiry, held on 7 April 1923, the men in question lost their lives in an explosion, 
caused by a landmine, while they removed obstructions from the road which were placed there 
by the Irregulars. The report further stated that the Irregulars placed the mine there with the 
object of causing loss of life amongst members of the National Army. The court of which 
O‘Daly was the President, an issue which caused some controversy, validated the actions of the 
National soldiers and also supported his order to use prisoners to remove barricades by stating 
that:  
it has been found necessary to employ civilian prisoners for the purpose of 
removing obstructions since September last in this particular command, owing to 
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the high percentage of casualties suffered by members of the army, having 
themselves been obliged to remove trap mines, which had become the principal 
weapon of the Irregulars [...] The Court further find[s] that the allegations 
contained in the Irregular propaganda submitted to the Court, particularly with 
reference to the maltreatment of prisoners are untrue and without foundation, and 
that no blame is attached to any officer or soldier engaged in the operations in 
which these prisoners lost their lives.
58
 
 
Lieutenant Harrington became increasingly suspicious of these findings. He began to 
investigate the matter further in an attempt to ascertain and divulge an honest account of these 
events. Harrington planned to gather as much information as possible with the intention of 
forwarding it to O‘Higgins whom he knew would be extremely concerned at the indiscipline of 
the Army and the possible cover-up by O‘Daly and Mulcahy. He discovered that the findings of 
the court of enquiry were ‗totally untrue‘: 
The mine was constructed in Tralee under the supervision of two [...] officers [...] 
Ed Flood and Jim Clarke, and with the complete knowledge and encouragement 
of Major Gen. Paddy Daly [...] Ballyseedy was a reprisal for Knocknagoshel. It 
was planned and carried out by a group of ―Dublin Guard‖ Officers. The prisoners 
were tied together and blown to pieces. Those not immediately killed were 
bombed, shot to death. One (Stephen Fuller) escaped.
59
 
 
Harrington suggested that the National troops in Kerry, with the full knowledge and consent of 
O‘Daly, had taken nine Irregular prisoners from their cells in Ballymullen, Co. Kerry and tied 
them to a landmine which they then exploded killing these men as a reprisal for Knocknagoshel. 
An Irregular report verifies this account. It stated that three prisoners named O‘Shea, Fuller and 
Twomey, who were in Free State custody with about five other prisoners in the Tralee 
workhouse, were taken from their fellow prisoners and marched to the guard room between 1 
a.m. and 2 a.m. on Wednesday, 7
 
March 1923. The nine prisoners, who were arrested two weeks 
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previously and who were unarmed when arrested, were then transported to Ballyseedy Cross 
with a guard of about twenty members of the National forces. According to the report, once the 
transport arrived at Ballyseedy Cross each prisoner‘s hands were tied behind their backs with a 
strong cord roughly a foot long. Then their feet were bound together, above the ankles, with a 
strong rope. Finally, the prisoners‘ legs were bound together above the knees and they were tied 
together with a strong rope around a mine that had been placed there previously by the National 
troops.
60
 Following this preparation: 
The prisoners backs were to the mine and the majority of the Guard moved away 
leaving 2 of their number covering the Prisoners with rifles. At a given signal the 
remainder of the Guard ran and the mine was exploded electrically as no fuse had 
been seen lighted by the prisoner who escaped. The explosion was a deafening 
one and when the survivor [Stephen Fuller] came to his senses he crawled away 
as far as he could [...] While crawling away he heard rending cries [...] all the 
remaining 8 were not dead, but then the sound of rifle fire and exploding grenades 
was heard and those who were [alive] were finished with the rifle and bomb.
61
 
 
According to Harrington, the above report was received from an officer who interviewed 
the escaped prisoner, Stephen Fuller. Years later Fuller gave his own account of the events which 
occurred at Ballyseedy Cross on 7 March 1923. In an interview, which was aired as part of an 
RTÉ documentary in November 1997 entitled „Ballyseedy‟, Fuller verified the aforementioned 
account in the Irregular report. Firstly, he described how he was brought into a room in 
Ballymullen barracks and shown nine coffins. He was then informed that the remains of his 
comrades were in the coffins. Following this, he stated that the National troops fired revolver 
shots at him which ricocheted all over the room. Fuller and eight of his comrades were 
subsequently escorted to Ballyseedy Cross where they were bound in a circle around a make-
shift mound in which the National soldiers had placed a landmine. The bomb was then detonated 
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and Fuller was blown free and landed a short distance away on the bank of a river, which he then 
entered to escape. According to Fuller, ‗I got into the river anyway, it was very deep and I was 
deciding myself whether I‘d stay in the river [...] I could keep down my head over the water 
under the bank and they wouldn‘t see me if they were looking for me.‘62 Following this, he heard 
several smaller explosions and rifle fire which were used to ensure that the remaining prisoners 
were dead. He eventually made it to a house where he was taken in and cared for until the 
following morning when he was taken away by local Irregulars and hidden.
63
 The Irregular 
report stated that the scene of the ‗massacre‘ presented a shocking sight the following morning. 
‗The road was covered with blood, pieces of flesh, bones, boots, and clothing were scattered 
about.‘64 When the remains were handed over to relatives they ‗stoned every member of the Free 
State Army they saw [...] [the remains] were removed to other coffins and those provided by the 
Free State Army were kicked through the Barrack gate.‘65 This was not to be the last of these 
controversial events.  
The following day another attempt to force prisoners to clear mines was foiled when 
some of the prisoners escaped. However, on the same day another mine exploded killing four 
more prisoners at Countess-Bridge near Killarney with another, Tadhg Coffey, escaping. 
According to Mulcahy, upon reaching Countess-Bridge the National troops found a barricade of 
stones on the road near the bridge. The officer in charge sent for prisoners to remove it. He 
further stated that five prisoners returned and were ordered to remove the obstruction. Mulcahy 
claimed that prisoners: 
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had been working for a few minutes there was a loud explosion, followed by 
several small ones. The military party had, meantime, been ordered to stand clear 
while the work of removing the barricade was going on. On approaching the 
barricade after the explosion they found four of the prisoners dead. The fifth 
prisoner was missing, and a search of the locality failed to find him. The barricade 
contained a mine and several hand grenades.
66
 
 
Finally, five more Irregular prisoners were killed by a mine at Cahirciveen, County Kerry on 12 
March 1923. However, each of these five prisoners was, according to Lieutenant McCarthy, shot 
in the legs prior to the explosion in order to ensure that none of the men would escape. Following 
this incident he resigned his commission from the Army in protest.
67
 
These particular events are very important when analysing the Irish Civil War as they 
represent the extremities of the unofficial actions during the conflict. As has been the case with 
the official executions that occurred the reasoning behind these particular events also needs to be 
examined. As stated previously, Kerry became increasingly difficult to control and the National 
Army‘s attempts to decisively defeat the Irregulars in this county foundered. Kerry‘s 
mountainous terrain facilitated the Irregulars‘ guerrilla methods, particularly the laying of mines. 
This was a constant problem for the Army and its personnel. As Kerry proved to be an Irregular 
stronghold the National Army operated there under extreme pressure and adverse conditions. 
The guerrilla methods employed by the Irregulars on the National soldiers would have tested the 
resolve of any army. Furthermore, they could not regard the majority of the population as 
friendly partly because of their own actions and partly through fear or loyalty to the Irregulars. 
Even though Irregular resistance had been broken throughout the country Kerry remained a 
problem-spot, one which needed to be cleared if the National Army were to be victorious. 
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However, as Valiulis states, ‗it was not surprising that the areas which witnessed the worst lack 
of discipline were those in which the war dragged on the longest.‘68 The Irregulars were not 
innocent in this matter. Knocknagoshel was a perfect example of this. Mulcahy alluded to this 
issue when he was questioned about the events in Kerry. He stated that: 
The troops in Kerry have had to fight against every ugly form of warfare which 
the Irregulars could think of. They have lost 69 killed and 157 wounded, and their 
record there is such that it is inconceivable that they would be guilty of anything 
like the charges that are made against them in the Irregular statements which are 
at the present moment being circulated in profusion in connection with those 
occurrences. On the other hand, the Irregulars in Kerry have stooped to outrage of 
every kind. Of the 69 of our men killed in that area, 17 lost their lives guarding 
food convoys to feed the people in outlying districts. The Knocknagoshel incident 
is typical of the methods of their warfare, as is the recent urging of the O/C. of 
this particular area that the creation of unemployment would help their 
campaign.
69
 
 
Mulcahy, as always, was concerned about the reputation of the Army. This concern led 
him to make some questionable decisions. Mulcahy supported the Army and O‘Daly 
unconditionally. In the Dáil, Johnson questioned Mulcahy over the questionable make-up of the 
court of enquiry. In response Mulcahy stated ‗They have my fullest confidence from that point of 
view. I have the fullest confidence that the honour of the Army is as deeply rooted in them as it 
is in any of us here at Headquarters or in any member of the Government.‘70 Conditions in Kerry 
aside, Mulcahy played an important part in these particular set of events as he refused to 
acknowledge or question the conduct of O‘Daly and his troops in Kerry. There is no evidence 
which suggests that Mulcahy had prior knowledge of these particular events but by refusing to 
recognise any irregularities in the discipline of his troops in Kerry he essentially aided its cover 
up. He provided a thin facade of legitimacy over these events in an attempt to maintain the 
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Army‘s reputation. This conspiracy did little to heal the ever-present division and tension 
between the civilian and military aspects of the Free State Government. This strain culminated at 
the end of March when the Military Council, Mulcahy included, tendered their resignations to 
the Government, for the first time, on 27 March 1923. The Cabinet refused to accept their 
resignations, at this juncture.
71
 The Government were well aware of the necessity of having 
strong and unified military leadership during a time of civil war. Despite the fact that early 
March 1923 witnessed some of the most contentious events during the Irish Civil War the 
conflict and the executions policy continued. 
Seven executions occurred on 13 March 1923, one week after the atrocities in Kerry. 
Firstly, three executions took place in Wexford. Volunteers James Parle, John Crane and Patrick 
Hogan were members of the Fourth Battalion South Wexford Brigade and were arrested, on 14 
February 1923, in possession of arms and executed in the County Hall.
72
 Secondly, the last 
centralised execution occurred on 13 March when James O‘Rourke was put to death in 
Kilmainham Jail, Dublin. Thirdly, the only execution to occur in Cork during the Civil War took 
place the same day when William Healy of 52 Dublin Street, Blackpool, Cork was executed at 8 
a.m. This is a further indication of the level of resistance that occurred in this county due 
primarily to the lack of enthusiasm for a civil war by leaders like Deasy. Healy was arrested with 
arms following an attack on a house in Blarney Street.
73
 As stated previously, reprisals for local 
executions, particularly the burning of country homes, were common during the Civil War. This 
case was no exception. Several attempts to burn property were made by the Irregulars in 
response to Healy‘s execution. The report stated that: 
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8 attempts to burn property made, two were unsuccessful. In most cases the 
reason given was the ―Executions‖. All attacks were made on people friendly with 
or having connections with the Army. Two murders took place. One in Cork, an 
old man unidentified with any movement. The reason given was Healy‘s 
Execution. One in Bantry, a boy of sixteen years. The reason given was 
[a]―reprisal for [the] execution of our comrades.74 
 
Furthermore, several additional residences of people identified, by the Irregulars, as being 
connected to or having pro-treatyite sympathies were also attacked. The private dwellings of 
Sealy King of Richmond and Harding of Kilbrittain were burned to the ground on 16 March 
1923.
75
 Finally, the Irregulars attempted to burn the house of Jerome Kingston, of Kilgariffe, 
Clonakilty on the same night, however, National troops succeeded in putting the fire out before 
much damage was done.
76
 
 Of the seven executions, on 13 March 1923, two are particularly noteworthy. According 
to an official statement in the Westmeath Examiner two executions occurred in Mullingar, Co. 
Westmeath. It stated: 
Henry Keenan, Newcastle, County Down and Michael Greery, Athenry, Co. 
Galway [were charged with] Taking part in an armed raid on the Hibernian and 
Northern Banks, Oldcastle, Co. Meath, on February 27
th
, and with being in 
possession of £385 19s 11d, stolen money. The accused were tried by military 
courts, found guilty and sentenced to death. The sentence was duly carried out on 
Tuesday morning at 8 a.m.
77
 
 
This statement had to be rectified shortly after the executions had taken place as it had been 
discovered that one of the men, Keenan, had used an alias, the correct name and address being 
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Luke Burke, from Keady, County Armagh.
78
 The Government had finally extended application 
of the emergency resolution to the civilian population. Even though these men were civilians 
they were armed and apprehended after committing armed robbery. The execution of civilians 
was abnormal for the Civil War, however, it should not be wondered at. The September 
resolution, in addition to other decrees, stipulated that civilians would face the death penalty if 
they possessed without proper authority any weapons. Under the ‗Stand-Clear‘ order in January 
1923 for example anyone who ‗attempt[ed] in any way to murder any person‘ would face the 
death penalty. What is surprising is that the Government only executed four civilians given that 
they executed seventy-seven Irregulars. This can be explained as the public, generally speaking, 
assented to the execution of Irregulars. It is doubtful, however, that public support would 
continue if the Government undertook extensive civilian executions regardless of the crimes 
committed. They had always stated that they were fighting for democracy, for the Irish people. If 
they executed civilians on a large scale their credibility would disappear and support for the 
Irregulars and perhaps British reintervention would increase. As nothing appears in the Dáil 
Debates referring to this event it appears that the Government received little political criticism 
over these executions. It was just another indication of the Government‘s resolute determination 
to restore order to the country by any means necessary. It was not the only occasion, however, 
where civilians fell afoul of the executions policy.  
Following the executions which occurred on 13 March Donegal witnessed its only set of 
executions during the Civil War. Irregular prisoners John Larkin, Timothy O‘Sullivan, Daniel 
Enright and Charles Daly were executed in Drumboe Castle, County Donegal on 14 March 1923. 
According to the Executive Council minutes there were several attempts by concerned parties to 
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halt these particular executions. However, the Government and Army did not consider these 
appeals practical. Mulcahy had stated that he: 
received a number of letters from Tirconnell with reference to certain impending 
Executions, asking that these be not carried out [...] It was decided that he should 
reply to the effect that the decision already made in connection with these matters 
could not be altered.
79
  
 
Whereas the majority of those executed during the conflict were regular soldiers Daly, like 
Childers and those executed in Mountjoy Jail, was a high-ranking Irregular. According to 
Seamus McCann, an associate of Daly, he was appointed the O.C. Second Northern Division, 
covering Co. Tyrone and Co. Derry, which primarily operated in the Sperrin Mountains in April 
1921. Daly subsequently established his headquarters in Raphoe, Co. Donegal. While there he 
was joined by some of his old comrades from Kerry. These men travelled north to fight the 
British during the War of Independence two of which, Daniel Enright and Thomas O‘Sullivan, 
were executed with Daly. Daly moved his headquarters to Glenveigh Castle when the Civil War 
started. He was accompanied by Seán Lehan and his staff from west Cork. However, as Donegal 
was predominantly pro-treaty it was very hard for the Irregulars to operate. With the National 
Army in constant pursuit they could not spend any more than one night in a particular town. On 
the night they were apprehended, Daly and his comrades had just lay down and even had their 
boots on when the house in which they were staying was surrounded by a large National force. 
Daly reached for his rifle but before he could get it he received a blow from a rifle butt. Several 
men were with Daly when he was arrested, Seán Larkin the O.C. South Derry Brigade, Daniel 
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Enright and Timothy O‘Sullivan from Listowel, Co. Kerry. After their arrest the men were 
lodged in Drumboe Castle.
80
 In his final letter to his father, Daly stated: 
Perhaps I may have been more conscientious in the service of my country than 
God‘s, but the service of both are so closely identified that I trust in his Mercy for 
forgiveness if it has happened that I have been more diligent in the service of 
Ireland than in his [...] Goodbye dear Father, may God and his blessed Mother 
strengthen me and comfort you and all the others.
81
 
 
Three other Irregulars, Daniel Coyle of Falcaragh, Co. Donegal, James Donaghy of 
Dungiven, Co. Derry, and James Lane from Clonakilty, Co. Cork were arrested with Daly. These 
men signed an undertaking in which they agreed not to take up arms against the Government and 
Army again.
82
 Whether or not Daly and his associates were given an opportunity to sign such a 
declaration is unclear. A statement issued by the Government‘s Department of Publicity declared 
that four Irregular prisoners had signed a declaration to avoid execution and to indicate to other 
Irregulars that the continuance of armed resistance was pointless. The fourth prisoner Frank 
Ward was not mentioned in the original information pertaining to Daly‘s arrest. He was, 
however, included in the statement which was signed by the four Irregulars. Whether he was one 
of the party arrested with Daly and was just accidently omitted or whether he was a prisoner in 
Drumboe Castle at the same time and then included it is unclear. It is of little consequence either 
way. What is important are the details of this scheme. The prisoners stated that: 
We believe the cause of our country could be best served by pursuing or opening 
some avenue towards a peace understanding [...] When arrested the late Chas. 
Daly and his comrades were on their way to evacuate the country under official 
orders from H.Q. [...] Therefore we can‘t see what is to be gained by such acts, [as 
they] jeopardise the lives of the men held under sentence of death. As we believe 
those responsible for such acts brought about the execution of Daly and [his] 
                                                          
80
 Information concerning Charles Daly, undated (N.L.I. Archives, O‘Donoghue papers, Ms. 31, 315). 
81
 Ibid. 
82
 Ibid. 
 230 
 
comrades [...] We believe we are held as hostages, for the peace of the county, 
and it is not in a spirit of fear we act, but we think it not fair to us to be held 
responsible for the acts of those, whom we disclaim any knowledge or association 
with [...] We believe we are expressing the wishes of our deceased comrades in 
this appeal.
83
 
 
These men were used, like the hostages in Kerry and Cork before them, by the Government and 
Army to pacify Donegal considering that four executions had just occurred there and in a further 
attempt to undermine the remaining Irregulars which operated there. As the Civil War entered 
April 1923 it also entered its final phase, one which would see the culmination of the conflict, 
however, not before fourteen more Irregulars were executed in several different locations 
throughout the country. Furthermore, Lynch‘s death removed the final barrier that had blocked 
any credible chance of peace and an end to the Irish Civil War. 
 Lynch finally agreed to hold a meeting at the end of March in the area of the Nire Valley, 
County Waterford. Unfortunately for those in attendance details of this meeting were extracted 
from republican prisoners in Dublin and large sweeps were devised under the command of 
General Prout. The meeting began on 24 March and continued for four days but because of the 
threat of capture it was held in several different locations. It was the first opportunity since 
October for the Irregular hierarchy to meet properly. The assembly was called primarily to 
discuss Barry‘s motion to end the conflict as he believed that further armed resistance would not 
further the cause of Irish independence. De Valera was admitted to the meeting, after a long 
debate, and had no voting rights. Following the defeat of Barry‘s proposal and several other 
propositions a resolution was eventually passed which allowed de Valera to conduct peace talks 
which were in line with Irregular demands. The Military Executive had a veto over any 
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conclusions of these negotiations.
84
 Lynch, although not totally adverse to a truce on his terms, 
had been determined not to surrender on the Free State Government‘s conditions. Lynch 
divulged to Florence O‘Donoghue, on 8 March, the Free State would gain too many advantages 
if a truce was called. He argued: 
Before we can agree to a truce we must have some assurance that the 
independence of the country will be recognised or that the present domestic 
enemies are prepared to stand with us in upholding our independence. As the war 
has gone on owing to the differences which existed last June [...] I suggest that 
you forget happenings and position created since start of the war and get down to 
removing difficulties which started it. This is my best suggestion to bring about a 
truce.
85
 
 
Lynch believed that the removal of the Free State and the National Army was the best 
way to bring about a truce, one which would suit the Irregulars. According to Dan Breen, it was 
only Lynch‘s unrealistic assumptions which kept the Civil War going. He stated that: 
By late spring 1923 it was becoming obvious that the Republican army had 
disintegrated to such an extent that a further continuation of the struggle seemed 
useless [...] Most of the leaders realised the hopelessness of the position and urged 
that the war should be ended. The Chief of Staff, General Liam Lynch, 
maintained that the army was sufficiently strong to continue resistance for an 
indefinite period.
86
 
 
This argument is also advanced by Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Måns Söderbom. They argue 
that the larger the degree of over-optimism regarding military prospects in a civil conflict the 
longer the conflict will last. What should naturally occur is that as the conflict continues the 
regular flow of new military information which is inconsistent with these initially overoptimistic 
expectations should ensure a convergence towards reality. It becomes progressively easier to find 
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a settlement recognised as mutually beneficial.
87
 Lynch refused to accept any advice given to 
him mentioning defeat. His over-optimistic beliefs ensured that the Civil War continued far 
longer than it would have otherwise.  
After the inconclusive meeting in late March it was agreed that the Executive Council 
should meet three weeks later in April when they knew the results of de Valera‘s peace moves. 
By then they would have a better understanding of the military position in the West. However, 
Lynch did not survive to chair this meeting. His fears about the risks of the Irregular Executive 
meeting together were confirmed on 10 April 1923. Lynch, accompanied by Aiken, William 
Quirke and Seán Hyde on the slopes of the Knockmealdown Mountains, near Newcastle, County 
Tipperary was surrounded by National troops commanded by Thomas Ryan and Lieutenant 
Clancy. Lynch and his comrades were only carrying revolvers and were ‗exhausted by their 
fugitive existence.‘88 While the Irregular party was fleeing up a hillside Lynch was struck by a 
long-range bullet and died that evening. According to Aiken, who was with Lynch when he died: 
a single shot rang out and Liam fell. We could hardly believe him when he said he 
was hit, we started to carry him off saying the act of contrition and he repeating it. 
He was suffering badly – he was shot through the body – and the carrying hurt 
him. He begged us several times to leave him saying they (the Staters) might 
bandage him when they came up. We left him down, he gave us his pocket book; 
we took his gun and left him [...] To leave him was the hardest thing any of us 
ever had to do [.] I was last leaving, having been [carrying] his feet. I was afraid 
to even say ―Good-bye Liam‖ least it would dishearten him.89  
 
Lynch was a noble leader, according to de Valera, and he died honourably. De Valera 
stated that the Irregulars‘ task was a hard and sad one as they were faced by former comrades in 
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arms who had deserted them in their pursuit of the Republic. Finally, he proclaimed that it was 
better to die honourably, as Lynch did, than to live as a slave.
90
 Other prominent anti-treatyites 
were also captured. Austin Stack was arrested near Ballymacarbry on 14 April. He was a senior 
member of the Republican Government and was captured in possession of peace terms which 
backed the Archbishop of Cashel‘s proposal for a simple dumping of Irregular arms. According 
to these terms: 
Realising the gravity of the situation of the Army and the Republic, owing to the 
great odds now facing them, and the losses lately sustained; and being of opinion 
that further military efforts would be futile [...] the defensive war which has been 
waged by our Army during the past nine or ten months has made it impossible [...] 
We the undersigned members of the Army Council and of the Executive, and 
other officers of the Army, do hereby call upon and authorise the President [de 
Valera] of the Republic to order an immediate cessation of hostilities.
91
 
 
Stack‘s terms were not supported by Seán Gaynor, Frank Barrett and Dan Breen, who were with 
Stack prior to his capture. Shortly afterwards Breen himself was discovered in the Glen of 
Aherlow and many other Irregulars including Barrett, Gaynor and Andrews were captured and 
jailed.
92
 The Irregulars‘ Army Executive met again on 20 April at Poulacapple near Mulinahone, 
County Tipperary. The meeting had to be postponed due to Lynch‘s death and the intensity of 
National Army activity in the area. At this meeting Aiken was elected Chief of Staff following a 
proposition by Barry and seconded by Seán MacSwiney.
93
 Aiken was one of the few remaining 
original members of the Army Executive and whether those who elected him meant it or not his 
appointment vastly improved the prospects of the adoption of a more realistic attitude towards 
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negotiations.
94
 Aiken was much more akin personally and ideologically to de Valera than Lynch 
ever was. He backed a motion that peace should be made with the Free State Government on the 
basis that the sovereignty of Ireland and its territory were inalienable. The proposition passed by 
nine votes to two. A subsequent motion by Barry and Tom Crofts which proposed that a total 
surrender should occur was defeated. Nonetheless, the conflict was still in motion and the pro-
treatyites were determined to finish the Civil War on their terms. 
 Following the death of Lynch, on 10 April, six men were executed in Galway. These men 
Seamus O‘Malley, Frank Cunnane, Michael Monaghan, John Newell, John Maguire and Martin 
Moylan were put to death in Tuam on 11 April 1923. Three men were also executed in Tralee 
barracks in Kerry on 25 April. They were arrested in an extraordinary episode which proved to 
be the last major episode of the Civil War in Kerry. In mid-April Timothy (Aeroplane) Lyons 
and five members of his North Kerry Irregular column, were pursued by National soldiers. They 
subsequently took cover in Dumfort‘s Cave, one of the Clashmealcon caves, on the face of a tall 
cliff facing the Atlantic Ocean off the Kerry Head. This proved a poor choice of refuge as when 
the men entered the cave they were trapped inside by National forces under Michael Hogan‘s 
First Western Division. According to a general weekly report, the cave ‗was a veritable death 
trap and was absolutely inaccessible – as the Cave mouth commanded the one steep path leading 
from Cliff to the beach.‘95 Following the stand-off two National soldiers were shot dead as they 
attempted to enter the cave.
96
 This alone sealed the fate of the Irregulars, if they were captured. 
In addition to this, two of the Irregular column Thomas McGrath and Patrick O‘Shea drowned as 
they tried to escape on the night of 16 April. Lyons himself surrendered on 18 April, however, 
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the rope which the National soldiers used to haul him to the top of the cliff broke and he fell to 
his death on the rocks below. The area where his body lay was then littered with bullets. The 
remaining Irregulars, Hathaway, Greaney and McInerney surrendered and were hoisted to safety 
and then arrested. According to the aforementioned report Reginald Hathaway, alias Walter 
Stephens, had in his possession when taken prisoner a note of safe conduct from O‘Daly, given 
to him on a previous release. The report also claimed that Hathaway was a deserter from both the 
British and National armies. O‘Daly was eager to have these men tried and executed.97 He tried 
and convicted these men and subsequently requested confirmation of the sentence on 19 April. 
Following a brief delay the confirmation arrived and O‘Daly carried out the sentence. Thus: 
Reginal[d] Stephen Hathaway, James McInerney, Edward Greaney, were tried by 
a committee of Officers on [the] following charges: (1) Taking part in an attack 
on National Troops at Clashmealcon, Ballyduff, Co. Kerry in which Lieut. 
Pierson and Vol. O‘Neill were killed (2) Robbing Ballyduff Post Office (3) 
Burning of Civic Guard Station at Ballyheigue (4) Stripping of Civic Guards. (5) 
Being in armed opposition to the Government. The Court found the three accused 
guilty of all charges and sentenced them to death. The sentence was duly 
confirmed and carried out at Tralee Jail at 8. o‘c this morning.98 
 
 The Free State Government also had to finalise their ongoing efforts to establish a new 
national party in April 1923. Even though the pro-treatyite faction of Sinn Féin had formed the 
Provisional Government, following the ratification of the Treaty, and later created the Free State 
Government in December 1922 the old Sinn Féin party structure had been in serious demise 
since the split in January 1922. Efforts were made throughout 1922 and the early parts of 1923 to 
establish a new political party with a constitution, an executive council and grass roots 
organisation. Following several preliminary conferences the name Sinn Féin was jettisoned and 
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the name which Arthur Griffith assigned to his original Sinn Féin organisation, Cumann na 
nGaedheal (League of Gaels), was adopted. However, as Hales was assassinated in December 
1922, following one such meeting, the official launch of the new party was postponed. The first 
public Cumann na nGaedheal convention was held in the Mansion House on 27 April 1923. 
Roughly 150 delegates and representatives attended amid a strong military presence.
99
 
Remarkably, the new party got off to a bad start as Cosgrave declined the presidency of the 
organisation and it instead went to the Minister for Education Eoin MacNeill. The fact that the 
Party was led by Cosgrave in the Dáil and by MacNeill outside emphasised the abnormal 
situation which existed between the Government and the Party.
100
 The strained relationship was a 
consequence of Cumann na nGaedheal‘s unusual birth. According to Meehan, ‗Born in the midst 
of the bloodshed of a civil war, the party was created to support a government already in power, 
and in the decade that followed the relationship between the two bodies was far from 
harmonious.‘101 This situation continued for several years and was one of the reasons for 
Cumann na nGaedheal‘s decline over the coming decade.  
It was now the end of April 1923 and the Irregulars‘ guerrilla resistance had all but 
collapsed. Despite this it was business as usual for the Government and Army. They executed 
Patrick Mahoney on 26 April. This Irregular was arrested for armed robbery and executed in 
Home barracks, Ennis County Clare.
102
 It has also been stated that Mahoney had been arrested 
with another Irregular, J. O‘Leary, after a group of National troops were ambushed by the 
Irregulars in Carmody Street in Ennis on 21 April. One National soldier, Private Stephen Canty 
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was killed by an Irregular called Miko Casey.
103
 It was also claimed that the jury at the inquest 
into Canty‘s killing found that neither Mahoney nor O‘Leary ‗could have fired the fatal shot.‘104 
Nonetheless, both Mahoney and O‘Leary were sentenced to death. O‘Leary‘s sentence was later 
commuted to ten years imprisonment.  
This proved to be the final straw for Aiken. Following the execution in Ennis the new 
Irregulars Chief of Staff Aiken, who had authorised de Valera to seek an honourable peace, 
realised that it was futile to continue armed resistance regardless of de Valera‘s actions. 
Therefore, he issued a general ceasefire order on 30 April 1923.
105
 However, the Government 
were determined to put the final nail in the Irregulars‘ coffin, literally. Two days after the 
Irregulars‘ ceasefire both Christopher Quinn and William O‘Shaughnessy were executed on 2 
May 1923 in Home barracks, Ennis County Clare.
106
 Apparently both of these men were also 
implicated in Canty‘s killing.107 The Government were, as Fanning suggests, implacably 
resolved that surrender should be unconditional.
108
 They assured the anti-treatyites, through the 
use of intermediaries, that during the cautious moves towards peace that the Irregulars had to 
recognise that the resolution of all political issues should be decided by the majority of the 
people‘s elected representatives and that the State should have in its control all lethal weaponry 
present in the country. De Valera issued peace terms to the Dáil which centred around six 
conditions, one of which was that ‗no individual, or class of individuals […] can be justly 
excluded by any political oath, test, or other device, from their proper share and influence in 
                                                          
103
 Pádraig Óg Ó Ruairc, Blood on the banner, the republican struggle in Clare (Dublin, 2009), p. 318. 
104
 Ibid. 
105
 Ceasefire order from Aiken, 31 April 1923 (M.A., Captured Documents Collection, Lot 67/1(a)). 
106
 Operation report from Limerick Command, 2 May 1923 (M.A., Irish Civil War Operation/Intelligence reports, 
Limerick Command, Box 3/2). 
107
 Ó Ruairc, Blood on the banner, p. 319. 
108
 Ronan Fanning, Independent Ireland (Dublin, 1983), pp 21-22. 
 238 
 
determining national policy, or from the Councils and Parliament of the nation.‘109 In response to 
these demands Cosgrave firmly stated: 
Now, I am not impressed by these peace conditions or peace statements or peace 
proclamations. An examination of them does not convince me that there was any 
real intention of making peace; none whatever [...] Examine these proposals any 
way that you wish, in any humour that you wish, and you will find that as far as 
the party that has promoted disorder is concerned they are prepared to accept 
peace only if they are guaranteed a lease of political life [...] We have said from 
the very commencement that we are prepared to wipe the slate clean but we are 
not prepared to take any risk with regard to the possession of arms by people who 
do not realise their responsibilities as citizens.
110
 
 
Finally, at a joint meeting between the Republican Government and the Irregular military 
Executive Council held between 13 and 14 May decided that Irregular arms would be dumped. 
While they did not openly accept the Government‘s terms of an unconditional surrender both the 
anti-treatyite military and political leaders realised that they did not have many alternatives. Both 
Aiken and de Valera finally issued their dual call to dump arms on 24 May 1923. In their joint 
order Aiken acknowledged that the ‗foreign and domestic enemies of the Republic have for the 
moment prevailed. But our enemies have not won.‘111 He also stated that neither ‗tortures or 
firing squads, nor a slavish press can crush the desire for Independence out of the hearts of those 
who fought for the Republic or out of the hearts of our people.‘112 In addition to this, de Valera 
stated: 
Soldiers of Liberty – Legion of the Rearguard: The Republic can no longer be 
defended successfully by your arms. Further sacrifices on your part would now be 
in vain and continuance of the struggle in arms unwise in the national interest. 
Military victory must be allowed to rest for the moment with these who have 
                                                          
109
 Dáil Debates, Proposals for peace, volume 3, col. 677 (9 May 1923). 
110
 Dáil Debates, Finance Bill, 1923. – Adjournment motion – Peace proposals, volume 3, cols 816-818 (10 May 
1923). 
111
 Order of the day, 24 May 1923 (N.L.I. Archives, Ms. 35, 262/2), see also Appendix 7. 
112
 Ibid. 
 239 
 
destroyed the Republic. Other means must be sought to safeguard the nation‘s 
right. Eamon de Valera.
113
 
 
The Government continued executing Irregulars regardless as they claimed they could 
not verify the legitimacy of the documents. As the Irregulars had merely dumped their arms the 
Government did not want to seem like they had reached a settlement with the anti-treatyites. 
They remained determined to end the conflict on their terms. This resulted in two final 
executions. Two civilians were executed in Tuam on 30 May 1923, six days after the supposed 
end of the Civil War. According to the official report from the National Army G.H.Q: 
Michael Murphy, Ardrahan, Co. Galway, and Joseph O‘Rourke, Coxtown, 
Ardrahan, County Galway, were tried before a military tribunal at Tuam on 24
th
 
May, 1923, on the charge of taking part in an armed robbery in that they did on 
the 2
nd
 day of May, 1923, steal from the Munster and Leinster Bank, Athenry, a 
sum of money. Both the accused were further charged with being in possession, 
without proper authority, of two Webley revolvers and a sum of money stolen 
from the bank on the same day when arrested at Newport, Athenry, County 
Galway.
114
 
 
The Freeman‟s Journal stated that these two farmer‘s sons were captured two hours after the 
armed robbery with nearly £700. It also claimed that both men admitted their guilt, but declared 
that the robbery had no political significance but was related to land trouble.
115
 It finally stated 
that these men were blindfolded and walked unflinchingly to their doom.
116
 This case is a further 
indication that, even though these men were not associated with the Irregulars, agrarian disorder 
contributed to the level of lawlessness that existed in many parts of the country, particularly in 
the west, but also in other areas like Kildare. 
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The fact that these executions occurred after the orders on 24 May did not escape 
contemporary commentators. According to one reporter, ‗in view of Mr de Valera‘s order it 
hopes these executions – although the motive is stated not to have been ―political‖ – will be the 
last, and that the end of the unhappy state of affairs in Ireland has now been reached.‘117 Darrell 
Figgis alluded to this fact when he questioned Cosgrave in the Dáil. He inquired: 
if it is the policy of the Executive Council to execute the sentence of death in the 
case of prisoners taken for offences other than offences in which the taking of life 
resulted or was clearly the intention, as in the case of the executions announced to 
have been carried out at Tuam?
118
 
 
In response to this inquiry, Cosgrave stated that he had received no assurances that the orders 
given by both Aiken and de Valera were legitimate and that the Irregulars‘ armed rebellion had 
ceased. He stated: 
The documents referred to purported to be over the names mentioned, but the 
Government has no knowledge as to whether they in fact emanated from the 
persons so named. The Government has received no assurance of a cessation of 
defiance of the authority of the people or of the acts of sabotage and outrage 
described by the Deputy as ―hostilities.‖119 
 
Following this Johnson asked the President whether the original reasoning for the adoption of the 
1922 Public Safety Resolution, military necessity, still applied to the present situation in Tuam. 
Cosgrave replied, ‗I take it the action that has been taken in this case, and all cases, has been 
taken by reason of the military necessities of the time.‘120 Cosgrave‘s claim is interesting. How 
could it be a military necessity to execute two men given that the conflict was technically over? 
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These proved to be the final two official executions of the Irish Civil War and brought the total 
to eighty-one. 
The Irish Civil War was over. However, what forced the anti-treatyite militants to dump 
their arms on 24 May 1923? Did the Government‘s executions policy, as Deasy claimed, create a 
very serious situation in Ireland? It has been established that Deasy‘s assertions were in fact 
representative of the situation in Ireland in January 1923. Moreover, it has been ascertained that 
the official executions did indeed achieve their primary objective, the hastening of the end of the 
Civil War. Evidence suggests that the Government‘s alteration and augmentation of the 
executions policy, as conditions dictated, ensured that the effect of the policy infiltrated Irregular 
units all over southern Ireland. Initially, this policy was restricted both in scope and geographical 
dispersion resulting in only a few executions in Dublin. Following the attack on 7 December it 
was decided that these emergency powers would be streamlined and summarily applied all over 
the country. Evidence aside, it is only logical that an executions policy would impact on the 
dynamic and outcome of a given conflict. To say that a policy of this nature had no effect on the 
Irregular morale or their prosecution of the Civil War would be negligent.  
It must be emphasised that the executions policy was not the only factor that contributed 
to the Irregulars‘ defeat. In reality, their military position had deteriorated significantly in the 
months which followed fall of the Four Courts in June 1922. The Government and Army 
benefited greatly from the support of several important parties. It received financial and military 
assistance from the British Government and it also benefited from both public and clerical 
support. Furthermore, evidence indicates that the Irregulars‘ own defensive tactics also 
contributed to their eventual defeat. They outnumbered and were better equipped than the 
National Army at the start of the conflict. They also faced an opponent which was initially 
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uncertain and indecisive with regards to the possibility of fighting fellow Irishmen and former 
comrades. The decision taken by Rory O‘Connor and his associates to barricade themselves in to 
the Four Courts, and other areas around Dublin, ensured that a considerable number of able anti-
treatyite leaders were captured and removed from any further participation in the Civil War. 
Generally speaking, these defeats proved to be the rule rather than the exception. The Irregulars‘ 
response to the executions policy also contributed to their defeat. Lynch‘s endorsement of 
reprisals and the subsequent assassination of Hales served to strengthen pro-treatyite resolve and 
directly led to the augmentation of the Government‘s executions policy. It was Lynch‘s 
unrealistic assumptions that kept the War going far longer than it otherwise would have. Once he 
was killed the final barrier to peace was removed. 
Following the events in early December it became clear that the Government would 
continue to adopt increasingly resolute policies to decrease the level of lawlessness and disorder 
in the country. One such strategy was the execution of civilians. It has been established that the 
Government executed four civilians for the unauthorised possession of weapons and armed 
robbery during the Civil War. Therefore, eighty-one executions and not seventy-seven 
executions actually occurred during the conflict. Moreover, evidence suggests that two of these 
executions happened six days after the supposed conclusion of the War. 
The Irish Civil War nearly bankrupted the fledgling state. It resulted in several thousand 
military dead and wounded and it also ensured that the country‘s detention facilities were filled 
to bursting point with thousands of incarcerated Irregulars. Furthermore, due to the executions 
policy, in addition to the unofficial actions, a bitter legacy was imbued upon post-war Ireland. 
Even though they refrained from accepting the Free State‘s terms of an unconditional surrender 
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publically, the end result amounted to the same thing as the Irregulars dumped their arms and 
ceased fighting. 
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CHAPTER 7 
‘Extraordinary Graveyard Scenes’  
The 1924 reinterments 
 
 
The Irish Civil War ended in May 1923. Yet the issues which caused the conflict and the 
controversy which surrounded the methods used to win the War did not just simply disappear 
following the cessation of hostilities. One of the main reasons for this was that the National 
Army still held the remains of the executed men interred in a number of military installations 
throughout Ireland. However, as will be established in this chapter, the Government‘s post-war 
process of demobilisation caused the closure of several of these facilities and, by extension, led 
to the reinterment of the executed men in October 1924. Bearing this in mind the process of 
reinterment will be examined in detail paying particular attention to the contemporary conditions 
which forced the Cumann na nGaedheal Government to release the remains of these men. 
Furthermore, the extraordinary scenes that occurred during the reinterments in Glasnevin 
Cemetery, Dublin and Dowdallshill Cemetery, Dundalk, County Louth will be studied. Both of 
these events resulted in substantial armed clashes between pro- and anti- treatyite forces in which 
an innocent bystander, Joseph Hughes, was killed. Despite these encounters the bodies of the 
men executed during the Irish Civil War were finally returned to their respective families and 
laid to rest in various cemeteries throughout Ireland. Given that the conflict proved so divisive, 
the return of these remains would not have occurred so quickly had it not been for the prevailing 
conditions that existed in Ireland following the dumping of arms by the Irregulars. 
The Cumann na nGaedheal Government could not dwell on victory as the cessation of 
hostilities in May 1923 did not result in the wholesale return of normal conditions throughout the 
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country, nor did it mean a total disappearance of the issues and controversy that the Civil War 
and the executions policy exposed. The Government now had to contend with consolidating their 
victory and rebuilding the country after several successive years of war and social turmoil. This 
would not prove to be an easy task. The Irish exchequer was nearly bankrupt as a result of two 
consecutive wars.
1
 Thousands were dead and wounded.
2
 Furthermore, Irish detention facilities 
had swelled to bursting point with between 10,000 and 11,000 Irregular prisoners by May 1923.
3
 
Significant numbers of Irregulars and a large quantity of weaponry also remained in circulation 
which left the Government anxious over the possibility of the resumption of hostilities at a later 
date. For instance, 985 rifles, 1,156 revolvers, 185 pistols, 2,979 shotguns and 1,262 bombs were 
seized by the Gardaí between 1923 and July 1931.
4
 This all contributed the air of uncertainty 
which prevailed over Ireland in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War. There was, as Ferriter 
states, ‗an inevitability about post-Civil War pessimism, particularly given the number of 
republicans in prison by the end of the conflict, and that the governments hands were still red 
with the blood of official executions.‘5  
In reality, the morale of the Irregulars had been broken for some time due in part to the 
executions policy and they were in no condition to attempt any kind of coordinated military 
offensive. They became more concerned with avoiding arrest rather than a renewed campaign. 
This was indicated by several reports from the Director of Intelligence to the Chief of Staff of the 
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National Army. One such report, on 26 May 1923, stated that there had been a definite reduction 
‗in aggressive activity and in almost every Command the Irregulars are devoting their main 
attention to avoiding arrest and capture of their arms. Their efforts to reorganise would seem to 
have been an absolute failure.‘6 Nonetheless, the pro-treatyites was justifiably paranoid. Even 
though the morale of the defeated Irregulars was severely depressed armed crime throughout the 
country remained a major issue for the Government. This was acknowledged by Kevin 
O‘Higgins when he proclaimed, prior to the ceasefire, that the ‗aftermath of these last ten months 
is going to be more serious, perhaps, than the last ten months themselves. In many areas you 
have conditions bordering on anarchy.‘7 On 26 September 1923 H. M. Murray, a civil servant, 
informed the Cabinet that armed robberies would significantly increase after the Civil War. 
Murray argued that: 
This particular brand of crime will likely reach [a] higher water mark within the 
next six or nine months owing to the demobilisation of a large number from the 
Army and the releasing of prisoners, throwing on their own resources a large 
number of men who have been used, for so long, to conditions which have torn 
moral standards to shreds.
8
  
 
Garda figures on serious crime recorded that 260 armed robberies and 119 armed raids occurred 
during the six months from July to December 1923.
9
 These figures cannot be totally attributed to 
the Irregulars. According to O‘Higgins, by the end of 1923 ninety-five percent of crime in the 
country was attributable to the Army or to demobilised men.
10
 Even though this was an 
exaggeration a certain proportion of the crimes could be ascribed to ill-disciplined elements in 
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the Army and/or to demobilised officers. Firstly, of the 260 armed robberies mentioned above 
thirty-six involved members of the Army with seven being found guilty. Also, of these 260 
incidents seventeen cases involved demobilised men with nine being found guilty. Secondly, of 
the 119 armed raids fourteen cases occurred where members of the Army were implicated. 
Additionally, five cases involved demobilised men with one being convicted.
11
  
Several post-war inspection reports from various commands continued to indicate a 
serious lack of discipline inherent in many barracks, especially in the Kerry Command. This was 
evidenced by an infamous incident which became known as the ‗Kenmare case‘. According to 
Éire, four Free State officers forced their way into a well-known and highly respected doctor‘s 
house and attacked two of his daughters on 22 June 1923. The officers flogged the young girls 
with their belts and smeared their hair with cart grease. Following an investigation Lieutenant 
Harrington, the same officer that carried out the Ballyseedy investigation, discovered a revolver 
in the grounds where the assault occurred ‗which he identified as belonging to Brigadier-General 
O‘Daly, the same man implicated in the Ballyseedy massacre. One of the young ladies in 
defending herself had also left ample identification marks on the face of one of her assailants.
12
 
O‘Higgins, constantly critical of the ill-discipline and inefficiency within the Army, informed 
Cosgrave that if the case was not dealt with immediately he would not join any future Cumann 
na nGaedheal Government.
13
 In similar fashion to the incident at Ballyseedy, O‘Daly and his 
men were not reprimanded as, according to Mulcahy, there was not enough evidence available. 
The existence of this threat to the country whether by the Irregulars or ill-disciplined National 
troops/ex-troops ensured the adoption of a two-pronged strategy by the Government. Firstly, in 
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tackling the Irregulars the Government decided that there would be no widespread release of 
anti-treatyite prisoners and no subsequent reduction in the severity of emergency powers. In 
addition, Cosgrave and his ministers advocated the holding of a general election. The 
legitimisation of the State would hopefully reduce the appeal of crime and decrease support for 
the Irregulars even further. Secondly, the Government would over-haul the Army in an effort to 
decrease its size and increase its efficiency and respectability.  
Even before the dumping of arms by the Irregulars the Government began to contemplate 
new successive emergency legislation. As a result, it quickly passed the Public Safety 
(Emergency Powers) Act on 2 July 1923. This Act, according to O‘Higgins, was regretful but an 
absolute necessity. He stated that this legislation ‗is based on recognition of facts, however 
unpleasant, and a recognition of the conditions which are likely to exist, if not to prevail, in this 
country for 5 or 6 months.‘14 This law was primarily devised to ensure the continued internment 
of Irregular prisoners incarcerated throughout the country until settled conditions were 
established. Like its predecessor, the Public Safety Resolution ratified in September 1922, this 
legislation provided for the maximum punishment of death. It also allowed a wide range of 
offences to be punishable by penal servitude and permitted flogging on conviction for arson and 
armed robbery.
15
 However, due to some constitutional entanglements, particularly article 47 of 
the Constitution, this piece of law was deemed to be insufficient.
16
 The Public Safety 
(Emergency Powers) (No. 2) Act 1923 was devised. It augmented the previous legislation and 
ensured that the constitutional issues were now inapplicable. With the matter over internment 
resolved the Government set about to legally protect itself for the methods it employed to win the 
                                                          
14
 Dáil Debates, Public Safety (Emergency Powers) Bill, 1923. First Stage, volume 3, col. 1984 (15 June 1923). 
15
 Seosamh Ó Longaigh, Emergency law in independent Ireland, 1922-1948 (Dublin, 2006), p. 38. 
16
 For a description of Article 47 of the Constitution see Ó Longaigh, Emergency law in independent Ireland, p. 40. 
 249 
 
Civil War. Two months after the end of the conflict Cosgrave introduced the Indemnity Act to 
the Dáil on 30 July 1923. This legislation stated that no action or other legal proceeding 
whatsoever, whether civil or criminal, shall be instituted in any court of law in the Free State as a 
result of any actions that occurred during the Government‘s suppression of the Irregulars‘ 
rebellion. It covered the period from 27 June 1922, the day before the conflict started, until the 
day the Act was passed.
17
 It stated that any measures undertaken by the Government were done 
in good faith for the public‘s safety. These actions were: 
done by a person[s] holding office under or employed in the service of the 
Provisional Government or the Government of Saorstát Eireann in any capacity 
whether military or civil, or by any other person acting under the authority of a 
person so holding office or so employed.
18
  
 
Section three of this piece of law is of particular interest to this thesis. It stipulated that: 
Every military court or committee or tribunal […] established since the 27th day 
of June, 1922, and before the passing of this Act […] shall be deemed to be and 
always to have been a validly established tribunal, and every sentence passed, 
judgment given, or order made before the passing of this Act by any such military 
tribunal shall be deemed to be and always to have been valid and to be and always 
to have been within the lawful jurisdiction of the tribunal.
19
 
 
This section ensured whatever issues that existed, with regards to the legality of the Public Safety 
Resolution, no longer applied. Moreover, it guaranteed that acts carried out in accordance with 
the conventions of the emergency decree were exempt from legal reproach. With the Irregulars 
legislated for, in the short-term at least, the Government now set its focus on the holding of an 
election and the reconditioning of the Army. 
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Eamon de Valera, despite being a fugitive, advocated anti-treatyite participation in the 
up-coming general election in August 1923. Thus, he travelled to his former constituency in 
County Clare on 15 August. However, as he took to the podium he was quickly arrested and 
transported to Arbour Hill prison, Dublin.
20
 This act alone was important as it had a resounding 
effect on the development of the Irish political landscape. The emphasis placed on arresting and 
incarcerating de Valera demonstrated that the Free State authorities still regarded him as a key 
opponent. This helped restore him to the top position in the anti-treatyite movement following 
the nominal influence he had during the Civil War. As a result of the conflict, the anti-treatyites 
lacked an abundance of resources normally required to run an effective election campaign.
21
 
Furthermore, they possessed only rudimentary organisation and they had no coherent publicity 
machine. That said anti-treatyite propaganda did feature in the campaign. In County Clare, where 
de Valera was running for re-election, posters were displayed which stated ‗We will wade 
through the blood of our fellow Irishmen and through the blood of Members of the 
Government.‘22 Moreover, the anti-treatyites used the Civil War executions in an effort to attract 
a sympathy vote. For instance, the aforementioned election poster asked the question ‗Executions 
– Was this the will of the people of Clare? [...] Vote for De Valera.‘23 Despite the fact that many 
of their candidates were in hiding or imprisoned, they managed to carry out a rather successful 
campaign.
24
 The anti-treatyites gained a respectable forty-four seats in comparison to Cumann na 
nGaedheal‘s sixty-three. The remaining political parties such as the Independents, the Farmers 
and Labour achieved sixteen, fifteen and fourteen seats, respectively.
25
 Even though Cosgrave 
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and his Government did not do as well as they expected de Valera‘s anti-treatyite abstentionist 
policy enabled Cosgrave to form another Government with a comfortable majority.  
The results of the 1923 election highlighted several important issues. Firstly, even though 
the Irregulars were defeated militarily the anti-treatyites were far from beaten politically. This 
fact became more apparent and important as the decade progressed with the rise of Fianna Fáil. 
Secondly, results suggested that resentment at the methods used by the Government to win the 
Civil War may have influenced the electorate. Further antipathy at the continuous employment of 
emergency legislation effected voting patterns in certain places throughout the country. Kerry for 
example, where the Civil War was most fiercely fought, is worth noting. Conor Maguire, an anti-
treatyite election organiser stated that ‗Our greatest successes have been gained in the two 
counties in which the Free State terrorism was greatest, and in which it is probable that most of 
our workers were in prison. I refer to Leitrim – Sligo and Kerry.‘26 Yet this claim was not 
entirely correct. Kerry did indeed witness seven official executions and a number of atrocities 
during the Civil War and this did contribute to the anti-treatyites good performance in this 
constituency. Four anti-treatyite deputies were elected in comparison to three Cumann na 
nGaedheal deputies in the August 1923 election.
27
 But Maguire‘s assertion that ‗Free State 
terrorism‘ aided great successes in the Sligo – Leitrim constituency was unfounded. There were 
no official executions in either county during the Civil War. However, the level of military 
activity in this constituency, whether pro- or anti-treatyite, during the Civil War was relatively 
minor in comparison to other areas such as Kerry or Dublin City. Peter Hart states that both Sligo 
and Leitrim consistently feature at the lower end of the scale in relation to military activity 
                                                          
26
 Hopkinson, Green against green, p. 262. 
27
 Brian M. Walker, Parliamentary election results in Ireland 1918 – 92 (Dublin, 1992), p. 112. 
 252 
 
during both the War of Independence and the Civil War.
28
 The anti-treatyites only managed to 
elect three deputies to the Dáil in comparison to Cumann na nGaedheal‘s four deputies in this 
election.
29
 Even though Maguire‘s claim proved inaccurate for Sligo – Leitrim it did indicate that 
anti-Government sentiment remained a notable issue in places like Kerry.  
On the one hand the election results gave encouragement to the anti-treatyites. According 
to Coogan, the 1923 election results signified ‗a backlash against the executions‘.30 This is a 
possibility. Even though the public, generally speaking, supported the Government and 
consented to the executions policy, during the Civil War, some of these supporters may have, 
now that the conflict was over, reconsidered their position. But whether or not any such changes 
occurred purely because of the executions policy is difficult to say. Conversely, the election 
legitimised the Free State‘s existence and endorsed the Government‘s motivations for fighting 
the Civil War, democracy and the primacy of the ballot over the bullet in Irish society. Electoral 
success although important for the Government was not the only challenge they faced in the 
immediate aftermath of the Civil War. The Government had to implement the second phase of its 
post-war strategy, reform of the armed forces from an army constructed for war to a suitably 
sized peacetime force which was, if the Kenmare case was any indication, disciplined and 
efficient. This process was to produce some significant and interesting consequences. Firstly, it 
resulted in a mutiny within the Army. Even though the number of men that actually mutinied 
was small this event remained significant. It facilitated the development of a non-political armed 
force subordinate to the civilian government of Dáil Éireann. This from an army that was, over 
the past several years, rife with factionalism and a government that expressed, at best, a fragile 
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control over its armed forces, was a significant achievement. Secondly, it resulted in further 
scandal for the pro-treatyites. It not only forced the Government to return the remains of the 
executed men for reinterment, amidst rumor and indignation, but it also ensured substantial 
violent demonstrations and armed clashes between Government forces and anti-treatyite 
supporters in several locations throughout the country. 
In the immediate post-war period the responsibility of preserving public order primarily 
rested with the National Army which numbered around 52,000 men in April 1923.
31
 The armed 
forces were aided by the recently established Garda Síochána, an unarmed police force, 
established in August 1922 and numbered about 4,500 by the first half of 1923.
32
 However the 
Army was, as previously discussed, haphazardly put together out of necessity in an effort to 
prosecute the Civil War. As O‘Halpin states, during the Civil War the Government‘s response to 
military inefficiency was wholesale expansion as ‗the priority was to defeat the republicans, not 
to nurture an effective, disciplined military machine [...] [however once] the civil war was over, 
drastic contraction was inevitable.‘33 According to Gialanella Valiulis, the process of 
demobilisation planned to ‗transform the nature of the military from a politically-involved and 
independent guerrilla force into a highly professional and disciplined army subject to 
unquestioning civil control.‘34 The immediate peacetime objective was to reduce the size of the 
armed forces to roughly 20,000 men of whom 1,400 would be commissioned officers.
35
 Final 
projections were for an army sized around 18,000 men.
36
 The process was initiated on 15 
                                                          
31
 Hopkinson, Green against green, p. 265. 
32
 Dermot Keogh, Twentieth-Century Ireland, nation and state (Dublin, 1994), p. 18. 
33
 Eunan O‘Halpin, ‗Politics and the state, 1922-32‘ in F. J. Byrne, W. E. Vaughan, A. Cosgrove, J. R. Hill and D. Ó 
Cróinín (eds), A new history of Ireland, vii: Ireland, 1921-84 (Oxford, 2003), p. 99. 
34
 Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, ‗The ‗Army Mutiny‘ of 1924 and the Assertion of Civilian Authority in Independent 
Ireland‘, in Irish Historical Studies, 23, no. 92 (November, 1983), p. 358. 
35
 Keogh, Twentieth-Century Ireland, p. 19. 
36
 Gialanella Valiulis, ‗The ‗Army Mutiny‘ of 1924‘, p. 358. 
 254 
 
September 1923 when the Ministry of Defence issued its Defence Order no. 28. This directive 
stated that ‗It is notified for general information that in consequence of the reduction of the 
strength of the National Forces, arrangements are being made for the demobilisation of a certain 
number of Officers.‘37  
The process of demobilisation was resented by a number of officers collectively known 
as the Old I.R.A. or O.I.R.A. headed by Major-General Liam Tobin and Colonel Charles F. 
Dalton. First and foremost these officers were, as O‘Halpin states, dissatisfied with the prospect 
of decimation due to the radical reduction in the size of the Army.
38
 They also felt that they were 
unfairly treated in favour of ex-British troops. In reality, however, relatively few ex-British army 
officers had been retained in the Army and those that were had particular skills required by the 
National forces.
39
 The O.I.R.A. was also dissatisfied with the lack of progress made towards the 
Republic by the Government and Army Council which it also believed to be an I.R.B. clique. 
These discontented officers issued an ultimatum to Cosgrave, on 6 March 1924, demanding a 
satisfactory end to their grievances.
40
 They demanded the removal of the Army Council and 
immediate suspension of Army demobilisation and reorganisation.
41
 After the ultimatum a series 
of events transpired which would result in the resignation of several deputies, two of which were 
Cabinet ministers, the demise of the Army Council and the final subordination of the Army 
under the civilian Government.  
The March mutiny resulted in the resignation of forty-nine officers, including three 
Major-Generals, five Colonels, seventeen Commandants, twelve Captains and twelve 
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Lieutenants. Fifty officers also absconded with military materials which included eleven Lewis 
guns, twenty-one rifles, one grenade rifle, one revolver, forty-one grenades and 35,400 rounds of 
.303 ammunition.
42
 Joseph McGrath, Minister for Trade and Commerce and an overt supporter 
of the O.I.R.A., resigned, as did several of his supporters, due to a raid on his house by the 
Army.
43
 As a consequence an Army Inquiry was established. At the investigation Mulcahy 
resolutely defended his position and stated in response to accusations of a resurgence of the 
I.R.B. within the Army‘s hierarchy that the ‗I.R.B. was never organised, or re-organised, or 
intended to be organised as a counter-blast to the ―Old I.R.A.‖ or any other such association.‘44 
O‘Higgins finally succeeded in realising an aim he held for many years, the complete 
subordination of the armed forces under the civilian leadership in Dáil Éireann. He was 
determined, as Regan states, to ensure that ‗neither he nor the institutions of the state would ever 
again take their stride from a soldier‘s boot‘.45 O‘Higgins took charge of the situation as 
Cosgrave was supposedly ill. Mulcahy had already retired from the Army in May 1923 following 
the conclusion of the Civil War to focus on his political career as Minister for Defence. 
However, he now resigned from this ministerial post in protest at O‘Higgins‘ sacking of the 
Army Council.
46
 Mulcahy would remain in the political wilderness until Cosgrave reluctantly 
reinstated him to the Cabinet in 1927 as Minister for Local Government and Public Health. 
Ironically, Cosgrave bowed to pressure from members of the Cumann na nGaedheal Party which 
included, amongst others, both O‘Higgins and Hogan.47 However, at this juncture, he paid the 
price for his long-term rift with his civilian colleagues, such as O‘Higgins and Cosgrave, in the 
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Government and the more radical elements, such as Tobin and Dalton, within the Army. This 
entire act was significant as it allowed O‘Higgins to amputate, what he felt was, an infected limb 
and undertake a comprehensive clear-out of disloyal elements within both the Army and the 
Cabinet. To bridge the gap left by Mulcahy‘s prompt exit, Eoin O‘Duffy became the G.O.C. of 
the National Army and Cosgrave became Minister for Defence, in addition to his other 
ministerial posts.
48
  
The anti-treatyite‘s remained in some difficulty too. Following the initial boost to morale 
that the results of the August 1923 election provided their esprit de corps quickly foundered once 
more. This was evidenced by the failure of the latest set of hunger strikes which occurred 
between October and November 1923. The strike began in Mountjoy Jail on 14 October and 
lasted forty-one days. It spread to several other prisons and internment camps and at one point it 
included up to 8,000 men. The primary demand was release. However, all but 200 strikers 
stopped after the first month. In the end two prisoners died around the fortieth day and the 
remaining strikers ceased on 23 November 1923.
49
 Furthermore, the upcoming first anniversaries 
of the men executed during the Civil War did not receive the support that some, like Ernie 
O‘Malley, expected. On 24 November 1923 O‘Malley, aware of the potential propaganda that 
could be achieved if these anniversaries were handled correctly, ordered all ranks to turn out and 
undertake to their fullest abilities the work for which the men were put to death. The order stated:  
Let every Volunteer make it a practice to examine his conscience on the 
anniversary of all those who died to defend the rights of the Republic of Ireland. 
Let him find out his own capabilities, get busy on the work for which he is fitted 
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and educate himself and those around him to do all that is necessary to complete 
the work for which his comrades died.
50
 
 
His call, however, did not appear to be headed in places like Cork, judging by official reports 
from the Cork Command. Very few people turned out to acknowledge the anniversary of the four 
Mountjoy executions on 15 December 1923. This report stated that the:  
anniversary celebration of the execution of Rory O‘Connor, [Richard Barrett] Joe 
McKelvey, and Liam Mellows, attracted very little attention in Cork City. 
Scarcely one hundred persons participated, and enthusiasm was at a very low ebb. 
Even ex-prisoners did not trouble to turn out.
51
  
 
This could be partly explained by the fact a large number of Irregulars were still imprisoned or 
on the run. In Dublin city, however, the anti-treatyites organised a ‗Monster Demonstration in 
O‘Connell Street‘52 for the first anniversary of the men put to death in Mountjoy Jail in 
December 1922. According to this notice, ‗Miss Mary MacSwiney will address the Meeting [and 
there will be a] Procession Afterwards.‘53 Cumann na mBán and Sinn Féin Cumainn were 
requested to go, however, Labour and other bodies were invited to attend.
54
 It is unclear if this 
demonstration was well-attended. Even though anti-treatyite morale seemed to be suffering after 
the Civil War, the Government now faced another problem. A further by-product of 
demobilisation was the relocation of the bodies of the executed men that were interred in several 
barracks throughout the country which were set to close. 
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As the numbers of soldiers decreased so too did the number of barracks required to house 
and train the remaining troops. As certain facilities closed and soldiers moved to different 
locations the issue of relocating the interred bodies of the executed men became a concern for the 
Government. Cosgrave was aware since the inception of the Government‘s process of 
demobilisation that something would have to be done with the remains of the executed men. He 
was equally aware that this issue would cause significant problems for the Government if 
handled incorrectly. It had been policy during the Civil War to retain the remains of these men 
indefinitely. Cosgrave was of the opinion that the remains might be returned to the families in 
the distant future, however, for now another, less public, alternative would have to suffice. Due 
to this uncertainty he sought the opinion of O‘Duffy. In a letter from Cosgrave‘s office to 
O‘Duffy, on 20 June 1924, his secretary indicated that: 
He [Cosgrave] is disposed to hand over the remains to the relatives on some 
particular day, from every particular station in which executed remains are buried. 
He simply gives this as an indication of his personal opinion but that the matter 
would have to be put up in the ordinary way for consideration.
55
 
 
O‘Duffy disagreed with Cosgrave. In reply to Cosgrave‘s letter he stated, on 27 June, that it was 
not desirable to exhume and return the bodies. He believed that:  
The re-interment of an executed Irregular would almost certainly be made the 
occasion for a demonstration for the purpose of attracting the sympathies of the 
general public towards the bereavement of the relatives at a time when the 
necessity for the executions has to a certain extent faded from the minds of the 
people. I am also of the opinion that a general exhumation of all bodies from posts 
likely to be evacuated in the near and distant future, is not desirable. I think, there 
will be far less comment in dealing with such cases when the evacuation of a post 
is under completion.
56
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This response was not as helpful as Cosgrave had hoped. O‘Duffy merely advocated ignoring the 
issue and completing the closure of unnecessary military stations regardless of the remains. But a 
decision had to be made. Cosgrave decided that further problems for the Government had to be 
avoided. He finally opted for the secret exhumation and relocation of the remains to other, more 
permanent, military installations rather than return the remains to their families. This was 
indicated in the minutes of the Executive Council on 5 July 1924. They stated that it ‗was agreed 
that the remains of executed men buried in posts about to be evacuated should be exhumed 
quietly [,] encased in strong oak coffins and re-interred in the nearest military post proposed for 
permanent occupation.‘57 As a result of Cosgrave‘s cautious approach the pro-treatyite 
authorities remained in possession of the bodies of the men executed during the Civil War for 
nearly four additional months.  
Cosgrave‘s decision was promptly put in to practice. To facilitate these secret 
exhumations guidelines were drawn up. On 24 July Commandant R. J. Feely, on behalf of the 
Adjutant General, stated in a confidential letter to the Army Finance officer that: 
it has been decided to exhume the remains of executed Irregulars interred in 
places not likely to be held as permanent military posts, and re-inter them at 
permanent posts. As in the majority of cases the remains have been interred for a 
considerable time, the work of exhumation is an objectionable and disagreeable 
one, consequently the G.O.C. Forces has agreed that the personnel engaged 
should be suitably remunerated. He Adjutant General suggests that extra pay at 
the rate of 1/6 per hour should be issued to each of the men engaged, and would 
like to have the necessary sanction (financial) for the issue of this money. For 
your information I am to say that with a party of 10 men working in relays the 
time taken is 3 hours, and the number of posts to be evacuated is 10.
58
 
 
                                                          
57
 Minutes of the Executive Council, 5 July 1924 (N.A.I., Department of an Taoiseach files, D/T S 1884). 
58
 Confidential letter from the office of the Adjutant General to the Army finance officer, 24 July 1924 (N.A.I., 
Department of Finance files, FIN/s004/0215/24). 
 260 
 
It was only a matter of time before the public became aware of the covert procedure. Ultimately, 
the controversy which surrounded one particular case, the relocation of the six men from Tuam, 
County Galway, to Athlone barracks, County Westmeath, forced Cosgrave‘s hand and finally 
resulted in the reinterment of the men executed during the Civil War.  
Colonel M. Dunphy, on behalf of O‘Duffy, informed Cosgrave on 1 August 1924 that 
‗Tuam Workhouse will be evacuated as soon as possible after the 5th instant, by which date the 
bodies interred there will be exhumed and re-interred in Athlone.‘59 The remains of the six men 
executed in Tuam during the Civil War were unceremoniously exhumed and transferred to 
Athlone quietly, without the consent of the families of the dead men. However, following public 
knowledge of the existence of the exhumations Cosgrave and the Cumann na nGaedheal 
Government received considerable criticism not only from fellow T.D.s, County Corporations 
and members of the public alike but also the Secretary of the Cumann na nGaedheal party itself. 
Cosgrave‘s attempt to literally bury the problem had failed and now both he and the Government 
faced significant condemnation. He received a letter from member of the Farmers Party, Patrick 
F. Baxter T.D. on 13 August 1924. In this letter Baxter outlined his dismay at the secretive 
manner in which the Government handled the exhumation and relocation of the men interred in 
Tuam. He stated that: 
A matter has been brought to my notice which although outside the confines of 
my constituency [...] calls for protest. I refer to the recent action as reported in the 
press of raising the bodies of executed men in Galway for re-interment elsewhere. 
If such a step became necessary unquestionably the proper step was to inform the 
relatives of the deceased men and hand over the bodies. Rumour has it that 
because of probable evacuation of the tuberculosis hospital at Roscrea similar 
action may also be taken there and perhaps at some other places. Such events as 
these do far more to add fuel to the flickering embers of hate and endanger 
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thereby the National position than would any display over a burial ceremony 
which might take place if the bodies of these men were handed over to their 
relatives. These men could not by any stretch of the imagination be styled 
criminal and I am sure even you however wrong you believe their action to have 
been do not believe they were criminal in the true meaning of the word. I think it 
right that I should make this protest directly to you in the hope that you will take 
such appropriate action as will put this matter right and save us any such 
experience in future.
60
 
 
Following this Pádraic Ó Maille protested to Cosgrave on 27 August. Ó Maille stated that 
the removal of the remains from Tuam had caused a good deal of resentment in County Galway. 
He suggested that the time to return the remains of the executed men to their relatives was now at 
hand before any further damage to the Government‘s reputation could be done.61 He argued that: 
If the Government came to this decision there would not be very much trouble in 
the matter as, I understand, identification discs are placed on each of the coffins. 
Of course if the remains are handed back there may be some demonstrations, but 
such demonstrations will not have much effect seeing that the grievance those 
parties complain of is removed.
62
 
 
Despite the fact that the Irregulars attempted to assassinate Ó Maille, in December 1922, he 
urged Cosgrave to adopt a conciliatory approach to negate the damage caused by the incident at 
Tuam. The secret relocation of the remains also elicited a resolution from Waterford Corporation 
on 2 September 1924. The council protested against the Government‘s recent action of secretly 
exhuming and reinterring the remains of the men executed in Tuam barracks. It stated that: 
We consider such action as being most un-Irish and un-Christian, and calculated 
to cause most unnecessary and grievous pain to the relatives of the deceased and 
we request that in future similar cases of evacuations of Military Posts, any such 
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remains of executed Republicans should be handed back to relatives, or, 
otherwise left to rest in peace.
63
 
 
Finally, on 16 September 1924, the Cumann na nGaedheal‘s Secretary, the Coiste 
Gnotha, intervened. The Secretary chastised Cosgrave for his decision to secretly disinter and 
relocate the remains of the executed Irregulars. The Secretary was primarily concerned with the 
political repercussions that this incident might have. Cosgrave was bluntly reminded of the five 
pending by-elections and that the continuance of the procedure would only aggravate the 
electorate further. The Secretary argued that: 
In these circumstances the Coiste Gnotha believe that the Ministry of Defence 
must surely have had good and sufficient reason for their action in digging up the 
remains of recently executed men at Tuam and elsewhere and unceremoniously 
disposing of them in some fashion which can only have been satisfactory to the 
official who gave the order, but which certainly has produced violent indignation 
amongst our members, and is regarded throughout the country as nothing short of 
an atrocity [...] With a view therefore to disseminating the information and 
undoing to the best of our ability the political harm done by this unfortunate 
order, the Coiste Gnotha would be grateful for a statement of the reasons which 
made such action necessary on the part of the Ministry of Defence.
64
  
 
Even though Cosgrave rarely listened to the party he realised the effect this initiative was having 
on the Government‘s reputation. Following the anti-treatyites‘ relatively good performance in the 
August 1923 general election he knew that the Government could ill-afford a further reduction in 
public support. He knew that if the anti-treatyites abandoned their abstentionist policy the 
dominance enjoyed by the Government in the Dáil would swiftly disappear. Cosgrave finally 
bowed to both public and political pressure and decided not to provoke the electorate any further. 
It was announced in the press, on 18 October, that the Government were to release the bodies of 
                                                          
63
 Resolution passed by Waterford Council, 2 September 1924 (N.A.I., Department of an Taoiseach files, D/T S 
1884). 
64
 Letter from the Coiste Gnotha to W. T. Cosgrave, 16 September 1924 (N.A.I., Department of an Taoiseach files, 
D/T S 1884). 
 263 
 
the executed men on 24 October 1924. Cosgrave, aware of the demonstrations that occurred 
outside Kilmainham Jail in 1916, due to the prolongation of the execution process, decided that 
all the remains were to be returned in a single day. He knew that if the Government staggered the 
returning of the bodies over several days, public sympathy for the executed men, and by 
extension the anti-treatyites, might increase. Nevertheless, the announcement in the papers stated 
that ‗if they did not notify their intention of claiming the remains before Monday next, the 
military authorities would have them buried in sanctified ground.‘65 Thus, almost two years after 
the first set of executions occurred during the Irish Civil War the families of the eighty-one 
executed men could finally give their loved ones the burial they believed they deserved.  
Following the announcement provisional instructions were outlined for the exhumation of 
these remains. On 18 September É. Ó. Frighil wrote to Cosgrave and suggested that: 
the most appropriate time would be from 5.15 p.m. on any week day or from 2 
p.m. on Sunday as from these hours work is closed down and the prisoners are in 
their cells and the regular staffs, excepting patrols, are off duty. The Sunday time 
may be the most desirable as this will allow for the entire work being done during 
day-light hours.
66
 
 
Officers that undertook exhumation duties were to receive extra pay. To facilitate payment those 
who carried out these duties were required to submit their work details to the Army Finance 
officer who would forward them on to the Department of Finance. From two submissions, 
tendered by Captain Stafford and Captain Kearns, a detailed account can be constructed outlining 
when the exhumations occurred and what the officers got paid. These particulars relate to 
exhumation work from the middle of July, which applies to the secret exhumations, to the end of 
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October 1924 after the public announcement was made. (See Table 1 at the end of the chapter). 
The Army Finance officer requested that both men receive adequate pay for duties performed. 
He stated ‗I attach for your information particulars of the duty performed by the two officers 
under consideration and recommend as recognition of the extra services performed payment of 
£15 to Capt. Stafford and £5 to Capt. Kearns respectively.‘67 
In accordance with the general release of remains applications were submitted from 
relatives and republican associations alike. For example, the Republican headquarters submitted 
an application for several executed Irregulars which stated: 
It has been announced from Republican headquarters that applications have been 
made to the General Headquarters of the Free State Army for the remains of the 
following executed men: - James Fisher […] Peter Cassidy […]  Richard Twohig 
[…] Joseph Gaffney […] Erskine Childers […] Joseph Spooner […] Patrick 
Farrelly […] John Murphy.68 
 
Cosgrave knew that the occasion of receiving the remains would result in large demonstrations 
as the anti-treatyite movement would attempt to derive as much sympathy as possible. He was 
determined to ensure that pro-treatyite forces acted professionally and not engage in any 
behaviour which would result in scandal. To achieve this end Cosgrave issued an order which 
stated: 
With reference of the handing over of the remains of Executed Irregulars, there is 
to be no unnecessary armed display. Armed Guards will be present at the actual 
handing over to the relatives at the mortuary. The Guards at the gate will ―Present 
Arms‖ as the Hearses pass out.69  
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With the date set at 24 October 1924 and the applications submitted many barracks throughout 
Ireland began returning the remains of the men executed during the Civil War. 
 Erskine Childers‘ remains were received from Beggars Bush barracks, on 24 October, by 
Robert Barton. He described the event in excellent detail. He stated that he, accompanied by 
Childers‘ immediate family, arrived at the aforementioned barracks at 8.45 a.m. where a small 
crowd of fifty to one hundred people and several hearses were waiting in the rain. At around 9 
o‘clock the barracks gates opened and the cortège entered accompanied by Medlar, the 
undertaker. Upon entering the yard Barton saw two soldiers either side of a coffin which was of a 
‗dull, dark yellowish red colour without any furnishings except for a small tawdry and tarnished 
name plate insecurely fastened on the top with the name Erskine Childers on it.‘70 Eventually the 
undertaker gave the order and his men aided by National soldiers transferred the coffin into the 
hearse and the vehicle moved to give space to the next family waiting to receive remains. 
According to Barton, all ‗the coffins were the crudest and cheapest manufacture […] The 
concrete floor was running water as a constant drip fell from the coffins; I had noticed this in the 
case of Erskine‘s coffin.‘71 He also noted that the National troops in attendance presented arms 
and saluted the coffins as the cortège left the barrack‘s courtyard. He concluded by stating that:  
We filed out between them [the hearses] and passed again the sentry in front of 
his box still standing ―at the ready‖ with the bayonet fixed and facing the entrance 
and so in through the great gate and out into the friendly street where a large 
crowd now awaited our return.
72
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This was indicative of the returning of the remains from military installations throughout the 
country and the majority of events occurred without major incident. In addition to the above 
example, the removal of the remains from Kilmainham Jail passed without problems. According 
to a report from Sergeant Jeremiah Tangney of the Dublin Metropolitan Police (D.M.P.) to 
Superintendant A. Lawler this removal saw roughly ‗150 men and women marched in military 
formation, and proceeded by Island Bridge Road, Old Kilmainham, James‘ Street, en route to 
Hardwicke Hall. The police paid attention and no incident arose.‘73 The Kerry News described 
the harrowing scenes during the returning of the remains of the seven Irregulars executed in 
Tralee during the Civil War. According to this article: 
The remains of James McEnery [...] Edward Greaney [...] James Hanlon [...] 
Reginald Stenning [...] Jack Clifford [...] Michael Brosnan [...] and James Daly 
[...] the seven Republicans who were executed in Tralee jail by order of the Free 
State Government, were handed over to their relatives yesterday [...] Shortly after 
one o‘clock hundreds of people began to gather outside the jail gates. The 
relatives and dearest friends of the dead soldiers gathered nearest to the closed 
and guarded entrance; and the heartrendering cries of the grief stricken ones, as 
they waited the conclusion of the operations within the prison.
74
 
 
Some minor incidents did inevitably occur. For example, several Irregulars were arrested at the 
Costume barracks, Athlone, County Westmeath when they caused a disturbance during the 
receiving of the remains interred there. T. Killeen, from the office of the Director of Intelligence, 
wrote to the Chief of Staff, on 30 October 1924, and reported that a party of twenty four 
Irregulars marched in military formation to the main gate of the barracks. They were 
subsequently halted upon arrival. It further stated that Bernard Mulvihill from Coosan, Athlone, 
was in charge. He was subsequently arrested for illegal drilling. Following his arrest another man 
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took charge of the party but he was also detained. Five arrests were ultimately made. The 
remains were then taken to their respective destinations. In the case of those men native to the 
district their remains were taken to Athlone‘s town hall. Conversely, non-natives were 
transported to the local railway station.
75
 The report concluded by stating: 
The demonstration at the removal of the remains consisted of about 500 people, a 
good many of whom were simply lookers-on. The general public took no interest 
in the proceedings. The crowd, small as it was, was very disorderly, and a large 
proportion of the Irregular element in attendance was under the influence of drink. 
It may be said that the condition of the Irregulars and their disorderly behaviour 
were anything but a mark of respect to the dead which was evidently their 
intention.
76
 
 
The remains of both Luke Burke and Michael Greery, two civilians executed in 
Mullingar on 13 March 1923, were also returned shortly after noon on 24 October. As Burke was 
a native of Keady, County Armagh, his remains were subsequently transported north. An hour 
after Burke‘s remains were taken Greery‘s coffined remains emerged and were covered in a 
tricolour and followed by a significant procession to his final resting place where Dr. Conor 
Byrne, a Republican T.D. for Longford-Westmeath, gave the funeral oration.
77
 This is 
interesting. Neither of these men were associated with the Irregulars yet following the release of 
Greery‘s remains the tri-colour was draped over his coffin as if to initiate a republican burial. 
The anti-treatyites were therefore attempting to use the occasion of this man‘s reinterment for 
their own benefit. Surprising considering that he is then omitted from any republican roll of 
honour. Nonetheless, despite some small disturbances, such as the one in Athlone, the relatives 
of the executed men were finally in possession of their remains. Once the bodies were received, 
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funeral arrangements were made and carefully planned in order to derive every possible 
propaganda benefit from the events. It was announced in the Irish Times that the majority of the 
bodies of the men executed in Dublin were: 
transferred last night from Hardwicke Hall, Hardwicke street, to the Carmelite 
Friary, Whitefriar street, Dublin. They were conveyed in hearses, and passed in 
the following order:- Rory O‘Connor, Liam Mellows, Richard Barrett, J. Gaffney, 
P. Cassidy, J. Fisher, R, Twohig, T. Brady, [L] Dowling, S. Heaney, L. Sheehy 
and A. O‘Reilly. There was a wreath on every coffin. Behind the hearses marched 
a large cortege, in the midst of which were the relatives of the executed men, in 
cabs, and three bands. The procession included contingents from various Sinn 
Fein Clubs, the Cumann na mBan, Fianna Scouts, and Girl Scouts, and was 
accompanied by Miss Mary MacSwiney, Madame Markievicz, Mr. Dan Breen 
T.D.; Mr. Charles Murphy T.D.; Mr. Art O‘Connor, and Mr. P. O‘Donnell, T.D. 
It set out at 8 o‘clock, and went through the heart of the city, passing large crowds 
of onlookers all along the route.
78
 
 
Childers‘ body remained in Hardwicke Hall until the day of the funeral, 30 October 1924. 
Several of the remains were repatriated back to their own individual localities. The bodies of 
Joseph McKelvey, Leo Dowling and Sylvester Heaney were transported by train to Belfast City, 
County Antrim, Kildare town, County Kildare and Dunleer, County Louth, respectively. 
McKelvey‘s remains were transported to Amiens Street railway station accompanied by a guard 
of honour with a procession which included the Fianna Boy Scouts and members of Cumann na 
mBán.
79
 
Due to the nature of these reinterments Cosgrave decided that they would be supervised 
by National troops. He stated that when these burials were taking place ‗Special precautions are 
to be taken that arms will not be carried by [anti-treatyite] Body Guards on the Street, and that no 
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Firing Parties will be allowed.‘80 When outlining the efficacy of using armed troops to oversee 
the reinterments Cosgrave stated: 
It is obvious that a demonstration of armed men, not under the control of the 
State, but in opposition to the State, cannot be permitted, and every effort will be 
taken in the present and in the future to prevent any such armed displays. Persons 
taking part in them do so at their own risk.
81
 
 
The decision to place National troops at the reinterments meant that there would be two 
adversarial sets of forces, some with arms, in close proximity attending already volatile events 
which were filled with animosity and grief. This proved to be a recipe for disaster. As Dublin 
witnessed the highest number of executions, totaling eighteen, it proved to be the main location 
for the reinterments. Even though several sets of remains were repatriated throughout the country 
a significant number were kept in Dublin to be buried in the Republican plot in Glasnevin 
Cemetery, on 30 October 1924. According to the Irish Times, the procession which followed the 
transferal of the bodies from Whitefriar Church to Glasnevin Cemetery was ‗one of the largest 
seen in the city for some time.‘82 It further stated that the hearses carrying the remains were 
followed by relatives ‗in a long line of mourning coaches and taxi-cabs, and the rear was brought 
up by many thousands of marching men and women. Although rain fell heavily large crowds 
assembled in the streets.‘83 Once the funeral procession arrived at the aforementioned cemetery 
and the ceremony began the inevitable occurred.  
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According to a report from the Adjutant Dublin No. 1 Brigade the ‗Glasnevin incident‘ as 
it became known witnessed: 
About an hour before the Funeral [procession] arrived a Party of Free State 
Troops consisting of about 50 men accompanied by about 20 C.I.D. [Criminal 
Investigation Department] men entered the Graveyard. The F.S. [Free State] 
military remained at the F.S. plot but the C.I.D. went straight to the Republican 
Plot [...] The Superintendant of the Graveyard was informed that they [The C.I.D. 
and Free State troops] were present to see that the F.S. plot was not interfered 
with. Immediately [after] our Firing Squad had fired the third volley a party of 
C.I.D. men rushed at them and the [Free State] military doubled to the scene. 
Whether through ignorance or otherwise no attempt was made by the military to 
surround the crowd or to hold the exit gate, consequently the men of the Firing 
Squad got away.
84
 
 
The event was reported in the Irish Times the following day, 31 October 1924. In an article 
entitled: ‗The Republican Funerals. Exciting Graveyard Scenes. Searches by Troops.‘ it was 
stated that National troops arrived at the cemetery around 4 o‘clock in tenders and took up 
position on the boundary wall in sight of the Republican plot. The remains of the executed men 
were received by Father Fitzgibbon and P. J. Rutledge gave the graveside oration as the last two 
coffins, those of O‘Connor and Childers, were being lowered. When Rutledge had concluded the 
‗Last Post‘ was sounded and six young men all in possession of revolvers drew them and fired 
into the air. Before the second volley was sounded a woman on the outskirts of the crowd 
shouted that the soldiers were approaching.
85
 According to the article: 
The soldiers approached with fixed bayonets, but the majority of the people 
remained where they were. Some of the women hurled epithets at the soldiers, 
who quickly surrounded the men standing about the graves. They searched many 
of them but so far as could be learned no arms were found, and apparently the 
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men who had fired had succeeded in getting away in the first rush […] When the 
soldiers were leaving the graveyard they were subjected to abuse.
86
 
 
Ultimately, several of the executed Irregulars were laid to rest in the Republican plot. These 
include, amongst others, Richard Twohig, Peter Cassidy, James Fisher, John Gaffney, Patrick 
Farrelly, Erskine Childers, John Murphy, Joseph Spooner, Rory O‘Connor, and James 
O‘Rourke.87 
A similar event occurred in Dundalk, County Louth, during the reinterment the men 
executed there in January 1923. According to a report from Commandant P. King, the Eastern 
Command Adjutant, to the Chief of Staff a large altercation occurred between Free State and 
anti-treatyite supporters in St. Patrick‘s Cemetery, Dowdallshill, Dundalk, County Louth on 30 
October 1924. The report stated that sixteen Free State officers, some dressed in civilian 
clothing, and thirty-four men armed with revolvers and rifles surrounded the cemetery and grave 
to prevent the admittance of parties of Irregulars. It further declared that: 
The Funeral cortege arrived at the Grave Yard about 3.30 p.m. and after the 
necessary ceremonies had been conducted four men and four girls were noticed 
along the sides of the graves. Immediately the sound of revolvers being 
discharged was heard, the Officers in Mufti made a rush and secured two men 
named Ivor Monaghan and James Goodfellow, with revolvers in their hands. 
Another revolver was picked up on the ground. A hand grenade and some 
revolver shots were fired by civilians in the crowd at the party of troops in the 
Grave Yard. The Troops fired a number of shots in the air.
88
 
 
The Dundalk Democrat published an article, on 1 November, entitled: ‗Gunfire! Extraordinary 
Graveyard Scenes in Dundalk‘ which stated that: 
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When the coffins had been laid in the graves six young men proceeded to fire 
three volleys from revolvers. [Free State] Military, who were on duty inside and 
outside the cemetery, rushed in with fixed bayonets towards the men [...] 
Hundreds of shots were exchanged between the soldiers and the armed civilians.
89
 
 
 
Both of the arrested men were tried in early November. The Judge was prepared to give the men 
the benefit of the First Offenders Act if they gave sureties of good behaviour for twelve months. 
However, both men refused to give such guarantees. The Judge sentenced them to one month 
without hard labour. He finished by saying ‗I am sorry to do it but I have to do it.‘90  
The sentence was seen as lenient by both the Director of Intelligence and the 
Commissioner of an Garda Síochána. The former sent a letter to the latter in which he vented his 
frustration. Following receipt of this letter the Commissioner then forwarded the original letter to 
O‘Higgins in the Department of Home Affairs on 7 November. In this letter the Director of 
Intelligence argued: 
It is absolutely useless arresting Irregulars for being in possession of arms unless 
they get at least twelve months with hard labour. Sentences, such as the one 
imposed in Dundalk and in other places recently, will only make these persons 
anxious to get arrested so that they will be popular heroes when they get out, as 
used to occur about 1919.
91
 
 
The Commissioner added his own thoughts which were just as scornful.  He believed that both 
Goodfellow and Monaghan should have been dealt with firmly. He was of the opinion that if the 
defendants had been arrested during the Civil War they would certainly have been executed.  
I make no comment on the matter myself, beyond saying that the two defendants 
deserved no consideration, apart altogether from the case under discussion. If 
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arrested during the period their activities had full scope, and they were much 
sought, they would certainly have been executed.
92
 
 
The presence of National troops at the reinterments also elicited public condemnation. 
This is evidenced by a letter received by O‘Higgins from Joseph Dolan, a family grocer from 
Ardee, County Louth. Dolan claimed that the incidents that occurred in various cemeteries 
throughout Ireland would give the anti-treatyites and ‗all the crowd of childish wretches 
securities and better propaganda material than they could themselves plan or desire.‘93 He 
claimed that the anti-treatyite movement was dying out and that events such as these would not 
only ‗win them sympathy from hitherto supporters of the Govt. [but] will [also] embitter their 
followers and revive all the dying hostility of their rank and file.‘94 Dolan supported the 
executions policy. However, he seemed perplexed on the issue of returning the remains. He 
stated it ‗was quite right to execute these prisoners, but why were not their bodies given back the 
day of their deaths and this gesture of kindliness would have killed half the antagonism that 
keeps burning still.‘95 He summed up by stating ‗when they were being returned now, why were 
not their friends and die-hard boy adherents let bury them as they liked. What harm did their 
childish revolver firing do? Was not the presence of Military in the graveyard altogether 
offensive and unnecessary[?] 
96
 In response to this letter O‘Higgins wrote: 
The Government can scarcely be expected to tacitly accept the idea of two armies 
in the country. Further the Dail, having passed an Act regulating the possession 
and use of firearms, cannot afford to allow that Act to become a dead letter and to 
be openly flouted. If military funerals and volleys over graves were to be 
permitted how long would it be before we should have an irregular army 
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marching with arms and in military formation through the country? The Dundalk 
affair does not seem to have been well-handled and it appears to me that military 
action should have taken the form of prevention at an earlier stage rather than 
intervention when the offence had actually happened.
97
 
 
O‘Higgins assertion that the incident in Dundalk was mishandled was an understatement. 
Due to the altercation in Dundalk on 30 October one man, Joseph Hughes, was seriously hurt and 
died from his injuries the following day. According to Commandant King, ‗one man named 
Hughes was wounded. It is not known how he was wounded, but the description of the wound 
would resemble a splinter from a hand grenade.‘98 According to correspondence between the 
Superintendant, John Farrell, and the Garda Commissioner, Hughes died on 1 November 1924 at 
3 a.m. after suddenly lapsing into unconsciousness around midnight. The Superintendant also 
stated that: 
Hughes ‗did not belong to any political organisation, and was on the occasion of 
his getting wounded in St. Patrick‘s Cemetery there as an ordinary spectator. It is 
obvious from the [Inquiry] proceedings [...] that the Republican party are 
endeavouring to use this young man as a ―pawn‖ purely for propaganda 
purposes.
99
 
 
His parents, according to Anne Dolan, were quite averse to efforts by republicans to organise his 
funeral. They wanted to bury their son in private, without politics and party lines.
100
 Hughes was 
buried, according to Superintendant Farrell, in: 
Castletown Cemetery on Monday, and it is rumoured [...] that the Republican 
party will endeavour to represent to the public that he belonged to their 
organisation and give him a public funeral. I am reliably informed that his 
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relatives are adverse to this procedure, so possibly there may be some trouble here 
over this matter.
101
 
 
The death of an innocent spectator raised serious questions in the Dáil. One T.D. from 
Clare and member of the Farmer‘s Party, Mr. Conor Hogan, questioned Cosgrave on whether or 
not civilians were given adequate notice of the inherent risks in attending these reinterments due 
to the presence of armed troops. Cosgrave responded if ‗they give us warning that they are going 
to use these arms at these demonstrations, we will give the necessary warning afterwards.‘102 Mr. 
Hogan pressed Cosgrave to comment on death of Hughes, however, the former evaded this 
awkward issue stating: 
The facts as to the incidents referred to are being inquired into. The investigation 
has been delayed on account of the holding of an inquest in connection with a 
death resulting from the incidents. Pending the receipt of the military report I am 
not in a position to make any statement, but I will communicate with the Deputy 
on the matter as soon as possible.
103
 
 
Despite Cosgrave‘s political posturing and the fact that a man had lost his life in the Dundalk 
affair the remains of the men executed during the Irish Civil War were finally buried by their 
families and friends in a ceremonious manner in several cemeteries throughout the country.  
 The cessation of hostilities in May 1923 did not mean an end to the controversy and 
dispute over the causes of the Irish Civil War and the manner in which it was fought. Even 
though the country faced numerous problems following the conclusion of the conflict the 
Cumann na nGaedheal Government was determined to work the Anglo-Irish Treaty over which 
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the War was fought. As evidence suggests it enacted several contentious post-war policies to aid 
the return of settled conditions to the country. It has been established, however, that it was the 
Government‘s decision to demobilise a significant portion of its armed forces, in September 
1923, which caused significant controversy in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War. Two 
main consequences of this process aggravated both pro- and anti- treatyites alike. Firstly, it 
caused discontent with the Army and resulted in a mutiny in March 1924. Secondly, it forced the 
Government to release the remains of the executed men for reinterment in October 1924 
following several weeks of both public and political condemnation. Inevitably, numerous clashes 
occurred at these ceremonies and one man, Joseph Hughes, lost his life. Despite this the fact that 
these reinterments occurred at all is worth noting as reinterments associated with other, less 
divisive, conflicts did not occur for nearly eighty years. For instance, the ‗Forgotten Ten‘, i.e. the 
men executed in Mountjoy Jail by the British during the Irish War of Independence, were not 
reinterred until 2001.
104
 Even though contemporary conditions influenced the prompt reinterment 
of the men executed during the Civil War it is important that it occurred as promptly as it did. It 
removed one of the obstacles to post-war reconciliation. The latter stages of 1924 also saw the 
introduction of a general amnesty as the Government decided that it was not in the best interest 
of the State to enact any further criminal proceedings for crimes committed during the Civil 
War.
105
 By the summer of that year the vast majority of the remaining Irregular internees, 
including de Valera, were released and only those with criminal convictions were retained in 
prison.
106
 Yet the most important thing for the families of the executed men, at least, was that 
they finally got the chance to bury them in a manner which befitted those that had fought and 
died for Ireland. 
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Table 1 
Captain Stafford’s work schedule was as follows: 
Location Date
Kehoe Barracks Night of 17th & 18th July '24
Wexford Prison 25th & 26th July '24
Rossess‘ Castle, Birr 30th & 31st July - August 1st
Tuam Military Barracks 5
th
, 6
th
 & 7
th
 August 1924
Drumboe Castle 25
th
, 26
th
, 27
th
, & 28
th
 Aug. 1924
Beggars Bush Barracks 15
th
 September, 1924
Mountjoy Prison 18
th
 September, 1924
Kilmainham Prison 25
th
 September, 1924
Carlow Barracks 29
th
 September, 1924
Kilkenny Barracks 7
th
 October, 1924
Mullingar Barracks 13
th
 October, 1924
Southern Command including: 14
th
 October to 24
th
 inclusive
Cork Prison, Waterford
Home Barracks, Roscrea
Castle Barracks, Ennis,      
Limerick & Tralee Prisons 
Arbour Hill Barracks October 25
th
, 1924  
Captain Kearns’ work schedule was as follows: 
Location Date
Prison and Barracks, Dundalk October 15
th
, 16
th
, and 17
th
 1924
Curragh Camp October 18
th
, 1924
Carlow Barracks October 20
th
, 1924
Maryboro‘ Barracks October 21
st
, 1924
Athlone Barracks October 23
rd
, & 24
th
, 1924.  
 
Source: Letter from Captain Stafford to Assistant Adjutant General regarding payment for exhumation duties, 13 
November 1924 (N.A.I., in Department of Finance files, FIN s004/0215/24). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Irish Civil War and the methods by which the conflict was fought had a significant 
impact on post-war Ireland. The bitterness engendered by the official and unofficial actions 
performed by both sides during the Civil War ensured that prompt reconciliation was unlikely. 
The fact that the War did not end in a compromise or a comprehensive victory ensured that 
political reunification was improbable. This remains the case. Both main political parties in 
Ireland, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, owe their origins to the divide that the Treaty created and 
both the Civil War and executions policy solidified. The former party was established in 1926 by 
Eamon de Valera and the anti-treatyite Sinn Féin T.D.s who wished to enter the Dáil. The latter 
was a coalition established on 8 September 1933. It consisted of the Cumann na nGaedheal 
Party, Eoin O‘Duffy‘s Blueshirts, so-called due to their attire, and National Centre Party.1 This is 
the most evident and enduring consequence of the Civil War. But it was certainly not the only 
one as the acrimonious atmosphere generated by the conflict did not simply evaporate in May 
1923.  
Following the conclusion of the Civil War the Government and the Army still possessed 
the remains of the eighty-one executed men. The reinterments, in October 1924, provided the 
first real stage for the anti-treatyites to further demonstrate their contempt for the Government 
and the Treaty. It has been established that these reinterments occurred not out of any desire 
from Cumann na nGaedheal to heal civil war wounds but because of the considerable public and 
political pressure placed on the Government following their mishandling of the remains during 
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the demobilisation process. The reinterments resulted in sizeable republican demonstrations in 
several parts of the country as remains were received, streets were lined in support and 
cemeteries were filled to finally bury their loved ones, friends and comrades. However, as 
previously mentioned, several of these events were marred by armed clashes. Ultimately one 
man, Joseph Hughes an innocent spectator from Dundalk, County Louth, lost his life in one such 
skirmish. This was not the only way in which the Civil War and the executions policy continued 
to affect post-war Ireland. Members of the Cumann na nGaedheal hierarchy, such as Richard 
Mulcahy and Kevin O‘Higgins, never managed to purge themselves of culpability for the 
executions. This was to have major consequences for both men in the years following the Civil 
War. 
An unarmed and unprotected O‘Higgins was assassinated near his home whilst on his 
way to mass in Booterstown, County Dublin on 10 July 1927.
2
 Three I.R.A. men Archie Doyle, 
Bill Gannon and Tim Coughlan came upon the Minster by chance and shot him several times.
3
 
O‘Higgins was loathed by the anti-treatyite militants for his role during the Civil War.4 
Furthermore he had, on several subsequent occasions, reiterated, what he believed to be, the 
necessity for his and the Government‘s actions during the War. For example, he stated at an 
election rally in Sligo in January 1925 that ‗I stand over those seventy-seven executions and over 
seven hundred and seventy-seven more if they become necessary.‘5 In this instance, O‘Higgins 
was trying to reiterate his, and Cumann na nGaedheal‘s, ability to govern the country by taking 
stern action against, what he argued was, a national threat. According to O‘Higgins‘ wife Brigid, 
he remained resolute, yet forgiving, until his death. He stated that my ‗hour has come and my 
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work is done […] May God forgive those who did this thing to me. […] You must hold no 
bitterness in your heart against them.‘6 Remarkably, Mrs. O‘Higgins received a letter of 
condolence from Rory O‘Connor‘s sister, Eily. She wrote: ‗Dear Mrs. O‘Higgins, Words are of 
little avail in times of grief – but I would like to offer you from myself & the whole family our 
most heartfelt sympathy. May God console you as he alone can. I remain very sincerely, Eily 
O‘Connor.‘7 The O‘Connor and O‘Higgins families were close friends and the fact that Kevin 
was the best man at Rory‘s wedding made the decision to sanction his execution in Mountjoy 
Jail, in December 1922, even more difficult for O‘Higgins. Given the circumstances the 
sympathy shown by Eily O‘Connor is worth noting. 
President Cosgrave quickly introduced the Electoral (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill to the 
Dáil, on 20 July 1927, after O‘Higgins‘ death. The legislation required electoral candidates ‗to 
make before nomination a declaration on oath of intention to take their seats therein and to take 
the oath [of allegiance] required by Article 17 of the Constitution‘.8 The provision ensured that 
every elected T.D. was obliged to take the Oath or forfeit their seat. De Valera subsequently 
altered his abstentionist position and finally took the Oath, ironically declaring it an ‗empty 
formula‘, and entered Dáil Éireann with his anti-treatyite T.D.s on 11 August.9 The Oath had not 
been so insignificant for de Valera five years previously. This would not be the only time that de 
Valera altered his position concerning policy that he vehemently opposed during the Civil War. 
Fianna Fáil went from strength to strength after they entered the Dáil eventually taking power on 
9 March 1932. The transfer of power from the victors of the Civil War to the vanquished proved 
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to be one of the undeniable achievements of the emerging Irish democracy.
10
 However, two days 
before Cumann na nGaedheal were due to leave Office the Minister for Defence, Desmond 
FitzGerald, discreetly ordered his secretary to destroy all material relating to the Civil War 
executions lest it fall into the hands of Fianna Fáil. This previously unreported order was given 
as FitzGerald believed that the: 
Proceedings of Military Courts, including Committee of Officers. Reports on and details 
of Executions 1922 – 1923 period [...] contain information which may lead – if disclosed 
to unauthorised persons – to loss of life, you are hereby ordered to destroy same by fire.11  
 
This is significant. It was an acknowledgment by the Government that material pertaining to the 
Civil War executions policy was, even after ten years, still highly sensitive. This previously 
undiscovered order, more than any other, affected this thesis as it ensured that a substantial 
quantity of primary information pertaining to the Irish Civil War executions was destroyed in 
1932.  
Mulcahy‘s close association with the Civil War executions had major ramifications on his 
political career. In 1948 the Irish electorate voted for change after sixteen years of Fianna Fáil 
governance. Despite winning sixty-eight seats and remaining the largest party they were toppled 
by a coalition formed between Fine Gael, Clann na Poblachta, Clann na Talmhan, Labour, and 
several Independents.
12
 Clann na Poblachta was established on 6 July 1946 in Barry‘s Hotel, 
Dublin, by former I.R.A. Chief of Staff and barrister Seán MacBride.
13
 It appealed to republicans 
that had become disillusioned with violence. Mulcahy, having become the leader of Fine Gael in 
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1943 following Cosgrave‘s departure, was the presumed choice for Taoiseach. However 
MacBride, a former anti-treatyite who was imprisoned by the Free State Government on several 
occasions and a man that had a history of defending I.R.A. men against execution during the 
Second World War, would not form a coalition under the premiership of a man with such clear 
ties to the Civil War executions policy. According to Elizabeth Keane, ‗MacBride could not 
agree to Mulcahy‘s becoming Taoiseach, as Mulcahy had been commander of the Free State 
forces during the Civil War and had once signed an internment order for MacBride.‘14 It must be 
emphasised, however, the fact that Mulcahy and MacBride could serve in the same government 
having being on opposite sides during a bitter civil war indicated that tensions had abated, to 
some degree, by 1948. It was also indicative of an avid desire to stop de Valera and Fianna Fáil 
from forming another government. A compromise candidate was chosen to become the head of 
the first Inter-Party Government, John A. Costello. He was a staff member in the office of the 
Attorney-General during the Civil War. Costello had become the Attorney-General and was also 
a Cumann na nGaedheal T.D.
15
 The legacy bequeathed to Ireland by the Civil War and the 
executions policy did not just affect the Irish political landscape or result in the destruction of 
highly sensitive historical material. The executions that occurred under Cumann na nGaedheal 
had set a notorious precedent. Remarkably, given his stance during the Civil War, this was a 
pattern repeated by de Valera and Fianna Fáil during the Second World War. 
Initially, de Valera decided to placate the I.R.A when he came to power in 1932. 
However, they continued to be a menace to society with their open drilling and several political 
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murders throughout the 1930s.
16
 He finally proscribed the organisation in June 1936.
17
 
Furthermore, he enacted the Emergency Powers (Amendment) (No. 2) Act on 5 January 1940 in 
response to events undertaken by the I.R.A. For example, the Coventry bombing on 23 August 
1939 and the Phoenix Park magazine raid on 23 December 1939.
18
 Following the advent of the 
Second World War, known as the ‗Emergency‘ in Ireland, he decided to crack-down on the 
republican dissidents. Ireland remained neutral during the War. De Valera and his administration 
ultimately executed six I.R.A. men, allowed several others to die on hunger strike and interned 
over five hundred men without trial during the Second World War.
19
 Firstly, Patrick McGrath 
and Francis Harte were found guilty of the murder of Richard Hyland, of the Garda Special 
Branch, during a raid on 98a Rathgar Road, County Dublin. They were sentenced to death by 
shooting on 20 August 1940.
20
 The sentence was carried out in Mountjoy Jail at 6.45 a.m. on 6 
September. Richard Goss was charged with shooting at military officers and police with the 
intent of resisting arrest on 18 July 1941. Convicted on 1 August 1941, he was executed on 9 
August 1941.
21
 George Plant was charged with the murder of Michael Devereaux on 27 
September 1940. He was convicted and executed on 25 February 1942 and 5 March 1942, 
respectively.
22
 Maurice O‘Neill was arrested for shooting at Gardaí with the intention of resisting 
arrest on 24 October 1942. The incident resulted in the death of Detective Mordant. He was 
convicted on 5 November and put to death on 12 November 1942. Finally, Charlie Kerins was 
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hanged on 1 December 1944 having been convicted, on 9 October, of killing of Sergeant Denny 
O‘Brien. O‘Brien had commanded the raid in which McGrath and Harte were captured on 9 
September 1942.
23
 With these actions, as Lyons argues, ‗the wheel came full circle and the logic 
of the Civil War was worked out to its own grim conclusion. The men who had upheld the 
revolution against the state now upheld the state against the men who still believed that 
revolution was a sacred duty.‘24 Coogan also argues as de Valera had adopted emergency 
measures, filled internment camps and executed I.R.A. prisoners ‗The mantle, or nemesis, of the 
civil war executioners had finally descended on to the shoulders of Eamon de Valera.‘25 That 
said Ireland‘s neutrality possessed a positive side. Despite the fact that neutrality damaged an 
already stagnant economy the policy commanded over-whelming public and political support. It 
also gave the country a sense of confidence and common dedication to a national purpose. This 
did a great deal to mollify civil war divisions.
26
 
De Valera finally stepped down in 1959, thirty-six years after the conclusion of the Irish 
Civil War.
27
 When he left office he handed the reins of power to Seán Lemass. Lemass, himself a 
veteran of the Civil War, ironically presided over a generational transition in Irish politics and 
society. According to Garvin, Lemass: 
had the good fortune to come to power at a time coincident with a general wave of 
opinion that looked for sweeping changes in Irish government policy and Irish society 
[...] a generational change was occurring, as people who did not remember the revolution 
or its passions took over from the older people.
28
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Lemass was relentless in removing de Valera‘s old and increasingly gerontocratic power group, 
all of which were appointed due to their roles in the revolution forty years previously, siding 
with young progressive men instead of the ‗boys of the old brigade‘.29 After initiating this 
evolution Lemass finally retired in 1966 and Jack Lynch, former Minister for Finance, became 
leader of both Fianna Fáil and the country as an Taoiseach.  
Lynch was a relative light-weight compared to previous Taoisigh. Born in 1917 he was 
an all-Ireland sportsman and arrived relatively late to politics when he was elected as T.D. for 
Cork Borough in 1948.
30
 His premiership marked a natural watershed in Irish politics, one which 
had begun under the auspices of his predecessor. For the first time since 1922 the incumbent 
Taoiseach was not a veteran of the revolutionary period in Ireland. Several other stalwarts also 
departed over the coming years. Frank Aiken, for example, stepped down as Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and Tánaiste in 1969.
31
 Consequently, Irish politics was gradually transfused with new 
younger forward-looking politicians that were far less entrenched and untainted with the bitter 
politics of the Irish Civil War. Previously politicians tended to cultivate the Civil War legacy not 
only for political gain but also political identity. Lee states that ‗as other distinguishing features 
between the main parties become more difficult to discern, only memory continued to divide 
them.‘32 Due to the progress made in such areas as national sovereignty, the establishment of the 
Irish Republic in 1949 by Costello for example, the necessity for their successors to brandish 
these memories to promote the illusion of fundamental differences gradually disappeared.
33
 
Lynch‘s attainment of power occurred concurrently with the fiftieth anniversary of the 1916 
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Easter Rising. The national celebrations, as Ferriter states, encapsulated a pride in the past and 
confidence in the future.
34
 
Fianna Fáil tended to lag behind Fine Gael on this matter. This was due to Fianna Fáil‘s 
relevant dominance in Irish politics with one man, de Valera, at its pinnacle for four decades. For 
instance, only twenty-two men held ministerial post in all of de Valera‘s administrations from 
1932–1954.35 Whereas Fine Gael/Cumann na nGaedheal, even though its hierarchy composed of 
revolutionary veterans such as Cosgrave and Mulcahy from 1923–1959, new younger men rose 
to prominence within the party. That said familial ties were important for political success in 
Ireland. For example, Liam Cosgrave and Garreth FitzGerald, being sons of W. T. Cosgrave and 
Desmond FitzGerald, both became Taoiseach in 1973 and 1981, respectively.
36
 Additionally, 
Erskine Hamilton Childers, President of Ireland from 1973–1974, was the son of Erskine 
Childers.
37
 Finally, Charles Haughey was Lemass‘ son-in-law and became Taoiseach on three 
separate occasions between the years 1979–1992.38  
Outside of politics efforts were also made by other veterans of the conflict who were 
determined to ensure that their hatred did not contaminate the mind-sets of their children. C. S. 
Andrews stated that:  
I had the most disastrous bitterness [...] it was a motivation in my official life that 
we republicans could do it better than those [Free State] bastards. My wife who 
was as equally involved in the Civil War [...] she and I made every effort to keep 
that feeling away from our children and I think with great success.
39
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That said old tensions did not disappear completely. For example, a straightforward debate over 
financial estimates in the Dáil in 1950 devolved into a contentious debate over the executions 
that occurred during the Civil War and the Second World War. Deputy Patrick McGrath, of 
Fianna Fáil, attempted to draw Deputy Con Lehane, of Clann na Poblachta, into an argument 
pertaining to the procedure for executions in Ireland. McGrath, in an attempt to stifle Lehane 
shouted across the floor ‗There were 77 executions.‘40 However, Lehane promptly responded 
referring to the fact that the British executioner, Albert Pierrepoint, was employed by the Fianna 
Fáil Government during the Second World War to hang Charlie Kerins. Following this taunt 
Lehane stated, ‗I am not going to allow myself to follow Deputy McGrath along the lines of that 
interjection. It would be easy for Deputies continually to hark back to events in the past. This 
country has a future.‘41 Another example of this occurred, on 3 December 1958, during a debate 
on the abolition of the Proportional Representation (P.R.) system in Ireland. Deputy Frank 
Sherwin, an Independent T.D., attacked the Fianna Fáil party for employing, what he believed to 
be, callous tactics during their election campaigns. He accused Fainna Fáil of using 
inflammatory rhetoric, pertaining to the Civil War executions, in an effort to heighten emotions 
throughout the country and win votes. Sherwin stated that: 
The difference between them [Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael] was the Civil War and it 
has been largely personal ever since. Each side, especially the Fianna Fáil side, 
largely depends on a certain blood lust which they continue to stir in the Irish 
Press, always going back to the executions with the intention of getting people to 
rally back to them.
42
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Finally, in 1996 a debate between an Taoiseach John Bruton of Fine Gael and future Taoiseach 
Bertie Ahern of Fianna Fáil over the eightieth anniversary of the Rising denigrated in to a heated 
debate over who were the true founders of the Irish State.
43
 These instances, however, have 
proven to be exceptions rather than the rule. The resentment bequeathed by the Civil War and the 
executions policy, which must have seemed immortal in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, 
has naturally given way to progress.
44
 That is not to say that the conflict and the executions have 
lost their significance. A nation cannot expect to move forward if it ignores a major part of its 
origins. Accordingly, what has been ascertained from this study of the executions policy 
employed by the pro-treatyites during the Irish Civil War? 
The executions policy formed a central part of the Provisional/Free State Government‘s 
prosecution of the Irish Civil War. Yet, there was nothing new about emergency measures in 
Ireland. The British, as stated previously, executed a total of thirty combatants between the 
Rising and the War of Independence. The Civil War executions differed, however, as they were 
undertaken by the first independent Irish Government. It has been established in this study that 
the pro-treatyites implemented the emergency measures in a calculated and unyielding fashion. 
They ultimately executed eighty-one men in a little over six months, nearly three times the 
amount that the British put to death in over five years. It is also evident that this policy, 
introduced to hasten the end of the Civil War, did in fact achieve its objective. It must be 
emphasised, however, that it was not the only factor that contributed to the pro-treatyites‘ victory 
in May 1923. The Government benefited from the support of several important and influential 
parties: the public; the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and the British Government. The 
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National Army, moreover, received finance and equipment from the British. Furthermore, after 
several successful recruitment drives the Army was also numerically superior to the Irregulars, 
despite the fact that many of these recruits were of a poor quality. The Irregulars‘ tactics, their 
defensive and uncoordinated prosecution of the conflict in particular, also contributed to their 
eventual defeat. The introduction of the Special Infantry Corps and the Land Bill, in February 
and May 1923, respectively, played a part in the Irregulars‘ demise. The formal introduction of 
the 1923 Land Bill into the Dáil, it has been argued, contributed to the decline in support for the 
Irregulars, particularly in the west of Ireland. Nonetheless, the pro-treatyites may well have won 
the Civil War without resorting to the execution of Irishmen and former comrades. Given that the 
executions policy imbued such an acrimonious legacy on post-war Ireland, one which would take 
decades to subside, whether or not a policy of this nature was ultimately justified is open to 
question. The pro-treatyites did not have the luxury of hindsight in 1922. The Irregulars posed a 
significant threat to the establishment of the Free State and victory in the Civil War was by no 
means a foregone conclusion for the pro-treatyites. In considering the effect that the adoption of 
guerrilla tactics by the Irregulars had on the conflict, it has been shown that it changed the face 
of this increasingly bitter war. It has been established that the killing of Collins shocked the 
Government and crystallised support for the adoption of emergency powers. The Government 
were now determined to meet ‗terror with terror.‘ 
The introduction of the Public Safety Resolution, on 28 September 1922, irrevocably 
altered the dynamic of the Irish Civil War. The resolution, adopted to tackle the Irregulars‘ 
guerrilla tactics, facilitated the executions and ensured that the conflict became a more bitter and 
divisive affair. Critics of this decree questioned its legality. The hypothesis that the resolution 
was unlawful was based on the supposition that the Provisional Government, as a transitional 
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institution, did not possess supreme legislative authority. Evidence suggests that there is some 
merit in this claim. Hugh Kennedy, Law Officer, acknowledged that the Government was not 
exactly on terra firma when it came to ratifying certain types of legislation. To circumvent this 
restriction Kennedy advised the Government to adopt resolutions when introducing emergency 
public safety measures. This important point is generally overlooked in existing academic works 
on the Civil War. It is assumed that this decree was a fully-fledged Act of Parliament, however, 
it was not. 
Questions concerning the validity of this resolution, while interesting, need to be placed 
in context. The Provisional Government was the only credible administration in Ireland during 
the conflict, despite the claims of the anti-treatyites. As the Government of the country it had, in 
theory, the right to introduce emergency measures to defend itself and its citizens during a state 
of war. This point was acknowledged by Judge O‘Connor M.R. in refusing Erskine Childers‘ 
habeas corpus plea. It must also be emphasised that the Government passed a retrospective Act 
of Indemnity in August 1923 to correct any irregularities. Ultimately, the Government 
implemented its emergency resolution regardless of its legality. 
Controversy inevitably surrounded the initial executions. It has been argued that there 
was a connection between the executions of four men, on 17 November, and Childers‘ execution 
on 24 November 1922. It was claimed that the inaugural executions were a test case to gauge the 
possibility of executing members of the Irregulars‘ hierarchy. Furthermore, it was suggested that 
the executions on 17 November were devised to desensitise the country in preparation for 
Childers‘ execution. It has been established that a less controversial and more rational chain of 
events occurred. The initial executions were undoubtedly a test case. However, the first cases 
under any new policy are used to assess to practicality of that policy. Even though Childers was, 
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technically speaking, a leader this does not imply conspiracy. The vast majority of those 
executed during the conflict were ordinary soldiers and not members of the Irregulars‘ elite. It is 
evident that there was a relationship between both sets of executions, however, the link was not 
as questionable as was claimed. Furthermore, there is no evidence which suggests that the 
inaugural executions were designed to dampen the eventual criticism that the Government would 
receive following Childers‘ execution. The occurrence of five executions in one week rather than 
decrease condemnation actually fuelled it. 
It has been demonstrated that the Public Safety Resolution was not devised solely for 
Childers. Those involved in proposing emergency measures, on 27 September, could not have 
known that Childers would be captured, armed with a gun, on 10 November. Moreover, it is 
highly improbable that the pro-treatyites would have executed eighty additional men to facilitate 
Childers‘ death. If the executions policy was meant purely for Childers then why did it not stop 
following his death? Critics also claimed that O‘Higgins‘ referral to Childers on two separate 
occasions in the Dáil was proof that the pro-treatyites had a grudge against the prominent 
Irregular. Evidence indicates that the pro-treatyites, particularly O‘Higgins and Griffith, did 
loathe Childers. However, these contemptuous opinions do not equate to pre-existing intent. The 
pro-treatyites seized an opportunity to issue a stern warning to all Irregulars when Childers was 
captured, tried and convicted. They did not put him to death for personal pleasure. According to 
FitzGerald‘s letters to Arthur, the decision to execute Childers was taken not out of 
vindictiveness but out of necessity.  
Evidence indicates that there was no British involvement in Childers‘ execution. What is 
evident is that Churchill wanted to try Childers for treason. However, it must be emphasised that 
the Provisional Government did not need British permission to convict and execute this man 
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given that he was already guilty. It has been established that arguments concerning the manner 
and location of Childers‘ arrest are in fact irrelevant. Whether he was captured in his familial 
home or in an open engagement does not matter. Childers was a prominent and influential anti-
treatyite. He was a member of an organisation that was engaged in military resistance against the 
Government. Controversy aside, Childers was armed when he was captured and under the terms 
of the Public Safety Resolution he was guilty. 
December 1922 was an important month during the Irish Civil War particularly as it 
witnessed several of the most controversial incidents during the conflict. Following the adoption 
of the Public Safety Resolution and its subsequent implementation the Irregulars‘ Chief of Staff, 
Liam Lynch, reconsidered the practicality of reprisals against those who voted for the emergency 
measures. Subsequently, two pro-treatyite T.D.s Pádraic Ó Maille and Seán Hales were attacked 
on 7 December 1922, the latter being killed. Evidence suggests that Ó Maille was the intended 
target and Hales was shot by mistake. The fact that Hales did not vote on the September 
resolution may explain this. In considering the effect that this single event had on the landscape 
of the Civil War it has been demonstrated that Hales‘ assassination more than any other event, 
the death of Collins included, permanently transformed the character of the conflict. It resulted in 
four controversial executions and had a drastic impact on the Government‘s implementation of 
the executions policy. 
As has been argued in preceding chapters Hales‘ assassination led to the extrajudicial 
execution of four Irregular prisoners in Mountjoy Jail on 8 December 1922. It has been argued 
that these four men were chosen to represent each province of Ireland yet Liam Mellows, chosen 
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to represent Connaught, was undoubtedly a Leinster man.
45
 In reality, there are a myriad of 
plausible reasons which could explain why each of these men were chosen. Regan argues it was 
politically and militarily expedient for the pro-treatyites to execute some of their most intractable 
opponents. He also suggests that several of these particularly high ranking Irregulars had 
intricate knowledge of the secret joint northern policy undertaken during early 1922 by both 
Collins and O‘Connor. Whereas Hopkinson states that some of these men were particularly 
despised by the pro-treatyite leadership due to their roles in the split in the I.R.A. Some theories 
are more credible than others. Nonetheless, the reason for their inclusion is of little significance 
compared to the actual executions. It has been shown that these four men could not avail of the 
offer of amnesty in October as they had been incarcerated for several months. Furthermore, they 
were executed without trial as a reprisal for an attack that they had no part in. This may seem like 
a disproportionate response, however, it needs to be placed in context. This was only one event 
of which there were many. The Mountjoy executions only resulted in the death of four men 
whereas a further sixty-nine men were put to death by the end of the Civil War. This response 
was indicative of a Government shocked to its core. They did not know if Hales‘ assassination 
would be an isolated incident. Evidence indicates that other Irregular attacks were set to 
continue. They responded in such a way as to make the price of further assassinations much too 
costly for the Irregulars. It must be emphasised that as no other political assassinations occurred 
during the conflict it can be argued that the Government‘s course of action was indeed justified. 
However, it was events such as this which contributed to and helped perpetuate the acrimonious 
legacy in post-war Ireland. 
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It has also been shown that the Government subsequently decided to drastically alter the 
implementation of the executions policy in response to Hales‘ assassination. Dissatisfied with the 
impact of the executions the pro-treatyites introduced the mobile committee system. This scheme 
has received little scholarly attention in existing works on the Civil War. Yet it is highly 
significant as it characterised the Government‘s implementation of the executions policy in the 
latter half of the Civil War. It has been ascertained that the scheme was devised to decentralise 
and streamline the executions. It ultimately ensured that the effects of the policy would be felt by 
Irregulars throughout the country rather than simply in Dublin. A prime example of this was the 
seven executions that occurred in Kildare, on 19 December 1922, making it the single largest set 
of executions during the Civil War. The acceleration of the executions policy is further 
evidenced by the thirty-four men put to death in January alone, of which thirty occurred outside 
Dublin.
46
 This became the worst month for executions during the Civil War.  
It must be emphasised that the Government‘s decentralisation process also altered the 
procedure for choosing who, after trial and conviction, was to be executed. Evidence suggests 
that prior to decentralisation the political and military leadership jointly decided who was to be 
put to death. However, following the shift in focus from Dublin to the localities the responsibility 
was transferred to the G.O.C.s in the area where the offence was committed. It appears that the 
local commanders tried and, if found guilty, convicted the Irregular prisoners. If the sentence 
was death then the G.O.C.s were obliged, under the regulations, to seek confirmation of the 
verdict from the Army Council. Upon receipt of the necessary verification the sentence was 
carried out as quickly as possible. 
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The case has been made that the events in early December, like the death of Collins 
before, acted as a catalyst for the Government. Growing increasingly impatient at the 
continuance of the Civil War it devised a number of additional strategies to defeat the Irregulars. 
Evidence suggests that the Government initiated an official hostage scheme in Kerry in 
December 1922. The policy, which was also implemented in other areas such as Cork and 
Donegal, consisted of suspending death sentences provided that there was a measurable 
reduction in guerrilla activity in a particular area. Even though the policy did not have the 
desired effect in Kerry, as it remained a hotspot for Irregular resistance until the end of the 
conflict, the scheme as a whole proved relatively successful. Even though it is unclear if any 
Irregulars that received a stay in execution were ultimately executed the possibility of death 
proved just as effective as an actual execution. It has been shown that this policy placed 
Irregulars in a serious predicament and had a considerable impact on their morale. The lives of 
their incarcerated comrades now depended on their behaviour. As a result a significant number 
of anti-treatyite prisoners sought release in order to persuade active militants to surrender in 
order to avoid further executions. 
It must also be emphasised that towards the end of the conflict the Government refrained 
from restricting the scope of the emergency resolution to just militants. The Public Safety 
Resolution, in addition to subsequent orders such as the ‗Stand Clear Order‘, allowed for the 
execution of civilians. However, the Government only executed four non-combatants in total. 
This can be explained by the fact that the public acquiesced to Irregular executions. It is doubtful 
that this support would continue if the Government initiated widespread civilian executions. The 
Government had prided themselves on their civic duties and responsibilities. If they undertook 
widespread civilian executions then the Government‘s credibility would diminish rapidly. This 
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would, in turn, favour the Irregulars who always claimed that the pro-treatyites were a vicious 
group of British puppets. The scholarly attention that these four cases have received to date is 
almost non-existent. This study has established not only their identities but also when, where and 
why they were put to death. Thus these four men can be finally included in the list of men 
executed during the Irish Civil War. 
In considering the impact of the Government‘s executions policy on the outcome of the 
Civil War the case has been made in the foregoing chapters that they did, despite the claims of 
Frank Aiken, ultimately hasten the end of the conflict. He claimed in his order to dump arms on 
24 May 1923 that neither ‗tortures or firing squads, nor a slavish press can crush the desire for 
Independence out of the hearts of those who fought for the Republic or out of the hearts of our 
people.‘47 Aiken‘s defiant tone, in the face of total defeat, cannot conceal the fact that individual 
sets of executions, the controversial Mountjoy executions in particular, achieved their primary 
objective the halting of the Irregulars‘ policy of assassination. Irregular morale was constantly 
harassed. It must be emphasised that the threat of execution, signified by the Government‘s 
official hostage scheme, in addition to the acceleration and decentralisation of the executions 
policy significantly impacted on the morale of Irregulars. It is unrealistic to assume that the 
execution of seven men in one event, thirty-four in a single month and eighty-one in six months 
did not have any effect on the morale of the Irregulars and, by extension, their prosecution of the 
Civil War. Incidents such as these ensured that the full rigor the Government‘s emergency 
powers were felt throughout the country. 
The impact that the executions policy had on the Irregulars was specifically 
acknowledged by Liam Deasy. Following his arrest, in January 1923, Deasy stated that the 
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executions policy had created a very ‗serious situation‘ in Ireland where ultimate disaster would 
occur unless fighting ceased. Whether this would have occurred is open to question, however, 
the Government showed no indication of stopping the executions. Despite a lull in February, due 
to Deasy‘s circular appeal for peace, the Government executed a further twenty-six men by the 
conflict‘s end in May 1923. Furthermore, it has been established that they executed two men 
several days following the conclusion of the Civil War. Other high ranking Irregulars 
acknowledged the effect that the executions policy had had on their prosecution of the conflict. 
Subsequent to Deasy‘s appeal Tom Barry, Todd Andrews, Frank Barrett and Maurice Sweeney 
also appealed for peace, partly because of the detrimental effect of the executions. 
This dissertation set out to examine a much-neglected area of Irish history, the 
Government‘s executions policy during the Irish Civil War. The thesis questions were posed: 
why was this policy adopted; how was it implemented throughout the course of the conflict; how 
did the Irregulars respond to this course of action and how did the executions policy affect the 
character, course and outcome of the Civil War? It has been established that the Government 
adopted the executions policy to tackle the Irregulars‘ guerrilla warfare in an attempt to hasten 
the end of the Civil War. It was also determined that the Government willingly altered the 
implementation of this policy as circumstances dictated. This flexibility characterised the 
executions policy. Evidence suggests that many of these alterations were directly attributable to 
actions undertaken by the Irregulars. Analysis of the foregoing chapters has established that the 
executions policy did alter the dynamic of the Civil War and ultimately expedited the end of the 
conflict. It can also be argued that Joseph O‘Rourke and Michael Murphy were not the last 
people to succumb to the executions policy. Evidence suggests that an innocent bystander, 
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Joseph Hughes, was killed at the reinterment of the executed men in 1924. Moreover, 
O‘Higgins‘ assassination in 1927 can be directly attributed to his role during the Civil War.  
Hindsight was not an option in 1922. The Government and Army may well have won the 
Civil War without resorting to such a controversial and divisive policy. This begs the question, 
was the executions policy justified given that it imbued such an acrimonious legacy, one which 
took decades to subside? This is a subjective question which is difficult, if not impossible, to 
answer regardless of the amount of research undertaken. It was the aim of this study to present 
the facts, based on the available evidence, and not to imply retrospective justification for acts 
undertaken either by both the pro- and anti- treatyites during the conflict. The fact remains that 
eighty-one men were put to death during the Civil War and whether or not this policy was 
necessary remains open to question. 
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APPENDICES 
 
1. List of the Eighty-One Official Executions During the Irish Civil War 
 
Name Place of Execution County of Execution Date of Execution 
James Fisher Kilmainham Jail  Dublin 17/11/1922 
Peter Cassidy Kilmainham Jail  Dublin 17/11/1922 
Richard Twohig Kilmainham Jail  Dublin 17/11/1922 
John Gaffney Kilmainham Jail  Dublin 17/11/1922 
Erskine Childers Beggars Bush barracks Dublin 24/11/1922 
Joseph Spooner Beggars Bush barracks Dublin 30/11/1922 
Patrick Farrelly Beggars Bush barracks Dublin 30/11/1922 
John Murphy Beggars Bush barracks Dublin 30/11/1922 
Rory O'Connor Mountjoy Jail Dublin 08/12/1922 
Liam Mellows Mountjoy Jail Dublin 08/12/1922 
Joseph McKelvey Mountjoy Jail Dublin 08/12/1922 
Richard Barrett Mountjoy Jail Dublin 08/12/1922 
Stephen White Curragh Camp Kildare 19/12/1922 
Joseph Johnston Curragh Camp Kildare 19/12/1922 
Patrick Mangan Curragh Camp Kildare 19/12/1922 
Patrick Nolan Curragh Camp Kildare 19/12/1922 
Brian Moore Curragh Camp Kildare 19/12/1922 
James O'Connor Curragh Camp Kildare 19/12/1922 
Patrick Bagnel Curragh Camp Kildare 19/12/1922 
John Phelan Kilkenny Jail Kilkenny 29/12/1922 
John Murphy Kilkenny Jail Kilkenny 29/12/1922 
Leo Dowling Portobello barracks Dublin 08/01/1923 
Sylvester Heaney Portobello barracks Dublin 08/01/1923 
Laurence Sheehy Portobello barracks Dublin 08/01/1923 
Anthony O'Reilly Portobello barracks Dublin 08/01/1923 
Terence Brady Portobello barracks Dublin 08/01/1923 
Thomas McKeown Dundalk barracks Louth 13/01/1923 
John McNulty Dundalk barracks Louth 13/01/1923 
Thomas Murray Dundalk barracks Louth 13/01/1923 
Fred Burke Roscrea Tipperary 15/01/1923 
Patrick Russell Roscrea Tipperary 15/01/1923 
Martin O'Shea Roscrea Tipperary 15/01/1923 
Patrick McNamara Roscrea Tipperary 15/01/1923 
James Lillis Carlow Jail Carlow 15/01/1923 
James Daly Tralee barracks Kerry 20/01/1923 
 300 
 
John Clifford Tralee barracks Kerry 20/01/1923 
Michael Brosnan Tralee barracks Kerry 20/01/1923 
James Hanlon Tralee barracks Kerry 20/01/1923 
Cornelius McMahon Limerick Limerick 20/01/1923 
Patrick Hennessy Limerick Limerick 20/01/1923 
Thomas Hughes Athlone barracks Westmeath 20/01/1923 
Michael Walsh Athlone barracks Westmeath 20/01/1923 
Herbert Collins Athlone barracks Westmeath 20/01/1923 
Stephen Joyce Athlone barracks Westmeath 20/01/1923 
Martin Bourke Athlone barracks Westmeath 20/01/1923 
James Melia Dundalk barracks Louth 22/01/1923 
Thomas Lennon  Dundalk barracks Louth 22/01/1923 
Joseph Ferguson Dundalk barracks Louth 22/01/1923 
Michael Fitzgerald Waterford Waterford 25/01/1923 
Patrick O'Reilly Waterford Waterford 25/01/1923 
Patrick Cunningham Birr Offaly 26/01/1923 
William Conroy Birr Offaly 26/01/1923 
Colum Kelly Birr Offaly 26/01/1923 
Patrick Geraghty Port Laois Laois 27/01/1923 
Joseph Byrne Port Laois Laois 27/01/1923 
Thomas Gibson Port Laois Laois 26/02/1923 
James O'Rourke Kilmainham Jail  Dublin 13/03/1923 
William Healy Cork Cork 13/03/1923 
James Parle  Wexford Jail Wexford 13/03/1923 
Patrick Hogan Wexford Jail Wexford 13/03/1923 
John Creane  Wexford Jail Wexford 13/03/1923 
Luke Burke Mullingar Westmeath 13/03/1923 
Michael Greery Mullingar Westmeath 13/03/1923 
John Larkin Drumboe Donegal 14/03/1923 
Timothy O'Sullivan Drumboe Donegal 14/03/1923 
Daniel Enright Drumboe Donegal 14/03/1923 
Charles Daly  Drumboe Donegal 14/03/1923 
Seamus O'Malley Tuam barracks Galway 11/04/1923 
Frank Cunnane Tuam barracks Galway 11/04/1923 
Michael Monaghan Tuam barracks Galway 11/04/1923 
John Newell Tuam barracks Galway 11/04/1923 
John Maguire Tuam barracks Galway 11/04/1923 
Martin Moylan Tuam barracks Galway 11/04/1923 
Edward Greaney Tralee barracks Kerry 25/04/1923 
Reginald Hathaway Tralee barracks Kerry 25/04/1923 
James McInerney Tralee barracks Kerry 25/04/1923 
Patrick Mahoney Ennis Clare 26/04/1923 
Christopher Quinn Ennis Clare 02/05/1923 
William Shaughnessy Ennis Clare 02/05/1923 
Michael Murphy Tuam barracks Galway 30/05/1923 
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Joseph O'Rourke Tuam barracks Galway 30/05/1923 
 
Note: Those names in Red were civilians officially executed by the National Army during the 
Irish Civil War. Those in Blue were tried by court-martial and executed for treachery having 
formally been National troops but captured aiding Irregulars. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Particulars of the 77 Free State Official Executions, undated (U.C.D. Archives, Twomey 
papers, P69/162 (40-42)), see also Dorothy Macardle, The Irish Republic, a documented 
chronicle of the Anglo-Irish conflict and the partitioning of Ireland, with a detailed account of 
the period 1916-1923, 3rd edition (Dublin, 1999), pp 984-985, see also Nollaig Ó Gadhra, Civil 
War in Connacht 1922-1923 (Dublin, 1999), pp 144-145, Colm Campbell, Emergency law in 
Ireland, 1918-1925 (New York, 1994), pp 361-371, see also List of executed men, undated 
(U.C.D. Archives, de Valera papers, P150/1657), see also List of executed republicans, undated 
(T.C.D. Manuscripts Department, Childers papers, Ms 7808/324), see also List of executed 
Irregulars, undated (N.A.I., Department of an Taoiseach S Files, D/T S 1369/5). 
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2. The 1922 Public Safety Resolution 
 
 
TRANSLATION. 
―(1) DE BHRÍ gur chuir an Rialtas mar 
dhualgas ar an Arm an pobal do chosaint ó 
bhaol agus dea-órdú do bhunú arís ar 
fnaid na tíre agus gur chuireadar de 
chúram ar an Arm údarás an Rialtais do 
dhaingniú I ngach páirt den tír ina 
bhfuiltear ag cur I gcoinne an údaráis sin 
le fóiréigean. 
―(1) WHEREAS the Government has entrusted to the 
Army the duty of securing the public safety and 
restoring order throughout the country and has placed 
on the Army the responsibility for the establishment 
of the authority of the Government in all parts of the 
country in which that authority is challenged by 
force: 
―(2) AGUS DE BHRÍ gur chuir 
Comhairle an Airm in úil don Rialtas go 
bhfuil sé riachtanach chun an dualgas agus 
an cúram do cuireadh ortha do chólíona le 
héifeacht go mbeadh comhacht ag 
Comhairle an Airm chun Cúirteanna no 
Coistí Airm do chur ar bun ag a mbeadh 
lán-chomhacht chun cúiseanna do scrúdú 
agus daoine do phionósú ar iad d'fháil 
ciontach I ngíomhartha do thiocfadh 
trasna ar no do mhoilleodh údarás an 
Rialtais do lán-dhaingniú agus go mbeadh 
comhacht ag Comhairle an Airm údarás 
do thabhairt le daoine atá I mbraighdeanas 
Airm ag Comhairle an Airm do chimeád 
in áiteanna atá laistigh no lasmuich de 
líomatáiste dlí an Rialtais agus fós go 
mbeadh comracht acu deighleáil agus 
seilbh in airm theine do rialú. 
―(2) AND WHEREAS the Army Council has 
represented to the Government that in order to 
discharge effectively the duty and responsibility so 
placed on them it is essential that the Army Council 
should have power to set up Military Courts or 
Committees with full powers of enquiring into 
charges and inflicting punishments on persons found 
guilty of acts calculated to interfere with or delay the 
effective establishment of the authority of the 
Government, and that the Army Council should have 
power to authorise the detention in places whether 
within or without the area of the jurisdiction of the 
Government of persons in Military custody and 
power to control the dealing in and possession of 
firearms; 
―(3) AGUS DE BHRÍ gur soiléir don 
Rialtas fírinne na faisnéise sin agus gur 
thoiligheadar go ndéanfaí fé údarás 
Chomhairle an Airm gach no aon cheann 
de sna nithe agus na rudaí seo leanas. 
―(3) AND WHEREAS the Government, recognising 
the force of such representations, has sanctioned the 
doing under the authority of the Army Council of all 
or any of the following matters and things: 
(a) Cúirteanna no Coistí Airm do chur ar 
bun chun cúiseanna I gcoinne daoine I 
dtaobh aon cheann de sna cionta a 
luaidhtear 'na dhiaidh seo do sgrúdú ar 
choiníoll, amh, go mbeidh mar bhall de 
gach Cúirt no Coiste Airm dá leithéid 
duine ambain ar a luighead a ainmneoidh 
an t-Aire un Chosaint agus a 
(a) The setting up of Military Courts or Committees 
for the enquiring into charges against persons in 
respect of any of the offences hereinafter mentioned 
provided however that every such Military Court or 
Committee shall include as a member thereof at least 
one person nominated by the Minister of Defence 
and certified by the Law Officer to be a person of 
legal knowledge and experience; 
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dheimhneoidh an Dlí-Oigigeach bheith 'na 
dhuine go bhfuil eolas agus taithí dlí aige. 
(b) Na Cúirteanna no Coistí Airm sin do 
sgrúdú chás daoine go bhfuil aon cheann 
de sna cionta so leanas curtha 'na leith sé 
sin le rá:— 
(b) The enquiry by such Military Courts or 
Committees into the cases of persons charged with 
any of the offences following that is to say— 
(1) Bheith páirteach I no do chabhrú le no 
do chur suas chun aon ionsuidhe do 
dhéanamh ar no fórsa d'úsáid I gcoinne an 
Airm Náisiúnta. 
(1) Taking part in or aiding or abetting any attack 
upon or using force against the National Forces; 
(2) Creach tóiteán lot gabháil seilbh no 
aistriú no díobháil mhídhleathach do 
déanamh do mhaoin phuiblí no 
phríobháideach. 
(2) Looting arson destruction seizure unlawful 
possession or removal of or damage to any public or 
private property; 
(3) Bheith I seilbh gan údarás chóir aon 
bhoma no aon rud de nádúir bhoma no 
aon dynamite, gelignite, no aon stuff 
phléasgach eile no aon phiostal, rifle, 
gunna no arm teine eile no arm 
marbhthach no aon lón d'aon arm teine dá 
leithéid. 
(3) Having possession without proper authority of 
any bomb or article in the nature of a bomb or any 
dynamite gelignite or other explosive substance or 
any revolver rifle gun or other firearm or lethal 
weapon or any ammunition for such firearm; 
(4) Aon ordú no riail ghenerálta a 
dhéanfaidh Comhairle an Airm do bhrise 
agus na Cúirteanna no Coistí Airm sin do 
thabhairt bhreith bháis no bhreith 
dhaorphríosúin ar feadh aon téarma no 
bhreith phríosúin ar feadh aon téarma no 
do chur fíneála d'aon mhéid le no gan 
phríosún ar aon duine a ciontófar ag aon 
Chúirt no Choiste mar sin in aon cheann 
de sna cionta roimhráite. Ar choiníoll ná 
cuirfear aon bhreith bháis mar sin I 
bhfeidhm ach fé cho-shighniú dhá bhall de 
Chomhairle an Airm. 
(4) The breach of any general order or regulation 
made by the Army Council and the infliction by such 
Military Courts or Committees of the punishment of 
death or of penal servitude for any period or of 
imprisonment for any period or of a fine for any 
amount either with or without imprisonment on any 
person found guilty by such Court or Committee of 
any of the offences aforesaid. Provided that no such 
sentence of death be executed except under the 
countersignature of two members of the Army 
Council; 
(c) Fé údarás Chomhairle an Airm gach 
no aon duine atá tógtha no cimeádtha 'na 
phríosúnach ag an Arm Náisiúnta d'aistriú 
go dtí aon áit no áiteanna laistigh no 
lasmuich de liómatáiste dlí an Rialtais 
agus aon duine mar sin do chimeád no do 
chur don phríosún in aon áit no áiteanna 
laistigh no lasmuich den líomatáiste dlí 
roimh-ráite. 
(c) The removal under authority of the Army Council 
of any person taken prisoner arrested or detained by 
the National Forces to any place or places whether 
within or without the area of jurisdiction of the 
Government and the detention or imprisonment of 
any such persons in any place or places within or 
without the area aforesaid; 
(d) Díol seilbh aistriú agus deighleáil I (d) The regulation and control of the sale possession 
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bpiostail riflí gunnaí agus airm theine eile 
do rialú agus do riara. 
transfer of and dealing in revolvers rifles guns and 
other firearms; 
―(4) ANOIS deimhnigheann agus molann 
an Dáil seo déanamh gach no aon cheann 
de sna gníomhartha agus na nithe roimh-
ráite ag no fé údarás Chomhairle an Airm 
agus an cead ata tugtha ag an Rialtas uatha 
mar gurb é tuairim na Dála gur riachtanas 
Airm déanamh na nithe uile roimh-ráite ag 
no fé údarás Chomhairle an Airm. Ar 
choiníoll amh maidir le n-a leithéid d'órdú 
no de riail ghenearalta mar roimh-ráite go 
luaidhfear ann an pionós is mó is féidir do 
chur ar dhuine as ucht a bhriste agus go 
leagfar é ar bhord na Dála so agus go 
mbeidh feidhm aige ar chríochnú cheithre 
lá ar a mbeidh an Dáil I siosóin 'na 
dhiaidh sin mara mbeidh rún curtha I 
bhfeidhm ag an nDáil seo roimhe sin á 
chur ar ceal. 
―(4) NOW this Dáil being of opinion that the doing 
by or under the authority of the Army Council of the 
several matters aforesaid is a matter of Military 
necessity doth hereby ratify and approve of the 
sanction given by the Government and of the doing 
by or under the Authority of the Army Council of all 
or any of the acts and matters aforesaid. Provided 
however that as regards such general order or 
regulation as aforesaid the same shall specify the 
maximum penalty which may be inflicted for any 
breach thereof and shall be laid on the table of this 
Dáil and shall take effect on the expiration of four 
days thereafter during which this Dáil shall be in 
session unless this Dáil shall have previously passed 
a resolution disallowing the same. 
―Baile Atha Cliath an 28adh lá so de 
Mheadhon Foghmhair, 1922.‖ 
―Dublin this 28th day of September, 1922.‖ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Dáil Debates, The President‟s Motion-Clause 4, volume 1, cols 926-931 (28 September 
1922). 
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3. Notice Given To O’Connor, McKelvey, Barrett and Mellows 
  
 
7
th. Nov. ‘22. 
 
You             are hereby notified that, being a person taken in arms against 
the Government, you will be executed at 8 a.m. on Friday 8
th
 December as a reprisal for the 
assassination of Brigadier Sean Hales T.D., in Dublin, on the 7
th
 December, on his way to a 
meeting of Dail Eireann and as a solemn warning to those associated [with] you who are engaged 
in a conspiracy of assassination against the representatives of the Irish People.  
 
Signed on Behalf of the Army Council: 
 
      Risteárd Ó Maolchatha    
       
General. 
      Commander in Chief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Notice given to the Mountjoy four, 7 December 1922 (U.C.D. Archives, Mulcahy 
papers, P7/B/85). 
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4. Ministry of Defence Order on 7 March 1932 
 
The Secretary, 
  
(a) Intelligence Reports – including Reports and particulars supplied by Agents and other 
persons. 
(b) Secret Service Vouchers, etc. 
(c) Proceedings of Military Courts, including Committee of Officers. Reports on and 
details of Executions 1922 – 1923 period. 
 
As the above-mentioned documents contain information which may lead – if disclosed to 
unauthorised persons – to loss of life, you are hereby ordered to destroy same by fire, 
extracting therefrom previous to such destructions such particulars as you consider might 
be required hereafter in the conduct of the business of the Department of Defence. 
 
     Deasmhumhain Mac Gearailt 
      MINISTER FOR DEFENCE. 
       7
th
. March, 1932. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Order from the Minister of Defence, Desmond FitzGerald, to his secretary, 7 March 
1932 (U.C.D. Archives, Andrew papers, P91/86 (20)). 
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5. Response To The ‘Murder Bill’ 
 
OGLAIGH NA hEIREANN. 
(Irish Republican Army). 
 
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, 
DUBLIN. 30
th 
November, 1922. 
 
GENERAL ORDER. 
 
To: O/C., All Battalions. 
―ENEMY MURDER BILL‖. 
1. All members of Provisional ―Parliament‖ who were present and voted for murder Bill 
will be shot at sight. Attached find list of names. 
 
2. Houses of members of Murder Bill, Murder Gang and active supporters of P.G. who 
are known to support Murder Bill decision will be destroyed. 
  
3. All Free State Army Officers who approve of Murder Bill and aggressive 
(misspelling) and active against our Forces will be shot at sight; also all ex-British 
Army Officers and men who joined the Free State Army since the 6
th
 December, 
1921. 
 
4. Individual action on paragraph 2/3 will be ordered by Brigade O/C. 
 
5. To be duplicated and transmitted to O/C., all Units. 
 
CHIEF OF STAFF. 
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NOTE:      On day of first execution an Order to shoot at sight members of P.G. was issued in 
Dublin ½ Brigade, since an opportunity was not got to put same into effect. 
 
 
LIST OF MEMBERS OF P.G. PARLIAMENT 
WHO VOTED FOR MURDER BILL. 
 
 
W.T. Cosgrave      F. Bulfin 
Walter Cole       William Seers 
John Dineen       Richard Hayes (Doctor) 
Sean Hayes       D.J. Gorey 
J. J. Walsh       Sean Milroy 
P. J. Ward       Michael Hennessy 
Desmond FitzGerald      Liam De Roiste 
Seumas Derham      Patrick McGoldrick 
Richard Mulcahy      Darrell Figgis 
Michael Staines      John Rooney 
Daniel McCarthy      Sean McGarry 
E. Alton       Phillip Cosgrove 
Gerald Fitzgibbon      Joe McGrath 
Eoin McNeill       Dr. Myles Keogh 
Padraig O‘Maille      Sir James Craig 
George Nicholls      W. Thrift 
James Crowley      Prof. W. Magennis 
Richard Wislon      Joseph Whelehan 
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James. N. Dolan      Piaras Beasley 
William Hayes      Christopher Byrne 
Sean McKeon       Kevin O‘Higgins 
James Murphy      Frank McGennis 
Ernest Blythe       Eamon Duggan 
Doctor J. Byrne      Peter Hughes 
D. Vaughan       Thomas O‘Donnell 
T. Carter       Doctor V. White 
Andrew Lavin       James Bourke 
Alec. McCabe       Michl. Doyle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Irregulars‘ response to the ‗Murder Bill‘, 30 November 1922 (U.C.D. Archives, 
Mulcahy papers, P7a/83). 
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6. Liam Deasy’s Circular Appeal For Peace on 18 January 1923 
 
Previous to my arrest, I had decided to advocate a termination of the present hostilities. My 
principal reason was based on the grounds that the National position was decreasing in strength, 
rather than increasing; as a result, not so much as the actual fighting, but primarily because of the 
particular side phases that had arisen, and were being concentrated on, vis., the executions and 
what has followed as a result. That the latter phase would develop and become more intense, I 
had not the slightest doubt, and to avoid our country and people being reduced to such a state, I 
am prepared to advocate a cessation on lines that would mean a temporary setting aside of the 
attainment of our ideals.  
 
My arrest prevented me carrying out my intentions, and it was not until I saw the development of 
a campaign above referred to; vis., taking people as hostages because of the acts of their sons and 
brothers, that I decided to ascertain the extent to which I might go in taking action inside.  
 
In considering the whole position, there are a few matters I will put before you all, and asked that 
they be carefully weighed before making your decision:-  
 
(a) The increasing strength of the F.S. Army as evidenced by the present response to the 
recruiting appeal. 
(b) The decrease in strength [...] of the I.R.A. consequent on the recent numerous arrests. 
(c) The entirely defensive position of our units in many areas, and the general decreasing 
in fighting. 
(d) The ―War Weariness‖ so apparent in many areas. 
(e) The increasing support of the F.S. Government, consequent on our failure to combat 
the false propaganda. 
(f) The serious situation which the Executions have created; Reprisals, Counter-reprisals 
etc.  
 
Regarding  (a): Undoubtedly the increase is due to unemployment, but then a War like the 
present will only make for more unemployment; in other words, more fodder for the battlefield. 
  (b): In many areas we are confined to the numbers at present under arms and 
instances of arms being dumped for want of men are not rare. More serious is the loss of fighting 
Officers. 
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  (c): Protection of small columns by road blocking etc. and the impeding of 
Railway traffic is the general rule. Ambushing, town fighting, etc. is so very isolated that its 
effect on the general situation is nil.  
  (d): This is apparent in the South and not confined to the rank and file, but also 
among the Senior Officers of certain of our best Brigades. 
  (e): Comment is needless. This may not be support, but at any rate propaganda 
has alienated a big percentage of genuine separatists from us. 
  (f):   This calls for more serious consideration than the others. There is nothing to 
prevent the Government from continuing and naturally reprisals will follow; so will counter-
reprisals. Then we will have arrived at a point where the war will be waged by both sides against 
the people, in some cases against active people, but in the majority non-combatants, whose only 
crime is having a son or brother in either Army, will suffer. Family against family will be forced 
to fight in defence, until the losses on both sides will be so great, some other power, probably 
England, will be called to intervene, and possibly will be welcomed with more enthusiasm that 
was displayed at her departure.  By this phase we gradually forget the National position – it must 
be so in a death struggle of this kind. At whatever the sacrifice, we must prevent such 
happenings, if the position of Ireland supreme is maintained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Liam Deasy‘s circular appeal to de Valera, 18 January 1923 (U.C.D. Archives, de 
Valera papers, P150/1697). 
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7. Orders Of The Day 
 
24
th
 May 1923. 
 
Comrades: 
 The arms with which we have fought the enemies of our country are to be dumped. The 
foreign and domestic enemies of the Republic have for the moment prevailed. 
 But our enemies have not won. Neither tortures or firing squads, nor a slavish press can 
crush the desire for Independence out of the hearts of those who fought for the Republic or out of 
the hearts of our people. 
 
Frank Aiken, Chief of Staff. 
 
Soldiers of Liberty – Legion of the Rearguard: 
 
 The Republic can no longer be defended successfully by your arms. Further sacrifices on 
your part would now be in vain and continuance of the struggle in arms unwise in the national 
interest. 
 Military victory must be allowed to rest for the moment with these who have destroyed 
the Republic. Other means must be sought to safeguard the nation‘s right. 
 
Eamon de Valera. 
 
Source: Orders of the day, 24 May 1923 (N.L.I., Archives, Ms. 35, 262/2). 
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8. Statistical Analysis 
a) Percentage Executions Per County 
County Quantity % of Total 
      
Carlow 1 1.23 
Clare 3 3.70 
Cork 1 1.23 
Donegal 4 4.94 
Dublin 18 22.22 
Galway 8 9.88 
Kerry 7 8.64 
Kildare 7 8.64 
Kilkenny 2 2.47 
Limerick 2 2.60 
Laois 3 3.75 
Louth 6 7.41 
Offaly 3 3.70 
Tipperary 4 4.94 
Waterford 2 2.47 
Westmeath 7 8.64 
Wexford 3 3.70 
Total 81 100 
 Average                 4.76 
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b) Executions In Kildare 
Name Place of Execution County of Execution Date of Execution 
Stephen White Curragh Camp Kildare 19/12/1922 
Joseph Johnston Curragh Camp Kildare 19/12/1922 
Patrick Mangan Curragh Camp Kildare 19/12/1922 
Patrick Nolan Curragh Camp Kildare 19/12/1922 
Brian Moore Curragh Camp Kildare 19/12/1922 
James O'Connor Curragh Camp Kildare 19/12/1922 
Patrick Bagnel Curragh Camp Kildare 19/12/1922 
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c) Executions Per Month 
Month No. of Executions 
November 1922 8 
December 1922 13 
January     1923 34 
February   1923 1 
March       1923 11 
April         1923 10 
May          1923 4 
    
Total 81 
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d) Provincial Executions 
Province Quantity 
Connaught 8 
Leinster 50 
Munster 19 
Ulster 4 
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9. Republican Plot at Glasnevin Cemetery. 
 
a) Republican Plot Plaque 
 
 
b) Peter Cassidy and Joseph Spooner. 
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c) John Gaffney and Patrick Farrelly 
 
 
 
d) John Murphy, James O‘Rourke and Erskine Childers 
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e) Richard Twohig, James Fisher and Rory O‘Connor  
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10. Civil War executions memorial in the Market Square, Kildare Town. 
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11.  Anti-treatyite propaganda used in the 1923 General Election 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ‗Irish Elections 1923‘, viewed on Prints-Online website, available at: http://www.prints-
online.com/pictures_621450/irish-elections-1923.html [4 March 2011] 
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12.  ‘Monster Demonstration’ advertisement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Irish Independent (8 Dec. 1923) 
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